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Thesis Abstract 
In this thesis, I will examine various methods of argument used for and against 
euthanasia by Christian,  Islamic and secular ethicists. Overall, this  is intended to 
examine the role of faith-specific or tradition-specific assumptions and sources in 
shaping the stance on euthanasia that is taken by  certain Western Christian thinkers  
and scholars in Islamic Medical Ethics. Following an initial overview of some of the 
central concerns of the thesis in the introduction (Chapter I), I will look at a range of 
select Western Christian perspectives (Chapter II) and certain Western and Eastern 
Islamic perspectives (Chapter III) on euthanasia.  In these chapters, I will investigate 
how various sources are used by particular Western Christian and  Islamic scholars to 
formulate their perspective for or against euthanasia.  In Chapter IV, I will compare the 
approaches of these Western Christian and Islamic ethicists to determine points of 
overlap and distinction. Based on this comparison, it may be contended that the 
Western Christian literature on euthanasia is in some respects more developed than 
the Islamic literature. Chapter V will take account of some of the types of argument 
that are found in the Christian literature but for which there is at present no fully 
developed counterpart in Sunni Islamic literature.  For example, the notion of 
respecting the elderly, as it specifically relates to opposing euthanasia, is discussed in 
the Western Christian ethics literature reviewed, but is not considered at least in 
Islamic Medical Ethics sources examined in this thesis. On this basis, Chapter V will 
offer an expanded Western Sunni Islamic perspective on euthanasia, which engages 
with strategies of argument drawn from the Western Christian literature, so providing 
a contribution to the literature in the developing discipline of Islamic medical ethics.  
The conclusion to the study will identify the possibilities and nature of dialogue on this 
issue between faiths, and between monotheistic and other ethical perspectives.  So a 
secondary objective is to examine the possibility of convergence of thought among 
Christians and Muslims not just on medical ethical issues, but on a range of further 
issues from a Western point-of-view.  In this way, the thesis also aims to make a 
broader contribution to interfaith dialogue as well as the study of method in ethics 
directed toward a Western audience.
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Chapter I: Terms, Issues and Positions in the Euthanasia Debate 
The fundamental purpose of this thesis is to develop an expanded Western Sunni Islamic 
account of euthanasia by bringing the established Islamic literature on euthanasia into 
stronger dialogue with the Western moral philosophical literature on euthanasia and also the 
literature in Western Christian ethics on euthanasia.  By adopting this comparative 
perspective, the thesis aims to bring some central themes in the Islamic literature on 
euthanasia into clearer focus by reading them through the lenses provided by the Western 
philosophical and Western Christian literature. The study also aims to extend the Islamic 
literature on euthanasia by, for example, considering whether strategies similar to those 
employed in the Western Christian and philosophical literature can also be developed in 
Islamic terms. For example, the ideal of respect of the body is used in the Western Christian 
ethics literature to make a case against euthanasia, and in this thesis we shall consider 
whether a similar case can be constructed in Islamic terms. Such an approach can help to 
strengthen the interfaith and intra-faith dialogue on medical ethical and other issues, as well 
as the dialogue between monotheistic and secular traditions at least from a Western 
perspective (or for Western audiences). 
The purpose of Chapter I is to set the scene for the later chapters by presenting an 
initial overview of some of the central concerns of the thesis.  This overview will cover: 1) 
terms and definitions of euthanasia, 2) focal issues in the debate and 3) the range of ethical 
positions in the debate.   
Euthanasia derives from a Greek term meaning ‘easy or gentle death,’ and is generally 
defined by religious and secular scholars as the intentional hastening of an individual’s death 
mainly in terminal medical cases, or cases of serious, chronic pain which cannot be relieved by 
conventional means.1  However, although John Finnis presents a similar account of the 
meaning of euthanasia, he also contends that ‘the term euthanasia has no generally accepted 
and philosophically warranted core of meaning.’2 There are two major forms of euthanasia 
with related subtypes.  The first major form is called active euthanasia, sometimes termed 
‘mercy killing,’ which involves an agent like a health-care professional who provides and 
administers a lethal dose of some substance by means of pills, gas or injection to terminate the 
                                                          
1 Albert Jonsen, Mark Siegler, William J. Winsdale, Clinical Ethics: A Practical Approach to Ethical Decisions in Clinical Medicine,  
fifth edition, (New York: McGraw Hill, 2002), p. 137; Thomas Wood, A Dictionary of Christian Ethics, edited by John Macquarrie, 
Euthanasia (SCM Press, 1967), p. 119; Helga Kuhse, A Companion to Ethics (Blackwell Reference, 1993), p. 294; Jonathan Glover, 
Causing Death and Saving Lives (London: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 182. 
2 John Finnis, ‘A Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia,’ in Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives, Edited by 
John Keown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 23.   
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patient’s life.3  Physician-assisted suicide (PAS) may be considered a form of active euthanasia 
which similarly involves an agent providing lethal means, but here the patient administers it 
themselves by ingestion, inhalation or injection.4  Currently, the Netherlands permits both 
active euthanasia and PAS whereas Switzerland (e.g. Dignitas clinic) and the American state of 
Oregon, for example, only allow PAS.5 
Some relevant subtypes of active euthanasia may also be considered by reference to 
different accounts of the patient’s ‘will’ in such cases.  For example, voluntary active 
euthanasia (VAE) also known as ‘aid-in-dying’ generally must involve a competent patient’s 
consent to euthanasia, in most cases both verbal and written.6  However, for Mary Warnock 
and Elisabeth Macdonald, the standard conception of ‘voluntary’ does not adequately 
underscore what they more forcefully describe as the ‘passionate wish to die.’7  They claim 
that this passion which is present in those who want to die indicates not only consent, but also 
an emphatic ‘begging to die.’ 8  Therefore, they recommend that ‘voluntary’ should be 
substituted with ‘asked for,’ ‘requested’ or ‘chosen.’9  Like other proponents of euthanasia, 
Warnock and Macdonald emphasize upholding patient autonomy and independence.   
A second subtype involves a non-voluntary form of euthanasia (NVE) in which the 
patient is unable to give consent or communicate their request due to incompetence or 
mental incapacitation (e.g. a severely deformed newborn, or one suffering from dementia, a 
persistent vegetative state (PVS) or brain death).10  In these cases, some scholars argue NVE 
may be justified on the basis of a professional paternalistic judgment that the patient would 
not want to continue (suffering) in their present condition.11  However, other scholars believe 
euthanasia is permissible only when the (adult) patient clearly communicates their will at 
some earlier time (e.g. in the form of a living will or advanced directive) when they were alert 
and competent.12  While mental illness like depression may impair judgment, some argue it 
need not imply incompetence or require paternalism in all cases.13 For example, Warnock 
argues that the request(s) of a depressed patient to end suffering in incurable mental illnesses 
                                                          
3 Kuhse, A Companion to Ethics, p. 296; Bernard Lo, Resolving Ethical Dilemmas, A Guide for Clinicians (Lippincott Williams and 
Wilkins, 2000), page 156.   
4 Lo, Resolving Ethical Dilemmas, A Guide for Clinicians, p. 156; Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 
157. 
5 Mary Warnock and Elisabeth Macdonald, Easeful Death: Is there a case for assisted dying? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), p. 16.    
6  Jonsen et al., Clinical Ethics, p. 138.  
7 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 18.    
8 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 18.    
9 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 18.   
10 Kuhse, A Companion to Ethics, p. 295; Neil Messer, SCM Study Guide to Christian Ethics, “Duty, Consequences and Christian 
Ethics” (Hymns Ancient & Modern Ltd, 2006), p. 83. 
11 Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, p. 192. 
12 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 51.    
13 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 22.    
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may be considered in order to avoid desperate attempts at suicide.14  On the other hand, in 
some cases of mental incapacitation, NVE may be unnecessary since the patient may be 
considered ‘clinically dead.’  Some consider the 1989 UK case of PVS patient Anthony Bland an 
example of this scenario.  Anthony Bland, 17, suffered severe brain damage after the 
Hillsborough Football Stadium disaster in April 1989.  He was in a PVS, a condition in which the 
higher centres of the brain are destroyed.  In 1993, his parents requested a High Court to 
withdraw his ‘futile’ artificial nutrition and hydration and the High Court agreed.Still, there are 
important questions: How and when, if ever, does one assess that a patient’s life is not ‘worth’ 
living to defend killing them without their consent?  Who should make this assessment or 
decision?  How should ‘worth’ or ‘value’ be defined?  The last subtype is involuntary 
euthanasia (IE) which entails deliberate termination of life against the patient’s wishes.15  
Almost all scholars reject IE, though Jonathan Glover has suggested that IE may be remotely 
conceivable if one can accurately predict that the patient would experience a horrible future. 16       
Based on these definitions, euthanasia may be distinguished from suicide since in the 
latter case a person need not require support or knowledge of another to terminate their own 
life.  This difference is relevant in the UK paralysis case of Daniel James who attempted suicide 
three times before going to Dignitas for PAS in 2007.17  Similarly, Warnock argues that since 
Diane Pretty had difficulty terminating her life independently due to motor neuron disease, 
either VAE or PAS may have been appropriate. 18  On the grounds that either option involves 
honouring a patient’s autonomy and preserving their dignity, Warnock opposes a moral 
distinction between VAE and PAS.19  These cases also encourage organizations like Dignity in 
Dying to push for changes in UK euthanasia laws to prevent individuals from committing 
suicide ‘underground’ out of desperation or travelling abroad, which Pretty considered and 
James did.20   And according to the 2006 Dignity in Dying Report, close to eighty per cent of the 
general population also supports legislative changes.21  Although it was rejected, these 
concerns were reflected in the 2006 UK Bill titled ‘Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill’ tabled 
by Lord Joel Joffe, which aimed at legalizing at least PAS for competent patients with terminal 
                                                          
14 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 22.    
15 Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, p. 191.  
16 Tom Beauchamp and LeRoy Walters, Contemporary Issues in Bioethics, Fifth Edition (Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1999), 
page 274; Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, p. 191 
17BBC News, “Paralyzed player killed himself,” BBC News, 10th December 2008, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/hereford/worcs/7774802.stm> (accessed 13 January 2009).  
18 Mary Warnock and Elisabeth Macdonald, Easeful Death, page 16; BBC News “Britons who choose assisted suicide,” BBC News, 
24th January 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4643802.stm> (accessed 16 May 2010) 
19 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. xiii   
20CNN News, “British couple die at assisted suicide clinic,” CNN News/Europe on the Web, 6th March 2009,  
<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/03/06/uk.assisted.suicide/index.html> (accessed 17th February 2010); BBC News, 
“Family ‘respect’ woman’s decision,” in BBC News,  24th January 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4643738.stm> 
(accessed 26 June 2009); BBC News, “No charges over assisted suicide,” BBC News,  9th December 2008, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/hereford/worcs/7773540.stm> (accessed 26 January 2009); Dignity in Dying 
Report, Dignity in Dying Online, February 2006, <www.dignityindying.org> (accessed 14 February 2011).  
21 Dignity in Dying Report, February 2006, <www.dignityindying.org> (accessed 14th February 2011) 
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illnesses like Pretty.22  However, the UK 1961 Suicide Act currently prohibits all forms of 
assisted suicide with a penalty of up to 14 years’ imprisonment if found guilty.23     
Another, more widely debated, form of euthanasia is ‘passive’ euthanasia (PE).  
According to most religious and secular interpretations, PE may also involve paternalism or a 
best interest-type decision to withdraw or withhold treatment that no longer provides benefit 
to ‘let die’ or ‘allow death’ to occur.24  On one interpretation of PE, it involves ‘not doing 
anything’ to cause a patient’s death and leaving the underlying disease to cause death.  This 
view is supported by Perrin et al.25  However, this view is rejected by James Rachels on the 
grounds that if one is ‘allowing death to occur,’ then one is ‘doing something.’26  So the first 
part of the debate on this question concerns the extent or nature of an agent’s contribution to 
a patient’s death.  If the patient is conscious, PE may also involve patient autonomy to refuse 
treatment verbally.27  With an unconscious patient, a similar decision or wish may be made 
through an advanced directive (AD) or by a surrogate decision-maker often in collaboration 
with physician recommendation.28  But in cases of no AD like in the case of Anthony Bland, 
who was deemed ‘clinically dead,’ PE is arguably justified as a best-interest action based on the 
2007 UK Mental Capacity Act.29   
A second part of the debate surrounding PE concerns whether some forms of 
treatment are properly deemed ‘extraordinary.’ Rather than being ‘ordinary’ or ‘beneficial,’ 
treatment in cases where PE is advocated is commonly described as ‘futile,’ ‘burdensome’ or 
‘extraordinary.’  For example, Warnock and Macdonald describe as futile treatment that has 
‘no prospect of benefit to the patient,’ and they argue that such treatment should be more 
carefully evaluated to avoid needlessly prolonging life.30 An example of ‘futile’ care was the 
treatment used to artificially sustain Anthony Bland in his PVS.  Further, they associate 
burdensome or extraordinary approaches with ‘heroic’ forms of treatment or treatments that 
                                                          
22 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 16;  BBC News, “Bid to legalize assisted suicide,” BBC News,  20 February 2003, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2782887.stm> (accessed 17 January 2009); Neil Messer, SCM Study Guide to 
Christian Ethics, ‘Duty, Consequences and Christian Ethics,’ (Hymns Ancient & Modern Ltd, 2006), p. 167; Dignity in Dying Report, 
February 2006, <www.dignityindying.org> (accessed 14 February 2011). 
23 BBC News, “Brown against assisted dying law,” BBC News, 30 December 2008, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7804044.stm> (accessed 15 January 2009); BBC News “Euthanasia and the Law,” 
BBC News, 28th November 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/background_briefings/euthanasia/1044740.stm> (accessed 
15 January 2009) 
24 Thomas Mappes and David Grazia, Biomedical Ethics, Fifth Edition (McGraw Hill, 2001), p. 383; Kuhse, A Companion to Ethics, p. 
296; John Bryant, Linda Baggott la Velle and John Searle, Introduction to Bioethics (West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 2005), p. 
209.   
25 Kathleen Perrin, Ouimet Perrin, Caryn A. Sheehan, Mertie L. Potter, Mary K. Kazanowski, Palliative Care Nursing: Caring for 
Suffering Patients (Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2011), p. 102.   
26 James Rachels, ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia,’ in Killing and Letting Die, edited by Bonnie Steinbock and Alastair Norcross (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 1994), p. 117.    
27 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 24.    
28 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 24; John Bryant, Linda Baggott la Velle and John Searle, Introduction to Bioethics, p. 
206.   
29 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 63; Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion (London: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 188.     
30 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 100.    
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are unnecessary or unwarranted.31  Similarly, Bonnie Steinbock describes ‘extraordinary’ 
treatment as having relatively ‘little hope of benefiting the patient’ in a brain damage case.32  
Other glosses on the idea of ‘extraordinary’ treatment, such as that provided by Paul Ramsey, 
represent such treatment as entailing ‘excessive expense, pain, or other inconvenience’ and 
note that such treatments could be experimental or unconventional.33  As we shall see in the 
next section, the important matter for Rachels, Glover and others mainly involves the role of 
consequences in determining whether treatment is ‘extraordinary’ or ‘ordinary’ in each 
specific case.34   
Due to these considerations, a third strand of the debate involves some scholars arguing that 
withdrawing or withholding treatment need not constitute a form of euthanasia.  This practice, 
it is argued, can be different from VAE and PAS because so-called PE need not involve any aim 
to kill or a deliberate intent to terminate life. For example, Luke Bretherton asserts that a case 
of removing life-sustaining treatment that a patient has refused or the physician deems 
ineffective and need not be provided ‘is not necessarily an instance of euthanasia.’35  So while 
some scholars consider withdrawing extraordinary treatment as ‘passive euthanasia,’ other 
scholars consider it a standard or conventionally accepted practice from a medical, spiritual 
and economic viewpoint.36 As in the Anthony Bland case, this view is also seen in the 1989 U.S. 
case of PVS patient Nancy Cruzan.  After many legal battles, it was determined that life support 
should be removed due to her irreversible state.  Other scholars, as we will see next, argue 
that there is no moral difference between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ euthanasia since the intention 
and outcome may be the same in both cases.Killing versus Letting Die: A Morally Significant 
Difference? 
Most countries draw a legal distinction between ‘active’ euthanasia, which is often described 
as intentional killing, and ‘passive’ euthanasia or ‘letting’ or ‘allowing’ a patient to die.  
However, the debate continues over whether a moral difference exists.  It seems this debate is 
based on questions of aim, consequence and different understandings of traditional 
euthanasia terms.  Possible misinterpretation or ambiguity on these matters may cause 
doctors to be guarded about withdrawing treatment because of the risk that this will be 
                                                          
31 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 100.    
32 Bonnie Steinbock, ‘The Intentional Termination of Life,’ in Killing and Letting Die, edited by Bonnie Steinbock and Alastair 
Norcross, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994), p. 124.    
33 Thomas Sullivan, ‘Active Euthanasia: An Impertinent Distinction?,’ in Killing and Letting Die, edited by Bonnie Steinbock and 
Alastair Norcross, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994), p. 135.     
34 James Rachels, ‘Impertinent Distinctions and Defence of Active Euthanasia,’ in Killing and Letting Die, edited by Bonnie 
Steinbock and Alastair Norcross, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994), p. 143; Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving 
Lives, p. 196.  
35 Luke Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness: Christian Witness Amid Moral Diversity, (Ashgate Publishing, 2010), p. 164.   
36 Messer, ‘Duty, Consequences and Christian Ethics,’ p. 83; Perrin et al., Palliative Care Nursing, p. 102.   
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construed from a legal point of view as intentional killing or murder.37  Similarly, there may be 
further confusion and controversy when laws are applied in individual euthanasia cases.  For 
instance, similar to the case of Diane Pretty, in 2008, UK multiple sclerosis patient Debbie 
Purdy requested clarification of the assisted-suicide laws to establish whether her husband 
would be prosecuted if he accompanied her to Dignitas.38  The existence of multiple 
interpretations suggests the need for greater clarity of terms and intention, which may lead to 
less disagreement on the need for reform of euthanasia laws.  We will now examine the 
debate over the distinction between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’ as it relates to intention, 
consequences and interpretation of terms, definitions and descriptions.   
On one side of the debate, Warnock, Macdonald and Rachels, among others, contend 
that in general there is no moral difference between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’ because in both 
cases there can be intent to kill, terminate life, or bring about death.  For example, Warnock 
and Macdonald believe that there need be no moral distinction between letting an individual 
die by a horrible death which one could easily prevent and deliberately poisoning him, because 
both options involve some form of agent participation with intent to cause death.39  For 
Warnock and Macdonald, in such situations the intended outcome and consequence of 
terminating life can be the same in each case.  Further, they dispute a common argument that 
letting someone die is ‘less causal’ or morally superior to killing them because there is no 
intent to kill.  Instead, they believe intentional killing need not be viewed as negative in all 
cases, because in some cases it may be better or more merciful than standing by and thereby 
prolonging intolerable suffering.40  Warnock and Macdonald take their position one step 
further to argue that there is no moral difference between VAE and PAS in principle.  Although 
the methods are technically different, the intended outcome in VAE and PAS are the same 
once again, namely, to ‘deliberately bring about the death of [the] patient.’41  Luke Bretherton 
holds a similar view, namely, that there is a ‘practical distinction’ between euthanasia and PAS, 
but no moral distinction.42  And on a similar note, though seemingly less contentiously, some 
scholars believe that there is no moral difference between turning off life-sustaining assistance 
and interrupting futile treatment since both acts will lead to death, but do not deliberately kill 
the patient.43  However, Jonathan Glover favours PAS over VAE because VAE may introduce 
                                                          
37 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 94 
38  BBC News, “Woman loses assisted suicide case,” BBC News, 29th October 2008, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7697200.stm> (accessed 6 December 2008). 
39 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 92.    
40 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 93.    
41 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. xiii   
42 Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness, p. 165.   
43 John Mahoney, Bioethics and Belief: Religion and Medicine in Dialogue (Sheed & Ward, 1984), p. 48-49.   
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doubt as to whether the patient wanted to die as opposed to the patient killing themselves in 
PAS.44  
James Rachels expresses similar views to those of Warnock, Macdonald and Glover.  
Rachels considers two comparable hypothetical scenarios.  In one case, an individual ‘allows’ 
or ‘lets’ another die and, in the other case, an individual kills another.  He contends that in 
these cases, there is no intrinsic difference between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die.’45  Rather, killing 
and letting die can be ‘morally equivalent’ in both cases because the ‘motive’ and outcome 
may be the same.46  As Rachels states, ‘The bare difference between killing and letting die does 
not, in itself, make a moral difference. If a doctor let a patient die, for humane reasons, he is in 
the same moral position as if he had given the patient a lethal injection for humane reasons.’ 47  
However, like Warnock and Macdonald, Rachels believes that in some extreme cases, it is 
‘morally worse’ to extend a person’s suffering needlessly by letting die.48  Rather, it can be 
morally ‘preferable’ and ‘humane’ to deliberately hasten death because the intent to kill need 
not involve harm, but rather alleviation of pain.49  So killing is not in general any ‘worse’ than 
letting die.50   As Rachels states, ‘There may be important moral differences in some cases in 
their consequences, but…these differences may make active euthanasia, and not passive 
euthanasia, the morally preferable option.’ 51 Since both killing and letting die can involve 
intent to terminate life, for Rachels intended outcome and consequence are decisive, so there 
is no deep seated moral distinction between killing and letting die.52    
Others who argue against the distinction between killing and letting die seem to 
interpret the traditional terminology similarly.  For example, Warnock and Macdonald argue 
that the difference between killing and letting die ‘has become blurred’ because turning off a 
respirator may be construed as actively killing. 53  Tom Beauchamp and James Childress 
similarly argue that some actions can be construed as killing and letting die.54  As Beauchamp 
and Childress assert, ‘The distinction between killing and letting die suffers from vagueness 
and moral confusion. The language of killing is so thoroughly confusing—causally, legally and 
morally—that it can provide little if any help in discussions of assistance in dying.’55  On a 
similar note, Craig Patterson and Ruth Putilo believe lack of clear intention may also make it 
                                                          
44 Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, p. 184.   
45 Rachels, ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia,’ in Killing and Letting Die, p. 116.    
46 Rachels, ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia,’ in Killing and Letting Die, p. 116.    
47 Rachels, ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia,’ in Killing and Letting Die, p. 116.    
48 Rachels, ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia,’ in Killing and Letting Die, p. 117.    
49 Rachels, ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia,’ in Killing and Letting Die, p. 113.    
50 Rachels, ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia,’ in Killing and Letting Die, p. 117.     
51 Rachels, ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia,’ in Killing and Letting Die, p. 119.    
52 Rachels, ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia,’ in Killing and Letting Die, p. 112 and p. 116.    
53 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 92.    
54 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, ‘Nonmaleficence,’ in Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Fifth Edition (Oxford University Press, 
2001), p. 140. 
55 Beauchamp and Childress, ‘Nonmaleficence,’ in Principles of Biomedical Ethics, p. 143. 
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difficult to morally distinguish ‘active’ euthanasia from ‘passive’ euthanasia.56  And based on 
his interpretation of the 1973 American Medical Association (AMA) statement on euthanasia,57 
Rachels contends that ‘cessation of extraordinary treatment,’ which may be construed as 
‘letting die’ and is permitted by the AMA, may also be read as ‘intentional termination’ of 
human life.58  However, as we will discuss, Bonnie Steinbock reads the AMA statement as 
prohibiting all forms of euthanasia and disputes Rachels’ view that ‘cessation of extraordinary 
treatment’ implies ‘intentional termination’ or ‘intentionally letting die.’59  However these 
terms are interpreted, it seems the main concern in each interpretation lies with the nature of 
intentions and consequences.   
While the scholars in the previous discussion argue there need be no intrinsic moral 
difference between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die,’ other scholars maintain some sort of distinction.  
This distinction, which is generally based on interpretations of intent to kill versus not 
intending to kill, is often reflected in traditional statements by medical organizations and is in 
line with the current UK legal stance.  These statements prohibit all medical practices that aim 
at causing or bringing about death.  In contrast, they allow practices that ‘let the patient die’ or 
‘allow death’ by removing extraordinary or burdensome treatment, because such responses 
need not involve intent to kill, but rather aim at removing the burden associated with 
treatment.   
For example, when developing her interpretation of the 1973 AMA statement, 
Steinbock argues that ‘intentional termination of life’ implies prohibition of active/passive 
euthanasia and that this is distinct from the ‘cessation…of extraordinary means to prolong life,’ 
which is the only case the AMA allows. 60  She asserts that ‘cessation’ of such treatment does 
not strictly mean intending the patient’s death, but rather acknowledges the right to refuse or 
withhold ‘extraordinary’ treatment to avoid harm.  In most cases, Steinbock believes this is 
morally not the same as, and is not a license for, aiming at death as in VAE or PAS.61  
Furthermore, she disagrees with Warnock, Macdonald and Rachels that a quick and painless 
death may well be morally preferable to a protracted death, because the patient may 
sometimes want to experience suffering.62  Steinbock’s view is interesting because she does 
                                                          
56 Craig Patterson, Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia: A Natural Law Ethics Approach (England: Ashgate, 2008), p. 7; Ruth Putilo, 
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not seem to make a moral distinction between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ euthanasia.  To her, both 
acts involve intent to cause, or hasten, death.  And she does not regard ‘cessation…of 
extraordinary means’ or refusing burdensome treatment as ‘passive’ or any other form of 
euthanasia.  Therefore, Steinbock does not make a moral distinction between VAE and PE.  
Rather, she broadly distinguishes acts that involve intent to cause or bring about death from 
acts that merely ‘allow death to occur.’ 
Thomas Sullivan also supports the idea that ‘killing’ is not morally equivalent to ‘letting 
die’ and he also refers to the AMA statement to refute comments made by Rachels above.  
According to Sullivan, Rachels understands ‘cessation of extraordinary treatment’ as 
‘intentionally terminating life’ by ‘allowing death to occur.’63 Sullivan acknowledges that there 
may be no moral distinction between acts and omissions if the intended outcome in each case 
is death.64  However, he believes that the AMA statement clearly distinguishes acts that 
deliberately cause death by ‘intentionally terminating life’ (e.g. lethal injection or withholding 
‘ordinary’ treatment) from cases of ‘letting die’ by withdrawing extraordinary or burdensome 
treatment, because in these further cases death is foreseen but not intended.65  So, for 
Sullivan, removing ‘extraordinary’ treatment need not imply ‘intentionally terminating life’ or 
involve intent to kill, but rather an intention to remove a burden.  In this way, Sullivan takes 
the statement as an overall ban on any acts or omissions that intend death. 66 As Sullivan 
states, the statement is a ‘prohibition against intentional killing, which includes both direct 
actions and malevolent omissions.’ 67  However, Rachels rejects Sullivan’s idea, and in his 
response to Sullivan, he asserts that intention is ethically irrelevant in assessing whether an act 
is morally right or wrong.68  Although intention may be used to appraise a person’s character 
as good or bad, Rachels believes an act must be judged right or wrong according to reasons for 
or against treatment producing the best overall outcome.69  On this view, there can be no 
fundamental moral distinction between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’ because both have the same 
outcome.   
A second related argument made by Sullivan claims that because the AMA statement 
allows for the discontinuation of ‘extraordinary’ treatment, it implicitly differentiates 
‘extraordinary’ and ‘ordinary’ treatment.70  As stated, Sullivan believes that removing 
‘extraordinary’ treatment is permissible because this act involves removing a burden rather 
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than an intention to kill.  By contrast, removing ‘ordinary’ treatment may imply intent to kill, 
because here there is no burden to be removed.  However, Rachels argues that in addition to 
removing ‘extraordinary’ treatment, it is also permissible to sometimes remove or refuse 
traditional ‘ordinary’ or conventional treatment (e.g. insulin, aspirin) when a patient has, for 
example, terminal cancer or is in PVS.71  Although refusing or removing ‘ordinary’ treatment 
may be construed as ‘intentionally terminating life,’ according to Rachels it is permissible in 
some cases to achieve the best overall outcome.  In this way, Rachels believes that in order to 
call treatment ‘ordinary’ (beneficial) or ‘extraordinary’ (burdensome), one should assess 
‘whether using treatment would be a good thing for the life in question to be [reasonably] 
prolonged’ rather than adhere to traditional definitions.72  So Rachels concludes that ‘it 
appears that the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means does not have the 
significance traditionally attributed to it.’ 73  
The previous discussion has also led other scholars such as Jonathan Glover, Bonnie 
Steinbock and Judith Jarvis Thomson to argue similarly that judgments about whether a 
treatment is ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ ought to be context relative, or determined by the 
details or circumstances of each individual case, since each case is different.74  As Steinbock 
asserts, this process involves providing ‘the most appropriate treatment for that patient at that 
time,’ while Thomson similarly states that ‘cases have to be looked at individually.’ 75 
Another way of framing these issues is in terms of the Doctrine or Principle of Double 
Effect (DDE or PDE).  According to Lawrence E. Johnson, PDE is originally a Christian concept, 
but has been widely accepted by other groups as an idea that can be used in scenarios within, 
and outside of, the context of medicine.76 For example, a woman jumps out of the window of a 
burning high-rise building, with the intention of getting away from the fire, but also knowing 
that jumping may result in death, an unintended but foreseen consequence.77 And in (end-of-
life) medicine, the objective in providing pain relief may be to bring the patient comfort rather 
than to kill, even if death occurs as a second, unintended but foreseen effect.  Similarly, 
withdrawing extraordinary treatment need not involve intention to kill, because death may be 
merely foreseen, and the intended outcome may be just the removal of the burden of 
treatment.  This stance appeals to the DDE which is often referred to in discussions on 
abortion and applied to support the distinction between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ euthanasia.  For 
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example, Neil Messer argues that when extraordinary treatment is withdrawn, the intention 
need not be to bring about death, and the good of relieving pain may outweigh the bad of the 
unintended effect, namely death.  As Messer states:  ‘The doctrine of double effect is that it is 
morally justified for me to do something in order to achieve a good result, even if I can foresee 
that my action will also have an evil consequence, provided that I do not intend the evil and 
that the evil “side effect” will be outweighed by the good I am aiming for.’78  Similarly, Philippa 
Foot concedes DDE may be helpful in some cases to emphasize the intended (positive) 
outcome of relieving pain rather than the (negative) unintended foreseeable consequence.79  
Glover agrees with this notion and asserts that if the intent to relieve pain is argued under the 
premise of DDE, this may make prosecution ‘less likely.’80  Based on these views, it seems that 
the act is assessed by the (positive) intention and not solely by the (negative) outcome or 
consequence that is merely foreseen.  This viewpoint is exemplified in the 2007 case of a 
terminally ill Bristol woman named Kelly Taylor who acknowledged that medication intended 
to relieve her pain could also cause her death even though it was not the primary aim.81   
However, other scholars question the distinction drawn in DDE between an intended 
and unintended outcome.  For example, Warnock and Macdonald acknowledge DDE by citing 
the medication example described above.  However, they argue that DDE ‘carries somewhat 
less weight today’ because it is rare that extremely high doses of life threatening medication 
are needed to maintain pain relief due to advances in palliative care.82 If such high doses were 
to be frequently required, this would suggest that palliative care needs further development.  
A physician who therefore administers this level of medication in these cases, as justification to 
relieve ‘uncontrolled and unendurable’ pain, may actually intend to kill the patient, making 
DDE ‘less persuasive’ in legal settings and morally irrelevant.83 So for Warnock and Macdonald, 
DDE is essentially irrelevant in extreme suffering cases because the intention is in fact to cause 
death.  In these types of case, they insist, physicians have a ‘moral duty’ to intentionally hasten 
the death of those who deem their life not ‘worth’ living, particularly when they are in extreme 
pain, since palliative care may be ineffective in these relatively rare cases.84   
The complex moral debate on ‘killing’ versus ‘letting die’ involves discussion of intent, 
outcome and the interpretation of euthanasia-related terms.  For those who oppose 
euthanasia, the role of intention is typically crucial with the result that some cases of 
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withdrawing treatment do not count as euthanasia.  And for those who favour euthanasia, the 
consequence generally has greater significance, namely, it matters that both killing and letting 
die result in death.  However, both sides of the debate arguably are affected by broad 
disagreement over construal of terms.  These issues can arguably present legal confusion and 
difficulties for euthanasia patients as well as physicians whose actions may be interpreted as 
murder or accessory to murder.85  Therefore, many scholars justifiably urge greater clarity of 
descriptions of terms to produce clearer laws, so physicians may not be held liable for such 
charges, without good reason, and so that patients can make informed decisions.86  
Euthanasia in Practice: Opponents versus Proponents 
The previous section discussed the debate on whether there is a moral difference between 
‘killing’ and ‘letting die’ by examining intention, outcome and interpretation of terms and 
definitions.  From this examination, it may be broadly inferred that those who argue for no 
distinction seem to favour (the legalization of) VAE and PAS at least in principle.  However, 
those who argue for a distinction will argue against legalization as a matter of principle, while 
thinking it is permissible to withdraw or withhold extraordinary treatment.  In this section, we 
will explore some common concepts and arguments that are often presented to either oppose 
or support VAE and PAS in terminal or suffering cases.  It is interesting to note how some 
common concepts and terms may be interpreted differently by each side.  This section may 
also serve as a preview to the forthcoming discussion in Chapters II and III.  Let us first present 
the view of those opposed to euthanasia. 
Among those who oppose legalizing VAE and PAS are scholars, health care 
professionals, religious leaders, politicians, representatives of palliative care associations and 
ordinary citizens.  So it is evident that opposition to euthanasia reflects considerations drawn 
from a range of sources, including religion, medicine and society.   
For example, some may oppose legalization based on religious principles, common 
among Christians, Muslims and Jews, involving the value of human life, the importance of its 
protection and God’s ownership or control over life and death.  Some opponents argue 
euthanasia can be interpreted as a form of, or is morally equivalent to, suicide, which is 
forbidden in many religious traditions.87  Euthanasia is also deemed contrary to many religious 
traditions because it involves taking control of, or choosing, when one will die.88  The idea of 
control and choice is related to autonomy, which some opponents argue ought to be limited 
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when it comes to decisions or actions that aim to terminate or harm human life.  Terminating 
or harming life may also be linked to the idea of sanctity or sacredness of human life, which is 
arguably degraded by these actions.  The idea of life as sacred is based on the notion that since 
humans are created by God, their lives are sacred or sacrosanct regardless of condition.89  A 
similar understanding maintains that human life is a ‘gift’ or a ‘loan’ from God, a view which 
may also be invoked to oppose euthanasia.90 
However, other scholars believe ‘sacred’ or ‘sacrosanct’ may not be appropriate terms 
to describe human life.91  Some believe that thinking of human life as sacred may imply that it 
has an ‘absolute or infinite quality.’ 92  And for others, the terms may be applied only to those 
of sufficient mental capacity or who are fully conscious as opposed to leading a merely 
‘biological’ life.93  Therefore, some scholars propose that ‘respect,’ ‘dignity,’ and 
‘worthwhileness’ may be more appropriate terms.94  Regardless of how human life is described 
though, on standard monotheistic views humans are endowed by God with responsibility or 
stewardship to preserve and care for their life, the lives of others and their environment.95  
Further, some opponents believe the sufferer should also attempt to understand the purpose 
and ‘value of suffering,’ if any, and endure it with patience, perseverance and trust in God.96 
A second way of opposing legalization may come from a medical perspective and from 
pro-life organizations like ‘Care Not Killing’ and ‘National Council for Palliative Care.’97  Some 
contend that allowing VAE and PAS will corrode and negate or violate the fundamental values 
or standards of the medical profession based on Hippocratic principles of providing comfort, 
avoiding harm and reasonably prolonging life.98  Moreover, killing would arguably not only 
degrade the image of the medical establishment of the Western tradition and portray 
physicians as executioners, but would also destabilize the medical profession’s promotion of 
health, longevity and welfare for society.99  In this way, the medical establishment’s adoption 
of euthanasia may be linked to potential social consequences.  This may include what is 
termed by many scholars as the ‘slippery slope phenomenon,’ which suggests that if VAE and 
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PAS are legalized, then physicians may also engage in IE and NVE.  This slide may involve the 
killing of those who are deemed weak, vulnerable, mentally ill, a burden to society or the 
health system or those who may restrict the freedom of others, as suggested in two 
Netherland euthanasia studies.100  Similarly, those who think they may be a burden upon 
society may be more likely to consider VAE and PAS if euthanasia is legalized.  And Meilaender 
believes that if autonomy is a powerful argument for euthanasia, then killing need not be 
restricted to only those who are ‘suffering greatly’ thereby increasing the ‘class of candidates’ 
for euthanasia.101  Instead, opponents contend society has responsibility to care for the weak 
and vulnerable rather than favouring a culture of individualism.102 
For these reasons, among others, opponents resist changes to UK laws that currently 
prohibit VAE and PAS.  As an alternative, they generally favour palliative options like hospice 
care which aim at comprehensive end of life support.103  This support involves treating the 
‘whole person’ implying the physical, emotional, psychological and spiritual needs of the 
patient as well as including the family and patient in medical decisions.104  Opponents believe 
this type of alternative is the best way of respecting human life and expressing mercy and 
compassion for those who suffer.  In fact, evidence suggests that hospice care can be effective 
in ’99 per cent’ of terminal and suffering cases and can provide a reasonable quality of life to 
the remaining one percent.105 Still, even some proponents argue that if better palliative care is 
available to deal with the remaining one percent of rare cases of intolerable suffering, it may 
decrease or eliminate the need for VAE and PAS.106 
However, until that time, proponents of VAE and PAS will continue to argue for its 
legalization or changes in UK law.  Some favour at least an interim change in the law to assist 
only competent patients like Diane Pretty who seriously wish to die in their terminal or 
suffering conditions and who cannot travel abroad or commit suicide.107  This suggests 
euthanasia may be the last option following an unsuccessful suicide attempt(s) or ineffective 
palliative care.  Proponents acknowledge one does not currently have a legal right to 
deliberately terminate another human life, but they strongly believe that the law should be 
changed as one has a moral right to termination in terminal or suffering cases.108  Further, if 
one has the right to refuse non-beneficial treatment or the right to live, then one should also 
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have the right to die.109  Based on this idea, while opponents argue autonomy does not justify 
euthanasia, proponents favour less constrained autonomy, which may include the freely 
chosen decision for VAE or PAS (or whatever one desires).110  To stop a person from fulfilling 
this preference is construed by some as ‘overriding’ or a ‘denial’ of autonomy.111  So for some 
proponents, autonomy may be defined as ‘making one’s laws [and] adopting one’s own 
principles.’112  And it seems that, by contrast with the opponent’s view, these laws and 
principles are to be defined without reference to how they would affect the broader society.   
The loss of independence may be another motive for VAE and PAS.  Some proponents 
argue one may wish to hasten death because one’s condition has required one to be 
dependent on others and this may also include loss of control to make decisions, plans, etc.113  
These changes are interpreted by some as involving a ‘loss of dignity and control.’ 114 This may 
be because life has been reduced to mere ‘biological’ life by suffering or disease.115  For 
proponents, rather than merely ‘being alive,’ it is physical and mental capabilities, freedom, 
control, desires, goals, etc. that give human life its ‘inviolability,’ ‘worthwhileness’ or ‘sacred’ 
or ‘intrinsic’ value.116  Another interpretation suggests human life has ‘sacred’ or ‘personal 
value’ because it is a ‘special’ product of natural creation, rather than because it is ‘made in 
the image of God.’117  But a life that has lost its ‘sacredness’ implies a life not worth living or 
not worth preserving.118  Therefore, instead of palliative care, VAE or PAS by a ‘decent and 
generous person’ are appropriate responses in these cases and compassionate expressions of 
a respect for life, so relief of pain should be an appropriate medical duty.119 Would a merciful 
God or a merciful person want an individual or even an animal to endure prolonged 
suffering?120  Some proponents use a form of Kant’s Categorical Imperative to argue for a 
painless death over a prolonged painful death because we or God would presumably not 
choose the latter for us.121 Due to these reasons in part, recent evidence suggests that ‘about 
half’ of UK physicians favour a change in current euthanasia laws while sixty two per cent of 
                                                          
109 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 5; Gula, ‘Medical Ethics,’ p. 279; Dignity in Dying Report, February 2006, 
<www.dignityindying.org> (accessed 14th February 2011). 
110 Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, p. 80; Putilo, Ethical Dimensions in the Health Professions, p. 228; Dworkin, Life’s 
Dominion, p. 190; Bryant et al., Introduction to Bioethics, p. 203; Jonsen et al., Clinical Ethics, p. 140.  
111 Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, p. 177 and 184. 
112 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 14.    
113 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 8.    
114 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 9; Dworkin, Life’s Dominion, p. 210.  
115 Dworkin, Life’s Dominion, p. 201; Nigel Biggar, Aiming to Kill: The Ethics of Suicide and Euthanasia (London: Darton, Longman & 
Todd, 2004), p. 56.   
116 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 9, 70 and 88; Rachels, ‘Impertinent Distinctions and Defence of Active Euthanasia,’ 
in Killing and Letting Die, p. 146; Dworkin, Life’s Dominion, p.82, 195 and 235.      
117 Dworkin, Life’s Dominion, p. 82 and 195.   
118 Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, p. 197. 
119 Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, p. 200; Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 10; Kuhse, A Companion to Ethics, p. 
294; Rachels, ‘Impertinent Distinctions and Defence of Active Euthanasia,’ in Killing and Letting Die, p. 146; Jonsen et al., Clinical 
Ethics, p. 138.     
120 Flynn, Issues in Health Care Ethics, p. 207; Neil Messer, ‘Duty,….,’ page 88; Bryant et al., p. 203.   
121 Rachels, ‘Impertinent Distinctions and Defence of Active Euthanasia,’ in Killing and Letting Die, p. 152.      
20 
 
physicians may have administered pain relieving drugs with an intent to hasten death, 
according to a recent poll.122  
Secular interpretations of ‘sacred’ by proponents of euthanasia clearly indicate it is not 
exclusively a religious term.  Alternatively, some proponents interpret ‘sacred’ as a vague 
notion that may be abandoned especially if it is taken to apply even to mere ‘biological’ life.123  
On the other hand, a few advocates of euthanasia also seem to have a misunderstanding of 
what the notion means from a religious viewpoint.  Some proponents interpret the idea that 
life is ‘sacred’ as meaning that life has an ‘absolute and overriding value’ and should be 
preserved ‘at all costs.’124  While this attitude may be found in some conservative religious 
sects, it may not be the most commonly accepted interpretation, as explained previously.   For 
example, as we will see in Chapter II, Pope John Paul II (d. 2005) believes that although human 
life has unconditional value, this value is not absolute and life should not be preserved in all 
conditions.125  Proponents also seem to interpret other religious-based terms differently.  For 
example, opponents may construe human life as a ‘gift’ or a ‘loan’ from God, the owner of 
human life.  However, proponents argue that if human life is a ‘gift,’ then as the recipient or 
the new owner of the gift, I can choose to do whatever I want with it and God forfeits any 
rights He had over that gift.126 R.M. Hayden Lemmons believes that those who support suicide 
and PAS view the body as an instrument or a disposable appendage, especially in cases of 
intense and continuous physical suffering, so ownership of one’s body means that one can 
choose at any time to detach oneself or one’s body.127 More about the body and euthanasia 
will be discussed in Michael Banner’s perspective forthcoming.  
Warnock and Macdonald make an interesting claim that opponents who use the 
sanctity of life principle also seem to endorse pragmatic arguments involving the potential 
effect(s) legalization will have on society.128  For example, it is said that legalization may 
pressure the weak or those who are deemed a burden on society to consider euthanasia 
thereby diminishing the respect which is accorded to human life.  And even if euthanasia is at 
first strictly voluntary, it may potentially slide into IE or NVE, practices which are reminiscent of 
the Nazi era.  Moreover, legalization may erode the relationship between society and the 
medical establishment.  However, some proponents dispute these effects.  First, some believe 
                                                          
122 Bryant et al., Introduction to Bioethics, p. 203; Dignity in Dying Report, February 2006, <www.dignityindying.org> (accessed 14th 
February 2011).  
123 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 72; Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, p. 138. 
124 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 67, 70 and 74.    
125 Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, 25 March 1995, Section 47 and 65, 
<http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html> 
(accessed 23 February 2009) 
126 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, page 69 Neil Messer, ‘Duty, Consequences and Christian Ethics,’ p. 87.  
127 R.M. Hayden Lemmons, ‘Compassion and Personalism of American Jurisprudence: Bioethical Entailments,’ in Bioethics with 
Liberty and Justice: Themes in the Work of Joseph M. Boyle, edited by Christopher Tollefsen (Springer, 2010): p. 64.   
128Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 75.    
21 
 
if euthanasia is kept strictly voluntary and by consent for competent patients only, then it is 
unlikely a slide will occur because euthanasia could not be justified in other cases.129  Second, 
since Nazi practices did not involve consent but rather mass extermination, this case is entirely 
different from voluntary euthanasia.130  Third, while in most cases persons are not considered 
a burden to society, some proponents concede that in some rare cases voluntary euthanasia 
may be justified to relieve the ‘great’ burden patients may place on others.131  Such a death 
may even be seen as an ‘admirable’ or ‘altruistic’ act.132  Fourth, if palliative care became more 
advanced to relieve intolerable suffering, then it is possible euthanasia may be eliminated.133  
But since palliative care cannot completely relieve all forms of extreme suffering, proponents 
support at least an interim change in the law to allow at least PAS.134 This change may also 
allow society to better gauge the social consequences.135              
In this chapter, we have broadly discussed the terms and definitions of euthanasia 
along with the ethical positions in the debate.  The objective of this chapter was to present an 
overview of some of the central concerns of this thesis, to provide the reader with an initial 
orientation for the discussion which follows.  In the next chapter, we will examine different 
Western Christian perspectives on euthanasia and focus on the methods these Christian 
ethicists use to formulate their standpoint.
                                                          
129 Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, p. 186; Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 77, 81 and 84; Dignity in Dying 
Report, Dignity in Dying Report, February 2006, <www.dignityindying.org> (accessed 14th February 2011).   
130 Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, p. 186; Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 186. 
131 Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, p. 187; Dignity in Dying Report, February 2006, <www.dignityindying.org> (accessed 
14th February 2011) 
132 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 83.    
133 Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, p. 187. 
134 Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, p. 188. 
135 Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, p. 188. 
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Chapter II: Selected Western Christian Perspectives on Euthanasia 
In Chapter I, we considered terms and definitions, the killing versus letting die debate and the 
main elements in the discussion on euthanasia to provide an overview of the central issues 
covered in this thesis.  Chapter II will present four specific examples of Western Christian 
approaches to euthanasia and examine the methods of argument used in each case.  These 
methods may include deontology grounded in Western Christian anthropology on the one side 
and secular Western consequentialism on the other.  We will look at these perspectives to 
examine how sources such as scripture, traditional assumptions, reason and experience are 
used within a very specific Western context to reach conclusions on euthanasia.  Scripture 
refers to the canonical manuscripts that are recognized as authoritative divine revelation of 
God’s purpose for humanity.  For Christians, these texts include the Old and New Testaments, 
and for Muslims, the Qur’an.1  Reason involves human capacity to formulate ideas, reflect and 
freely pursue understandable human goods.2  This source plays a significant role in an 
approach in Roman Catholic bioethics called ‘natural law.’  Tradition refers both to official 
church teachings and statements as well as practices, rituals and customs.3  Lastly, experience 
generally refers to the tangible knowledge that is accumulated through the lived reality of the 
world understood as individuals in community.4 
In particular, this chapter will describe and analyze the Western perspectives of 
Michael Banner, the late Pope John Paul II, Nigel Biggar, and Joseph Fletcher.  These Christian 
scholars have been chosen because their approaches provide a spectrum of opinions on this 
topic in contemporary Western Christian thought.  As we shall see, each scholar applies his 
Christian belief within his own very specific respective Western tradition and the sources 
discussed above in varying ways to argue for or against euthanasia.   
Michael Banner appeals to a Western Christian anthropological foundation to argue 
that euthanasia is unconditionally wrong.  He draws on a combination of dogmatic and 
practice-based arguments.  Christian medical ethics is distinctive, he maintains, because it is 
grounded in Christian dogma, whereas secular medical ethics is based on science, philosophy 
and non-religious assumptions.  The importance of respecting the body is a presiding theme in 
his thought on these issues.  A similar but not identical perspective is presented in Evangelium 
Vitae by the late John Paul II.  This text presents an authoritative Western Roman Catholic 
perspective against euthanasia, and uses scriptural verses to defend the unconditional value of 
each human life, a value which starts at conception, and endures through life regardless of 
                                                          
1 Eric Gregory, ‘Religion and Bioethics,’ in A Companion to Bioethics, edited by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer (England: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2009), p. 47.  
2 Gregory, ‘Religion and Bioethics,’ p. 47. 
3 Gregory, ‘Religion and Bioethics,’ p. 48.  
4 Gregory, ‘Religion and Bioethics,’ p. 48.  
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human condition.  In contrast to these approaches, Joseph Fletcher follows a Western 
consequentialist approach to reach a liberal Christian ‘personalistic’ perspective in support of 
euthanasia.  He is distinctive because he is one of a few Christian scholars to apply Biblical 
scripture and reason to argue for euthanasia.  When quality of life or ‘personhood’ diminishes 
and/or one is no longer able to help others, an individual should have the freedom to hasten 
death, he claims.  The last account takes a more ‘middle of the road’ approach.  Nigel Biggar 
uses a combination of Western Christian anthropological and Western secular consequentialist 
styles of argument to make the case that although VAE and PAS may be permissible in 
principle in terminal or extreme cases, they are ultimately not permissible in practice.  
The role of this chapter is to expound the views of selected Christian scholars on 
euthanasia specifically from a Western point of view.  So, in doing so, this chapter bears, or is 
defined by, three limitations: (1) we will study Western Christian perspectives formulated 
specifically in the English vernacular, as opposed to (Middle) Eastern Christian perspectives 
(that may have been written in foreign languages), (2) we will study contemporary Western 
views or commentators and will not delve into historical ways of dealing with the topic under 
study and (3) we will not attempt to compare Western Christian perspectives with Eastern 
Christian perspectives on euthanasia, but rather, we will compare intra-Western Christian 
perspectives in this chapter.  These views will, first, provide an effective point of comparison in 
Chapter IV with the Islamic perspectives on euthanasia, which are intended for Western 
readers that will be discussed in Chapter III.  As with other issues of interfaith dialogue, we will 
expect to find similarities and differences in what methods and/or sources are used to 
generate a perspective on euthanasia.  Second, these views will help to inform the formulation 
of a Western Sunni Islamic viewpoint on euthanasia to be developed in Chapter V.  We will 
now examine these Western Christian perspectives starting with the English ethicist Michael 
Banner. 
Introduction to Michael Banner’s Anthropological Approach 
Michael Banner uses a dogmatic mode of reasoning grounded in authoritative scriptural 
sources to argue in his book, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, that 
euthanasia is unconditionally wrong.  As defined by Banner, the dogmatic core for these 
purposes consists of the doctrines of creation, reconciliation and redemption.  As we shall see, 
these dogmas generate a correlative anthropology, which then grounds certain ethical 
arguments.  For example, Banner argues that sexual relations need not be seen as intrinsically 
bad because sexual differentiation is part of the pre-Fall dispensation.  Banner applies this 
model of Christian ethics to euthanasia and other medical practices.   
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Drawing on this model, Banner presents two dogmatic arguments and two practice-
based arguments against euthanasia.  Dogmatic arguments start from the record of God’s 
activities provided in scripture to establish ethical conclusions.   An example may be using the 
doctrine of the resurrection to establish the intrinsic goodness of the body and applying that 
insight in turn to the question of euthanasia.  Practice-based arguments appeal to Christian 
traditions and ideals of behaviour.  For example, Banner cites the practice of asceticism, which 
he says trains and disciplines the body as a way of integrating it into the spiritual life.  The 
attitude to the body implied in euthanasia, he argues, is incompatible with the attitude implied 
in asceticism.   
Banner’s model of moral reasoning suggests that the consequences of an action do not 
necessarily determine its moral status.  In his view, actions such as euthanasia are 
unconditionally wrong, that is, they are wrong regardless of their consequences.  As we shall 
see, Banner employs a duty-based approach grounded in religious tradition and scripture 
rather than ‘pure reason,’ intuition or emotion.5  We will now examine how Banner builds on 
scriptural texts to make a case against euthanasia.   
(A): ‘Fear Not’ 
‘Fear not, I am the first and the last, and the living one’ (Revelation 1:17).
6
  
Banner asserts that fear of death is implied in the medical practices of patient neglect and 
prolonging life indefinitely.  And intentionally hastening death can involve fear of: pain, losing 
control, dying without dignity and dependence on others.  
Based on the verse above, Banner argues that we should not fear death.  Banner’s 
view seems to suggest that an individual should trust or depend on God before and at death 
rather than experiencing death ‘alone.’  For him, this is an implication of the ‘fear not’ 
principle.  In turn, he grounds this principle in the saying ‘I am the first and the last.’ For 
Banner, this saying signifies that Christ is an all embracing presence not limited by time or 
space, so he is always and everywhere present, even at death.  Knowing Christ is always 
present should provide assurance.  Banner thinks the believer therefore need not fear death.  
Here Banner treats scripture as a primary normative source to provide guidance for the moral 
life.7  Although Stivers et al. also argue that fear of death is inappropriate from a Christian 
point-of-view, they too concede that in the Western culture, ‘most people’ are ‘horrified’ by 
                                                          
5 This view is similarly expressed by Brian Stiltner.  In Stiltners’ review of Banner’s book, Stiltner states that Banner’s approach to 
addressing medical ethics issues is a good example of dogmatic ethics in practice that convincingly supports the position of a 
distinctive Christian ethic (Brian Stiltner, Modern Theology, Volume 17, Number 1 (January 2001): p. 102-4).   
6 Michael Banner, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 48.  
7 Robert Stivers, Christine Gudorf, Alice Frazer Evans and Robert Evan, Christian Ethics: A Case Based Approach (New York: Orbis 
Books, 2005), p. 6.  
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the idea of facing their own death, perhaps because it may involve prolonged pain and 
suffering, dependence on others, as well as decline in dignity.8 
However, it might be argued that fear of death can be an appropriate or beneficial 
response in some cases, since it can help a person stay focused, careful and aware.  For 
example, fear of death can lead a person to take appropriate self-protective measures in some 
contexts.  This is not to suggest one should fear everything or have irrational fears.  For 
instance, a person may have an irrational fear of lightning, and always stays indoors to avoid 
being electrocuted. From these considerations, we might conclude that fear has a proper role 
to play in human life, and that some forms of fear can be compatible with trust in God.  
According to one source, recent studies in evolutionary biology suggest that we are genetically 
predisposed to fear death, so some fears may be a fitting response to some kinds of danger 
which are observed in human nature.9  Moreover, a person may not have fear of death itself, 
but rather for what they are leaving behind.  Fear can also be involved in other aspects of 
death, such as the desire to make a deathbed confession, concern over the welfare of one’s 
family, the handling of one’s financial affairs or the completion of unfinished tasks.10  And 
Fukuyama adds that fear can involve losing ‘active commitments and obligation to others that 
make life worthwhile.’11  So fear may be an essential or necessary part of the dying process.  
Banner might be using ‘fear’ in a somewhat technical sense, to signify loss of trust in God.  
However, some kinds of fear need not reduce one’s trust in God, but may give a person reason 
to turn to God.  We will now examine how, in Banner’s view, fear underlies the medical 
practices of neglect, indefinite prolongation of life and euthanasia.   
Banner argues that patient neglect implies a fear of death.  He defines neglect in this 
context as failure to provide the patient with ongoing care by leaving them in isolation until 
death occurs. Neglect can help to worsen suffering by removing further treatment so that the 
patient is left to experience an agonizing and undignified death, because medicine can no 
longer provide a suitable cure.12  This, he thinks, implies a failure to attend to the process of 
dying, which may be motivated by a fear of, or unwillingness to confront, death.  Instead of 
denying death in this way, Banner believes one should acknowledge the patient’s condition, 
even if this means that it is necessary to accept the inevitability of death.  Mary Warnock and 
Elisabeth Macdonald also oppose neglect or self-denial of treatment due to prolonged 
suffering, and advocate palliative care as the best way of ending one’s life legally when it is not 
                                                          
8 Stivers, et al., Christian Ethics, p. 295. 
9 Guy Brown, The Living End: the future of death, ageing and mortality (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 135. 
10 Stivers, et al., Christian Ethics, p. 295.  
11 Douglas James Davies, A Brief History of Death (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), p. 205.  
12 Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness, p. 171.   
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worthwhile.13  And while neglect may be favoured when death is imminent, Glover similarly 
opposes it in cases of prolonged suffering or lingering death and supports a quick death in 
these cases.14  So perhaps neglect is not due to a fear of death, but rather because nothing 
more can be done for the patient from a curative perspective in which case palliative care may 
be the most suitable (and humane) option to avoid suffering.  
Similarly, Banner argues that overtreatment or the attempt to prolong life indefinitely 
can imply a failure to acknowledge that the patient is dying.  Overtreatment involves the 
continuation of suffering through medical treatment that is considered excessive in the face of 
death that is inevitable.15  And this failure too may derive from a fear of confronting death or 
an unwillingness to come to terms with it.  This point is acknowledged by some scholars who 
argue that perhaps because death may be seen as the great unknown, there is an urge to resist 
death as well as avoid thinking about death.16  Abigail Rian Evans puts the point well: ‘Our fear 
of death causes us to deny its reality.  We mask real death because we are afraid that we are 
not immortal—that this could be the end—and we do not want to admit it.’17  Once again, 
Banner believes the proper Christian response is not to fear death, but to recognize it in a spirit 
of trust in God.  A supporter of Banner could provide examples of cases when fear of death in 
such cases is indeed inappropriate.  For example, the family may express a reluctance to ‘let 
go’ because of unrealistic hopes of a miraculous recovery.  Alternatively, the patient’s fear of 
death may signify an inappropriately strong attachment to material possessions.  The plea to 
live ‘a bit longer’ is common and understandable, especially when one’s life is connected to a 
network of positive relationships, and one desires the fulfilment of one’s self-assertive life 
goals and aspirations.  But fear of death can be natural and appropriate when there is 
uncertainty about the dying process and what will happen after death, even for committed 
Christians.  Some scholars argue that Christians are ‘not immune’ from the fear of death.18  
Recent studies have challenged the notion that those with (Christian) faith are better prepared 
to face death.19  Rather, these studies have suggested that fear can be present regardless of 
the level of faith. 20  Furthermore, the dying process may allow the family as well as the 
individual to come to terms with death by experiencing different stages in dying, which include 
denial, anger, acceptance and peace, so preventing the need to resist death.21  To this extent, 
Banner’s argument may be psychologically unrealistic.  Rather than eliminating the fear of 
                                                          
13 Warnock and Macdonald, Easeful Death, p. 111-112.  
14 Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, p. 198-199. 
15 Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness, p. 171.   
16 Robert Stivers, et al., Christian Ethics, p. 296.  
17Abigail Ryan Evans, Is God Still at the Bedside?: The Medical, Ethical, and Pastoral Issues of Death and Dying (Cambridge: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011), p. 32.  
18 Jeff Stephenson, “Being a Christian in Palliative Care,” Nucleus (2004): p. 11-17.  
19 Stephenson, “Being a Christian in Palliative Care,” Nucleus (2004): p. 11-17.  
20 Stephenson, “Being a Christian in Palliative Care,” Nucleus (2004): p. 11-17.  
21 Stivers, et al., Christian Ethics, p. 296.  
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death entirely, the real challenge, arguably, is to constructively come to terms with this fear 
and assess how it may be a positive factor in the dying process.  Perhaps one way coming to 
terms with the fear of death is openly discussing what the dying person fears about death, or 
what their feelings are about death.  Evans believes that people at the end of their life want 
‘very much’ to talk about death, but ‘rarely’ get the chance to do it, which may call attention to 
the way health care professionals interact and communicate with patients.22  
In contrast to the cases of neglect and prolonging life indefinitely, Banner believes that 
euthanasia does not involve fear of death but, rather, other types of fear.  For example, it may 
involve fear of extreme pain and suffering, fear of losing self respect, fear of low quality of life, 
fear of losing autonomy, and fear of dependence on others.  Banner blames the fear of 
dependence on a growing tendency in contemporary western culture to prize independence.  
As he notes, fear of dependency is ‘more likely to arise in a society which is in the grip of an 
ideology of self-reliance, than in a society where the giving and receiving of care is reckoned to 
be constitutive of genuinely social life.’23 Euthanasia may resolve these various fears by 
relieving pain, respecting autonomy and preserving dignity.  Banner acknowledges the force of 
these reasons: given these concerns, he says, ‘euthanasia steps forward as the “reasonable” 
and “caring” answer.’24 He also acknowledges euthanasia is perceived by some as an answer to 
these fears because it is ‘painless, planned and dignified.’25   
So although euthanasia need not imply a fear of death, in Banner’s view it implies 
various other kinds of fear, such as fear of pain, and loss of respect and autonomy.  Banner 
believes these forms of fear are also inappropriate and contrary to the fear-not principle.  
However, Warnock, Macdonald, Dworkin, Glover and Rachels among others contend that at 
least some of these fears can be appropriate.  The process of dying can involve loss of dignity 
and control, pain and suffering and some forms of dependence may be degrading and 
shameful, they all similarly argue.  And Badham adds that incontinence, the loss of something 
to look forward to and ‘constantly fighting for breath’ may be other factors.26 So from this 
point of view, euthanasia can (also) be a ‘“reasonable” and “caring” answer.’  
In response to these objections, Banner could argue that the hospice movement 
demonstrates effective management of pain and suffering, preservation of dignity and respect 
of autonomy in the process of dying.  Like John Paul II, Banner believes that hospice care 
expresses unconditional respect for life because at no point is there a direct intention to kill, 
                                                          
22 Evans, Is God Still at the Bedside?, p. 33.  
23 Banner, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, p. 79.  
24 Banner, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, p. 77.  
25 Banner, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, p. 78.  
26 Paul Badham, Is there a Christian Case for Assisted Dying? (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2009), p. 12. 
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even if it is foreseen that some forms of pain relief will hasten death.  Proponents of 
euthanasia like those named above seem to support palliative care in most cases, as we 
discussed in Chapter I.  However, when hospice care cannot manage extreme pain and 
suffering, preserve dignity and quality of life or when the patient wants to die, proponents 
maintain that euthanasia can express a proper respect for life.    
Moreover, a critic might argue that Banner’s own argument may arise from his fears of 
an individual overstepping the boundaries of what is humanly permitted.  Based on his 
writings, Banner could suggest that in euthanasia human beings can violate God’s power by 
assuming the role of God or ‘playing God.’  
(B): Bodily Resurrection 
[Resurrection] applies not only to the spirit but also to the body.
27
  
In either [abortion or euthanasia], whether in repudiation of human life, or in its thoroughgoing 
manipulation, medicine would come to express a hatred of the body….
28
 
 
So far, we have examined various ways fear may be presupposed in medical practices.  In 
addition, Banner argues, these practices can imply harm and disregard of the body.  In this 
further strand of argument, Banner contends that the body should be respected because it will 
be resurrected and because the body (like the soul) is integral to human identity. Therefore, 
medicine should ‘serve the good of the body’ and this requires taking a stance against 
euthanasia.29  Let us examine these arguments next.   
Banner argues that the body is good because it will be resurrected and plays an 
enduring role in the person’s relationship with God.  Since other monotheistic faith traditions 
also believe in bodily resurrection, these traditions could in principle develop a similar 
argument for the goodness of bodily life.  And since the body is important in this way, Banner 
believes it should be respected and protected from harm.   
Banner develops his argument by considering the implication of contrary views of the 
fate of the body.  These views, Banner argues, imply a less elevated view of the importance of 
the body.  For example, he notes that Platonic and Neo-platonic philosophies emphasize 
immortality of the soul and irreversible decomposition of the body.  So their attitude to the 
body is different from that of the Christian traditions.  For example, according to A.H. 
Armstrong, Plotinus believes our attitude to the body should be ‘one of austere detached 
tolerance.’30  On this sort of view, the body is seen fundamentally as a dispensable appendage 
and not integral to the ‘real self.’  Since the body is of lesser value than the soul, death may 
                                                          
27 Banner, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, p. 57.  
28 Banner, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, p. 52.  
29 Banner, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, p. 60.  
30 Banner, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, p. 54.  
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even be welcomed as a release of the soul from the body, as Plato famously suggested in the 
Phaedo.31    
Banner argues that through euthanasia and other practices such as abortion or genetic 
engineering, contemporary medicine rejects the body as good and does not show it adequate 
respect. As he states: ‘In either case, whether in repudiation of human life or in its thorough-
going manipulation, medicine would come to express a hatred of the body.’32  In this way, 
secular medicine fails to adhere to the insights of a Christian anthropology of the body.   
Although euthanasia may imply destruction of the body, it might be argued, contrary 
to Banner, that this need not mean ‘hatred’ of the body, but rather love for the person, since 
the aim of the practice is to alleviate extreme pain or preserve the dignity of the person.  
Similarly, if a pregnant woman’s life is in danger, an abortion to save her life would not express 
a ‘repudiation of human life,’ but rather a determination to save life because without abortion, 
both mother and child will die.  Moreover, Banner acknowledges that his dogmatic ethic 
presupposes certain Christian doctrines, so he would expect secularist commentators to reach 
different conclusions.  For example, the British Humanist Association argued against the 
opposition to euthanasia by Christian organizations based on the premise that some people 
‘do not believe in God or afterlife [and] must suffer intolerable pain or indignity in deference 
to a God or afterlife he does not accept.’33  According to Dowbiggin, Humanists believe that 
rather than conforming to religious laws and guidelines, giving individuals maximum freedom 
to make decisions about life and death issues through reason and logic is the best method to 
reduce suffering and agony.  And like the British Humanist Association, the American chapter 
has also been a staunch proponent for the legalization of euthanasia.34  This stance is just one 
example of the great divide between religious and secular perspectives. 
And besides euthanasia, Banner’s approach may apply to other practices implying 
harm of the body.  For example, practices such as inappropriate diet or lack of fitness, 
excessive alcohol consumption, chronic smoking, or illicit drug use.  So hastening death may 
not be the only way of damaging or disrespecting the body.  If medicine can rectify these 
negative practices, this would be another way in which it can ‘serve the good of the body.’35 
 
 
                                                          
31 Phaedo, by Plato, (Bibliobazaar, 2007), 128 pages 
32 Banner, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, p. 52.  
33 Badham, Is there a Christian Case for Assisted Dying?, p. 2. 
34 Ian Dowbiggin, A Merciful End: The Euthanasia Movement in Modern America (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 12. 
35 Banner, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, p. 60.  
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(C): Practices of the Body 
As we have seen, Banner argues that the body should be respected because it will be 
resurrected. He also cites certain Christian practices as further grounds for respecting the 
body.  
Asceticism, in the sense Banner intends, is a religiously motivated practice involving 
bodily discipline which may include fasting, regular prayer and renunciation of material goods 
and intimate relationships.  Banner believes this discipline is ‘for the sake of the body, not to 
spite it.’36  Its aim is to empower and benefit the body.  Asceticism could be seen as an 
opportunity to ‘enrich the soul’ or an opportunity for the body to ‘share in the life of the soul’ 
through this discipline.  In support of Banner, it may be argued fasting may indeed benefit the 
body by, for example, helping to control carnal appetites which may harm the body if left 
unchecked.  Similarly, the discipline of prayer can result in mental tranquillity and peace of 
mind and this may benefit the body.   
However, although asceticism may be seen as beneficial, various non-ascetic practices 
also appear to be beneficial to the body.  For example, delicious foods may enhance the 
person’s bodily experience and improve the physical condition of the body, if enjoyed in 
moderation.  In fact, Banner would not deny this.  His main concern is to oppose a view of 
asceticism that involves a rejection or disgust of the body, as seen in the next section.  
Contrary to Banner, some commentators would argue asceticism, in some forms, 
involves a hatred of bodily life.  For example, Peter Brown argues that certain forms of 
asceticism which have been shaped by Greek philosophical assumptions view the body with 
distaste.  However, Brown argues that this sort of asceticism should be distinguished from 
Christian asceticism which attempts to treat the body with respect and disciplines the body in 
order to draw it into the spiritual life of the person.  This distinction reflects a difference of 
view about the afterlife.  Certain Greek philosophies affirm immortality of the soul apart from 
the body, whereas Christian tradition views the body as partaking in the afterlife, and 
therefore as properly caught up into the life of the soul in the present life.   
So reference to Christian asceticism can lend support for an affirmation of the 
goodness of bodily life.  Ascetic practices can also be of interest in this context because they 
imply that bodily discomfort can be a source of spiritual growth. This notion can be linked to 
euthanasia because it implies that enduring pain and suffering can, under certain 
circumstances, be good.  Although Banner does not make this connection, it is plausible that 
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31 
 
the ideals of Christian asceticism influence the stance of some Christian commentators on 
euthanasia.   
Another Christian practice that shows respect for the body is relic veneration.  Banner 
cites Augustine’s reflections on the rationale for this practice.  As Augustine states, because 
the body ‘belongs to [a man’s] very nature as a man,’ the body is integral to the person’s 
identity in this life and the next.37  Banner believes that since the body has this sort of 
significance, it deserves respect through proper burial rites, and veneration of relics can be 
considered as a proper response to the body to this extent.38  Although Christianity and Islam 
have traditionally practiced relic veneration to honour important figures, some Christians and 
Muslims reject this practice on the grounds that veneration may slide into idolatry.   
(D): Martyrdom  
The practice of euthanasia is inconsistent with an anthropology of the kind presupposed in a Christian 
conception of martyrdom. The practice of martyrdom within the Christian tradition properly expresses a 
respect for life but not for death.
39
  
So far, Banner has presented two practice-based arguments that focus on respect for the 
body, namely the arguments from asceticism and relic veneration.  In this further practice-
based argument, he focuses on the moral distinction between martyrdom and euthanasia.   
Banner believes that unlike martyrdom, the practice of euthanasia (and suicide) is 
‘inconsistent’ with Christian anthropology because it aims at death.40    
By contrast, Banner argues that rather than aiming at death, martyrdom ‘expresses a 
respect for life.’41  Banner believes that the intention in martyrdom is not to seek out death, 
since this would equate to suicide.  As Banner states, ‘Too ready a relinquishing of life, 
amounting to a seeking of death, is incompatible with faith in the creator whose gift of life may 
be yielded in case of necessity, but not cast aside with an alacrity which renders one an 
accomplice to one’s own murder.’42  For this reason, Banner believes martyrdom is consistent 
with Christian anthropology because we see in the martyr ‘a belief in the goodness of bodily 
life.’43  
But how can we be certain that what appears to be martyrdom is actually martyrdom?  
It may be difficult to know the real intention of an individual because they could be aiming at 
death to, for example, gain paradise or avoid the present situation they are in.  So martyrdom 
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39 Banner, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, p. 68.  
40 Banner, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, p. 68.  
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can also be construed as suicide and vice versa.  Some scholars interpret martyrdom or suicide 
alike as ‘voluntary death’ which was practised in early Christianity.44  Some of these voluntary 
deaths were an effort to avoid apostasy to Roman paganism or to retain ‘the crown of 
virginity.’  While Paul Badham labels these deaths as martyrdom, it may be argued that the 
way these people died, namely, jumping off cliffs and hanging themselves can also be 
interpreted as suicide.45  Further, according to Droge and Tabor, ‘many’ early Christians shared 
the Stoic belief that self-killing was a justified and rational act in cases of extreme pain or 
illness.46  From this it may be inferred that in early Christianity death was not something that 
was avoided especially in a situation where one’s earthly condition (e.g. suffering) would make 
it unfavourable to continue living.  However, Banner, supported by the views of Augustine, 
would no doubt respond that suicide does not adhere to Christian values because it involves 
aiming at death, so is not properly a case of ‘martyrdom.’ As he states, ‘euthanasia…expresses 
more regard for death than for life....’47    
As we have seen, Banner also believes euthanasia involves a fear of the end of life.  
However, martyrdom can also involve fear of death.  We cannot assume a martyr’s death will 
not involve fear.  However, Banner would no doubt maintain the true martyr would not fear 
death.  One might also contend euthanasia can be ‘filled with hope,’ for example, the hope of 
exercising autonomy, the hope of being released from pain and the hope of dying with 
dignity.48  And by dying with dignity, a person is expressing ‘respect for life.’49  However, since 
euthanasia aims at putting an end to life, for Banner, it does not respect life in the sense he 
intends.50  
Conclusion 
Michael Banner develops a distinctive ethic based on his Western Christian anthropology.  His 
anti-euthanasia stance is firmly rooted in a conservative faith-based method of argument as 
well as within his own specific Western tradition.  His approach involves a strong anti-
consequentialist position grounded in scripture and tradition.  A clear example of this 
approach is his use of the verse ‘I am the first and the last’ to argue that euthanasia involves an 
incorrect attitude to death.  The other major strand of Banner’s case appeals to certain 
Christian practices involving respect of the body.  Banner believes that the correct practical 
response to a difficult death is hospice care, which provides a way of expressing unconditional 
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respect for life.  However, in his adherence to a strict Christian approach to death and dying, 
Banner does not consider that euthanasia can arguably also express respect of the person, by 
preserving their autonomy, alleviating their pain and maintaining dignity of human life. 
However, as Banner implies, there may be no neutral ground here which would allow different 
sides of the debate to come to some shared agreement. However, since Banner’s perspective 
seems to be directed toward a Western style audience, his stance can very well appeal, but not 
be necessarily limited, to fellow Western Christian scholars or groups such as Christian 
Evangelicals or other comparable religious conservative factions who may adopt the same 
types of sources or traditional perspectives to formulate a similar position on euthanasia 
In the next section, we examine an approach similar to Banner, which is set out in the 
encyclical letter Evangelium Vitae, authored by the late Pope John Paul II (1920-2005).   
Introduction to Pope John Paul II’s Deontological Approach 
John Paul’s Evangelium Vitae, or the Gospel of life, presents a Roman Catholic perspective on 
euthanasia.  This perspective uses biblical verses to make a case for the fundamental value of 
each human life, a value which starts at conception, and endures through life regardless of 
human condition.  John Paul uses a deontological approach, arguing that there is an absolutely 
binding duty never to intentionally hasten death in end of life situations.   
In this section, we will present John Paul’s development of two dogmatic arguments, a 
practice based argument, and a divine commandment argument. A) The first dogmatic 
argument states human life has a special dignity because we are made in the image of God and 
are called to a life with God beyond this world.  B) The practice-based argument makes the 
case that since older people are a source of wisdom and experience they should be treated 
with respect and reverence. C) The divine commandment argument discusses the ‘You shall 
not kill’ directive given in the Hebrew Bible. D) The second dogmatic argument examines 
various attitudes toward suffering.  We will now examine these arguments. 
(A): Sacredness of Human Life 
John Paul argues that human life is sacred because humans are created in the image of God.  
Here he alludes to Genesis: ‘The biblical text is concerned to emphasize how the sacredness of 
life has its foundation in God and in this creative activity: “For God made man in his own 
image”’ (9:6).51 This argument does not of course literally imply a physical ‘mirror image’ of 
God.52  Rather, it seems that human life is made in the ‘image of God’ in virtue of the human 
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capacity for understanding and rational choice.  As John Paul states: ‘Although formed from 
the dust of the earth (cf. Genesis 2:7, 3:19; Job 34:15; Psalms 103:14; 104:29), [human life] is a 
manifestation of God in the world, as sign of his presence, a trace of his glory (cf. Genesis 1:26-
27; Psalms 8:6).’53 54 For John Paul, human life occupies a distinctive place within creation 
because it is made in the ‘image of God.’55  Moreover, Christians traditionally believe that 
Christ, as the second person of the Trinity who came to earth to re-establish the ‘likeness’ after 
the original sin of Adam and Eve, is the ‘perfect’ ‘image of God’ on Earth.56  As one Vatican 
source notes: ‘Basic to the conciliar teaching is the Christological determination of the image: 
it is Christ who is the image of the invisible God (Col 1:15) (GS 10).  The Son is the perfect Man 
who restores the divine likeness to the sons and daughters of Adam which was wounded by 
the sin of the first parents (GS 22).’57   
John Paul believes that human beings are distinctive because they have been endowed 
with ‘spiritual faculties’ which involve the capacity to make rational choices and live a ‘storied’ 
or meaningful life.  As one source observes, ‘[the human person’s] sovereignty within the 
cosmos, his capacity for social existence, and his knowledge and love of the Creator - all are 
rooted in man's being made in the image of God.’58 Since human life is distinctive as a creative 
expression of God’s nature, John Paul believes that human life is ‘different from the life of all 
other living creatures.’59 Human attributes and capabilities as an imperfect reflection of God’s 
perfect and infallible attributes make human life distinctive, and God’s relationship to human 
beings ‘special.’60   
For John Paul, this ‘special’ relationship with God cannot be broken by any change in 
physical state.61  Thus, he argues that ‘human life is always good’ regardless of condition or 
well-being.62  John Paul believes these considerations show euthanasia to be wrong.  
Euthanasia, he maintains, contravenes the dignity of human life by discarding it as worthless or 
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as only conditionally good, and disregards the ‘intimate’ or ‘special’ connection between God 
and the individual.63  John Paul makes much the same point when he says euthanasia 
‘betray[s] [the] very foundations’ of human dignity and ‘denies or neglects [the] fundamental 
relationship with God.’64 This view is supported by Aaron Mackler who states that ‘God’s 
creation of humanity grounds not only God’s dominion over human life but also the sacred and 
inviolable quality of that life.’65  John Paul’s and Mackler’s viewpoints are supported by 
philosopher John Harris who argues that human life is not merely an ‘instrumental good’ for 
the human person or spirit, but rather a fundamental and intrinsic good, so sustaining human 
life regardless of condition demonstrates its respect and dignity in the most basic and 
indispensible manner.66   
Although John Paul argues that human condition or illness can not affect the 
sacredness of human life, it seems that euthanasia or suicide can affect one’s relationship with 
God, which suggests that there is a degree of tension in his argument.  Furthermore, Paul 
Badham disputes this idea by arguing that although human life is sacred and should be valued, 
it is because of this value that one should ‘surrender [human life] back to God’ when one is not 
able to use one’s storied life creatively or to its fullest value or when life becomes a burden on 
oneself or others.67 Based on this viewpoint, it may be contended that the relationship 
between God and human would not affected or diminished because one is giving human life 
back out of respect for its value.  For Badham, human life retains its sacred significance only 
when an individual need not exclusively depend on others or have others make decisions for 
them.68 These views suggest that the value of human life is relative to one’s overall condition 
or is good only for as long as it is of sufficient quality.   
Before continuing with John Paul’s arguments, let us consider another critique from an 
alternative Christian point of view that challenges the original assumptions of the ‘image of 
God’ argument. Jürgen Moltmann acknowledges that the ‘image of God’ idea has been 
expounded by scholars for centuries.  However, Moltmann argues that besides the Genesis 
verses cited above, there is only weak evidence to link the ‘image of God’ idea to the 
sacredness of life argument in Christianity. 69 He believes that the image of God idea was 
adopted or has ‘probably been borrowed from Egyptian royal theology’ and reflected in the 
Genesis verses, but there is no further support or development of this idea in the New 
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Testament to mark it out as a Christian concept.70 Moreover, Moltmann claims that the verses 
used to support the ‘image of God’ idea are misread.  He seems to indicate that John Paul is 
interpreting the verses as implying that the human person is a direct reflection of God’s image, 
which is what John Paul seems to indicate when he states: ‘In man there shines forth a 
reflection of God himself.’71  Rather than interpreting the Genesis verses as meaning ‘to be his 
image,’ Moltmann interprets the verses as ‘according to his image’ suggesting that this image 
involving good qualities and traits is the basis by which ‘[human beings] are modelled and of 
which they are a copy.’72 For Moltmann, all aspects that make up human life and society are 
made ‘in the direction of’ God as special representatives of Him, implying creation according to 
divine will.73   
In addition to the sacredness of human life argument, John Paul offers other 
arguments against euthanasia.   For instance, he takes euthanasia to be wrong since it 
interferes with the divinely appointed time of death.  As he asserts, ‘this practice represents a 
rejection of God’s absolute sovereignty over life and death [and] take[s] control of death and 
bring[s] it about before its time.’74  Moreover, while some, as we will see, interpret euthanasia 
as a form of ‘mercy killing,’ John Paul instead reads it as ‘a false mercy and indeed a disturbing 
“perversion” of mercy’ because true mercy under painful end-of-life conditions will always 
involve encouragement to endure suffering or use licit forms of pain relief.75 Moreover, he 
believes that loved ones should encourage recovery or the endurance of suffering as a ‘way of 
[expressing] love and true mercy.’76 In this way, John Paul argues that euthanasia is an ‘attack 
against human life’ and promotes a ‘culture of death’ or a ‘conspiracy against life.’77 78  In fact, 
a similar argument was made by Christian representatives in 2006 in their opposition to Lord 
Joffe’s Assisted Suicide Bill, namely, that euthanasia implies ‘playing God’ in taking decisions 
that are only for God.79  However, if God has ‘absolute’ command over life and death, then 
how can euthanasia reject this control?  Is free-will independent of divine predetermination?  
‘Absolute sovereignty’ seems to imply that God strictly controls all matters, yet God would 
arguably not allow a suicide or euthanasia to occur since it is contrary to divine law.  Some 
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scholars challenge the idea of ‘absolute sovereignty’ involving death by arguing that although 
God has the ‘power to control life and death,’ God does not ‘consciously and deliberately’ 
decide the moment of death because this would imply that God wills, for example, the 
murderer to kill.80  Rather, humans have free-will that is given by God which allows the 
murderer to kill or an individual to commit suicide or euthanasia.81  And humans are 
accountable to God for the actions they commit.  This suggests that God is free from allowing 
self-willed evil acts to occur, and that free-will may be a part of divine ‘sovereignty’ which is 
not ‘absolute.’   
As stated in Chapter I, although John Paul believes that human life is unconditionally 
good, he does not believe that it is an ‘absolute good.’82  As he states: ‘Certainly the life of the 
body in its earthly state is not an absolute good for the believer.’83 Luke Bretherton expresses a 
similar view, namely, that for Christians, life is a good, but it is not the ‘greatest good.’84  This is 
because worldly life is not the end of our human existence, since there is a better state beyond 
death.  This provides another reason for supposing that human beings have special dignity.  As 
John Paul states, ‘The dignity of this life is linked not only to its beginning, to the fact that 
comes from God, but also to its final end.’85 It is perhaps partly for this reason John Paul argues 
against prolonging life indefinitely in futile cases.  As he states, ‘In such situations when death 
is clearly imminent and inevitable, one can in conscience refuse forms of treatment that would 
only secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life.’86 87  This statement highlights 
the contentious distinction between ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ treatment that was 
discussed in Chapter I, but this is a distinction that is accepted in many religious traditions 
including Catholicism.88  Stivers et al. agree that physical life is not ‘absolutely valuable,’ but it 
does not follow from this, they say, that one may intentionally hasten death in the interest of 
the individual and the wider community.89  Instead of euthanasia, John Paul supports the use 
of hospice or palliative care to control or manage suffering even if the unintended but 
foreseen effect is the shortening of the patient’s life.90  However, some scholars argue that 
although most Christian traditions support palliative care, the support for euthanasia is 
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growing especially in extreme suffering cases, but the authors do not specify which traditions 
these are.91      
(B): Old Age and Respect 
Old age is characterized by dignity and surrounded with reverence (cf. 2 Mac 6:23).  The just man does not seek to 
be delivered from old age and its burden.
92 
So far, we have seen John Paul argue against euthanasia on the grounds that human life has 
unconditional value.  He develops this case by proposing that the value of old persons in 
particular can also be grounded in tradition.  
More exactly, John Paul argues that older people have traditionally been treated with 
‘reverence’ giving us a prima facie duty to do the same.  According to John Paul, most 
traditional cultures serve and care for elderly people, suggesting that society views them with 
esteem in their later years.  For him, this is another reason why life should not be seen as 
worthless during this period.  Similarly, he argues elders traditionally hold valuable roles in 
society because their ‘wisdom and experience [are] recognized as a unique source of 
enrichment for the family and for society.’93  This idea is supported by Stivers et al. who argue 
that such traditional practices suggest that the elderly can model practical wisdom for younger 
generations.94  Warnock and Macdonald also agree with this argument, asserting that some 
elders can play an ‘important and useful part’ in the community.95  For John Paul, these 
considerations provide a further objection to euthanasia on the grounds that it fails to express 
respect and care for the elderly, or to acknowledge their wisdom or their contribution to 
society.  Some scholars have expressed concern that the legalization of euthanasia could 
suggest the idea among elderly people that society expects them to request euthanasia, even 
if they do not desire it, in order to not be a burden on others.96  The ideal of respect for the 
elderly is hard to achieve as evidenced by a 2011 NHS report which concluded that NHS has 
‘failed to treat elderly people with respect’ based on a surge of complaints by elderly people of 
neglect, unnecessary suffering and distress in hospital.97  In another report released in May of 
2011, the Care Quality Commission stated that some elderly patients are ‘not spoken to with 
respect, not treated with dignity, and not receiving the help they need to eat or drink’ in some 
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UK hospitals.98 Although the report asserts that this issue is not endemic, it is a serious one 
nevertheless, and calls for measures to curb cases of negligence by improving the standard of 
medical care with, for example, greater nurse coverage for ward patients.  John Paul would 
presumably conclude that respect for the elderly is a challenging duty, but not one we can 
evade, especially since the elderly population is growing.99 100  
While John Paul argues that older persons should be treated with respect and that this 
implies an anti-euthanasia stance, proponents of euthanasia have taken a different view of 
what constitutes respect.  For example, Warnock and Macdonald contend that the wish to die 
in extreme cases can be the most appropriate way of expressing respect or reverence for 
human life.101  Furthermore, a critic may argue that not all elderly persons will be able to give 
‘wisdom and experience.’ What if an elder person is not able to teach from their experience or 
take care of themselves due to, for example, Alzheimer’s disease or senile dementia?  Should 
we uphold traditional roles and show them the same level of respect?  As one scholar 
suggests, such conditions may imply a complex and drastic change in lifestyle: ‘Alzheimer’s 
Disease intrudes on the lives of the patient and the family, robbing the mind, changing the 
person, assaulting the relationships, forcing dependency, changing the course of life, and 
challenging one’s faith or life-view.’102 For example, in the 2007 case of William and Barbara 
Wallace, William shot and killed his wife Barbara who was suffering from Alzheimer’s disease 
and then himself.  In a video suicide message, William explained how he was no longer 
mentally or physically able to care for himself or provide his wife with the proper care that she 
needed.103  Other similar cases have been reported.  While it may be questioned why William 
killed his wife and himself rather than just his wife to relieve his burden, some believe that 
these types of elderly murder-suicides are not an exception and are becoming more prevalent 
at least in Europe.104  According a 2005 study, murder-suicides are usually the result of spouses 
suffering from depression or mental breakdown due to the care demands and life changes 
associated with an ill spouse.105  Lawrence E. Johnson believes that the spouse or loved one 
commits suicide not to seek death itself, but to seek relief from the sorrow of their partner’s 
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life-altered condition irrevocably affecting their relationship.106  On the other hand, Harry 
Moody argues that the Alzheimer awareness movement in the past 25 years has evolved from 
a point of private sorrow and shame to more open public discussion and acceptance, which 
has been propelled by greater research, social advocacy and information about the disease.107  
And for care givers of Alzheimer patients, Moody believes that group therapy which allows 
them to express their experiences and advice can also help care givers.108  These approaches 
can introduce new options for dealing with the disease.  
While Warnock and Macdonald maintain that some elders play an important role in 
society, they support euthanasia for those whose lives are not worth living like those 
experiencing severe dementia.109  Joseph Fletcher supports this type of reasoning, as we will 
discuss later on.  However, in such cases John Paul could appeal to his human dignity argument 
and contend that dignity can never be lost in any condition.  But for others, it is clear that 
dignity can be lost, and the person can be ‘humiliated’ by losing independence and control.110  
In addition, a critic may argue that just because a practice is a part of tradition this does not 
make it right or correct.  Just because a practice is part of tradition this does not necessarily 
mean it is a good practice. Traditional practices can after all lead to negative consequences.  
For example, female genital mutilation and other acts of violence toward women are 
sometimes observed in African communities on the grounds that they have the sanction of 
tradition.111  Rather, there should be good reason(s) to preserve that practice.  A practice 
should be assessed in terms of whether it offers some benefit or improvement to the 
community such as civic development or individual ethical reform.  John Paul would agree with 
this.  However, he may say that in general if some practice is part of a long-established 
tradition, then this establishes a presumption that we should follow the practice, though this 
reason can be overturned if counter-evidence is provided.   
(C): ‘You Shall Not Kill’ 
The truth of life is revealed by God’s commandment: “You shall not kill” (Ex 20:13; Dt 5:17).
112 
The ‘Law of God’ based in the Hebrew Bible consists of specific commandments—and one of 
these is ‘you shall not kill’ (Exodus 20:13, Deuteronomy 5:17) or the ‘“law of life” (Sir 17:11).’113 
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According to John Paul, this commandment is also emphasized in the New Testament.  For 
example, a rich man asked Jesus how to attain eternal life.  Jesus replied that one must ‘keep 
the commandments,’ and the first one of these he asserts is ‘You shall not kill’ (Matthew 
19:16-18).114 Since this directive is a divine command instructing us not to take the life of 
others or our own life, John Paul believes it to present a moral absolute obligation.  On John 
Paul’s view, the preservation and protection of all innocent human life regardless of condition 
or status is an integral concern of the Law.115 As John Paul states, ‘It is thus the Law as a whole 
which fully protects human life.  The deepest element of God’s commandment to protect 
human life is the requirement to show reverence and love for every person and the life of 
every person.’116  
Although this Law may be applied to oppose the killing of all innocent persons, John 
Paul notes that the Old Testament was particularly concerned with protecting the vulnerable, 
such as unborn children, widows and orphans or those who cannot protect themselves 
(Exodus 21:22; 22:20-26).117 In addition, he believes that terminally ill, disabled and weak 
people are also vulnerable and are therefore naturally covered by the commandment.  Such 
people may be unable to care for themselves at the end-of-life, or may be a burden on the 
health care system or their families due to incapacitation or impairment in judgment.  So such 
people may be exposed to a greater risk of non-voluntary euthanasia because they would be 
unable to refuse or reject euthanasia if it is legal.  This stance was echoed by John Paul’s 
predecessor, Pope Pius XII, who condemned the non-voluntary killing of the mentally ill and 
the physically handicapped during World War II.118 Therefore, John Paul asserts: ‘I confirm that 
euthanasia is a grave violation of the law of God.’119 Moreover, Evans argues that the 
protection of human life is important especially for those who are needy and who are unable 
to care for themselves, because protection of human life should not be related to one’s level 
of health, one’s ability for relationships, one’s contribution to society, or one’s material 
status.120   
John Paul’s endorsement of the ‘thou shall not kill’ commandment and argument 
against killing the weak or vulnerable may suggest that the Church opposes all forms of killing.  
But although John Paul argues that there is a moral obligation not to kill, he also supposes that 
killing may be justified in some cases.  For example, on John Paul’s own view, killing can be 
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permissible as a matter of last resort in cases of capital punishment, just warfare or self-
defence.   
According to the Catholic Catechism, capital punishment is considered a ‘lawful 
slaying’ to maintain civil order, to be used only as a last option.121  John Paul believes that one 
should ‘not go to the extremes of executing the offender: in other words, when it would not 
be possible otherwise to defend society.’122 Moreover, capital punishment is in fact a way of 
upholding the ‘thou shall not murder’ commandment when it is imposed for murder, because 
it is a way of emphasizing the seriousness of violations of the commandment, and aims to 
protect the innocent and uphold justice.123  According to Evans, the King James Version of the 
Bible correctly translates the commandment, namely as ‘thou shall not murder’, but it can 
generally be interpreted as ‘thou shall not kill’ based on the original Hebrew and Greek 
translations.124 As one source states: ‘The just use of this power, far from involving the crime of 
murder, is an act of paramount obedience to this Commandment which prohibits murder.’125 
The ‘Commandment’ which is cited here is the same that John Paul supports.  So it is 
interesting to note that the commandment is interpreted in the Catechism as a justification of 
capital punishment while John Paul cites the same commandment to condemn euthanasia.  
The double meaning of this law further supports the idea that the lives of those who commit 
euthanasia may be considered innocent, so euthanasia should be prohibited while capital 
punishment and just war killing may be justified in some cases. This thought seems to be 
supported by the then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger who states: ‘While the Church exhorts civil 
authorities to seek peace, not war, and to exercise discretion and mercy in imposing 
punishment on criminals, it may still be permissible to take up arms to repel an aggressor or to 
have recourse to capital punishment. There may be a legitimate diversity of opinion even 
among Catholics about waging war and applying the death penalty, but not however with 
regard to abortion and euthanasia.’126   
It was on issues like abortion and euthanasia that Ratzinger, after he became Pope, 
sought global unanimity with others, especially with those who also professed a common 
belief in the one Abrahamic God.  According to Barbara Wood and Andrew Unsworth, 
Ratzinger developed three interrelated principles for his approach to interreligious dialogue 
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especially with Muslims.127  First, Ratzinger believed that one’s own core convictions or beliefs 
should not be renounced or questioned at the expense of searching for the ultimate truth.  
Rather, one’s beliefs should be or remain secure throughout interreligious dialogue.  Second, 
those in dialogue with persons of another faith must be prepared to be critical of their own 
tradition of religious faith in order to purify it.   And third, Ratzinger asserts that mission and 
dialogue should be ‘mutually interpenetrative’, which implies preaching the Gospel to non-
believers while also being in dialogue with those who are outside the Christian tradition, but 
who are also consciously seeking and living in relationship with God. 128    
Another form of killing that may be related to capital punishment is killing in self-
defence.  Protecting oneself, or one’s community, may lead to the intentional killing of 
another, especially if one’s life is in imminent danger, and this can be justified according to 
Church teaching.  As one Vatican source affirms: ‘It is legitimate to insist on respect for one's 
own right to life.  Someone who defends his life is not guilty of murder even if he is forced to 
deal his aggressor a lethal blow.’129 While protecting oneself from an aggressor may justify 
killing another in certain cases from the Church’s point of view, Joseph Fletcher paints a 
different gloss on this idea, by suggesting that killing oneself can count as legitimate self-
defence from the aggression of pain and suffering.  Fletcher adds, ‘If it is replied that in self-
defence against human attack we are seeking to preserve our life, whereas in euthanasia we 
are seeking to destroy our life, then we must call into question any such pure vitalism’ or 
attachment to the preservation of life regardless of circumstance.130   
If killing is allowed in capital punishment, just warfare and self-defence cases, a critic 
may question why euthanasia cannot also be allowed as a just form of killing.  For example, 
Fletcher acknowledges the ‘Thou shall not kill’ commandment as well as Christian and Jewish 
opposition to euthanasia and suicide.131 However, in his criticism of the Church and their 
stance against euthanasia (as we will see further), Fletcher contends that the Church is 
perverse in allowing involuntary killing in just war or capital punishment, while not allowing 
voluntary killing in the form of euthanasia.  He contends that it should also allow voluntary 
mercy killing in extreme pain and suffering.132 For Fletcher, to adhere to the commandment in 
such cases means ignoring or not properly acknowledging the physical or psychological 
symptoms which are typical of such situations.  So the intent to kill (with the patient’s consent) 
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in these cases may be morally permissible for Fletcher, if the goal is to alleviate pain, preserve 
dignity and decrease the burden on others.  Although he does not discuss his view on non-
voluntary euthanasia (NVE), it may be inferred that he would support NVE if the same goals 
were intended.  Since human life is not worth preserving in these cases, Fletcher would 
therefore deem the absolute reading of the commandment invalid, rigid, impractical and even 
inconsistent with other aspects of Church teaching.  
Paul Badham similarly contends that the commandment was ‘never’ considered 
‘absolute,’ but rather included ‘numerous exceptions’ during ancient times, such as killing 
enemies of Israel, which included men, women and children, and the death penalty for those 
involved in homosexuality, incest, rape and premarital sex.133 So Badham, like Fletcher, argues 
that if these exceptions are made then euthanasia should also be made an exception, and that 
the commandment should be interpreted as ‘Thou shall not murder.’134 From this point of 
view, killing the aggressor or enemy combatant and killing someone in terminal illness may be 
similar because the former action involves protecting society and the latter action involves 
protecting one from (further) suffering.  John Paul would probably not insist that the 
commandment is absolute since he supports killing in just warfare and capital punishment.  
However, he would likely try and preserve a moral distinction between these cases and 
euthanasia by contending that although voluntary, euthanasia involves intentionally killing the 
innocent, whereas in just warfare the intentional killing of the innocent, rather than 
combatants, is prohibited, even if their death may be foreseen.  And killing in capital 
punishment can be a way of safeguarding the innocent.  
John Paul and Fletcher both consider practical, but different, conditions for when it is 
appropriate to kill.  Both positions seem to emphasize killing as a last resort option to punish 
the guilty and protect society or alleviate pain and suffering, respectively.  So for Fletcher, 
euthanasia would be a form of voluntary self-protection from further pain and suffering and 
would therefore not involve harm.  However, the Church would oppose euthanasia since the 
intention is to harm oneself, an innocent person, even if it is voluntary.  In this way, the 
commandment is interpreted in different ways to support different arguments that justify 
killing in some cases.       
 
 
(D): Attitudes toward Suffering 
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In a further argument, John Paul argues that enduring pain has special significance because it 
can be viewed as ‘Christ-like’ in light of Christ’s bodily sufferings.135  He argues that suffering 
can be seen as a way of sharing in Christ’s condition, and suffering is good in this respect as a 
way of being like Christ, whether the person realizes this or not.  Just as Christ suffered a 
painful death, Christians are encouraged to follow his example.  As one Vatican source affirms: 
‘suffering, especially suffering during the last moments of life, has a special place in God’s 
saving plan: It is in fact a sharing in Christ’s passion…’ 136  In addition, he believes that suffering 
allows us to become closer to God by encouraging individuals to have trust in ‘[God’s] loving 
plan’ regardless of their condition.137  As John Paul states, ‘In this way, the person who lives his 
suffering in the Lord grows more fully conformed to Him’ (cf. Phil 3:10; 1 Pet 2:21).138  He 
believes this radical trust is made possible by the belief in the promised resurrection.139 
Meilaender argues that Jesus’ endurance of suffering in his last days came from a call to 
obedience and compassion, so like John Paul, he thinks that Christians ought to value their 
suffering because suffering can serve a divinely ordained meaning or purpose.140  
However, the concept of redemptive suffering, or valid enduring of suffering, is 
questioned by some Christian scholars.  On the one hand, Paul Badham professes respect for 
John Paul’s views as set out in Evangelium Vitae and the Vatican’s perspective in the 
Declaration on Euthanasia. However, Badham argues that if one is to ‘truly believe’ in the 
message of Christ, which is grounded in love, compassion, forgiveness and the idea that ‘God is 
love,’ then one would not make another suffer needlessly, particularly when suffering is 
extreme.141 Although Badham encourages the advancement and further use of palliative care 
in most cases, he argues that it is not effective in cases ‘where painful suffering remains 
inescapably present.’142  Moreover, based on empirical research Badham concludes that rather 
than strengthen one’s faith, continuous suffering and the breakdown of quality of life can lead 
to the questioning of one’s faith, while for other people suffering can result in the ‘collapse of 
faith’ rather than an enrichment of it.143 Furthermore, the idea of redemptive suffering or 
‘sharing’ in the sufferings of Christ can lead to atypical practices. For example, some who 
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engage in ascetic practices may participate in self-flagellation in an attempt to understand, 
value or empathize with Christ’s pain.144   
Instead, a different way of imitating Christ relates to Badham’s argument above, 
namely, since Jesus acted in a loving and compassionate way, as believers in His message 
Christians should act in this way towards those who are suffering, by alleviating it even if this 
means aiming at death.145  This view may also dispute the idea of whether suffering is a part of 
‘[God’s] loving plan.’  Instead, it may be argued that by acting in this way one can also ‘grow 
more fully conformed to Him.’ 
Moreover, if suffering is so good, then arguably one should never want to get rid of it.  
Does this argument suggest that it would be wrong to take an aspirin to relieve suffering? Can 
one use treatment to manage suffering and still ‘share’ in the sufferings of Christ or does 
suffering need to be uninhibited?  To what degree must one suffer to experience this 
‘sharing’?  While John Paul praises those who forego palliative treatment in order to ‘share 
consciously in the Lord’s Passion,’ he seems to advise against such ‘heroic’ actions for 
everyone.146 Instead, in the Declaration on Euthanasia John Paul notes that some will use 
medicine ‘only in moderation so that they can deliberately accept at least part of their 
suffering and thus consciously unite themselves with the crucified Christ.’147 And based on 
previous papal decrees, John Paul supports the use of palliative care ‘to relieve pain,’ which 
seems to provide further evidence that one need not have to experience unmitigated suffering 
to ‘share consciously in the Lord’s Passion.’148 However, critics argue that with recent advances 
in medicine, the aim of many Christian affiliated palliative care organizations is to control or 
minimize all pain, so ‘few today’ support John Paul’s view on this matter.149 
Conclusion 
Evangelium Vitae utilizes a deontological approach, which implies duty and an exception-less 
moral obligation to uphold or support certain norms, rules and principles.  John Paul’s 
approach emphasizes norms that are based on the premise that human life is unconditionally 
good and has a special dignity.  Thus, we have a duty to preserve and protect human life in all 
reasonable circumstances.  John Paul uses this approach to argue for trusting in God and 
preserving life during suffering rather than engaging in practices that interfere with the 
‘predestined’ moment of death or harm the body.  Similar to Michael Banner, he appeals to an 
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authoritative theological foundation for his argument centred on the assumption of the 
goodness of bodily life, and he too introduces specific scriptural texts to support his argument.  
Unlike Banner, John Paul also cites traditional cultural practices to argue against killing older 
people.   
Thus far, we have seen two approaches which share a reliance on religious 
assumptions and scripture, and essentially come to the same conclusion that euthanasia is 
unconditionally wrong.  Since John Paul’s arguments about human dignity, respect for the 
elderly, not killing and suffering are based on theological assumptions, it is difficult to envision 
some form of neutral ground that would allow him to reach some agreement with advocates 
of euthanasia.  However, his approach or stance on this topic (or other issues) can reasonably 
appeal to Catholics as well as other Christians in the West and in the East who oppose 
euthanasia (or abortion), due to his prominent global stature in the Roman Catholic Church, 
the influence of which is present in almost every country. In contrast to Banner and John Paul, 
as we shall see in the next section, proponents of euthanasia typically formulate their 
conception of the goodness of human life from a physical or psychological perspective.  The 
next section will examine a consequentialist argument for euthanasia developed by Joseph 
Fletcher. 
Introduction to Joseph Fletcher’s Utilitarian Approach 
American professor and former Episcopalian priest Joseph Fletcher (1905-1991) believes VAE 
and PAS are morally permissible and should be legalized.  According to Derek Humphrey, 
Joseph Fletcher was considered a prominent figure in the euthanasia movement in the 20th 
century.150  In his book, Medicine and Morals, he uses a utilitarian approach to support this 
claim but also appeals to scripture to make his case for euthanasia.151  Fletcher prizes goods 
such as good health, good quality of life, the dignity of the person and the freedom to make 
one’s own decisions.  Accordingly, Fletcher argues that euthanasia can be justified and will 
result in the best outcome if it preserves dignity, maintains quality of life, minimizes pain and 
suffering and prevents excessive dependence upon others.   
Fletcher has seven key proposals.  A) quality of life is more important than quantity of 
life; B) the case for euthanasia is particularly strong if the person is unable to serve or help 
others; C) euthanasia can be justified on the basis of the Biblical concept of ‘mercy;’ D) suicide 
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is viewed as a form of merciful killing in certain philosophical traditions and euthanasia can be 
thought of similarly; E) the church allows killing in certain cases, so they should also allow 
euthanasia; F) medical practices permit prolongation of life, so they should also permit 
hastening death and G) regulation can ensure that euthanasia is not a hasty decision.  
(A): Quality of life and the ‘personalistic view of man’ 
Incurable pain destroys self-possession and disintegrates personality.
152
  In the personalistic view of man and 
morals, personality is supreme over mere life.  To prolong life uselessly, while the personal qualities of freedom, 
knowledge, self-possession and control, and responsibility are sacrificed is to attack the moral status of a person.
153
    
According to Fletcher, quality of life depends on ‘personality,’ which involves qualities such as 
‘freedom, knowledge, responsibility’ along with ‘personal integrity,’ and an inherent sense of 
‘self’ consisting of ‘self-possession,’ ‘self-control and self-dignity.’154 He argues terminal disease 
or extreme pain can break down ‘personality’ and diminish quality of life, putting at risk the 
dignity or the ‘moral status of a person.’155  He believes euthanasia is permissible in these 
specific cases to prevent further suffering and preserve the dignity of human life.  Fletcher 
does not make it clear whether one must possess all the above qualities to have ‘personality’ 
or if having ‘personality’ is equivalent to being a person.   
Fletcher contrasts ‘personality’ with ‘mere life.’  As he states: ‘personality is supreme 
over mere life.’156  He argues that extreme forms of pain ‘destroy’ the self and break down or 
‘disintegrate’ personality and reduce the individual’s condition to ‘mere life.’157 For example, a 
terminal condition or extreme pain may take away self-possession, self control and freedom by 
forcing one to deal with nothing but one’s condition.  In this way, Fletcher believes extreme 
pain can have a comprehensive effect on the individual, namely, ‘a moral destruction, a 
spiritual disorder, as well as a physical degeneration.’158  And the loss of goods in ‘fatal and 
demoralizing’ cases implies loss in overall value or worth of life, so life ceases to be worth 
living.159  Since no form of treatment can reverse this loss, there is no good reason to continue 
living and any treatment may be considered a burden.  So, for Fletcher, euthanasia may be the 
best option in these cases to preserve the remaining value of life, which is similar to the 
arguments of Warnock, Rachels, Dworkin and Glover.  Fletcher’s view is also similar to that of 
Nigel Biggar who argues the special value of human life is based on the presence of 
‘biographical life,’ as we shall see.  From a situational ethic perspective, this argument would 
                                                          
152 Fletcher, Morals and Medicine, p. 187.   
153 Fletcher, Morals and Medicine, p. 191.   
154 Fletcher, Morals and Medicine, p. 175, 187, 191, 205.   
155 Fletcher, Morals and Medicine, p. 191.   
156 Fletcher, Morals and Medicine, p. 187.   
157 Fletcher, Morals and Medicine, p. 187.   
158 Fletcher, Morals and Medicine, p. 175. 
159 Fletcher, Morals and Medicine, p. 205. 
49 
 
imply that each case should be judged based on its circumstances, instead of applying a no-
exception rule to all cases which guided medical treatment.    
However, Craig Paterson contends that judgement about the quality of life should not 
determine our assessment of the overall worth or value of life or ‘whether life “overall” can be 
judged worthwhile living or not.’160 He believes that this type of approach is often too 
subjective to be reliable.  Moreover, poor quality of life does not mean that one’s life is not 
worth living because even in cases when quality of life is significantly reduced, one may still be 
able to experience and enjoy goods.161 This attitude is shared by Paul Ramsey, but he adds that 
this approach can also lead to NVE particularly for incapacitated, incompetent or handicapped 
patients, because loved ones may be overburdened and physicians may determine, based on 
best interest, that a patient’s current quality of life does not warrant further care, so using 
healthcare resources in cases with better prognoses.162   
Instead, Paterson and Ramsey argue that discussion of quality of life should be 
concerned with whether treatment can improve quality of life.  As Paterson, for example, 
states, ‘Quality of life concerns should always be focused on the ways and means in which 
humanitarian resources can be deployed to improve the health of patients and should not be 
conflated with attempts to assess the overall “benefit of living” versus the “benefits of 
death.”’163 If treatment improves the patient’s capacity to enjoy goods such as ‘friendship, 
family, beauty, truth, etc.’, then Paterson believes a competent patient should opt to continue 
the treatment.  However, if/when treatment becomes more of a burden or is judged to be 
ineffective, a competent patient or surrogate decision maker may at that point have it 
withheld or withdrawn. This approach accords with John Paul’s idea that human life is an 
intrinsic good but not an absolute good and should not be preserved regardless of 
circumstance.164  And although Paterson and Fletcher have different perspectives, it may be 
argued that Paterson’s resolve to determine the effectiveness of treatment in each case is 
reminiscent of considering Fletcher’s idea of situational ethics.  
Moreover, it may be argued that a terminal cancer patient in considerable pain can 
still be physically active and be able to pray and maintain a relationship with God.  From a 
standard Christian or Muslim perspective, if one can still maintain a relationship to God, then 
one’s life is to that extent worthwhile.  So on this view, decline in ‘personality’ need not imply 
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the individual’s life is not worth living.  Similarly, John Paul would dispute the idea that brain 
death implies any loss of personhood or ‘moral status.’ 
(B): Altruism and Euthanasia 
If altruistic values, such as defence of the innocent, are enough to justify the loss of one’s life (and we agree that 
they are), then it may be argued that personal integrity is a value worth the loss of life, especially since, by 
definition, there is no hope of relief from the demoralizing pain and no further possibility of serving others.
165 
So far, Fletcher has argued that when personality diminishes due to terminal disease or 
extreme pain, euthanasia is justified.  He now adds another strand to the case for euthanasia 
involving service to others.   
Fletcher notes that if an aggressor attacks an innocent person, another individual may 
intervene to save the innocent person from harm, even at the risk of losing their own life.  
Similarly, if a disease attacks a patient, Fletcher suggests, it can be worthwhile for a person to 
avoid the harmful consequences of this disease by giving up their own life.  Fletcher believes 
these scenarios are morally analogous.  In a similar way, Warnock and Macdonald believe by 
giving up their own life, the patient is carrying out an ‘altruistic’ or an ‘admirable’ act to 
remove a burden from others.166  However, a critic might object that these cases are not 
morally analogous because in the first case it is another person who intervenes to prevent 
harm to the innocent person.  In contrast, in the second scenario the person who is protected 
from harm and the person who loses their life are the same.  In this scenario, the person may 
be acting selfishly because they may be giving up the opportunity to help others or they may 
be succumbing to pressure from others.  Fletcher might argue in reply that in extreme pain or 
terminal disease, one cannot help others in any capacity, so euthanasia will remain permissible 
in these cases.   
Fletcher’s emphasis on autonomy and the ability to help others as a measure of value 
of a human life may indirectly run the risk of developing into the Nazi idea of killing those who 
are unable to be productive.  To support his argument, Fletcher presents the memoirs of a 
terminal cancer patient, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and her personal reflections leading her to 
euthanasia:  
A last duty.  Human life consists in mutual service.  No grief, no pain, misfortune or ‘broken heart’ is excuse for 
cutting off one’s life while any power of service remains. But when all usefulness is over, when one is assured of an 
imminent and unavoidable death it is in the simplest of human rights to choose a quick and easy death in place of a 
slow and horrible one.  Public opinion is changing on this subject.  The time is approaching when we shall consider it 
abhorrent to our civilization to allow a human being to lie in prolonged agony, which we should mercifully end in 
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any other creature.  Believing this choice to be of social service in promoting wider views on this question, I have 
preferred chloroform to cancer.
167
   
Gilman believes that as long as there is ‘power of service’ to help others and society, 
euthanasia or suicide are wrong.  Her rationale for euthanasia is not simply the desire to put 
an end to ‘pain, misfortune or [a] “broken heart,”’ but also her recognition that her ‘usefulness 
[to others] is over.’168  So she takes herself to prefer ‘a quick and easy death’ only in the most 
extreme conditions of incapacitation.169  She also believes euthanasia in her own case would 
be a ‘social service,’ by providing another perspective in the debate on euthanasia.  One may 
argue that more recent cases like that of Debbie Purdy are having similar effects.  A similar 
view to that of Gilman was espoused by Robert G. Ingersoll who believed that a man who is 
‘being slowly devoured by cancer’ and is suffering from its effects should be killed, and also 
because he ‘“is of no use to himself” nor his wife, children, friends and society.’170 In fact, 
Ingersoll believed that in these types of cases a man can be a ‘burden to himself and to others, 
useless in every way,’ so he should have the right to end his life in a painless and dignified 
manner.  Like Gilman, Ingersoll believed that the conditional worth or value of one’s life was 
determined by one’s capacity to care for oneself and others, by maintaining an ‘acceptable’ 
standard of quality of one’s life.   
However, another commentator reflects rather differently on what it means to be of 
service while suffering.  Carol Wanderhope believes that imitating Christ not only implies 
bearing suffering or adversity with patience, but it also means preaching the Word as well as 
helping others.  But even if one is suffering and unable to actively serve others, she argues that 
simply being in the presence of others can still be considered a form of service, in so far as it 
provides encouragement or inspiration for others.171  This stance clearly differs from Gilman’s 
point of view.     
Fletcher’s endorsement of Gilman’s argument that euthanasia should be permitted 
only when one is unable to help others seems contradictory to argument A.  In argument A, he 
seems to argue that loss of personality and autonomy are sufficient conditions for euthanasia.  
By contrast, in argument B he adds further condition, which he takes to be a necessary 
condition.  This condition has more of a social emphasis since it focuses on helping others, 
whereas argument A has more of an individualistic emphasis.  It seems Fletcher presents 
argument B to deflect a possible counterargument to argument A.   
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(C): Mercy as a Christian Idea 
“Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy” (Matthew 5:7).
172 
Previously, Fletcher argued that euthanasia is permissible when personality diminishes, in 
cases of extreme suffering, terminal suffering and/or when one cannot serve others.  He 
believes euthanasia in these cases could count as an act of mercy or compassion based on the 
verse cited above.  For example, physician-assisted suicide would be an act of mercy if it 
involves putting an end to incurable suffering, preserving dignity and avoiding further 
dependence on others.  Since mercy is a Christian ideal, he believes Christians can properly 
follow this ideal by providing a ‘merciful release from incurable suffering.’173 However, Fletcher 
claims that the Church, influenced by politics and society, has moved away from the Christian 
principle of mercy.  As he states, ‘As yet, mercy has failed to exert an influence upon many 
Christians equal to the pull or pressure of power.’174  Here he seems to allude to the fact that 
the Church has shifted its position historically from a pacifist stance to supporting certain 
forms of killing, as we will discuss.  Although the Church does forbid euthanasia and suicide, it 
arguably remains dedicated to providing mercy through pain medication or hospice care, 
which is largely a Church-sponsored development.  In addition, the believer may look to God 
for mercy.  Furthermore, according to Jonsen et al., killing someone on the grounds of 
‘compassion’ is currently not a defence that is recognized by the law even if the patient is 
competent and conscious (except in the regions of the world where PAS and/or VAE are 
permitted).175 This debate seems to indicate a divide not only among religious and secular 
persons but also between Christians.     
According to a 2004 poll, 40 per cent of Protestants and 49 per cent of Catholics would 
be ‘willing to break the law’ and help their loved one die if they were suffering and they asked 
to die.176 And another poll suggests that 81 per cent of Catholics and 81 per cent of Protestants 
favour a change in current UK laws on PAS based on the compassion principle.177 Moreover, 
James Rachels cites Fletcher to assert that mercy from ‘horrible’ pain is the ‘single most 
powerful argument’ for euthanasia when palliative care is ineffective.178 Similarly, Warnock 
and Macdonald argue for introducing ‘compassion’ into revised laws, also suggesting that 
euthanasia amounts to an act of mercy in intolerable suffering.179  Along the same lines, 
Badham makes an interesting claim, namely, that some doctors and nurses who support PAS 
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make ‘arrangements’ with their colleagues for euthanasia if they end up in suffering or 
terminal illness cases like some of their patients.180 According to Badham, Warnock and 
Macdonald refer to this alternative as a ‘more merciful death in contrast to their normal 
practice with the majority of their patients.’181  So Badham endorses Fletcher’s approach and 
argues that based on Jesus’ teachings of love and compassion, one should accede to 
(repeated) requests to end patient suffering.182 When viewed from Badham’s perspective, 
namely, providing mercy to terminal patients and receiving mercy if one is in a terminal 
condition, it would seem that the use of the 5:7 verse is appropriate, by contrast Fletcher 
seems to only argue for providing mercy.  Providing mercy in terminal cases is also argued by 
secular philosopher Margaret Battin who believes that an agent providing mercy by euthanasia 
demonstrates that the physician cares which is based on the duties of not prolonging suffering 
and eliminating existing suffering.183      
The link between euthanasia and mercy is evident in the phrase ‘mercy killing,’ which 
is used in many contemporary discussions.  For example, many common sources like the 
Oxford Dictionary and Dorland’s Medical Dictionary define this phrase as the deliberate 
termination of life that is ‘administered or performed out of mercy or pity for a suffering 
person.’184 Moreover, the expression ‘mercy killing’ is also used in many recent euthanasia 
cases at least in the UK.  For example, Frances Inglis claimed to have killed her son as an ‘act of 
mercy’ after he sustained accidental head injuries; so, she claims, the killing should not be 
construed as murder.185 Similarly, Ray Gosling killed his partner as ‘an act of mercy killing’ 
because he was suffering from end stage AIDS-related illness.186 In both cases, the sufferer was 
killed by a loved one due to distress or anxiety about their loved one’s suffering.  However, 
John Paul objects to this type of act even more vigorously than euthanasia that is performed 
by a professional: ‘The act of euthanasia appears all the more perverse if it is carried out by 
those, like relatives, who are supposed to treat a family member with patience and love.’187  To 
this, Fletcher might respond by stating that mercy killing by a relative is not perverse but can, 
rather, be a way of expressing love for the sufferer, as suggested by the cases above.    
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Mercy may be linked to love, kindness and care because mercy killing involves the 
patient’s consent, and has as its aim the alleviation of pain, preservation of dignity and 
perhaps the reduction of family burden, so the intention to kill need not involve intending 
harm or amount to murder.  As Fletcher states, ‘The true parallel is between self-sacrifice and 
a merciful death provided at the person’s request; there is none between self-sacrifice and 
violent and coercive killing.’188  In this way, it may be that the term ‘mercy killing’ carries a 
more benevolent overtone or invites a more sympathetic reaction as opposed to ‘euthanasia.’  
A recent illustration of this difference of meaning may be evident in the 2006 decision of the 
UK based Voluntary Euthanasia Society to change its name to Dignity in Dying in ‘an attempt to 
move away from negative connotations associated with the word euthanasia.’189   
(D): A Philosophical Argument for Mercy   
Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle held that suicide was a crime against the community because it robbed society of a 
resource, and Plato added that it was a like crime against God.  But all these were willing to justify suicide for a 
merciful death.  [Above all,] they all favoured euthanasia.
190
 
As we have seen, Fletcher provides a Biblical case for euthanasia as a form of mercy in terminal 
conditions.  In addition, Fletcher considers a philosophical perspective to support his mercy 
argument.   
The Greek translation of euthanasia, namely, ‘gentle or easy death,’ may also imply 
mercy if we follow some philosophical views.  Fletcher notes that some philosophical traditions 
supported euthanasia or suicide as a way of providing a ‘merciful death,’ presumably in case of 
extreme pain.  According to these traditions, suicide was a ‘crime against God’ and a ‘crime 
against the community’ because it ‘robbed society of a resource’ to serve others.191  This view 
may suggest that individuals who are able to serve others have a duty to continue to support 
their community.  However, this philosophical tradition maintains, Fletcher suggests, that even 
though suicide is wrong in most cases, it is permissible in cases of terminal illness or extreme 
pain when the person is unable to care for themselves or others.192  This argument is similar to 
Gilman’s case for mercy killing ‘when all usefulness is over.’193  Moreover, Fletcher’s view is 
supported by Jose Bufill who states: ‘To relieve the pain or distress of an incurable illness, to 
avoid a humiliation or indignity, to end an unhappy or tiresome life or to express a sense of 
triumph over Fate by ending one’s life voluntarily in old age were felt to be justifiable or even 
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honourable reasons to end one’s own life.’194 And similarly for Stoics and Epicureans, ‘self-
killing’ was justified in cases of pain, mutilation or when incurable illness could no longer be 
endured.195 According to some scholars, quality of life was the ‘cornerstone’ of Stoicism, 
because this prime value made life worthwhile.196  So if (incurable) illness (or similar 
circumstances) contributes to the deterioration of quality of life, Stoics believed that suicide is 
‘rational’ and ‘justifiable.’  A justified or ‘rational suicide’ was also argued in the 1971 case of 
Geertruida Postma’s mother who suffered from a cerebral haemorrhage.  It was this case 
which initiated the process of legalization of euthanasia in the Netherlands.197 Moreover, 
philosopher Harry R. Moody argues that suicide can be considered a ‘rational decision’ or as a 
‘serious and legitimate answer’ not on the basis of age meaning that elderly people should 
have the right to commit suicide, but rather on physical and psychological condition and 
outlook.198   
However, Patterson rejects Fletcher’s view and argues that suicide (and all types of 
euthanasia) is always wrong regardless of whether the killing was self-administered or 
performed by another individual, because all these acts involve killing an innocent person and 
disrespecting the ‘primary goods of human life.’199  And according to some scholars, suicide at 
old age negates the first principle in Stoicism, namely, that virtue alone is the only good in 
human life and freedom of mind remains in our capacity.200  This means that quality of life is 
determined not by external gains and afflictions, but rather by what can be controlled, namely, 
how suffering is perceived or approached.  In this way, for Stoics, quality of life is shaped by 
inner attitude and awareness despites one’s condition.  On the other hand, it may be argued, 
in support of Fletcher, that if one is not able to enjoy the ‘primary goods of human life’ or the 
values that make life worthwhile due to the deterioration of reason, awareness and 
consciousness, then suicide is justified or even obligatory, even if suicide means killing an 
innocent person regardless of age or length of life.  
Lastly, in addition to these philosophers, Fletcher claims that Jeremy Bentham (d. 
1832) also supported suicide in certain cases.  As Fletcher states, ‘utilitarians like Bentham 
have been most favourable to the notion of justifiable homicide.’201  This view coheres with 
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Bentham’s utilitarian account of the value of experiencing pleasure over pain.202  According to 
one source, Bentham requested euthanasia in the final moments of life.203  This source is 
supported by Fletcher who states, ‘when Bentham died, consistent to the last, he asked his 
doctor to “minimize pain” with his dying breath,’ though this request may also suggest 
palliative care.204 So through the use of scripture and philosophical sources, Fletcher makes a 
consequentialist argument that when one cannot serve the community or enjoy any quality of 
life, suicide or euthanasia is permissible as an act of mercy to alleviate pain and preserve 
dignity.  This view is somewhat similar to Nigel Biggar’s view (as we will see), but clearly 
different from that of John Paul.  
(E): ‘Willing to inflict death but unwilling to permit it’ 
As we have seen, Fletcher maintains that the Church fails to show mercy and does not consider 
the quality of life.  He makes a further argument against the Church by suggesting that it 
displays a double standard when it comes to killing.  In particular, he suggests that the Church 
sanctions involuntary killings such as executions but does not allow voluntary decisions for 
euthanasia.  As discussed, most Christian traditions do allow self-defence, for example, only 
when one’s life is directly or immediately threatened.205 And although the Church promotes 
non-violence and reconciliation, it also supports justice by killing aggressors or guilty persons 
through just war and capital punishment, respectively.206 So the Church opposes euthanasia 
since it involves killing an innocent person.  However, Fletcher argues that if the Church 
permits the former type of killing, it should also permit the latter form of killing.  As Fletcher 
comments, ‘Certainly those who justify war and capital punishment, as most Christians do, 
cannot condemn euthanasia,’ since all these practices involve the taking of life.207  It seems 
that Fletcher’s argument for euthanasia may receive support from at least from some Christian 
circles.  Although almost all Christian denominations oppose VAE and PAS, this opposition is 
‘weakening’ in some Christian traditions as requests are made by patients to reduce their 
suffering as well as because of the financial and emotional burdens on the family.208  Badham 
also supports Fletcher’s argument by claiming that there were at least ‘six instances of 
voluntary death’ in the Hebrew Bible which could be interpreted as martyrdom or suicide that 
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received no criticism or condemnation.209  While these instances did not involve illness or 
sickness, they were attempts to avoid a potentially undignified death.  
Warnock and Macdonald make a parallel argument to Fletcher which questions why 
religious groups are willing to see people killed in capital punishment, self-defence and war if 
they suppose that all life is sacred.210 This argument raises a good question:  Have the lives of 
those who are executed or killed lost their sacredness or are they less sacred than those of the 
innocent?  If so, how?  After all, John Paul argued above that sacredness of human life is 
unconditional, yet he favours these methods of justice.  It seems that in cases of capital 
punishment, self-defence and war, the issue is not about the sacredness of human life, but 
rather about promoting justice and maintaining order especially in cases when the well-being 
of the community is threatened.  If sacredness was the issue in these cases, then arguably the 
Catholic Church would ban all forms of intentional killing.  However, sacredness remains a 
primary issue when it comes to destroying innocent life (i.e. euthanasia or suicide).  Patterson 
believes that capital punishment can be considered ‘unnecessary intentional killing’ because 
the state often has other options to protect society and reform the criminal.211  This argument 
suggests that intentional killing can be justified only as a last resort.   
Lastly, Fletcher also believes that if the practice of martyrdom is accepted by the 
Church, then euthanasia should also be accepted, since both practices involve the death of 
innocent persons.  However, a critic could respond that Fletcher has a misconception about 
the traditional view of martyrdom.  Martyrdom is different from suicide because the martyr 
does not aim at death, whereas a person committing suicide does aim at death.  As we have 
seen, Michael Banner also emphasizes this point.  
(F): A Physician’s Conflict in Duties 
The doctor’s duty to prolong and protect life is in conflict with his equal duty to relieve suffering.  [But] if the 
physician’s obligation is both to relieve pain and prolong life, how then can he use analgesics, which bring relief but 
have the necessary effect of hastening death? 
212
   
Fletcher acknowledges that physicians have two Hippocratic duties in end of life cases: To 
prolong life and relieve suffering.  However, he argues that in some cases, physicians cannot 
fulfil both duties, but rather only one or the other.  Here he seems to suggest since these 
duties are ‘equal’ it can be legitimate to favour pain relief over prolongation of life in cases of 
conflict of duty.   
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Fletcher’s opposition to prolonging life is partly grounded in his challenge of the idea 
of ‘vitalism.’  He believes ‘vitalism’ is the Christian view that human life is sacrosanct, 
absolutely and unconditionally worthwhile, and is therefore to be preserved in every case.  
This view is interestingly similar to Warnock and Macdonald’s suggestion that when religious 
people describe human life as ‘sacred,’ they are committed to the idea that life has ‘absolute 
and overriding’ value and must therefore be preserved ‘at all costs.’213  However, as discussed 
in Chapter I, some Christian commentators would object that although life is sacrosanct and 
has unconditional value, this is not to say it is of absolute value.  Therefore, when treatment is 
futile, life need not be prolonged indefinitely.  So contrary to Fletcher and other 
interpretations, the traditional Christian position does not support extending life at all costs.   
Setting aside this point, Fletcher believes that by giving pain relief in large doses, the 
physician must ‘want’ or intend to hasten death.214  This means that physicians intend the 
effects of an action that are foreseen. In rare, but extreme, pain cases, one may experience 
prolonged suffering even with palliative care, and still be dependent on others.  In these cases, 
a ‘higher than normal’ palliative dose to merely alleviate pain may also result in death.  
Fletcher may argue that in such a situation there is in fact an intention to kill, thereby 
dismissing the relevance of DDE and the case for palliative care in extreme pain cases.  In this 
way, Fletcher would oppose palliative approaches because they cannot adequately relieve or 
manage pain in extreme pain cases.  Since palliative care cannot meet the needs of the patient 
in extreme cases, for Fletcher, euthanasia provides a ‘good death’ and expresses proper 
respect for the body.  However, Lawrence Johnson contends that individuals who want to 
commit (or consider) ‘active voluntary euthanasia’ do so not because they are ‘seeking death’ 
as the intended consequence, but rather only to relieve their pain and suffering, which is the 
cause of low quality of life.215 The patient is not using death as a means to alleviate their pain, 
but rather the relief leads to (an accelerated) death as the unintended foreseen by-product 
consequence of that relief.  In one way, this viewpoint would support the idea of DDE insofar 
as pain relief is concerned, and the good intention (i.e. pain relief and not seeking death) 
would outweigh the unintended bad consequence (i.e. death).  But Johnson’s view would 
differ from that of other supporters of DDE related to euthanasia (e.g. John Paul and Abdulaziz 
Sachedina), because the intention to relieve pain would not involve any form or procedure of 
‘active’ euthanasia or terminating human life, but rather something like palliative care or 
‘passive’ euthanasia.    
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Even so, recent research seems to support Fletcher’s argument.  For example, 
according to one poll of 1000 doctors, 51 per cent of them believe that UK physicians have 
administered pain-relieving drugs with the intent to hasten death.216  Other data suggests that 
192,000 UK patients die each year by this method.217  Patterson acknowledges Fletcher’s type 
of argument, but claims that without DDE we would have to abandon moral absolutes and 
instead adopt a consequentialist system of weighing goods to determine the morality of an 
action.218  As we saw in Chapter 1, the difference of view here is bound up within a larger 
debate on the importance for moral reflection of DDE.  
(G): Euthanasia: A Quick Decision? 
Fletcher notes that one may object to euthanasia because it is a quick or ‘snap’ decision, and 
not carefully considered.  For example, the Swiss Academy for Medical Sciences has ruled that 
the process for euthanasia at the Dignitas clinic occurs ‘too quickly.’219 Instead, they believe a 
‘patient [should] have repeated discussions with [their physician] over an extended period.’220 
This extension, they argue, would prevent the ‘current practice of Dignitas, in which patients 
from outside Switzerland arrive, see a doctor, and die all in the same day.’221 It may be argued 
that ‘same day’ euthanasia is concerning because a patient may have insufficient time to 
reflect upon their decision and discuss it with their family.  Even Fletcher admits this type of 
euthanasia can ‘be seen sometimes, although rarely,’ in patients who are vulnerable or in a 
non-extreme condition.   
However, Fletcher contends that euthanasia need not be a quick or ‘snap’ decision 
provided appropriate legal regulations are in place.  As reflected in the current movement to 
legalize euthanasia in the UK, these regulations would, first, involve permitting voluntary 
euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide only for competent patients with terminal disease or 
extreme pain.  Second, Fletcher states that ‘the law should not permit euthanasia to be done 
on the spur of the moment, and the patient should be free to withdraw his request at any 
time.’222 This view is supported by Warnock, Macdonald and Glover.  Like the Swiss Academy, 
they agree that a request must be first verbally declared and documented, with 2 weeks to 
pass between the original decision until the scheduled euthanasia date, in case the person 
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changes their decision.223  The same principle is considered in Lord Joffe’s 2006 UK PAS 
legalization Bill.224  Third, the decision must be ‘reasonable’ according to the condition and 
‘properly thought out’ when one is not depressed.225 Fourth, in the Netherlands, for example, 
the doctor must get to know the patient for a ‘specified length of time’ in order to confirm the 
patient’s wishes which also reflect general practice guidelines that are endorsed by the Dutch 
Medical Association.226  These types of measures have also been adopted as law in the US 
states of Oregon and Washington, and they include a requirement for a judgment of a 
patient’s terminal illness by two independent physicians, an oral request or declaration, a 
written request in the presence of a witness, and another oral consent 15 days later.227 
Moreover, the doctors must provide written confirmation that the consent was voluntary, 
informed and without coercion, and doctors must inform patients about hospice and palliative 
care alternatives.228  With this approach, patients can form their own perspective, draw their 
own conclusion and make an informed decision, and the physician can be a part of the 
decision making process not in charge of it.229  Once again, these types of regulations are also 
seen in the 2006 UK PAS Bill.230 And as we will discuss when we turn to Nigel Biggar’s 
perspective, some proponents of euthanasia in practice argue that rigorous regulations can 
also prevent a ‘slippery slope phenomenon’ or the slide from voluntary euthanasia to non-
voluntary and involuntary euthanasia.    
Moreover, Badham investigates the effect a change in euthanasia laws would have on, 
for example, the doctor-patient relationship.  He argues that legalizing euthanasia will increase 
trust and rapport between the two parties because it allows them to openly discuss all 
available end-of-life options, as has been observed in Oregon and the Netherlands.231  In fact, 
according to Badham, 79 per cent of British patients say they would trust their doctors ‘more’ 
if euthanasia was permissible.232  Similarly, Bryant et al. report that ‘about half’ of UK 
physicians support a change of euthanasia laws and ‘some’ doctors have fulfilled a patient’s 
request to end their lives.233   
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Conclusion  
This perspective utilizes a broadly Western style consequentialist approach, which involves 
achieving an end or goal as much as possible by weighing the benefits of various alternatives.  
Joseph Fletcher’s consequentialist approach is grounded in Biblical scripture to form a liberal 
Christian ‘personalistic’ perspective in support of VAE or PAS as a final option in terminal or 
extreme pain cases.  Although Fletcher does allude to scripture for one argument, it seems 
that John Paul and Banner clearly have a deeper religious foundation for their respective 
arguments, whereas Fletcher utilizes more of a secular platform to present his argument.   
It seems that the main emphasis of Fletcher’s argument comes from a physical and/or 
psychological perspective, where the overriding concern is to alleviate pain and discomfort 
through euthanasia. Moreover, it seems that Fletcher places greater weight on experience and 
overall results to make his argument as compared with John Paul and Banner.  Fletcher’s case 
is broadly consequentialist, and considers the circumstances of each case.  For example, his 
argument emphasizes quality of life where this is understood in psychological terms, and in 
terms of capacity for autonomous choice.  In certain cases, Fletcher believes that the patient’s 
death may be the best outcome for them because it will alleviate their pain and preserve their 
dignity.  He adds that this argument is particularly telling if the patient has lost the capacity to 
help others.    From this standpoint,  his approach clearly contrasts with those of John Paul and 
Banner not only in his conclusions but also in terms of his method.  Therefore, Fletcher’s 
intended base audience can plausibly include, but not necessarily be restricted to, liberal 
Western Christians or even Western secularists that may primarily consider factors such as the 
quality of life and pain and suffering as opposed to the sanctity or value of life from a 
theological perspective when making important end-of-life decisions.  In addition, these 
Christians or secularists may look to other similar stances in the minority like that of Fletcher’s 
(e.g. Paul Badham) to shift, influence or change the status quo position or policies on active 
euthanasia more broadly taken by the majority of Christian denominations and adopted by 
many countries (e.g. United States).      
Although Fletcher’s argument for euthanasia can be one way of providing mercy, there 
may be other ways of providing mercy from extreme pain, such as hospice care.  His 
antagonistic view of Church teachings rests at times on a misconception or perhaps an 
alternative viewpoint on its teaching concerning issues such as capital punishment, just war, 
‘vitalism’ and martyrdom, and this may serve to weaken or sustain his argument for 
euthanasia.  Since Fletcher misrepresents traditional teachings on these issues, he would likely 
not win over opponents of euthanasia such as Michael Banner and John Paul.  By stating that a 
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physician intends to kill by administering pain medication in large doses, Fletcher also 
dismisses the key distinction in the doctrine of double effect.  He also presents a weak 
argument against quick or ‘snap’ decisions on euthanasia, since some legally established 
institutions today do in fact adopt ‘fast-track’ procedures for euthanasia.   
The last section discusses the perspective of Nigel Biggar who utilizes a blend of Christian 
anthropology and secular consequentialism to formulate his argument.   
Introduction to Nigel Biggar’s Anthropological and Consequentialist Approach 
Nigel Biggar, professor of Christian ethics at the University of Oxford, uses a combination of 
Western Christian anthropological and secular consequentialist styles of argument in his book, 
Aiming to Kill: the Ethics of Suicide and Euthanasia, to make the case that although VAE or PAS 
may be permissible in principle, in certain rare, tightly defined conditions, they should be not 
accepted in practice.  Biggar holds a traditional position that human life is sacred and 
moderate suffering can be received in a spirit of acceptance.  Suffering within tolerable limits 
may have spiritual meaning and should be endured, but it also seems evident to him that, in 
serious cases, lack of quality of life is a sufficient reason for hastening death, at least in 
principle.  One may intend to hasten death when intense suffering or loss of ‘biographical life’ 
has ‘significantly’ reduced the sacredness or value of human life.  His grounds for this 
judgment are basically theological, as we shall see.  However, Biggar also believes that 
changing laws against VAE or PAS may ultimately lead to a decline in respect for human life.  
So for this consequentialist sort of reason, he stops short of endorsing euthanasia in 
practice.234   
Biggar is opposed to all forms of involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, so his discussion 
focuses on voluntary euthanasia. Biggar presents three arguments.  A)  Human life is 
worthwhile provided we are able to serve humanity; however, if biographical life is lost or pain 
becomes extreme, the value of human life has significantly diminished.  In these specific cases, 
hastening of death is permissible in principle.  B) It is also permissible in some other cases to 
give pain relief medication foreseeing death will result, while not intending this outcome.  And 
C) since relaxation of regulation can result in decline in respect for human life, there should be 
no changes in the UK law prohibiting VAE and PAS.   
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Let us first consider these arguments.  In concluding this chapter, we will compare Biggar’s 
approach with those of Michael Banner, Joseph Fletcher and John Paul.   
(A): The Value of Human Life 
The special value of human life lies in the opportunity it affords to hear and respond to a call from God to make a 
unique contribution to the maintenance and promotion of created goods in the world. It remains reasonable to 
regard human life—and the opportunity for responding to one’s vocation that it affords—as a gift or loan from God 
that deserves gratitude and obliges care and responsible management, even when that involves considerable 
suffering.  [However], not all physical suffering is redemptive, and some suffering can be so intense and relentless 
as to make responding to anything other than pain—including a vocation—inconceivable.
235
   
Biggar believes human life has ‘special value’ as long as ‘biographical life’ is present and the 
person experiences no more than moderate or ‘considerable’ suffering.  Biographical life is 
significant in his view because it allows one to serve others and grow spiritually.236   
Biggar distinguishes this ‘biographical life’ from ‘biological life.’  On this account, 
‘biographical life’ involves awareness or consciousness, thought formation, aspirations, the 
ability to reason, physical mobility and freedom from extreme pain.  Ronald Dworkin and 
James Rachels adopt similar descriptions which they term as having ‘critical interests’ and 
‘having a life,’ respectively.237 Biographical life has ‘special value’ because the ‘person’ can 
then ‘hear and respond to a call from God’ to cultivate a relationship with God.  As Biggar 
states, ‘the life of the human individual is precious because it is constituted and dignified by a 
unique vocation by God.’238  ‘Special value’ can also involve the idea that human life has divine 
origins.239 Additionally, biographical life may allow the person to appreciate his surroundings, 
his health, freedom and personal relationships.240  ‘Biographical life’ can also involve the 
capacity to take care of oneself and to ‘to make a unique contribution’ to society.241   
On the other hand, Biggar notes that an individual without ‘biographical life’ can be 
reduced to merely ‘biological life’ especially in cases of intolerable pain and terminal disease.  
Such an individual may be deficient in mental capacities as in cases of a PVS, brain death, 
permanent coma or continuous severe pain.  As Biggar states, ‘Severe brain damage can rob a 
human being even of the very capacity for consciousness that is the precondition of response 
[to opportunity].’242  Warnock and Macdonald express a similar view by stating that illness may 
leave an individual as ‘not the same person.’243  In these instances, Biggar maintains it may be 
permissible to intend hastening death because human life will then have lost ‘its sacred value’ 
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240 Biggar, Aiming to Kill, p. 55.  
241 Biggar, Aiming to Kill, p. 55.  
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and in these cases, killing need not involve harming the person.244  Warnock and Macdonald 
also interestingly point out that Biggar ascribes sacredness to ‘biographical’ life but not to all 
forms of human life, which is similar to Fletcher’s view.245 This contrasts with John Paul’s 
attitude that human life has special value in all circumstances because the human person is 
‘made in the image of God.’  Furthermore, John Harris argues that even if an individual is in, 
for example, a persistent vegetative state, that individual is still considered a ‘human person’ 
until death, because human (biological or bodily) life is considered unconditionally good.246   
Biggar also argues the ‘special value’ of human life can be related to God’s vocation for 
the individual.  As he comments: ‘The special value of human life lies in the opportunity it 
affords to hear and respond to a call from God to make a unique contribution to the 
maintenance and promotion of created goods in the world.’247 Here Biggar seems to develop 
the notion of biographical life by considering in particular the kind of life story which involves a 
response to God’s call.  This sort of life story is especially important in grounding the ‘special 
value’ of human life.248 Biggar believes human beings can respond to God’s call in most but not 
all circumstances.  For example, an individual who is in moderate or ‘considerable pain’ is 
encouraged to fulfil God’s calling.  Even in such cases, Biggar believes human life ‘deserves 
gratitude and obliges care and responsible management.’249 However, extreme pain or 
terminal disease may inhibit individuals from fulfilling this vocation because they are dealing 
with only the pain or disease.250  This attitude is similar to Stanley Hauerwas’s view that 
‘intense’ pain inhibits one from understanding the value of suffering.251  If an individual 
cannotrespond to their God-given vocation, then their life has lost its special value, Biggar 
suggests.  In that case, once again, the intention to hasten death need not be ‘malevolent.’252    
There may be a problem with this argument given Biggar’s understanding of this God-
given vocation.  The vocation seems to involve ‘a call from God to make a unique contribution 
to the maintenance and promotion of created goods in the world.’253 However, an individual 
with Alzheimer’s disease, for example, may well be unable to ‘make a unique contribution to 
the maintenance of created goods.’  And yet we may wish to say that such individuals retain 
their special value.  Biggar’s argument runs the risk of resembling the Nazi claim that 
unproductive individuals do not deserve to live.  We might also suppose that our lives retain 
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significant worth even when we are unable to help others.  For example, even someone who 
cannot actively promote ‘created goods,’ due to a state of mental and physical debilitation 
may still contribute to the worth of my life by providing me with an opportunity to be of 
service to them.    
There may also be a problem with Biggar’s idea that the person who lacks a storied life 
does not have special value.  He seems to be thinking that a person who cannot recount their 
own story will lack special value.  A newborn child cannot rehearse their own life story, yet 
their life surely has a storied significance even so because they are already someone’s son or 
daughter or someone’s brother or sister.  And on Biggar’s view, we surely ought to see each 
individual, whether or not they can tell their own story, as sharing in the story of God’s 
relationship to human beings.  We might then say an infant has special value even if they 
cannot relate their own story because they are caught up in a web of relationships involving 
other human beings and also God.      
The Opportunity for Spiritual Growth 
The idea of ‘development of moral character’ is another way in which Biggar extends his 
account of biographical life.  Certain forms of suffering we might associate with terminal 
conditions can contribute, he suggests, to rich forms of biographical life because suffering can 
play a part in spiritual growth.  In his book Evil and the God of Love, John Hick similarly 
develops this idea at some length.254  Hick explores how certain moral and spiritual qualities, 
such as patience or fortitude, can be strengthened in the face of adversity.  Biggar shares 
Hick’s perspective to some extent.  As Biggar asserts: ‘Christians place great value on 
opportunities to [develop moral character] and affirm an obligation to be grateful for these, 
even if they involve great suffering.’255  On this view, while pain itself is a bad thing, in some 
circumstances some good may come from it which outweighs the bad.  So a life that seems 
‘unsatisfactory’ at first because it involves pain and suffering could be seen as an opportunity 
to appreciate ‘the value of a life much hindered’ and acquire maturity, insight and 
‘fulfilment.’256  In other words, moderate pain or times of trial need not be viewed as bad 
overall, burdensome or a sign of a damaged life, but rather a valuable opportunity to 
overcome difficulties through faith, ‘experiences, convictions, and reflective reasoning.’257  
However, while these spiritual qualities can develop in response to moderate forms of pain, 
other forms of pain can demoralize the person rather than providing a stimulus to moral 
growth.   
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Extreme forms of suffering that are attributed to illness can overwhelm the person, 
rather than produce spiritual growth.258  For example, in moderate pain or discomfort, one can 
turn one’s thoughts to God in prayer, whereas in excruciating pain one may be able to think of 
nothing but the pain, so that one’s thoughts turn away from God.  Here Biggar refers to: ‘A 
patient who is suffering from physical pain so relentless that it permits her to do nothing else 
but struggle with it…’259  While Biggar may be right that extreme forms of pain can divert a 
person from God or disrupt their relationship with God, we may still think some saintly 
individuals can incorporate even extreme forms of pain into their relationship with God.  The 
capacity to endure pain will vary from person to person, and we might speculate that even 
extreme pain may be redemptive for some people.  In a similar way, Badham argues that 
suffering may often inhibit one from living one’s life creatively or to its fullest potential when 
one’s life becomes a burden on oneself or others.260  
In addition to moderate forms of suffering caused by illness, Biggar argues that certain 
types of suffering caused by another person should be accepted or experienced.  He believes 
suffering caused by others can be redemptive, because it allows the sufferer to follow Christ’s 
practice of forgiveness.  This implies expressing acts of Christ-like kindness by pardoning or 
showing mercy or compassion to those who have caused one to suffer in order to grow 
spiritually and become closer to God.  As he says: ‘It is possible to regard human suffering as 
redemptive, but only of a certain kind; namely, the compassionate and forgiving suffering of 
external injury that others have afflicted upon the individual.’261 262  This idea of redemptive 
suffering is somewhat different from John Paul’s attitude to redemptive suffering.  However, 
Biggar argues that ‘other physical kinds of human suffering’ caused by others should not be 
regarded as redemptive because these types of suffering may make it difficult to ‘[imitate] the 
compassion and forgiveness of God in Christ.’263  But Biggar does not provide any examples of 
‘other physical kinds of human suffering.’  Even so, it seems that for Biggar, certain (external) 
sources of pain or specific (internal) qualities of pain can provide spiritual benefit.  
This idea of forgiveness and compassion seems like a more practical way of ‘sharing’ in 
the sufferings of Christ.  However, this idea may not apply to suffering that is caused by oneself 
through, for example, one’s lifestyle habits (e.g. health related suffering).  Moreover, some 
critics maintain that Christ’s forgiveness and compassion demonstrates that ‘God is love’ or 
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loving, so God would not want one to needlessly endure suffering.264 This view would, once 
again, support the idea that medical intervention should be used to eliminate suffering, and 
this is a view that Biggar would defend, as we will see at the end of this account.  
Prolonging Life Indefinitely and Allocation of Resources 
Biggar argues that futile treatment should be discontinued rather than use resources to 
prolong the patient’s life when biographical life has diminished and there is little chance for 
recovery.  In these cases, he believes that individuals should ‘bow to the oncoming of death 
and let go of life,’ which implies accepting the inevitability of death.265  Instead, treatment may 
be used more effectively for those who are not in terminal conditions and have greater 
chances for recovery.  As Biggar states, there is benefit in ‘conserving health care resources for 
use in bettering the conditions of afflicted, but still responsible individuals.’266 Biggar also 
believes that maintaining an individual without biographical life may impose emotional costs 
on the family.  By discontinuing futile treatment, the family may be able to ‘move on’ 
emotionally in time and bring closure to the grieving process.   
This argument is supported by Stivers et al. who also appeal to resource allocation 
issues given the tremendous shortage of organs for transplant at least in the United States.267 
Many patients are rejected for a transplant on the grounds of their age and medical status. 268 
Such treatment may instead go to those ‘who can obtain the most life from them,’ which 
implies younger persons with favourable medical conditions.269  This type of approach is being 
considered with kidneys by the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Currently, the next 
person on the 87,000 recipient waiting list for a kidney will receive one regardless of age or 
status.270 However, a new approach would reserve 20% of kidneys for those who are ‘expected 
to live the longest after the transplant,’ which may often be younger patients, in order to use 
organs in the most effective and judicious way.271 Critics believe the approach invites age 
discrimination and bias. 272   
While this solution may result in productive use of organs, the question of who or 
what process decides the allocation and use of health care resources remains unresolved.  
Rising health care costs, low-income patients with pre-existing conditions and insurance 
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coverage policy stipulations can also have a bearing on this question.  Clearly, prolonging life 
indefinitely will not result in maximizing the value of resources, so Biggar is correct that each 
case must be judged on its individual merits, though he does not address how this should be 
done.  And to what can we attribute the increased incidence of prolonging life indefinitely?  
Hans Kung and Guy Brown argue, as stated by Badham, that while technology has greatly 
improved our lives, especially in the past few decades, it has also been used to delay death, ‘in 
some cases by many years,’ during which time the patient continues to suffer from, for 
example, chronic disease, so keeping them alive unnecessarily.273  
(B): The Morality of Acts of Killing 
In the previous discussion, we examined how the special value of human life is connected to its 
biographical character.  In Biggar’s view, when biographical life has significantly diminished, 
then one may intend to hasten death because killing the person need not involve harming 
them in these circumstances.  Biggar also asserts that some kinds of pain can be a source of 
spiritual benefit.  However, there may be little benefit in extreme pain which may diminish 
biographical life since one can focus on nothing but the pain and this may also cause one to 
consider euthanasia.  These views are clearly different from those of John Paul and Michael 
Banner and they represent a controversial approach in the context of Christian discussion of 
euthanasia.   
Biggar’s view is controversial among Christian ethicists because he says that, in certain 
special cases, it is permissible, in principle, to aim at death rather than merely foreseeing that 
death will be the consequence of one’s action.  It is worth being clearer about Biggar’s reason 
for taking this stance.  Biggar believes that one should not intend to hasten death if 
biographical life exists or in cases of moderate pain only because such pain can often be 
alleviated or managed by treatment.  He also believes the persistence of moderate pain can be 
a source of spiritual benefit.  However, extreme forms of pain may be unmanageable, and 
since there may be minimal benefit from these forms, Biggar argues that they are not worth 
enduring and, therefore, it is permissible to have recourse to euthanasia.  On the other hand, 
Biggar agrees with John Paul and Banner that under appropriate circumstances, it is 
permissible to provide pain relief foreseeing that this will result in death, while not intending 
death.  This idea appeals to the doctrine of double effect (DDE).  As we have noted in Chapter 
1, some scholars dispute the applicability of DDE in these cases since administering high doses 
of pain relief suggests, they say, direct intention to kill, rather than just relieve pain.274  And 
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care-givers in the hospice movement may concede that, if one administers high enough doses 
of morphine intending to relieve extreme pain, then in practice, this will likely result in death.   
(C): The Slippery Slope 
As we have seen, Biggar argued that intending to hasten death is permissible in principle in 
certain extreme cases, a view which is supported by Warnock, Macdonald and Glover.275  
However, for consequentialist reasons, he also holds one should never intend to hasten death 
in terminal disease cases in practice, since such behaviour could lead to a progressive loss of 
respect for human life.  Thus, there should be no change in UK laws prohibiting VAE and PAS.  I 
will now discuss his view on this point in greater detail.  
Even if it is known that a request to die is made voluntarily and the person is in 
extreme pain or terminal illness, Biggar believes that such requests should still be rejected, 
because the granting of such requests can contribute to a ‘moral slide’ or the degradation of 
the value of human life by encouraging others in similar situations to hasten their death.  
There is also a risk that such requests will in fact be made under pressure, because an 
individual feels like a burden on others.  And the number of such pressured requests may grow 
when a request is likely to be met.  In addition, the value of human life may arguably be 
affected by euthanasia that is non-voluntary.  To support his argument, Biggar cites two 
Netherland-based surveys from 1991 and 1996. The 1991 report stated that even with laws 
prohibiting NVE at that time, out of a total of 129,000 deaths in the Netherlands in 1990, 1000 
of these deaths were caused by euthanasia but ‘without explicit request of the patient.’276  And 
in the 1996 report, 900 deaths occurred by intentionally hastening death without patient 
consent, out of 135,000 total deaths in 1995.277 278 Based on these views, Biggar concludes that 
‘there is reason to fear that the shift from voluntary to non-voluntary euthanasia has indeed 
constituted a moral slide’ implying a degradation or rejection of the value of human life.279  So 
to uphold the value of human life, he argues that doctors should not fulfil patient requests for 
euthanasia and UK euthanasia laws should not be changed.  However, some scholars contend 
that these ‘figures, though often repeated, are not very reliable...since [NVE] is illegal in the 
Netherlands, it is unsurprising that evidence of its occurrence is difficult to collect.’280 
Furthermore, it may be questioned whether euthanasia can affect or reduce the value of 
human life in terminal illness or extreme pain because Biggar previously argued that in these 
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types of cases, the sacred value of human life is ‘lost.’281  Instead, it may be argued that 
euthanasia can disregard the value of human life only in cases when terminal illness or 
extreme pain is not a factor.  This argument may support the idea of euthanasia for competent 
patients with terminal suffering or extreme pain. 
While Warnock, Macdonald and Glover acknowledge these consequences, they 
believe that terminal suffering or extreme pain can also diminish the value, dignity and quality 
of life as well as increase dependence on others.  Therefore, permitting, but strictly regulating, 
VAE and PAS for competent consenting patients only in these cases would, in their view, inhibit 
this erosion of values for others and safeguard the patient from unwanted pressure, coercion 
and abuse.282 And ‘more stringent’ policies like these and others we have discussed may 
prevent or make it ‘less likely’ that VAE will slide into NVE or worst.283 Warnock and Macdonald 
believe ‘that with more stringent legislation, if it could be drafted, would serve to block the 
descent down the slippery slope which leads to non-voluntary euthanasia.’ 284 This view is 
similarly endorsed by the Dignity in Dying organization in their campaign to legalize euthanasia 
in the UK, and was reflected in Lord Joffe’s ‘Assisted Dying’ Bill.285  However, Badham questions 
why euthanasia should only be permitted for competent patients, since those who are 
incompetent may also experience suffering.286 But it is precisely this type of argument which 
seemingly provides the opponents of euthanasia a prime impetus to resist changes in UK law.    
Biggar is aware of the attempt to establish such regulations in the Netherlands (as well 
as the UK).  While these regulations have been somewhat successful in his view, he feels that 
there is still a risk that respect for human life will be eroded.  He states, ‘While [the 
Netherlands experience] does not (yet) support fear of a slide to the point of mercy-killing on 
demand, it certainly confirms doubts that the deliberate taking of the lives of patients can be 
confined.’287 Biggar’s argument may be supported by the fact that over fifty percent of 
Holland’s population oppose the euthanasia laws based on this reason.288  And this concern 
may also be realistic because it may be argued that no matter how strict a (euthanasia) law is, 
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it may not deter or prevent every illegality.  Warnock and Macdonald acknowledge that NVE 
can occur regardless of whether euthanasia is legal and may involve judging quality of life.289  
However, it may be argued that ‘deliberate taking of the lives of patients can be 
confined’ if there is a legal measure which allows voluntary euthanasia only.  Warnock and 
Macdonald respond directly to Biggar by citing research by Dr. Penney Lewis who suggests that 
there is ‘no evidence’ that NVE has increased due to VAE legalization in the Netherlands, 
Oregon or Belgium.290 In fact, according to Badham, Warnock and Macdonald assert that the 
permissibility of VAE and PAS in the Netherlands has served to avoid a ‘slippery slope’ implying 
a prevention of NVE and desperate attempts at suicide.291 This assertion is supported by a 
1998 study which found that legalizing VAE and PAS may not affect or may even decrease the 
frequency of NVE.292  So Warnock and Macdonald conclude that one should not ‘rely on “The 
Netherlands experience” as an argument against a change in the law.’293  These findings may 
indicate that NVE and suicide may be higher in regions where VAE is not legally permitted.  So 
a law that permits voluntary euthanasia may be beneficial to regulate or reduce NVE and 
suicide, which, in turn, may restrict ‘mercy killing on demand.’  Similarly, there is little evidence 
in the same areas to support the idea that VAE and PAS will/have put pressure on vulnerable 
or disabled groups.294  
In addition to the Netherlands, Biggar also cites the practices of the Nazi period to 
argue against legalizing euthanasia.  He believes that euthanasia may mimic or repeat Nazi 
practices, which involved manipulation, abuse and killing of those who were vulnerable or a 
burden on society such as the retarded, the elderly, the disabled, or those unable to work or 
care for themselves.295 This historical reference indicates how the rise of greater 
independence, rising health care expenses in the context of a declining economy, and the 
perceived burden of caring for these types of persons may bring a risk of eroding human 
values.  As Biggar states: ‘the record of Germany in the Weimar and Nazi periods warns of how 
medical frustration at impotence, economic pressures, the cultural worship of youth and 
physical health, and the natural desire of those who care for the incurable to have their 
burden lifted can combine to create an impatience with the handicapped, the chronically ill, 
and the dying that undermines the commitment to support their more limited forms of 
personal life.’296  This view is supported by Ian Dowbiggen and Susan Benedict and Lisa Shields 
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who similarly state that the Nazi agenda began with the ‘so called “euthanasia” program’ in 
1939 with the killing of mentally ill adults, but ‘over time [criteria for selection of killing] were 
bent’ leading to the killing of sick and disabled children and elders.297  John Harris is of the 
viewpoint that during this time ‘euthanasia’ broadly included killing those who were suffering, 
a burden on others, or who deemed their life not worth living.298  In addition, killing was also 
interpreted as a public benefit related to eugenics and racial purity, more space and benefits 
for indigenous Germans, and less usage of resources on so-called ‘useless mouths.’299 
Moreover, according to some scholars, this type of ideology began before the Nazi period and 
was inspired by the eugenics and the social Darwinism movement in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries.300  During this time, health policies were changing towards an approach called ‘racial 
hygiene’ which favoured more ‘fit’ members of society and the elimination of its weaker 
members or ‘inferior individuals.’  Biggar believes that because these types of factors can lead 
to similar approaches toward the weak in the modern era, euthanasia laws in the UK should 
remain prohibited.301  Robin Gill also expresses concerns about the negative treatment of 
potentially vulnerable persons as well as the overall image of the medical profession if 
euthanasia is legalized.302  These issues were also cited by other scholars in Chapter I as well as 
the American College of Physicians and the British Medical Association.303  But are the actions 
of the Nazi era a fair reflection of the modern euthanasia movement?  
Badham challenges Biggar’s point directly by arguing that Hitler’s ideology implied a 
‘murderous decree,’ so the Third Reich experience does not entail a slippery slope.304 
However, it may be argued that if killing was initially focused on Jews, for example, and then 
other groups (e.g. Gypsies, homosexuals, vulnerable persons) or vice versa then this process 
may have involved a slippery slope.  But Buchanan et al. believe that Hitler’s plans did not 
initially involve killing Jews and other minorities, but rather focused on ‘negative eugenics’ 
which involved purifying the German race from its weak status.305  However, on another note, 
other scholars state that during the Nazi era, Dutch physicians successfully prevented Hitler’s 
program in the Netherlands.306  Moreover, Badham argues that vulnerable groups today are 
‘less likely’ than the general population to seek assisted dying options, but does not discuss 
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why.307  According to research conducted by Margaret Battin et al., the very old (i.e. those over 
85) as well as women, the poor, and those from racial or ethnic minorities were ‘unlikely’ to 
commit euthanasia in Oregon and the Netherlands.308 This may be because a person from 
these groups may not fully comply with or meet all of the criteria for voluntary euthanasia.  
Rather, the research claimed that those who ‘enjoy positions of responsibility, independence 
and personal autonomy’ are ‘likely’ to seek euthanasia especially when these positions 
diminish.309    
Jonathan Glover, James Rachels and Peter Singer also believe that there are 
differences between the contemporary period and the Nazi period, because the former 
involves only voluntary euthanasia whereas the latter involved mass extermination.310 In fact, 
Rachels claims that the word ‘euthanasia’ was a deceptive term used by Hitler to conceal his 
agenda of ‘murderous policies.’311  It seems plausible that Hitler hid his plans behind the softer 
guise of euthanasia or the notion of Arbeit macht frei (‘Work sets you free’) to avoid detection 
or suspicion.   In fact, according to Dowbiggen, ‘Hitler gave the go-ahead for the euthanasia 
campaign in 1939.312  If Nazi killing is characterized as a form of ‘euthanasia,’ Singer believes it 
would be of the involuntary kind, so he agrees with scholars who argue that strict euthanasia 
guidelines should involve consent to prevent a slippery slope or ‘unchecked’ killing.313  For 
example, Nazi officials depicted the indiscriminate killing of more than 200,000 mental illness 
patients, prisoners and elderly patients as euthanasia, which contributed to damaging the 
reputation of the legitimate euthanasia movement elsewhere.314 Dowbiggin believes that 
these types of killings in German history ‘tainted the word “euthanasia” ever since.’ 315  If 
euthanasia involves mercifully ending suffering by terminating a person’s life with their 
consent, then the killing of innocent people during the Nazi era was not euthanasia nor should 
it be labelled as such.  Instead, such killing should be categorized as extermination or genocide, 
just as similar more recent acts in Darfur, Rwanda and Bosnia were not labelled as 
‘euthanasia.’     
Biggar acknowledges Glover’s and Badham’s point, but he argues that the experience 
of the Nazi period suggests that the legalization of euthanasia would pose a risk eroding 
human values and even a small risk of this nature should not be taken.  For this reason, Biggar 
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is opposed to changes in laws prohibiting VAE or PAS in the UK, unlike Warnock, Macdonald 
and Glover.  Although some argue for a distinction between Nazi practices and euthanasia and 
its legalization, this distinction need not imply that one cannot learn from the Nazi experience 
as well as current race-related issues.  Since the Third Reich may have influenced modern 
nationalistic groups like the Klu Klux Klan and the American Socialist Movement, Biggar’s 
points about the Nazi experience are valid today.316  History, it seems, has often repeated itself 
to yield valuable lessons.  So if euthanasia is practiced, it seems that tough laws will be 
important to avoid Nazi-like practices and restrict the practice to the case of voluntary 
informed decisions.  Proponents of euthanasia seem to support Biggar’s argument for 
euthanasia in principle as well as his case for palliative care in the majority of cases.   
According to Bryant et al., hospice care organizations claim that ‘ninety nine’ per cent 
of terminal pain cases can be managed, and in the remaining one per cent of cases, a 
‘reasonable’ quality of life can still be provided.317  And although he does not provide evidence, 
Biggar claims that hospice care can be used effectively to relieve seemingly all forms of pain, 
even to the point of lasting sedation.  As Biggar asks, ‘Does [the extreme case] mean that 
patients who are consumed with severe pain that cannot be effectively managed must simply 
be left to endure it?  Not at all.  There is no such thing as pain that cannot be relieved, insofar 
as permanent sedation can be used as a last resort, even if it were to result in the shortening 
of life.’318 However, if there ‘is no such thing as pain that cannot be relieved’, then arguably 
there would be minimal or no need or demand for euthanasia even in extreme cases of pain 
and suffering.  Although extreme cases where pain is hard to manage are rare, Biggar concedes 
that hospice care needs further improvement to manage pain in certain cases better.319 This 
type of improvement may bring about a decline in the number of euthanasia cases and change 
public perception. However, until palliative care can effectively manage all pain cases, 
proponents will arguably maintain that euthanasia in practice is appropriate for terminal cases 
involving intolerable suffering (that palliative care cannot relieve) or for lives that lack worth or 
quality that cannot be regained.320   
Some of Biggar’s arguments here warrant further examination.  First, his previous 
argument raises questions about the way resources should be used to save and extend life.  Is 
administering pain medication to ‘the point of lasting sedation’ the best approach?  What is 
the purpose of keeping someone in this lasting state?  This argument is puzzling, because 
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Biggar also favours proper allocation of resources in terminal cases, as discussed.  While 
hospice care can be effective in many cases, it should not be used to create a lasting sedative 
state as this may suggest that life is being needlessly prolonged, which Biggar also opposes.321 
Second, his overall argument seems to involve a paradox.  Biggar argues for euthanasia in 
principle with the loss of biographical life or in cases of extreme pain.  This argument is 
different from that of Banner and John Paul since they believe euthanasia is unconditionally 
wrong.  Yet, Biggar, like them, uses a Christian anthropology to make his argument for 
euthanasia in principle, which suggests that similar sources can be interpreted differently to 
reach different conclusions.  On the other hand, Biggar uses a consequentialist-style argument 
to oppose changes in UK euthanasia laws due to the potential erosion in human values and the 
risk of a slippery slope.  However, Fletcher also employs consequentialism to argue that since 
tight regulations can prevent snap decisions that may affect a slippery slope, euthanasia 
should be permissible in an effort to preserve human value.  These arguments are another 
example of the same method being used to draw contrary conclusions.  
Conclusion   
Biggar employs a ‘mixed’ method involving theological principle, recognition of the debilitating 
effects of pain, and assessment on historical and sociological grounds of likely outcomes of 
legalization.322  Biggar’s approach is different from that of the three former commentators 
because he does not adamantly declare himself either for or against euthanasia at the outset 
of his discussion.  Rather, he initially considers traditional assumptions about the value of 
human life and the fulfilment of God’s call in extreme situations of pain and terminal disease, 
and experience of past events, to formulate a similar conclusion to John Paul and Banner, 
namely, ultimately euthanasia should not be permitted in practice.323  But it seems Biggar is in 
a moral dilemma when considering various issues that lead to this traditionalist conclusion on 
euthanasia.  On the one hand, he emphasises the special value and preservation of human life 
in cases not involving extreme pain.  He also acknowledges that on occasion it may be 
justifiable to relieve pain when foreseeing but not intending death.  Biggar also takes into 
account the consequences of extreme pain or terminal disease and the effects it can have on a 
person’s response to and achieving a divine calling.  In such cases, he contends that the 
intention to hasten death may be morally permissible in principle.   
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On the other hand, such reflections are outweighed by a consequentialist argument against 
euthanasia, since its legalization may result in the erosion of respect for human life, the abuse 
of vulnerable persons and involuntary euthanasia.  While critics doubt the validity of these 
‘speculative’ consequences without the provision of empirical evidence, like Banner and John 
Paul, Biggar ultimately opposes euthanasia in practice and supports hospice care for all forms 
of pain.324  But unlike Banner and John Paul, Biggar adopts a more sociological approach to 
euthanasia and the effect it may have on society rather than a purely theological, physical or 
psychological approach focused solely on the individual.  This form of approach to euthanasia, 
which weighs multiple factors, has drawn praise from advocates and opponents of the 
practice.  Since this perspective seems to be the most balanced of the four approaches we 
have examined, it is more likely that it can serve as a compromise position on euthanasia 
within a polarized discussion.  Biggar’s more balanced perspective can reasonably draw the 
interest of Western Christians and secularist readers who are open to the idea of active 
euthanasia in extreme cases which hinder their vocational calling, allowing them to objectively 
examine these ‘multiple factors’ to make a more informed decision 
Conclusion of Chapter II: 
In Chapter II, we have examined a broad range of Western Christian approaches to euthanasia 
for the purpose of analyzing how scriptural sources, tradition, reason, experience and 
assumptions about the divine nature can shape a particular perspective on euthanasia.  In this 
chapter we have discussed the approaches of: Michael Banner, who applies a robust Christian 
anthropological approach grounded in scripture and the traditional value of human life to 
oppose euthanasia; John Paul II, who employs a traditional deontological perspective also 
grounded in scripture and value of human life to argue against euthanasia; Joseph Fletcher, 
who applies a liberal consequentialist type of approach to argue for euthanasia in terminal 
disease or extreme pain; and Nigel Biggar who uses a combination of Christian anthropology 
and secular consequentialism to argue for euthanasia in principle while ultimately arguing 
against it in practice.  
Since the perspectives chosen for this chapter are written specifically from a 
contemporary Western point-of-view using English-language sources and Western values, they 
would mainly be intended for modern conservative and progressive Western audiences, or at 
least an English-Anglophone readership.  Because there is some overlap in methods used in 
the four perspectives, the Western reader may also arrive at a better understanding as to how 
a perspective is formulated specifically from a Western context, by identifying and 
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understanding important methods and Western values which feature in these accounts. 
Moreover, this intra-Western Christian survey on euthanasia may also be compared in 
methodological terms to (Middle) Eastern Christian views on euthanasia, and other relevant 
bioethical issues in the West like abortion, stem cell technology and organ donation, as well as 
Western Islamic perspectives on euthanasia.  
From this description, we can highlight various themes or methods which may be 
similar in various Western Islamic attitudes to euthanasia, as we will see in Chapter III.  
Identification of common and different themes or approaches will be useful when comparing 
and contrasting Western Christian and Islamic approaches to euthanasia in Chapter IV.  Two 
major topics identified in Chapter II are religious anthropology and consequentialism.  
Theological anthropology can include dogmatic and practice based ideas or subject matters 
common to both faiths: for example, the use of scripture or other authoritative sources, 
specific views on the value or dignity of human life and the significance of the body, attitudes 
toward suffering and mercy in extreme conditions, viewpoints on earthly life and prolonging 
life indefinitely, and the idea of trusting God in death and dying matters.  Other aspects under 
this theme can include different faith-based or traditional practices common to both religions, 
such as asceticism, fasting, martyrdom and respect for older persons.  Conversely, there may 
be some specifically Christian ideas on euthanasia that may not be transferable such as the 
role of Christ and the use of New Testament scripture, but which can still be appealing to 
Muslim scholars and vice versa in the interest of interfaith discussion.   
The second major transferable theme identified in this chapter is consequentialism.  
This method can include a consideration of particular physical or psychological perspectives on 
euthanasia.  As we have seen, for example, under this theme we can consider how lack of 
quality of life or the breakdown of the personality by extreme pain or terminal disease can 
shape one’s approach toward euthanasia particularly if the person is unable to fulfil a divine 
vocation, spiritually grow or help others.   Another consequentialist-type idea can be the 
‘slippery slope’ phenomenon.  
In Chapter III, we will examine different Western Islamic perspectives on euthanasia through a 
similar approach to Chapter II, namely, by assessing how the use of scripture, tradition, reason 
and experience can influence Western Islamic attitudes on this issue.  Our Western Christian 
literature survey will then allow us, in Chapter IV, to compare methods of argument used by 
Christian and Muslim scholars, to consider the possibility of fruitful interaction between these 
traditions.  This survey will also pave the way for a consideration of how the Western Sunni 
Muslim perspective on euthanasia may be further developed on certain points in Chapter V.
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Chapter III: Selected Islamic Perspectives on Euthanasia 
Chapter II considered a range of Western Christian perspectives on euthanasia to analyze how 
particular uses of scripture and appeals to traditional assumptions and experience can guide a 
scholar’s reflections on the subject of euthanasia.  The role of Chapter III will be to examine 
various Islamic approaches to euthanasia with a similar purpose, namely, to identify how 
various methods of argument are employed to generate different Islamic viewpoints on 
euthanasia.   
The viewpoints examined in this chapter are specifically written by, or are restricted 
to, modern Western Muslim and non-Muslim commentators in English, but they can be 
compared to other current Western Islamic (Christian and secular) opinions on the subject.  
The authors apply a combination of contemporary Western values and ideas and normative 
traditional ethical Islamic principles and methods that may appeal to a broader Western 
religious and secular audience that hold conservative, moderate or liberal values or views.  
However, this study excludes an assessment of contemporary or historical Islamic perspectives 
on euthanasia written in Arabic or Persian due to the author’s lack of knowledge of these 
languages.       
This  chapter will describe and analyze the perspectives of, first, Jonathan Brockopp, 
second, Farzaneh Zahedi, Bagher Larijani and Javad Tavakoly Bazzaz (Zahedi et al.), and finally 
Abdulaziz Sachedina. These scholars were chosen for this study because they provide a   small 
sample of Western Islamic viewpoints on various issues related to euthanasia.  Although Islam 
almost unanimously prohibits euthanasia based on the Qur’an, Hadith and scholarly 
consensus, we should not assume that every scholar in Islamic ethics is necessarily against 
euthanasia.  As we shall see, one can argue for euthanasia on the basis of Islamic principles 
within a Western framework.   Jonathan Brockopp presents a utilitarian perspective to make 
the case that some forms of active and ‘passive’ euthanasia are permissible in very specific 
cases. Zahedi et al. argue that ‘passive euthanasia’ can be permitted in certain situations under 
consequentialist considerations.  Abdulaziz Sachedina uses a traditional Islamic approach to 
make a case against VAE and PAS. The information from this chapter will provide the basis for 
the examination of the relationship between Western Islamic and Christian approaches that 
will be undertaken in Chapter IV.  As with other issues, we will expect to find that Muslim and 
Christian scholars are in some respects alike and in some respects different in the arguments 
they present on the theme of euthanasia, because Christianity and Islam are grounded in 
shared principles and practices as well as tradition-specific ideas.   
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Before discussing these viewpoints, it is helpful to clarify some relevant Islamic terms. 
Sunna is the way of life or custom prescribed as normative in Islam, based on the teachings 
and practices of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), and the Hadith is the written collection of his 
(pbuh) narrations, actions and endorsements during his (pbuh) ministry.  Ijma can be defined 
as the consensus among scholars on certain religious issues.  According to Sheikh Al-Qaradawi, 
VAE and PAS involve a deliberate act to hasten death by the patient or caregiver through lethal 
injection ‘or the suspension of ordinary medical treatment.’1 According to Sheikh Muhammad 
bin Saalih al-`Uthaymeen, suicide is defined as intentionally killing oneself and euthanasia is 
therefore, from a moral point-of-view, like suicide.2  These forms of killing are prohibited in 
Islam, according to both scholars. The Islamic Code of Medical Ethics (ICME) also rejects these 
practices: ‘Mercy killing, like suicide, finds no support except in the atheistic way of thinking…’3 
‘Passive euthanasia’ is defined as withdrawing or withholding treatment considered futile to 
allow death to occur without aiming at death, according to Mufti Ebrahim Desai.4  Sheikh Al-
Qaradawi views ‘passive euthanasia’ as an acceptable practice ‘and sometimes it is even 
recommended.’5  The ICME adopts a similar stance: ‘If it is scientifically certain that life cannot 
be restored, then it is futile to diligently keep the patient in a vegetative state by heroic 
means.’6  However, as stated in Chapter I, some scholars do not consider this practice a form 
of ‘euthanasia,’ but rather a standard end-of-life medical procedure.  This view is also reflected 
in sources like the ICME.7 Death is clinically defined as complete cessation of cardiopulmonary 
and brain activity and is traditionally understood as the separation of the soul from the body.8  
Soul (nafs) or spirit (ruh) is the fundamental source for the existence of human life created by 
God.9  We will now examine these Islamic perspectives starting with American Islamic ethics 
scholar Jonathan Brockopp.   
Introduction to Jonathan Brockopp’s Utilitarian Perspective 
Jonathan Brockopp uses a Western  utilitarian method of argument in his book, Islamic Ethics 
of Life, Abortion War and Euthanasia, to make the case that active and ‘passive’ euthanasia  
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could be permitted in very specific cases.10  He formulates his  viewpoint based on his non-
Muslim scholarly academic interpretation  of sources such as the Qur’an, the Hadith and 
scholarly writings, as one, but not the only, way of arguing on euthanasia.  He also draws on a 
combination of tradition-neutral reasoning and clinical experience to consider ‘passive 
euthanasia’ in specific clinical contexts.  Interestingly, although Islam has traditionally 
prohibited active forms of euthanasia, Brockopp appeals to certain religious aspects of death 
and dying in Qur’an and Hadith to argue for the permissibility of intentionally hastening death 
under relevant circumstances.  
This methodological approach suggests that religious aspects of death and dying in these 
Islamic sources and scholarly writings could be interpreted in a philosophically universal or 
tradition neutral way, which can appeal to Muslims and non-Muslims, in order to reach similar 
conclusions.  Brockopp’s combined use of Western or philosophical perspectives and 
perspectives drawn from Islamic texts may explain or clarify how he arrives at a non-traditional 
or alternative conclusion.  In other words, Brockopp applies (secular) utilitarian ideas within a 
religious context to argue in favour of active euthanasia, since it may be supposed that 
euthanasia can be considered a means to a better outcome or result, where the goodness of 
this outcome is consonant with Muslim values – that is, euthanasia can be an act of mercy in 
so far as it is intended to achieve paradise and/or the relief of pain and suffering.  However, it 
may also be argued that a similar methodological approach can be utilized to reach a different 
conclusion that more closely resembles the traditional Islamic view on euthanasia, namely, the 
right response is to endure suffering through patience, prayer and medicine in order to gain a 
heavenly reward through divine mercy.       
Brockopp has four key arguments. A) The goal of a ‘good death,’ which is to attain 
paradise, has greater significance than the means of bringing about death. B) Since Islam 
allows ‘passive’ forms of euthanasia in cases when treatment is futile, not all forms of 
euthanasia are prohibited in Islam. C) Suicide can be considered an act of mercy or 
compassion. D) Lack of clarity in intention and/or circumstances should not result in 
martyrdom being confused with suicide. 
(A): The Teleology of Death 
Brockopp believes that the teleology of death is more significant than the means by which 
death occurs, since death is part of the larger cycle of God’s close involvement in human 
existence.  He argues that the divinely appointed time of death serves as a transition to a more 
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significant phase of life, namely, that involving resurrection, judgment and eternal life. The 
Islamic view of such matters, he notes, is to be contrasted with the pre-Islamic idea of death as 
having no meaning or consequence.  As he states: ‘The act of dying has no intrinsic 
importance, but rather gains its importance due to the teleology of death, resurrection and 
judgment.’11  To attain paradise, he suggests, one wants to achieve a ‘good death.’12 As he 
states: ‘The good death in Islamic theology and law embraces this teleology by focusing not on 
the pain and suffering of this world, but on God’s promise of eternal life in paradise.’13 Since an 
individual may have a greater focus on the life that is to come, Brockopp suggests that 
withdrawing futile treatment as well as PAS or VAE are worth considering as a means to 
achieving a ‘good death.’ As he states: ‘This teleology seems to be the strongest argument in 
favour of both passive and active forms of euthanasia.’14 15   
However, it may be contended that advocating active euthanasia or requesting death 
directly contradicts Islam’s clear stance on euthanasia and suicide based on the Qur’an, the 
Hadith and Sharia Law. These authoritative sources reject any form of intentional killing in such 
cases, regardless of condition or circumstance, and instead promote the use of medicine to 
manage pain to achieve a comfortable death. For example, a commonly used verse in the 
Qur’an against euthanasia and suicide is: ‘Do not kill yourselves, surely God is merciful to you’ 
(4:29). Similarly, the following Hadith also advises against killing due to its end result: 
The Prophet (pbuh) said: Whoever kills himself with a weapon made of iron, he will keep on hurting himself in hell 
with the same weapon in hell. And whoever kills himself with poison, he will keep on eating poison in hell. And 
whoever commits suicide falling from the mountain, he will keep on falling in the fire of hell forever over and over 
again.
16
    
Since euthanasia is considered a form of suicide in Islam, any such act would clearly imply 
divine punishment, as suggested by this Hadith among others.  So from an Islamic perspective, 
how can euthanasia be considered a means to a ‘good death’ or advancement to paradise?  
Moreover, Brockopp’s argument may convey an inappropriate message to contemporary 
popular culture that euthanasia and suicide-related acts can be justified if the object is to 
achieve a ‘good death’ and reach paradise.17  Although a ‘good death in Islamic theology’ can, 
according to Brockopp, be interpreted as one that is free from pain and suffering as a result of 
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extraordinary treatment or withdrawing or withholding futile treatment (Abul Fadl Mohsin Ebrahim, Journal of Islamic Studies, 
Volume 16, Number 3 (September 2005): p. 376-378).    
16 Hadith - Bukhari 7:670, Narrated Abu Huraira. 
17 Brockopp, Islamic Ethics of Life, Abortion War and Euthanasia, p. 189    
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euthanasia, it can also mean a pain-managed death involving palliative or hospice care, being 
at peace with God, being in the presence of one’s family, being mentally aware, having one’s 
finances in order, a feeling that life was meaningful, resolving conflicts, dying at home, having 
dignity and privacy and/or an overall sense of closure.18 Control over different aspects of the 
dying process need not include hastening death.  And by contrast with Brockopp’s emphasis on 
the idea of ‘focusing not on pain and suffering,’ a Muslim might support the idea that the 
endurance of suffering may serve as a way of achieving spiritual purification, spiritual maturity 
or moral rectitude, which may imply developing a closer relationship with God, strengthening 
one’s convictions or faith in God and/or the absolving of sins.  In this way, pain and suffering 
can be a means to ‘eternal life in paradise,’ making the teleology of death more meaningful.  
So while the teleology of death may be more important than the way death occurs, once 
again, death and dying need not involve euthanasia, and one might argue on Islamic grounds 
that they ought not to do so.  In addition, it may be argued that if eternal life in paradise is, as 
Brockopp states, ‘God’s promise,’ then one need not intentionally hasten death or give up the 
‘chance goods of this world’ to attain it.19 Although Brockopp uses tradition-specific reasoning 
to formulate this argument, it seems more plausible to use the same type of reasoning to 
oppose his conclusions.   
(B): ‘Passive Euthanasia’  
As we have seen, Brockopp argues in favour of active and ‘passive’ euthanasia as means to 
achieving a ‘good death.’20  He believes many Islamic scholars allow ‘passive euthanasia’ in 
futile cases because clinical judgment and physician experience dictate that futile treatment 
should be withdrawn or withheld.  Thus, he concludes, Islamic scholars cannot unanimously 
prohibit euthanasia.  This conclusion suggests that Brockopp considers withdrawing ineffective 
treatment as a form of euthanasia, but euthanasia traditionally implies a ‘gentle death’ based 
on intent to hasten death.  As he states, ‘For the muftis, it is not possible to say that 
euthanasia is always forbidden, as long as the act of euthanasia may be described in such a 
way that it does not defy the central tenets of Islamic theology.’21  For example, Brockopp 
considers the view of Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi (d. 2010), rector of al-Azhar University.  
Although Tantawi opposes active euthanasia or ‘mercy killing’ in all cases since it violates 
Islamic law, he believes physicians should withdraw or withhold treatment in futile or brain 
death cases.22 As Tantawi states, ‘[If] the heart of the patient continues to beat because he is 
hooked up to a machine, and his brain is dead, there is no fault in the family requesting the 
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20 Brockopp, Islamic Ethics of Life, Abortion War and Euthanasia, p. 189.    
21 Brockopp, Islamic Ethics of Life, Abortion War and Euthanasia, p. 178.    
22 Brockopp, Islamic Ethics of Life, Abortion War and Euthanasia, p. 178.    
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removal of the machine...they are accepting God’s decree [since] death is the separation of 
life.’23  In light of Tantawi’s distinction, it may be argued that euthanasia may be prohibited 
without exception if discontinuation of treatment is not regarded as ‘passive euthanasia,’ but 
rather standard practice, as many scholars have contended, since there is no aim to kill (see 
again Chapter I).  Therefore, Brockopp’s case does not establish that ‘euthanasia’ in one widely 
accepted sense of the term is acceptable in Islamic thought. Furthermore, Tantawi’s clear 
opposition to active euthanasia contradicts Brockopp’s previous ‘argument, in favor of both 
forms of euthanasia.’24  Is it possible then to define active euthanasia so that it does not ‘defy’ 
Islamic principles?  It seems not since active euthanasia intrinsically involves intent to 
terminate innocent human life, which is outside human authority.  Therefore, any such actions 
appear to remain clearly forbidden in Islam according to verse 4:29 and the Hadith cited 
above, and are not considered a legal form of terminating human life in Shariah Law.  
Brockopp believes that opinions like Tantawi’s demonstrate certain ‘flexibility’ toward 
medical practice, without threatening Islamic assumptions on the sacredness of human life.25  
As he states, ‘This flexibility both maintains the relevance of the classical Islamic sources and 
also offers due respect for technical and medical innovations.’26 This view suggests that 
openness to ‘technical and medical innovations’ can provide grounds for extending life, but 
not for prolonging life indefinitely, as this practice would violate the main guidelines of Islam 
on human life.  Brockopp’s stance can also be applied to other practices with ethical 
implications such as stem cell research and genetic engineering.  These practices may also find 
support in the Hadith which states that God has created a cure for every disease.  This stance 
can provide a significant impetus for human beings to advance research and exploration in 
health science and technology.27 In addition, this view assigns a clear role to physician 
authority and clinical experience when establishing death, rather than resorting to the views of 
religious scholars. 
(C): Mercy and Suicide 
So far, Brockopp has argued that in specific cases, one may have recourse to active or ‘passive’ 
euthanasia.  Moreover, Brockopp believes that killing oneself in circumstances of extreme pain 
or distress should not be considered an act of disobedience, but rather a merciful or 
compassionate response to human suffering.  As Brockopp states: ‘Euthanasia may be more 
generally defined as an act that results in the death of a human being, either by hastening that 
                                                          
23 Brockopp, Islamic Ethics of Life, Abortion War and Euthanasia, p. 178-179.    
24 Brockopp, Islamic Ethics of Life, Abortion War and Euthanasia, p. 189.    
25 Brockopp, Islamic Ethics of Life, Abortion War and Euthanasia, p. 178.    
26 Brockopp, Islamic Ethics of Life, Abortion War and Euthanasia, p. 178.    
27 Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-marda, volume 7, hadith 582.  
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death or by removing hindrances to death, for some positive purpose, usually to alleviate 
suffering.’28 Brockopp acknowledges that suicide is almost universally condemned in Islam 
based on the Quranic verse: ‘Do not kill yourselves, surely God is merciful to you,’ (4:29) 
together with the teaching that suicide will result in divine punishment.  Yet, he contends that 
although this verse is often used in the context of killing oneself, it actually refers to the 
prohibition of Muslims killing one another, following Abu Ja’far al-Tabari’s view (d. 923).  As 
Brockopp states: ‘It is worth noting, however, that while al-Tabari argues that the verse is 
actually referring to intra-Muslim conflict, and provides no direct evidence against suicide, he 
likens that conflict to a presumed prohibition of suicide.’29   
However, if al-Tabari’s interpretation is valid, then what is the relationship between 
not killing fellow Muslims and God’s mercy? Would it not make more sense to interpret this 
verse as applying to capital punishment cases or other situations of retribution?  For example, 
a Muslim (or a non-Muslim) who is to be executed or is required to pay diyah or ‘blood money’ 
(indemnity or remuneration) for a crime may be pardoned or forgiven by the victim or victim’s 
family. Based on its apparently clear directive not to kill oneself like the ‘thou shall not kill’ 
commandment, it is unsurprising or understandable that this verse has been interpreted, by 
some Muslim scholars and in contemporary Islamic sources such as the ICME, as a requirement 
not to kill oneself, so using the verse to oppose suicide and euthanasia.30  If interpreted this 
way, we can then make more sense of the reference to mercy because God can be merciful, 
by, for example, providing relief from suffering or helping the person to bear the suffering and 
seek out means of alleviation.  If this interpretation of verse 4:29 is plausible, then it would 
further support our objection to Brockopp’s first argument that active euthanasia may be 
permissible in some cases.    
Brockopp also cites the views of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 1209). Similar to al-Tabari, in 
al-Tafsir al-Kabir (The Great Commentary), al-Razi also believes that verse 4:29 specifically 
refers only to intra-Muslim conflict.  As al-Razi states, as cited by Brockopp, ‘[The interpreters] 
are agreed that this verse is a prohibition of some [Muslims] killing others.’31 On the one hand, 
al-Razi believes that verse 4:29 may be ‘useful’ as a deterrent against suicide in most cases 
based on its first part: ‘Do not kill yourselves,’ perhaps in an effort to accommodate 
contemporary exegesis of 4:29.32 However, on the basis of the second part of the verse, ‘for 
surely God is merciful to you,’ he does not explicitly condemn suicide and believes that it may 
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30 Dariusch Atighetchi, Islamic Bioethics: Problems and Perspectives (Netherlands: Springer, 2009), page 290-291; International 
Conference on Islamic Medicine, The Islamic Code of Medical Ethics, p. 65. 
31 Brockopp, Islamic Ethics of Life, Abortion War and Euthanasia, p. 184.    
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be acceptable in extreme pain or harm, as we will discuss. This view indicates that al-Razi 
seems to make a distinction between unjustified suicide and justified suicide.  Let us first 
discuss al-Razi’s view of unjustified suicide.    
Although al-Razi asserts that verse 4:29 refers to Muslims killing other Muslims, he 
also recognizes that it may be relevant to killing oneself.  The first part of the verse can be 
relevant to suicide, al-Razi argues, because it may serve as a warning to those who commit 
suicide without just motive, by extending to such people the prospect of worldly and eternal 
punishment.  Worldly punishment may mean family or community dishonour as a result of 
public condemnation and criticism, while eternal punishment could imply hell or torture from 
the source used to kill oneself, as suggested in the related Hadith cited above.33  Although 
Abdulaziz Sachedina opposes suicide from a religious standpoint, he concedes that there may 
be exceptional reasons to justify suicide which may be acknowledged to have a degree of 
validity.  On the one hand, he states: ‘In a typical Muslim cultural setting, when a person’s 
reduced circumstances result in extreme poverty and social ostracism, the decision to take 
one’s life might be viewed with as much understanding as condemnation.’34  However, he also 
asserts that ‘from a strict theological point of view, suicide trades a transient, unbearable life 
in this world for an even more horrible, eternal one beyond.’35  A similar view is supported by 
al-Razi: ‘Staying away from [suicide] in this world is obvious, due to the great suffering and 
powerful censure [it would cause].  And staying away from it is also obvious in relation to the 
afterlife, where one would be subject to a terrible chastisement.’36  
From this view, it may be inferred that suicide is not permitted at least in ‘non-
extreme,’ recoverable or manageable cases of loss, affliction or adversity.  Like Sachedina, al-
Razi seems to apply verse 4:29 from the Qur’an as a deterrent which holds out the prospect of 
eternal punishment or greater suffering than one may be presently experiencing.  This 
interpretation is reminiscent of Fletcher’s philosophical understanding of unjustified suicide.  
For example, on Plato’s view, unjustified suicide is ‘a crime against God’ and may merit eternal 
punishment.  Moreover, Fletcher’s argument that unjustified suicide implies that a community 
is ‘robbed’ of a potentially productive member may be the reason why al-Razi states that 
suicide results in worldly condemnation, community criticism or ‘powerful censure.’37      
Although it may lead to ‘terrible chastisement’ or ‘powerful censure,’ al-Razi also 
seems to argue that suicide may be justified as, for example, in cases of continued intolerable 
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suffering as well as when there are social pressures.  As al-Razi states, as cited by Brockopp: 
‘But even the believer, despite his status as a believer in God and the last day, may suffer so 
from censure and injury that death seems easier to bear than these.  In fact, we see many 
Muslims killing themselves for such reasons.’38  Atighetchi adds that suicide in these cases may 
also preserve self-dignity as continuing to live may be more burdensome than beneficial to 
society and the individual.39  Although al-Razi does not discuss the exact reasons for the 
‘censure,’ this view suggests the impact or influence the community may have on the 
individual.  Al-Razi’s view also draws attention to the limits of one’s endurance despite one’s 
faith and trust in God, which may suggest that social and other pressures serve as a ‘test’ of 
sorts.  Moreover, Sachedina acknowledges that these reasons may move others to commit 
suicide, which may support his earlier idea that suicide may meet with a sympathetic 
response.  As Sachedina states, ‘Some might even praise it as a splendid act that indicates a 
staunchness of spirit in defying such cruel and unbearable suffering.’40  In addition to physical 
and mental illness, Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi (d.1023) argues that in cases of loss of ‘virtue,’ that 
is, quality of life or intrinsic worth, suicide can be justified.41  
To support his argument for suicide in cases of pain and suffering, al-Razi seems to 
focus on the second part of verse 4:29 which states ‘for surely God is merciful to you.’ Here Al-
Razi emphasizes God’s compassion and mercy if a person kills themselves in such cases.  As 
Brockopp states, ‘Al-Razi concludes his discussion by returning to God’s qualities of mercy and 
compassion.’42 From this verse, Al-Razi seems to suggest that since God is forgiving, 
compassionate and merciful, He would not want one to suffer needlessly, so one may commit 
suicide, and eternal punishment may be withheld or negated.  As al-Razi states, as cited by 
Brockopp, ‘So He, the Most High, has made clear that He is merciful to His servants, and at the 
hour [of death] His mercy is forbidding them from all that is deserving of torment or trial.’43 So 
when looking at the entire verse 4:29 again: ‘Do not kill yourselves, for surely God is merciful to 
you,’ al-Razi seems, paradoxically, to change its translation so it states: ‘You may kill yourselves 
because God is merciful to you at least in extreme cases.’ Another translation that al-Razi may 
seem to suggest is: ‘Do not kill yourselves, [however you may in extreme cases, because] God is 
merciful to you.’ With these changes, al-Razi’s view seems to suggest that one need not endure 
extreme pain, and suicide need not lead to ‘torment or trial.’  So although al-Razi provides 
reasons against suicide, he does not explicitly condemn it, at least in extreme circumstances. 
Therefore, it would seem that one is not strictly required to follow the directive-like first part 
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of this verse.  This observation is supported by Brockopp who states: ‘so although al-Razi 
prohibits suicide, it is evident that such an act is for him neither irrational nor 
incomprehensible.’44  
However, this view contrasts with the common idea that endurance of suffering can 
lead to God’s mercy and eternal reward. This idea is reflected in the viewpoints of Sachedina 
or Zahedi et al. who have argued that the purpose of suffering may involve providing a test or 
trial.  Since God is merciful, the worldly effects of adversity or illness may be reduced or 
managed by, for example, palliative care, as opposed to abandoning hardship, which may be 
considered as ‘an act of cowardice,’ or disregarding God’s mercy for alleviation through earthly 
means via suicide.45  And suicide, as reflected in Sachedina’s views ‘trades a transient, 
unbearable life in this world for an even more horrible, eternal one beyond.’46  So it seems that 
the worldly effects of adversity or illness are less severe when compared to the effects that 
suicide may have in eternal life.  Since eliminating pain, which can only be temporary in earthly 
life, can result in permanent punishment in the next life, for Sachedina the worldly effects of 
suffering may be worth enduring, with the help of God’s mercy.   
For al-Razi, suicide may hinge on the degree or intensity of one’s suffering and 
whether it can be managed or not.  If suffering is severe or cannot be tolerated, then it is 
reasonable to infer that al-Razi takes 4:29 to prohibit the killing of fellow believers while 
leaving open the question of the permissibility of suicide.  And the consequences of suicide 
may not be as bad as Sachedina and others assert because God is merciful, at least in extreme 
cases.  As Brockopp states, ‘the tone of [al-Razi’s] discussion is strikingly compassionate toward 
human suffering.’47 This view may also imply that the worldly effects of adversity or illness may 
be worse than the eternal effects of committing suicide.  So suicide in these cases may result in 
the most favourable outcome, namely, forgiveness and paradise, as well as the elimination of 
physical and mental torment.  It is unclear, however, if al-Razi would also support euthanasia 
or killing others who are suffering.   
Since scholars like Sachedina and Zahedi et al. are part of the majority of Muslim 
scholars who oppose euthanasia using the Qur’an, Al-Razi’s argument, as a part of Jonathan 
Brockopp’s perspective, stands out as a rare consequentialist case in Islam in support of 
euthanasia or suicide through the use of Qur’anic verses. And since it is rare, this argument is 
potentially an important part of the intra-faith discussion by, for example, showing how the 
use of similar sources may lead to different conclusions.   
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Finally, in addition to the 4:29 verse, the mercy of God idea is cited several times in the 
Qur’an.  For example, at the beginning of every chapter (except one) the text reads: ‘In the 
Name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful.’  Other verses that stress God’s mercy include 2:26, 
3:31, 3:89, 4:16 and 4:110 which similarly end by stating: ‘God is much-forgiving, a dispenser of 
Grace (mercy).’ For example, Chapter (Surah) 4, Verse 110 states: ‘And whoever does evil and 
sins against himself, then asks forgiveness of God, he shall find God Forgiving, Merciful.’ 
Although no verse in the Qur’an including 4:29 explicitly refers to suicide, suicide may be 
interpreted as an example of ‘sin against himself’ to which the verse responds with the 
assurance that God is forgiving and merciful.  There are also many examples of God’s mercy in 
the Hadith.  For example, as one classic Hadith states: ‘Abu Hurayrah (rah) relates that Allah's 
Messenger (saw) said: "Indeed, before Allah created the creation, He decreed for Himself, 
'Indeed My Mercy prevails over My Anger.”’48 These examples may further support either 
Sachedina or al-Razi’s arguments.  Although there is no one verse that permits suicide and 
indicates its forgiveness, based on verses like those above which emphasize God’s mercy and 
compassion, it may be possible to justify al-Razi’s arguments for suicide in at least extreme 
cases.  It is not that suicide would be right or justified in these cases, just that it might be 
understandable, and any punishment therefore minimal.   
(D): Ambiguity in Martyrdom and Suicide 
In the previous section, we examined al-Razi’s view on mercy and suicide as discussed by 
Brockopp. Although suicide may be a clearly defined act, Brockopp believes that on occasions 
there is a lack of clarity about intention or circumstances, which may lead to the conflation of 
martyrdom with suicide.   
Brockopp also believes that there is a difference between suicide and martyrdom 
based on intention(s).  As he states, ‘the distinction between these examples remains one of 
inscrutable intentions.’49  Accordingly, he notes that traditionally the martyr gains the reward 
of heaven, while the one who commits suicide will receive an eternal punishment, because 
unlike the suicide, the martyr does not intend, or aim at, death.50  Brockopp seems to favor 
suicide in extreme situations, yet he also recognizes that suicide is a forbidden act.  Does this 
mean that a person who commits suicide when in extreme pain with the understanding that 
God is merciful may not be punished by God, as al-Razi seemed to propound?  Is every case of 
suicide judged differently by God based on circumstances or necessity? Should verse 4:29 not 
be read as an absolute prohibition of suicide, or should Muslims follow the example of those 
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Christian scholars who suppose that the text ‘Thou Shall Not Kill’ is not to be read as an 
unconditional ban against killing?   
However, Brockopp believes that when a person’s intentions and/or circumstances are 
unknown or unclear, the distinction between martyrdom and suicide can in practice become 
vague or indistinct, and martyrdom may be misconstrued as suicide.  For example, Brockopp 
cites the story of Amir b. Sinan, a soldier in early Islam, who accidently killed himself by his 
own sword while fighting.  It seemed like a suicide to those around him and they feared that 
his good deeds would be rejected and that he would go to hell.  But ‘due to [the Prophet’s 
(pbuh)] knowledge of the unseen’ he (pbuh) clarified for the people that Sinan’s intention was 
not to commit suicide, but rather to achieve martyrdom by continuing to fight.51  On the other 
hand, it may be argued that in the absence of such guidance, the nature of a person’s intention 
often remains vague and open to speculation.  Arguably, Brockopp is pointing not so much to a 
lack of clarity in how to define suicide and martyrdom and the distinction between them, but 
more to the difficulty of applying these concepts when there is uncertainty about intention.   
By contrast with the Amir b. Sinan example, Brockopp cites another instance to show 
how the martyr may inappropriately aim at death.  In this case, an injured soldier deliberately 
hastens death with the intention of gaining paradise.  Since the soldier was aiming at death, 
Brockopp believes that his actions involved ‘different intentions,’ which can lead to ‘different 
consequences,’ namely, eternal punishment.  As Brockopp states: ‘In the second case, a 
Muslim also actively causes his own death with his sword, but different intentions lead to 
different consequences.’52 Brockopp’s argument seems to involve the idea that the soldier may 
not have been in extreme pain or suffering, with the result that aiming at death was not 
warranted. This case is supported by a Hadith in which the Prophet (pbuh) declared that 
because the soldier aimed at death, his good deeds became void and he was destined to Hell.53 
Furthermore, in another similar case, the Prophet (pbuh) refused to pray over the dead body 
of a suicide at the funeral ceremony.54 However, praying over the body of a suicide has been 
debated for many centuries between the different schools of Islamic thought.55 Once again, it 
is arguably difficult to pinpoint in particular cases whether an action is martyrdom or suicide, 
especially when intention is not fully clear or disclosed.  An individual can equally not intend 
but merely foresee death or he may intend death, depending on the circumstance or situation.     
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Although it seems clear so far that martyrdom and suicide are to be distinguished by 
reference to the presence or absence of the intention to cause death, Brockopp adds a 
contemporary view to the discussion that seems to conflict with this distinction.  He cites the 
view of Hasan al-Banna’ (1906-1949) who argues it is permissible to ‘yearn for death’ to 
receive the rewards in the next life.  To ‘yearn for death’ need not necessarily involve actively 
hastening death, because yearning can equally imply simply expressing an aspiration or wish, 
through, for example, prayer or personal pleas (dua).  However, Al-Banna’s view seems to 
support the case above of the injured soldier who aims at death to achieve martyrdom and 
heavenly reward. If this is the case then based on the previous discussion the act would 
technically not be martyrdom, but rather suicide.  Further, this view would contradict that of 
the Prophet (pbuh) and send the wrong message that aiming at death can be justified if the 
object is to attain paradise.  Al-Banna’s message is troubling not least because it could 
promote an increase in modern-day violence against civilians and can contribute to the 
ongoing contentious debate over whether an act is martyrdom or suicide (i.e. ‘suicide 
bombings’). 
When the intention is not clear, Brockopp argues only God can determine whether the action 
was suicide or not, since He alone knows the true intention and circumstances of each death.  
As he states: ‘Since suicide must include an intention to die, and intentions are matters of the 
heart, only God (and his chosen Prophet) can know for certain whether any death was a 
suicide.’56  This suggests that we should not judge or suspect the cause of a person’s death 
when the situation is not clear.  Also, it may be questioned if suicide in terminal conditions is 
permissible for Brockopp.  However, based on the argument given in section A, it seems he 
would be in favour of suicide considered as an act of mercy, as a means of ending suffering and 
looking ahead to eternal life.  Yet, once again, he interestingly also acknowledges that 
euthanasia and suicide are proscribed in Islam. Conclusion 
Jonathan Brockopp presents a contemporary non-Muslim, Western utilitarian viewpoint 
supported by authoritative sources, tradition- neutral reasoning and practice-based judgment 
or reasoning to argue that ‘passive’ and active euthanasia can be justified in very specific 
cases. Despite current legal rulings against active euthanasia in Islam, this perspective indicates 
how Islamic sources can be cited in support of euthanasia from a Western point of view.  It 
seems that for Brockopp, euthanasia is right when it produces the most good or the best 
overall result, namely, paradise and the avoidance of suffering or hardships in this world.   
Additionally, his arguments focus less on the value of earthly life and more on that of eternal 
life.  For these reasons, while this type of view toward death and euthanasia is in the minority, 
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it could command wider support and appeal to a more moderate, liberal or broad-minded 
Western Islamic audience.  Moreover, his non-Muslim Western perspective may also appeal to 
other non-Muslims (e.g. Western Christians, Jews or secularists) with similar moderate, liberal 
or broad-minded views.  However, such consequentialist arguments can potentially have 
negative effects by encouraging Muslims to seek out ‘martyrdom,’ so creating further public 
hostility and morally suspect behaviour toward Islam.  Brockopp makes an ambitious effort to 
justify euthanasia and perhaps suicide at a critical time when moderate scholars are 
attempting to show that suicide and other acts of violence involving the killing of innocent 
persons cannot be justified in Islam.   
While there may be a dispute about these issues, it seems that Brockopp’s view of 
‘passive euthanasia’ reflects the opinion of many Muslim scholars, even though many do not 
regard withdrawing treatment as ‘euthanasia’ strictly speaking, but as conventional practice, 
because there is no intention to bring about death.  But if this practice can be distinguished 
from intentionally hastening death, then it is arguable that euthanasia in the strict sense of the 
term can be ‘always forbidden.’ On the other hand, Brockopp’s consideration of traditional 
views on death and dying, physician authority and judgment in futile cases and contemporary 
advances in medical science suggest that physicians have the authority and freedom to make 
critical end-of-life decisions provided that they are within the framework of Islamic principles 
on human life.  Lastly, Brockopp’s emphasis on examining the role of intention and 
circumstances implies that it is necessary to explore all necessary factors surrounding a 
person’s death, rather than assuming or suspecting a negative judgment (e.g. suicide).  
The next section will look at a broadly consequentlialist attitude in favor of ‘passive 
euthanasia.’  
Introduction to Farzaneh Zahedi, Bagher Larijani and Javad Tavakoly Bazzaz’s consequentialist 
approach:  
Contemporary Iranian Shi’ite ethics scholars Farzaneh Zahedi, Bagher Larijani and Javad 
Tavakoly Bazzaz (Zahedi et al.) present a somewhat different Islamic perspective that can 
interest a conservative or moderate Western Islamic readership or an English-language 
readership.  They argue that ‘passive euthanasia’ may be permissible in Islam in specific cases 
on the basis of consequentialist considerations.57 ‘Passive euthanasia’ is understood here as 
‘allowing’ natural death to occur without aiming at death by withholding or withdrawing 
treatment in terminal or futile cases.  Zahedi et al. use a case-based approach within a religious 
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framework to emphasize the role of reason and experience in clinical situations, patient 
autonomy in terminal situations and physician authority in futile cases such as those discussed 
by Brockopp.  This approach is espoused by Shi’ite scholars Soroush Dabbagh and Kiarash 
Aramesh who assert that in the Mu’tazilite and Ash’ariyyah traditions of Shi’ite Islam, ethical 
judgments or moral decisions are reached through the application of Qur’an and reason.58  The 
authors focus on the best action in certain terminal clinical situations that is, the action which 
will achieve the best overall outcome in accordance with Islamic principles.  Like the majority 
of Muslim scholars, however, they argue against active forms of euthanasia and needlessly 
prolonging life regardless of motive, condition or circumstance.      
Zahedi et al. present three arguments.  A) When treatment is considered more 
burdensome than beneficial, it should be discontinued (without aiming at death) as opposed 
to prolonging life indefinitely.  B) Patient wishes in advanced directives or living wills can be 
helpful in futile cases, while other requests can be problematic.  C) Physicians should have 
authority to discontinue treatment in futile cases.   
(A): Futile Treatment and ‘Passive’ Euthanasia  
Medically futile treatments are those that are highly unlikely to benefit a patient.
59
  The most important question is 
about futility; if the treatment is futile or not?
60
  The physician has a key role in carefully explaining the benefits and 
burdens of interventions near the end of life.  The idea that a treatment should provide the patient with some 
benefit that is sufficient to outweigh the burdens has been called the principle of proportionality.
61
   
Zahedi et al. argue that in cases when treatment provides little or no improvement or is more 
burdensome than beneficial, ‘passive euthanasia’ should be permitted rather than needlessly 
extending life.  Instead, these resources can be better used in cases with better chances for 
improvement.  
The authors believe beneficial treatment will typically help to improve an individual’s 
quality of life. In contrast, they argue that futile or ineffective treatment may well be 
burdensome. This idea involves what is known as the ‘principle of proportionality’ and is often 
associated with the ordinary vs. extraordinary means debate that was discussed in Chapter 1.  
Treatment may be considered futile when it fails to improve a patient’s condition, which 
implies that the treatment is extraordinary or burdensome and is needlessly extending life.  
Since futile treatment is ‘highly unlikely to benefit a patient,’ they believe it may be withdrawn 
or withheld without aiming at death, a stance which is also supported by religious guidelines 
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93 
 
on medicine.62  As they state, ‘Islamic law permits withdrawal of futile and disproportionate 
treatment’ to allow natural death.63  The authors provide Case 1 to support their argument:  
Case 1: Mr. S is a 65-year-old man with end-stage COPD, admitted last month with pneumonia.  His course was 
complicated by respiratory failure needing mechanical ventilation, and multiple efforts to wean him have been 
unsuccessful.  Awake and alert, he now communicates through written notes that he wants the ventilator taken 
off.
64
  
Mr. S has terminal lung disease implying he likely has little chance of recovering from his 
deteriorating condition. Since continued treatment would be considered more burdensome 
than beneficial in this case, ‘passive euthanasia’ is permitted here. In addition, ‘he now 
communicates through written notes that he wants the ventilator taken off,’ suggesting Mr. S 
has certain wishes to discontinue futile treatment.  In argument B, we will examine how end-
of-life requests can play a part in medical interventions.   
In end-stage cases of these types, withdrawing ineffective or burdensome treatment, 
first, will not technically count as a form of euthanasia in Islam (according to the definition 
provided by the Islamic Code of Medical Ethics) because this practice need not involve any aim 
to kill.65  Instead it may be argued that the terminal disease is the main cause of death and by 
stopping treatment, one is ‘allowing’ death to occur according to the natural course of 
events.66 Second, withdrawing ‘extraordinary’ treatment is, in Islam, one example of signifying 
the temporary nature of earthly life, which allows the patient to confront the reality of death.  
Thus, one need not use all means to sustain life particularly when quality of life has been 
significantly reduced in incurable situations.  Third, ‘passive euthanasia’ allows the health care 
provider to recognize or acknowledge their professional limits in terminal cases where there is 
no absolute duty to reasonably preserve or prolong life.  Refusal to recognize these limits or 
the inevitability of the patient’s death can arguably lead to needless life-saving interventions, 
which may cause the patient unnecessary harm.67  Lastly, limited and costly treatment that is 
considered futile in one case may be used more productively in another case.68  
This idea is also supported by Shi’ite commentators, Dabbagh and Aramesh, who argue 
that if ‘limited resources’ can be used, to, for example, save a child, then withdrawing or 
withholding treatment is permissible, according to Islamic and Shi’ite jurisprudence.69  There 
are two main theological schools of thought in Islam: Ash’arite and Mu’tazilite.70  According to 
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Dabbagh and Aramesh, the Shiite theoretical framework more closely resembles the 
Mu’tazilite school.71  The authors formulate their view primarily based on Mu’tazilite 
principles, since the Mu’tazilite perspective suggests that judgements about the moral 
goodness or badness of actions can be grounded in reason in addition to revelation and divine 
law, as opposed to relying on scripture and religious jurisprudence exclusively.  Moreover, 
Dabbagh and Aramesh claim that the Mu’tazilite perspective maintains that reason can be 
used to reach justified ethical or religious judgments, conclusions or decisions.72  So applying 
the Mu’tazilite perspective to the principle of proportionality in end-of-life medical ethics, 
Dabbagh and Aramesh argue in favour of the decision to withdraw or withhold limited 
treatment/intervention in futile cases like brain death patients (i.e. ‘non-established life’), if it 
means using the resources that could have been committed to these cases in a more 
appropriate or beneficial way in other cases, like saving a child (e.g. ‘established life’).  In fact, 
Dabbagh and Aramesh believe that most Shi’ite authorities would agree with this approach 
because it facilitates saving an ‘established life’ as opposed to ineffectually sustaining a ‘non-
established life.’73  And although Zahedi et al. do not claim to subscribe to any particular school 
of thought in their writings, it may be argued that their writings could reflect certain principles 
or ideas in traditional Mu’tazilite thought, due to their use of reason, scripture and 
jurisprudence jointly to arrive at religiously acceptable ethical judgments or decisions.  
Moreover, since the idea of reason can also be considered a Western philosophical one, 
Mu’tazilite thought can bear at least some similarity with Kantianism; but conservative or 
orthodox scholars in the Muslim world may well be disinclined to align themselves with a 
western approach, in order to formulate a purely Islamic perspective based on Qur’an and 
Hadith.74  Based on these reasons, the principle of proportionality can be a useful tool in end-
of-life cases.   
However, although futility and burden may be the most important question in some 
terminal cases, it is not the most important question in every case.  These terms are used 
when treatment fails, as in the case of Mr. S, to alleviate suffering, decrease dependence on 
others and extend quality of life.  However, if the patient can have a productive life, then what 
form of treatment may become ‘the most important question,’ which is also a question 
supported in Islam.  For example, although medically assisted nutrition and hydration may be 
considered extraordinary in some cases, it may equally be helpful in other cases.75 Moreover, 
Jonsen et al. argue that patients have the right to determine what they will accept as benefits 
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and burdens, as we shall see in the ‘End-of-Life planning’ section.76  Therefore, it may be 
argued that the principle of proportionality allows for treatment to be assessed based on the 
effect it can have in each individual case, as opposed to pre-labelling or categorizing treatment 
in general as ‘ordinary’ or ‘extraordinary,’ as we discussed in Chapter I.77 As the authors state, 
the ‘physician has a key role in carefully explaining the benefits and burdens of interventions 
near the end of life.’78 This idea is also supported by those scholars who argue that physicians 
must determine the benefits-to-burden ratio of each treatment to advise their patients or the 
patient’s surrogate.79 
Prolonging Life Indefinitely  
Zahedi et al. argue that in futile cases, an individual has the right to accept death rather than 
prolong life indefinitely.  They take this stance for religious and other reasons.  They believe 
that the withdrawal of treatment in these circumstances need not imply aiming at death, but 
only at relieving the needless burden of the treatment.  Moreover, according to the Islamic 
tradition, every individual has a divinely appointed or pre-determined time for birth, earthly 
life, and death, as suggested in the following Qur’anic verse: ‘When their time comes they 
cannot delay it for a single hour nor can they bring it forward by a single hour’ (16:61). The 
authors believe prolonging life may delay the ‘predestined time’ of death.  This idea invites 
closer examination.  
From a spiritual point of view, death is marked by the ‘separation of the soul’ from the 
body at a pre-destined time, according to Zahedi et al.’s interpretation of Persian philosopher 
Mulla Sadra’s (d. 1636) account of death.80  Given this view, it may be questioned whether it is 
possible to interfere with God’s predestined time for death or ‘delay’ death by prolonging life 
indefinitely.  Assuming verse 16:61 is true, needlessly prolonging life seemingly cannot 
override God’s predestined time of death by obstructing the separation of the soul from the 
body.  There is also the question of when exactly death occurs. When death is confirmed based 
on clinical criteria (e.g. cardiopulmonary cessation), it may be inferred that death from a 
spiritual point-of-view has also occurred (i.e. the soul has been detached from the body) 
regardless of how long the life of the body is extended.81 One may also add that loss of 
personhood or mental/cognitive function can be confirmed through clinical and psychological 
criteria.  And since clinical signs can confirm death according to Islamic requirements in these 
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ways, this would suggest that clinical criteria are arguably just as important as traditional 
guidelines, if not more so.  Moreover, keeping the patient connected to life support systems 
for an indeterminate amount of time following cardiopulmonary cessation may also hamper 
certain important Islamic rituals such as washing the body, funeral prayer, and burial since the 
dead body should be buried usually within twenty four hours of death according to Islamic 
tradition.82    
The authors believe that a Muslim ‘should be completely ready for the moment of 
death’ rather than seeking to prolong life indefinitely.83  This implies that an individual should 
submit to or accept death rather than resisting or denying death.  Like Michael Banner, Zahedi 
et al. believe submitting to death expresses trust in God that the moment of death has some 
higher meaning in respect of the life to come.84  However, it may be questioned whether one 
can ever be ‘completely ready for death,’ since a person does not know when it will occur, 
except in planned cases of euthanasia and suicide.  Although never ‘completely ready,’ one can 
nonetheless prepare for death and the hereafter by perhaps confronting these fears on the 
basis of Islamic teachings. Other forms of readiness may include getting one’s financial affairs 
in place and making sure one’s family is cared for, which can be a part of one’s end-of-life 
planning. 
(B): End-of-Life Planning 
Advance directives or living wills [can] avoid the ethical conflicts associated with withholding and withdrawing 
medical treatment.  Advance directives aim to honour individual autonomy and respect individual choice.
85
  Some 
Muslim jurists recognize as legal a competent patient’s informed refusal of treatment or a living will, which allows a 
person to die under circumstances in which there are no medical reasons to continue treatment.
86 
Zahedi et al. believe that allowing patients to express their wishes in advanced directives or 
living wills can prevent some of the ethical dilemmas associated with stopping treatment.87  
Such directives can convey wishes relating to resuscitation (such as a ‘Do Not Resuscitate’ 
order) or withdrawal of nutrients or treatments in futile conditions.  These measures can also 
prevent confusion or misunderstanding, so allowing physicians to have a clear direction or plan 
for the patient, especially if there is no designated surrogate decision maker or health-care 
proxy.  Moreover, planning can foster greater communication or rapport between the patient 
and physician, which can allow the parties to openly discuss all available treatment options.88  
On the other hand, it may be objected that advanced directives may be of limited use since a 
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person cannot accurately predict or foresee what they will do in practice in an end-of-life 
situation, and may change their decision in the midst of the situation in accordance with the 
circumstances.  
The authors support honouring such requests in cases where treatment is burdensome 
or extraordinary.  For example, in Case 1, Mr. S had a living will that expressed his desire to 
discontinue life support in his terminal condition.  As a competent patient, Mr. S is exercising 
his autonomy to refuse futile or extraordinary treatment, which is also supported in Islam 
given the declining prognosis of the case.  As the authors state, ‘Some Muslim jurists recognize 
as legal a competent patient’s informed refusal of treatment or a living will, which allows a 
person to die [where] there are no medical reasons to continue treatment.’89 Although a 
patient may have the autonomy to refuse futile treatment in these cases, in an Islamic context 
these decisions are often made with the approval of the family or next of kin based on 
professional guidance.90 
In many Muslim societies, an individual is inextricably linked to their family, tribal clan, 
social group or community.91 This means that major (medical) decisions are often made as a 
group, shaped by physician recommendations, and opposing or dissenting patient decisions 
can be overruled, so individual patient autonomy is limited.92  This approach suggests that 
cultural or traditional values can play a significant role in the decision-making process.  In 
addition, fundamental Islamic tenets such as the sanctity of life (i.e. reasonably preserving 
human life), and the requirement do no harm, as well as the ideal of accepting the inevitability 
of death, are also important considerations in the decision-making process.  Although these 
notions can reasonably apply to both Sunni and Shi’ite views of life, Seyed Mohammad Ghari S. 
Fatemi underscores that in the Shi’ite tradition, in particular, jurists make a clear distinction 
between the religious obligation to protect a life and the prohibition of killing.93   Moreover, 
Kiarash Aramesh and Heydar Shadi emphasize that unlike secular governments, formation and 
enforcement of policies and laws regarding issues like euthanasia in Islamic countries, such as 
Iran, are grounded mainly in the Qur’an, Hadith, scholarly consensus and reason.94  Other 
sources that can be used include religious-legal opinions (Fatwas) and the Islamic Code of 
Medical Ethics. 95 Scholars like Amani Babgi and Dariusch Atighetchi assert that this theological 
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approach contrasts with secular and Western systems of medicine in which patient autonomy 
is the essential part of, or a partner in, the decision-making process.96 Some legal scholars 
argue that in Western medicine a competent patient’s right to refuse life sustaining treatment 
is ‘virtually absolute,’ which means that a patient can legally decline all proposed treatment 
even it is contrary to the patient’s well being.97 However, US court rulings have determined 
that competent patients may only refuse treatment when ‘extremely’ affected by illness.98  
Given the range of views on patient autonomy in recent Islamic thought, Atighetchi believes 
that Western medicine has influenced Muslim medicine by prompting a re-examination of 
Muslim medical ethics in order to afford greater rights and autonomy to the patient.99 
Furthermore, Babgi believes that although fundamental variations exist between Shariah and 
Western laws, which would explain differences in medical and nursing practices, there is 
greater awareness of Shariah Law by Western Muslim healthcare professionals to the Western 
medical community when it comes to medical practice and professional interaction with 
Muslim patients.100  This type of idea is also discussed in ‘The Role of the Muslim Physician’ 
section of Chapter V.  Despite greater rights to the patient, does this mean that Muslim health 
care professionals should always ‘aim to honour’ patient requests?  
Zahedi et al. are of the view that although the care giver ought to ‘aim to honour’ 
wishes in futile cases, some requests should not be fulfilled, and that Muslim patient 
autonomy should remain limited.  For example, a wish to prolong life indefinitely may, as 
discussed, conflict with hospital policy or professional practice relating to use and cost of 
resources as well as personal moral views.101 We will examine a case study relating to this wish 
in the next section.  A second example involves a request to hasten death, which is discussed 
in Case 2.     
Case 2: A middle-aged woman diagnosed with acute leukaemia has refused chemotherapy for her condition.  She is 
educated, articulate and quite aware that she will certainly die without treatment.  She understands that her death 
will likely be painful and may be prolonged and requests a supply of barbiturates that she might use to take her life 
when the appropriate time comes.
102
    
The patient in Case 2 wishes to hasten her death by PAS rather than suffer prolonged pain.  A 
case like this may also involve a desire to avoid dependence on others as well as the wish to 
preserve one’s dignity.  And based on the description, the patient seems competent and is 
refusing medical advice that may be beneficial.  As discussed, at least from some secular points 
                                                          
96 Atighetchi, Islamic Bioethics: Problems and Perspectives, p. 47; Amani Babgi, ‘Legal issues in End-of-life Care: Perspectives from 
Saudi Arabia and United States,’ American Journal of Hospice & Palliative Medicine 26 (2009): p. 124. 
97 Jonsen et al., Clinical Ethics, p. 134 and 69.  
98 Jonsen et al., Clinical Ethics, p. 134.  
99 Atighetchi, Islamic Bioethics: Problems and Perspectives, p. 47. 
100 Amani Babgi, ‘Legal issues in End-of-life Care: Perspectives from Saudi Arabia and United States,’ American Journal of Hospice & 
Palliative Medicine 26 (2009): p. 126 
101 Pence, Brave New Bioethics, p. 101.  
102 Zahedi et al., ‘End of Life Ethical Issues and Islamic Views,’ p. 6.   
99 
 
of view, a competent and well-informed patient has the right to refuse all proposed 
treatments even if it brings the patient harm.103  Therefore, some scholars argue that if a 
competent patient provides an advanced directive and designates a person to fulfil their 
wishes, that person may challenge the physicians’ decision to proceed with treatment, so 
letting the patient die on the grounds of patient autonomy.104  This argument may be 
especially valid in regions where PAS is permissible, like Oregon, Switzerland or the 
Netherlands.  However, PAS (and non-voluntary active euthanasia) need not be limited to 
these regions, because figures suggest that at least 3,000 UK patients had their deaths 
hastened in 2004 with or without their consent.105      
There may be reasons for refusing PAS in cases like 2.  Based on the description, the 
patient in Case 2 is not in a terminal or chronic condition.  Second, she at present does not 
complain of being in pain, but is predicting that her condition will eventually be painful.  Third, 
even though she has the moral right to refuse it, the medically indicated chemotherapy 
(despite its many side effects) may help to inhibit the spread of the cancer and put it into 
remission, allowing her to resume her normal life. Therefore, it may be questioned whether 
the patient may have suicidal intentions or self-destructive thoughts.  If this is the case, then 
the patient’s competence or decision-making capacity may also be questioned.106  Moreover, 
her request for physician-assisted suicide may be rejected even where PAS is legal because in 
Oregon and Washington, for example, a patient must be terminally ill and that illness must be 
verified by two independent physicians if the patient is to qualify for euthanasia, as we 
discussed in Chapter II.107   
From an Islamic perspective, first, Zahedi et al. argue that ‘effective [or ordinary] 
treatment,’ which is treatment that will improve the patient’s condition or quality of life like 
the chemotherapy in Case 2, should not be refused.108  The patient in Case 2 is in an ‘acute’ 
state, so her cancer may be treatable.  They believe that ‘refusal [of ordinary treatment] is 
considered a big sin that would deteriorate his everlasting afterlife welfare.’109  Refusal may be 
considered ‘a big sin’ not only because it may be construed as suicide, which implies eternal 
punishment, but also because it may be interpreted as rejecting a gift that is made and given 
by God.  This is based on a classical Hadith which states that for every disease or condition that 
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God has created, He has also created a remedy or antidote.110  From a moral point-of-view, it 
may be argued that the patient’s decision to, for example, refuse standard or medically 
recommended treatment may violate the values or duties of the health care provider to 
provide care, avoid harm and prolong life.  This may lead the health care provider to override 
or refuse the patient’s request, as we will discuss in the next section.111 If a patient’s wishes 
are contrary to the physician’s conscience, then the physician may have a discussion with the 
patient to find other acceptable alternatives such as administering pain relief without 
intending to cause death.112 Second, based on a Hadith which states that ‘if one organ 
complains, all others share its complaint, suffering sleeplessness and fever,’ some scholars 
argue that a physical disease can have a mental effect on the individual thereby compromising 
their decision-making capacity.113 For example, a 45-year-old Muslim male with amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis, phonation and deglutition asks for euthanasia, but because his psychological 
state may be impaired his request is rejected.114 This argument may also support the 
uncertainty that was expressed above over whether the patient in Case 2 is competent or not.           
Third, even if the patient in Case 2 was in a terminal condition and was experiencing 
pain and suffering, Zahedi et al. assert that from an Islamic perspective, one does not have the 
right to intentionally hasten one’s death.  As they state, ‘Islam does not recognize a patient’s 
right to die voluntarily’ as ‘freedom of pain’ is not an acceptable rationale to hasten death.  
This is especially true in the current case since the chemotherapy could be a viable 
treatment.115 The authors also oppose euthanasia on the grounds that human life is sacred.116 
Let us now further examine this topic.  
Sacredness of Human Life  
Human life is considered unconditionally sacred in Islam.  As Zahedi et al. state, ‘The sanctity of 
human life is ordained in the Quran. Life is a gift from God.’117 The scholars believe that human 
life is sacred ‘because God is its origin and its destiny.’118 This suggests that God is directly 
present or intimately involved in human life, and He controls all phases of human existence.  
This idea is supported by the Qur’an in several places: ‘He made his seed from a draught fluid 
(male and female discharge); Then He fashioned him and breathed into him of His Spirit; and 
appointed for you hearing and sight and hearts. Small thanks give ye! And He it is Who gave 
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you life, then He will cause you to die, and then will give you life (again)’ (32:7-9, 22:66). The 
first half of this text seem to refer to God’s presence in the ‘origin,’ or beginning stages, of 
human life not only to support the sacredness of human life argument, but also to oppose 
unnecessary abortion.  As the Islamic code of Medical Ethics (ICME) states, ‘the sanctity of 
human life covers all stages including intrauterine life of the embryo and foetus. This shall not 
be compromised save for the absolute medical necessity recognized by Islamic Jurisprudence’ 
which implies cases in which the mother’s life is in imminent danger.119   
The latter half of the text above refers to the ‘destiny’ of human life and God’s 
involvement in one’s death as well as the events that occur after death.  God’s involvement at 
the end-of-life suggests that death occurs at a divinely pre-determined time.  As Zahedi et al. 
state:  ‘Death does not happen except by God’s permission, as dictated in the Qur’an: “it is not 
given to any soul to die, but with the permission of the God at an appointed time” (3:145).’120 
Additional verses in the Qur’an support this argument: ‘God gives life and he makes one to die’ 
(3:156). For this reason, ‘A person dies when it is written’ (3:185, 29:57, 39:42).121 In this way, 
the divinely appointed time of death grounds the unconditional sacredness or value of human 
life in Islam.  Moreover, euthanasia and suicide are seen to contravene the sacredness of 
human life because of the idea that there is a divinely appointed time of death.   
Since human life is sacred in Islam and is a gift from God, some Muslim scholars argue 
that intentionally hastening death should be/remain prohibited, because euthanasia and 
suicide imply spurning this gift and degrading the sacredness of human life.  As one scholar 
states: ‘Islam considers human life sacred.  Life is to be protected and promoted as much as 
possible.  It is neither permissible in Islam to kill another human being, nor even to kill one's 
own self (suicide).’122 While this statement may generally indicate that no individual should be 
killed, the Qur’an makes a clearer distinction between lawful killing such as in capital 
punishment, self defence and just warfare and unlawful killing, as we will discuss in Chapter V.  
As the Qur’an states, ‘Do not take life which God has made sacred except in the course of 
justice’ (6:151). This verse seems to shape the following ICME statement, which suggests that 
euthanasia (and suicide) is unlawful: ‘A human life is sacred and should not be wilfully taken 
except upon the indication specified by Islamic jurisprudence, all of which are outside the 
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domain of medical profession.’123 Members of the medical profession have a duty to protect 
and reasonably extend life, so some believe that ‘decisions about ending the life of a terminally 
ill patient are beyond the moral or legal purview of the Muslim physician.’124 This idea is also 
conveyed in the ‘Oath of a Doctor’ section of the ICME: ‘To protect human life in all stages and 
under all circumstances, doing my utmost to rescue it from death, malady, pain and 
anxiety…’125 The notion of protecting human life in medicine can be traced to an Islamic 
concept called divine trust.   
Zahedi et al. believe that the sanctity of human life is based on ‘a divine trust [which] 
cannot be terminated by any form of active human intervention.’126 Divine trust comes from 
the idea of Tawhid or the Oneness of God and His creation on the earth.  Divine trust means 
that humans are stewards or ‘vicegerents’ of the earth who are appointed by God to worship 
Him, spread virtue and prevent corruption.  As the Qur’an affirms: ‘Behold, your Lord said to 
the angels: “I will create a vicegerent on earth.” They said: “Will you place therein one who will 
make mischief therein and shed blood? While we do celebrate Your praises and glorify Your 
holy (name)?” He said: “I know what you know not’’’ (2:30). Another part of vicegerency 
involves responsibilities of caring for oneself, others and one’s environment.  As one source 
states: ‘Vicegerency is based upon knowledge that enables the human being to be a care taker 
of self and society along with rest of the creation as much as possible.’127    
It is these obligations that arguably make human life distinct or special among other 
forms of created life.  As one source explains: ‘The Qur’an explains that mankind holds a 
privileged position among God’s creations on earth: he is chosen as khalifa, “vice-regent” and 
carries the responsibility of caring for God’s earthly creations.’128 Moreover, because humans 
hold a special position as stewards, they are accountable to God for how they care for 
themselves and others.  As the Qur’an suggests: ‘It is He Who has made you (His) vicegerents, 
inheritors of the earth: He has raised you in ranks, some above others: that He may try you in 
the gifts He has given you...’(6:165). So stewardship in Islam seems to be part of divine trust, 
which makes human life distinct, and involves caring for the body responsibly to honour the 
sacredness of human life and respect the divinely appointed time of death.  As one scholar 
maintains: ‘The human being has only the stewardship, not the ownership, of his or her body, 
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and thus is not free to do with it whatever he or she pleases.’129  If divine trust and stewardship 
suggest caring for oneself and others, this means that euthanasia, suicide or physician-assisted 
suicide should be avoided.  
To this it might be objected: If human life is a gift from God, can an individual, as the 
new owner, not do with their life as they please, like Mary Warnock argues? Moreover, it is 
worth questioning once again if one can alter or influence the moment of death if it is pre-
determined. Recall the following Quranic verse: ‘When their time comes they cannot delay it 
for a single hour nor can they bring it forward by a single hour’ (16:61). This verse among 
others seems to imply that the moment of death cannot be altered, so suicide or euthanasia 
cannot conflict with God’s authority.  Yet, an individual arguably has free-will to commit 
suicide or euthanasia.  A few possibilities may offer a resolution of this issue.   
First, a pure free-will action may be external to the divine will, so that free will conflicts 
with pre-determination.  Second, from an atheistic point of view, it is plausible that only free-
will exists and divine pre-determination does not, so one is free to commit suicide or 
euthanasia without subjection to divine laws or consequences.  A third possibility may suggest 
that free-will and fate are compatible if free will actions such as suicide or euthanasia are a 
part of divine will and are subject to divine consequences. Perhaps human choice and freedom 
are susceptible to good and evil temptations or intentions, which are ultimately shaped by the 
will of God, and may result in a positive or negative outcome by God (e.g. reward or 
punishment).130  So God may allow one to commit euthanasia based on the urge to relieve 
suffering, but this act may result in a negative consequence.  However, if euthanasia is a form 
of suicide and suicide (or any negative action) is forbidden in Islam, then how can suicide be 
pre-determined or be relative to pre-determination?  And if, for example, God causes evil 
actions to occur like rape, murder or genocide, how do we reconcile this image of God with a 
God that is Good, Just and Kind? The difficulty with this view is that it may seem that God is 
responsible for, or involved in, these types of actions.  Whether free actions interfere with the 
pre-destined time of death remains perhaps unclear.  What is clear, however, is that how and 
when death will occur is known only by God, according to the Qur’an and Hadith.  Muslim 
physicians may take this thought into consideration when making end-of-life assessments to 
terminate ineffective treatment.  
 
(C): Physician Discretion in Futile Cases 
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Decision making on the issue of withholding or withdrawing treatments is a very difficult duty of health care 
providers, particularly when the patient or her/his family are not in agreement with the medical team’s decision.
131 
As we have seen in the previous argument, Zahedi et al. maintain that patients have the right 
to refuse futile treatment.  In addition, they believe that physicians have the authority to 
discontinue treatment in futile cases, even when family and physician are in disagreement. 
So besides patient autonomy, another element of the physician-patient relationship is 
paternalism, which can involve the physician ‘overriding or ignoring’ patient wishes in the 
interest of doing what is best for the patient.132 According to some sources, paternalism has 
historically been an important part of medicine and the decision-making process especially 
with patients who have lower comprehension levels.133 This crucial role as care taker of society 
has placed physicians in a position of high prestige, respect and authority.134  However, as 
indicated in the previous section, currently there is a greater effort to involve the patient (or 
their surrogate decision maker) in the decision-making process, thereby creating more equal 
patient and physician roles.  On the one hand, autonomy and paternalism arguably need not 
necessarily pose an issue if there is no major disagreement or conflict about a patient’s 
decision or plan.  For example, as discussed, a physician’s advice to withdraw futile treatment 
based on their clinical judgment and experience may be accepted by the patient in 
consultation with loved ones.  However, there may be similar scenarios in which there is a 
difference of opinion.  For example, a physician’s advice to withdraw futile treatment may be 
met with resistance or rejected by the patient, and they or their loved ones may be adamant 
that all measures should be applied.135 Case 3 highlights this example: 
Case 3: Mrs.  J is a 50 year old woman with ovarian cancer which has now relapsed.  She is now nearing the end of a 
trial of a new chemotherapy regime with no sign of improvement.  Mrs. J has said to her brother that she believes in 
miracles although the consultant team has told her that she has only a few weeks left to live.  Given her advanced 
disease, it is likely that vital organs will fail.  Therefore, the medical team decided that, if Mrs. J has a cardiac arrest, 
resuscitation would not be appropriate.  This is because she will die very shortly from her cancer.  But Mrs. J and her 
children say they want everything done for her, including CPR.
136 
Unlike Case 2, Mrs. J seems to be in a terminal stage of cancer with minimal beneficial 
response from experimental chemotherapy and foreseeable systemic failure.  Since death 
seems imminent, the physicians have advised against resuscitation, continued treatment or 
needlessly prolonging life via medical assistance.  However, despite ‘no sign of improvement,’ 
the patient’s family insists that all measures be taken to preserve her life perhaps based on 
their religious convictions and the hope for recovery.137 Based on the circumstances in this 
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case, Zahedi et al. argue that the physicians should discontinue care in spite of Mrs. J’s wishes.  
They cite previous arguments to support their case.  With little or no chance for recovery 
based on clinical data and prognosis: a) treatment is seen as more burdensome than beneficial 
since ‘it is likely that vital organs will fail’ and she will ‘die very shortly’; b) unnecessary or 
further experimental treatment may challenge hospital policy on resource use, and treatment 
may be used elsewhere with greater chances for recovery.138 These reasons partially support 
the argument of the previous section, that although patients have autonomy, it is limited by 
cultural and religious values as well as the objectives of medicine, which involve reasonably 
prolonging life as well as accepting death when nothing more can be done.  
Even though the authors argue that physicians should have the right to discontinue 
treatment in futile cases, they also believe it ‘is a very difficult duty.’139 It is an obligation to 
honour patient wishes, provide care and alleviate pain, and withdrawing treatment may even 
seem contrary to these professional duties to a Muslim physician.140 However, withdrawing 
futile treatment in these cases can also serve as a reminder that there are medical, economic 
and religious limits to one’s professional duty and what a health care provider can/should do 
to reasonably prolong life.  While acting on the ‘duty’ to withdraw futile treatment should 
arguably not be difficult, it may be hard to separate professional responsibility from personal 
feelings.  In practice, arranging an ethics consultation or speaking to another family member of 
Mrs. J to get another perspective may be advised and beneficial.  Patricia Marshall argues that 
ethics consults are becoming more common as the issues become more complex especially at 
the end-of-life.141  Ethics consults can help the patient (or family) identify, explore and discuss 
issues related to the case that may be broadly linked to personal circumstances, religious 
principles and cultural values in order to make morally appropriate decisions, and ethics 
consults can also be a way of improving institutional ethics policies.142 In this way, the success, 
product or effectiveness that comes from the ethics consult is determined by the parties 
involved and their contribution to the discussion.  
Although the authors argue that physicians should have the authority to override 
patient wishes in futile cases, it may be contended that physician authority can be misused or 
abused to harm the patient.  For example, the physician may non-voluntarily hasten the death 
of the patient for the sake of their best interest.  A physician may also use their power to 
unlawfully perform VAE or PAS.  On the one hand, Zahedi et al. argue that physicians do not 
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have the right to intentionally hasten death in any case by citing the arguments we noted 
above.  As the authors state, ‘Health care providers must do everything possible to prevent 
premature death.’143  However, a physician may in practice hasten the patient’s death out of 
compassion or mercy to alleviate their prolonged intense suffering, reduce their burden on 
others and preserve their dignity.  So the physician here would not consider euthanasia as an 
abuse of power, but rather a benefit to the patient.  An example of this may be the case of Dr. 
Howard Martin, the retired GP who admitted to hastening the death of a number of patients 
based on his ‘discretion’ out of ‘“compassion” for patients’ dignity.’144 Dr. Martin is not alone 
in the UK; according a survey, 1 in 7 UK doctors admit to intentionally hastening death.145  
Conclusion: 
Farzaneh Zahedi, Bagher Larijani and Javad Tavakoly Bazzaz use a consequentialist mode of 
argument from an Eastern Shi’ite Islamic perspective to make the case that ‘passive 
euthanasia’ can be permissible in Islam in certain medical situations.  The authors also ground 
their stance on euthanasia within a religious perspective by referring to some scriptural verses 
and the views of religious scholars.  They also shape their progressive and modern perspective 
on the basis of arguments of the kind which are advanced by secular commentators who 
appeal to reasoning and experience in clinical situations.  And the fact that the authors 
conveyed their perspective in English may be intended to demonstrate that their Eastern 
Shi’ite values, ideas and methods can resonate with a Western Islamic and Christian audience 
that may find similar values, ideas and methods in common.    
For example, for these authors, withdrawing futile treatment, respecting patient 
autonomy and allowing, within limits, authority to physicians yield the best overall results, and 
these types of practices are also observed and valued in the Western world. These results may 
include giving patients more freedom to make decisions about their own life and allowing 
physicians to curtail the ineffective use of costly and valuable treatment.  In a world where 
resources are not unlimited and costs fluctuate with supply and demand, the authors place an 
important responsibility on health care professionals today to use resources judiciously.  
Effective end-of-life planning also signifies a shift from the once-accepted paternalistic notion 
that the physician ‘knows all and knows best.’ Instead, argument B encourages the patient to 
be more pro-active, engaged and interactive in the health care process.  However, like most 
Muslim or religious scholars, Zahedi et al. oppose any form of active euthanasia or prolonging 
life indefinitely. These arguments demonstrate a balance between recognizing religious 
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principles relating to death and dying and allowing a role for practical and cost considerations 
in end-of-life situations which can also plausibly appeal to a moderate Western audience.  
Thus, this perspective can be regarded as a constructive addition to the dialogue about end-of-
life health care within an Islamic or interfaith setting from an Eastern or Western perspective.   
The next section will examine a traditional perspective against euthanasia propounded by 
Abdulaziz Sachedina.   
Introduction to Abdulaziz Sachedina’s anthropological approach 
American Shi’ite Islamic ethics scholar Abdulaziz Sachedina applies an modern anti-
consequentialist method supported by Qur’anic verses and tradition-specific reasoning.146 
Sachedina presents one dogmatic argument and one practice-based argument. A) Since 
suffering can be meaningful, one should not intentionally hasten one’s death, but rather 
approach suffering with patience in God while at the same time where appropriate seeking out 
medical treatment. B) There are two forms of ‘passive euthanasia’ which are permissible.  
First, administering medication intended to relieve pain where this unintentionally but 
foreseeably will result in death.  Second, withdrawing or withholding ineffective treatment 
which is a decision that is made as a family in consultation with the physician.   
(A): Suffering and Euthanasia 
Let us examine Sachedina’s Islamic perspective on suffering.  He argues that suffering may 
derive from ‘moral evil’ or ‘physical or natural evil.’147 Suffering that is caused by ‘physical evil’ 
may be generated by a natural phenomenon like an earthquake, which is caused by God or 
‘mysterious sources’ rather than a personal agent.148 And suffering that is interpreted as a 
‘moral evil’ may be caused by a person’s wrongdoing or bad behaviour.149 For example, chronic 
smoking may result in lung cancer, or eating unhealthy food or physical inactivity over a long 
period of time may lead to a heart attack.  He believes that suffering can be interpreted 
variously as a spiritual test or a trial, a type of spiritual purification or divine punishment.  He 
argues that suffering does not justify euthanasia or suicide; rather, one should approach 
suffering with patience and perseverance.     
Let us first examine a little more closely the idea of ‘physical or natural evil.’ An 
earthquake, for example, can cause suffering and grief from a mental, physical and emotional 
standpoint depending upon the nature of the loss or destruction.  Due to the destructive 
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nature of such disasters, Sachedina is reasonable in considering natural phenomena of this 
type a physical or natural ‘evil.’  However, from a theological standpoint it may be argued that 
if ‘physical evil’ is a spiritual test, then it need not necessarily be called ‘evil.’  For example, the 
Qur’an asserts: ‘Be sure We shall test you with something of fear and hunger, some loss in 
goods, lives and the fruits (of your toil), but give glad tidings to those who patiently persevere. 
Ye shall certainly be tried and tested in your possessions and in your personal selves’ (2:155, 
3:186). The Qur’an then states that those who ‘patiently persevere’ in the face of such tests 
will receive an eternal reward: ‘Did ye think that ye would enter Heaven without God testing 
those of you who fought hard (in His cause) and remained steadfast’ (3:142)?150 An earthquake 
may cause suffering and distress from physical destruction and loss of life.  However, if an 
appropriate Islamic response to suffering is patience and perseverance, as Sachedina argues, 
and if this may result in heaven, then a natural phenomenon of the kind need not be ‘evil.’ 
Sachedina argues that another advantage of suffering as a trial is its capacity to affect 
spiritually cleansing (Tazkiyah) by bringing about the absolution of sins, which may prevent 
punishment for those sins in the earthly world as well as the eternal world.  This stance is also 
supported by Zahedi et al. who state: ‘Pain functions as an instrument in revealing God’s 
purpose for humanity.  In addition to this spiritual and moral dimension, pain has an 
educational purpose.  As such, pain is a means to self-purification after sinful behaviour.’151  
This possible explanation of suffering is also supported by Hadith.152  Since a good action or 
experience can cancel out bad according to Islamic doctrine, it may be inferred that suffering 
may be a good that can negate sin, similar to the way prayer or fasting nullifies 
transgressions.153  Therefore, once again, it need not be considered ‘evil’ in every case.  
Sachedina seems to acknowledge this point when he states that an ‘afflicted human is 
expected to reflect on the positive role suffering plays in sharpening awareness of God’s 
infinite presence.’154   
Sachedina also argues that ‘physical or natural evil’ can be a way of asserting God’s 
power or dominion over creation and recognizing the imperfection and weakness of man. 
Once again, if natural phenomena are happening for these reasons, then should suffering 
which derives from them be regarded as ‘natural evil’?  Rather, if, for example, an earthquake 
makes the community more grateful or express greater awe of God’s awesome power, then 
suffering that is caused by an earthquake need not be interpreted as ‘evil.’  Sachedina seems 
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to acknowledge this when he states that natural phenomena may occur to teach humanity ‘a 
lesson in humility.’155 In fact, the previous argument that suffering can be a ‘test’ provides a 
further example of how it can lead to humility.  As the Qur’an suggests, ‘He knows what is 
before them, and what is behind them, and they offer no intercession except for those who are 
acceptable, and they stand in awe and reverence of His (glory).  If He wills, He causes the wind 
to cease, then they would become motionless on the back (of the sea). Verily, in this are signs 
for everyone patient and grateful.  And We seized them with extreme poverty (or loss in 
wealth) and loss in health with calamities so that they might believe with humility’ (21:28, 
42:33, 6:42).    
Sachedina argues that suffering which is caused by ‘physical or natural evil’ can also be 
construed as a ‘divine punishment.’156  This association seems more appropriate because in 
this case both terms have negative overtones.  However, suffering that is interpreted this way 
may result in individual repentance as well as community reform, so such suffering need not 
be wholly negative. This thought is also supported by the Qur’an: ‘God sets forth a parable: a 
city enjoying security and quiet, abundantly supplied with sustenance from every place: yet was 
it ungrateful for the favors of God: so God made it taste of hunger and terror (in extremes) 
(closing in on it) like a garment (from every side), because of the (evil) which (its people) 
wrought.  Those who had been despised will say to the arrogant ones: "Nay! It was a plot (of 
yours) by day and by night. Behold! Ye ordered us to be ungrateful to God and to attribute 
equals to Him!" They will declare (their) repentance when they see the Penalty’ (16:112, 34:33).  
Even so, it may be fair to argue that it can be difficult to prove that a natural phenomenon 
occurred for one of these theological reasons and not another.  An atheist may equally 
interpret a storm or an earthquake as a meteorological or geological occurrence based on 
physical principles. 
Another form of ‘evil’ that Sachedina discusses as a part of his interpretation of 
suffering is ‘moral evil.’ 157 He defines ‘moral evil’ as suffering that is caused by a personal 
agent’s wrongdoing.  The examples mentioned of ‘moral evil’ were chronic smoking, which 
may result in lung cancer, or eating unhealthy food or physical inactivity over a long period of 
time possibly leading to a heart attack. These actions, namely, smoking or overeating can 
arguably be regulated or prevented by the individual.  So it is fair to argue that competent 
individuals should be responsible or held accountable for their voluntary actions, especially if 
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they are aware of the consequences.158 And with greater responsibility, the individual may 
then confront their present lifestyle habits and behaviours and introduce changes therein like 
dietary modifications and exercise.159 In addition to a physical type of purification, Sachedina 
suggests that health related suffering can also be interpreted as spiritual purification, which, as 
discussed, involves the removal of sins.160 It may be fair to conclude that since suffering, at 
least in these types of case, may be a form of corrective action, it should not be called ‘evil.’161 
However, Sachedina argues that the suffering of ill health can also be interpreted as a 
form of divine punishment or ‘divinely ordained suffering.’162 This is because health related 
suffering can be an example of ‘both moral and physical evil, combining personal culpability 
with circumstances beyond human control.’163 In the context of health related suffering, good 
health in Islam can be considered a divine gift, so ruining or polluting that gift by avoiding a 
moderate lifestyle can be considered a ‘moral evil’ which brings divine punishment.164 Other 
violations of God’s moral and natural laws may also be seen as causes of this suffering.165 For 
example, it may also be argued that suffering may be the result of performing ill deeds, acts of 
disobedience or creating injustice.166  This argument would again support the idea that 
suffering is not simply caused by, or does not only involve, the agent.  So suffering, at least in 
these cases, may be a result of one’s own actions (or negligence) and may also be divinely 
predestined or a part of the divine plan.  On the other hand, one may question why suffering 
as evil or as punishment exists if God is All Good and All Merciful.  This is the main question 
related to the issue of theodicy which humanity has been attempting to understand for 
centuries.167 Does God also play a role in ‘moral evil’ type suffering and if so, to what extent?  
Does God’s role in ‘moral evil’ make God evil?  Furthermore, how do we explain suffering that 
is not caused by one’s actions such as the suffering of a child (e.g. leukaemia) or suffering 
caused by a genetically related disease (e.g. cystic fibrosis, breast cancer or Parkinson 
disease)?  What is God’s role in these forms of suffering and what does it mean?  Due to many 
unanswered questions, it is arguably difficult to develop a clear understanding of suffering, at 
least from an Islamic standpoint.  Other religions morally struggle with similar questions.   
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Whatever the form of suffering, Sachedina argues that suffering does not give a 
person the right to intentionally hasten their death.168 This is because, first, humans are 
stewards or caretakers of their life, so a person is ‘not free to do with it whatever he or she 
pleases.’169 Second, one does not have the ‘right to die’ because human life is grounded in a 
divine trust between God and the individual which ‘cannot be terminated’ by any active 
human involvement.170  Third, the term of earthly life is ‘fixed’ or pre-determined according to 
the Qur’an (3:145 & 3:156).171 Rather, Sachedina believes that the correct response is patience 
as well as the use of palliative care even if pain relief results in unintentional but foreseen 
death.172 This argument is partially based on the idea that for every ailment or pain, God has 
created a cure or relief.173 Based on these reasons, the Muslim physician does not have the 
right to assist in hastening their patients’ death which is an act that has no immunity in Islamic 
law.174 On the other hand, one may argue that if a person is not able to care for their life any 
longer, if they become a burden on others, or if they cannot live to their full capacity any 
longer due to progressive suffering, then they should have the right to intentionally hasten 
their death.175 What is the appropriate course of action in rare cases of extreme pain that 
palliative care fails to manage? And once again, if the earthly term of life is ‘fixed,’ then is the 
moment of death that is caused by euthanasia or suicide the predetermined time of death, or 
do these acts imply interfering with or altering the ‘fixed’ time of death?  
(B): End-of-Life Decisions involving ‘Passive’ Euthanasia 
In the previous section, we discussed different aspects of Sachedina’s case for the idea that 
suffering does not justify active euthanasia.  In the next section, we will discuss his perspective 
on ‘passive euthanasia.’  Sachedina believes there are two types of ‘passive’ euthanasia.  
First, he argues that ‘passive euthanasia’ can be interpreted as administering 
medication intended to relieve or manage pain where this can unintentionally but foreseeably 
result in death. 176 As we have seen in Chapter I, this distinction between an intended effect, 
namely, pain relief, and an unintended effect, namely, death, is at the heart of the doctrine of 
double effect (DDE). Since the intention was not to kill, Sachedina argues that the physician is 
exempt from wrongdoing.177 However, if the physician is charged with, or suspected of, killing 
the patient, how does the physician prove that their intention was to relieve pain and not to 
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169 Sachedina, Islamic Biomedical Ethics, p. 168. 
170 Sachedina, Islamic Biomedical Ethics, p. 167-169. 
171 Sachedina, Islamic Biomedical Ethics, p. 167-169. 
172 Sachedina, Islamic Biomedical Ethics, p. 99. 
173 Sachedina, Islamic Biomedical Ethics, p. 167. 
174 Sachedina, Islamic Biomedical Ethics, p. 167 and 169. 
175 Badham, Is there a Christian Case for Assisted Dying?, p. 66.   
176 Sachedina, Islamic Biomedical Ethics, p. 170. 
177 Sachedina, Islamic Biomedical Ethics, p. 170. 
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kill? 178 Conversely, how does the prosecution prove that the intention was to kill rather than 
to relieve pain?  As we discussed in Chapters I and II, the applicability of DDE in these cases 
may be disputed since a physician may intend to administer a high amount of morphine, for 
example, to kill as a way of relieving pain.  According to one survey, 62 per cent of health care 
professionals believe that UK physicians have administered pain-relieving drugs with the intent 
to hasten death.179  Due to a fear of causing premature death, physicians have traditionally 
been hesitant about providing large amounts of pain medication.180   
A second form of ‘passive euthanasia’ involves withdrawing futile treatment. 
Sachedina believes that physicians may face a dilemma when it comes to treating end-of-life 
patients. Muslim physicians have an obligation to save and preserve life and maintain quality 
of life, and with the recent rise of technology, there may be increased pressure on physicians 
to extend life (needlessly) and avoid death.181  However, he also believes that withdrawing or 
withholding treatment that is not contributing to the overall progress or quality of the 
patient’s condition is justified from a clinical and Islamic perspective.182 Based on this 
description, he makes a distinction between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ euthanasia because 
withdrawing futile treatment need not involve any aim to kill; rather, it is the disease which 
will then cause death, and by withdrawing treatment one is simply allowing death to occur.183 
However, if Sachedina is claiming that withdrawing ineffective treatment need not involve 
intent to kill, then it may be argued that this action should not be considered a form of 
euthanasia.  Rather it may be best to appeal to the distinction between ‘killing vs. letting die’ 
as we discussed in Chapter I. 
Sachedina argues that although a competent patient may refuse futile treatment 
based on Shariah Law, such decisions are usually made as a family in consultation with the 
physician, at least in many Muslim communities.184  This is because, as discussed in the Zahedi 
et al. section, the individual’s welfare is linked to that of their family, clan or community and 
the physician traditionally holds great power and influence due to their expertise and 
experience.  So a group decision can be a way of protecting the wellbeing of the individual by 
doing what is in their best interest, especially if the patient is vulnerable (e.g. elderly, disabled, 
poor, incompetent).  Further, this practice allows the patient to acknowledge the inevitability 
of a death that is divinely controlled and lets the care giver recognize their professional limits.  
This recognition may prevent the use of ‘aggressive’ and ‘burdensome’ responses that go 
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beyond a physician’s fundamental duties to preserve life in terminal cases.185  So treatment or 
resources, he argues, can then be used ‘in a better way,’ that is, treatment can be used in 
other cases that have better prognoses.186   
Allocation of Health Care Resources 
The resources which are freed up by withdrawing ‘extraordinary’ treatment in one case 
(without intending death) may then be distributed to another case where that treatment is 
considered useful or beneficial.  Considering the costs and availability of health care resources, 
Sachedina argues that the resources that would otherwise be committed to futile treatment in 
terminal cases may be used more effectively or productively in cases with greater chances for 
recovery.187 Reserving resources for higher recovery cases might enable a reduction in health 
care costs, or at any rate a better outcome for a given cost. Clearly, this approach suggests the 
need for a degree of selectivity in determining the best use of resources to achieve the most 
favourable results.  This type of process would be helpful because in some regions, financial 
corruption and misuse of funds has led to widespread mismanagement of resources, which has 
contributed to the increase in costs and reduction in supplies.188  Although health care 
resources in futile cases can be used in more promising cases, this does not answer the 
question of what or who decides the best usage of health care resources in other cases in light 
of rising health care costs and restricted supplies.  A related issue concerns how resources 
should be allocated in the care of non-terminal patients or if health care should ever be denied 
due to lack of funds or due to pre-existing conditions.  These are some of the many 
contentious issues that are being discussed in the ongoing debate about health-care reform in 
the USA.  
Conclusion   
Abdulaziz Sachedina presents an Western contemporary anti-consequentialist argument 
against active euthanasia based on tradition specific assumptions and clinical reasoning.  
Sachedina’s writings on death and dying give us some indication as to what his attitude is 
toward euthanasia.  His arguments give the reader a better understanding of what the nature 
and significance of suffering may be given an Islamic framework.  Although health related 
suffering can be considered a ‘moral’ or ‘physical’ evil, it need not be thought of in these terms 
since suffering can involve a test, which can result in an eternal reward or a process of spiritual 
                                                          
185 Sachedina, Islamic Biomedical Ethics, p. 165. 
186 Sachedina, Islamic Biomedical Ethics, p. 167. 
187 Sachedina, Islamic Biomedical Ethics, p. 166.   
188 Sachedina, Islamic Biomedical Ethics, p. 166.   
 
 
114 
 
cleansing.  Since suffering can be beneficial, the response to suffering which Sachedina 
advocates, namely, patient waiting for God’s help and the provision of support to endure 
suffering, but at the same time, actively seeking pain relief, seems justified in Islamic terms.  
Sachedina also seems to emphasize a more important lesson for Muslims, which is accepting 
responsibility or accountability for one’s actions when it comes to caring for one’s body.  Some 
forms of suffering can be avoided or prevented.  Not taking care of one’s body can cause 
suffering, but suffering can also be an opportunity to reform one’s lifestyle or habits.  
However, many interesting questions regarding suffering clearly remain unanswered.   
Sachedina’s advocacy of pain relief is compatible with the Islamic view of seeking cure 
or treatment, where these have been made available by God in creation.  It also suggests how 
religion and medicine can collaborate to understand illness and improve the condition of 
society.  Withdrawing treatment that does not benefit the patient is justified on this approach, 
because it allows the patient to acknowledge death, the professional to recognize their limits, 
and the use of restricted and costly treatment in a more effective manner.  His argument that 
end-of-life decisions should be made by family rather than the individual indicates the 
influence of the family unit in certain cultures and traditions and how an individual decision 
can potentially impact a larger populace.  Although his perspective has the potential for 
appealing to conservative Western values against terminating human life such as in euthanasia 
and abortion, his arguments against euthanasia are unlikely to effect reconciliation with 
advocates of euthanasia.  However, Sachedina’s perspective on euthanasia has the potential to 
be a significant strand in the Islamic approach toward death and dying and a useful reference 
point for comparison with Christian approaches.      
Conclusion to Chapter III 
Chapter III has looked at three examples of  Western Islamic approaches to 
euthanasia.  .  We limited our study of Islamic perspectives to English-language perspectives by 
Western and Eastern Muslim and non-Muslim scholars in Islamic ethics who argued in favour 
of or against active euthanasia.  Jonathan Brockopp uses a utilitarian mode of argument 
combined with scripture, scholarly viewpoints, tradition- neutral assumptions and clinical 
reasoning to argue for ‘active’ and ‘passive’ forms of euthanasia. Farzaneh Zahedi, Bagher 
Larijani and Javad Tavakoly Bazzaz use a similar consequentialist mode of argument and 
tradition specific reasoning and clinical experience to make the case for ‘passive euthanasia’, 
patient autonomy and physician discretion in futile cases.   Abdulaziz Sachedina applies an 
anti-consequentialist method of argument with Quranic verses, tradition-specific reasoning 
and clinical experience to argue against active euthanasia. 
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These scholars applied a combination of traditional Islamic principles, ideas and 
sources, as well as customary (or recognizable) Western values and practices, such as 
autonomy and withdrawing or withholding futile treatment.  Therefore, these perspectives 
may plausibly appeal, but not necessarily be restricted, to a Western or English-speaking 
audience.  Although limited in the scope of our study, these perspectives can reasonably be 
compared to other contemporary Western Islamic perspectives on euthanasia, (Middle) 
Eastern English-language perspectives on euthanasia, traditional Arabic or Persian influenced 
views on euthanasia, historical Islamic interpretations on the subject, as well as positions from 
other religious traditions. For the purposes of this study, the objective of this chapter was to 
assess how various methods of argument and associated resources such as scripture, tradition, 
reason and experience can be influential in shaping a specifically Western Islamic perspective 
on euthanasia.  This assessment was done so these Islamic perspectives may be compared to 
Christian methodological views on euthanasia from a Western perspective, in order to create 
an expanded Western Sunni Islamic account of euthanasia, as well as develop a broader 
monotheistic interfaith understanding on euthanasia and theological ethics.  
From this descriptive survey, there are certain key ideas that can be used for the 
analysis and comparison with Christian approaches which will be undertaken in Chapter IV.  
One major theme is utilitarianism.  This perspective has produced arguments in favour of 
‘passive euthanasia,’ patient autonomy and physician authority in futile cases and against 
prolonging life indefinitely, since these approaches would produce the best or worst 
outcomes, respectively.  Consequentialism has also been used to support active euthanasia to 
achieve a ‘good death’ and as an act of mercy in cases of extreme pain and suffering.  In 
addition, there were arguments shaped by a combination of consequentalism, tradition-
specific assumptions on death and dying and clinical reasoning.  A second major theme is anti-
consequentialism.  This method has influenced more religiously focused arguments against 
active euthanasia based on the value of life and suffering, the divinely appointed time of 
death, and the mercy of God as the healer of all diseases.   
The Christian and Islamic approaches discussed in Chapters II and III can now be 
brought into dialogue in Chapter IV with the objectives of: recognizing what methods and/or 
sources are similar or comparable between Christians and Muslims and understanding how 
these methods and resources are used to arrive at similar or different conclusions on 
euthanasia from a Western tradition.  We will also be interested in the possibility of 
meaningful interfaith dialogue on this and possibly other topics that are of interest to both 
traditions.  Chapter IV will also help us to assess what topics in Islamic medical ethics invite 
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further exploration given the course that has been taken by the Christian discussion.  On this 
basis, Chapter V will seek to formulate a more comprehensive and extended Western Sunni 
Islamic perspective on euthanasia, and to make thereby a contribution to the Islamic literature 
on this subject as well as providing a tool for interfaith and intra-faith exchange. 
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Chapter IV: Western Christian and Islamic Viewpoints: A Comparative Discussion 
Following an initial overview of some central concerns of this thesis in Chapter I, Chapter II 
examined various Western Christian perspectives on euthanasia with a focus on the methods 
Christian ethicists use to formulate their respective perspective.  Chapter III employed a similar 
approach to look at different Islamic viewpoints on euthanasia geared toward a Western 
readership.  An exploration of various approaches to euthanasia within the Christian and 
Islamic traditions in Chapters II and III also served to advance the intra-faith religious medical 
ethics discussion.  Drawing on these chapters, we identified some transferable themes, 
namely, consequentialism and anti-consequentialism or religious anthropology.  These themes 
will be used in Chapter IV to compare and contrast concepts, sources and practices cited by 
the focal scholars of our study.  The role of Chapter IV is to highlight potential similarities and 
differences that are specifically grounded in Western traditional thought between Christianity 
and Islam on these matters.  This comparative study will allow us to understand how various 
approaches can lead to Western-style deontological or consequentialist conclusions on 
euthanasia in the broader interest of creating more interfaith cooperation between 
Christianity and Islam.  Additionally, we will see how certain methods used by Christian 
scholars but not by Islamic scholars could still appeal to Muslim scholars and vice versa.  
Chapters III and IV will also help us to determine what areas in Islamic medical ethics 
invite further development at least from a Western point of view or are not as fully developed 
as the Western Christian perspectives in this study.  On this basis, Chapter V will attempt to 
create an expanded Western Sunni Islamic account of euthanasia.  This discussion will serve as 
an original contribution to IME and a call to further interfaith exchange.  
Chapter IV will have three sections.  The first two sections will look at anti-
consequentialist principles.  In this first section, we will examine traditional practices rooted in 
religious anthropology.  In the second section, we will discuss dogmatic principles also related 
to religious anthropology.  In the final section, we will look at consequentialist kinds of 
argument.     
Religious Anthropology: Traditional Practices 
Religious anthropology can be grounded in two ways: on the basis of dogmatic principles and 
on traditional practices.  This section will focus on traditional practices relevant to euthanasia.  
These practices are not simply independent of religious dogma, as they are often grounded in, 
or informed by, doctrinal principles, for instance those which emphasize the value of the body.  
In this section, we will look at practices that both Christian and Islamic scholars in this study 
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discuss, namely, palliative care, respect of the elderly and withholding ineffective treatment.  
Some practices we are reviewing such as palliative care and withholding ineffective treatment 
concern euthanasia directly, namely, as viable alternatives to intentionally aiming at death.  A 
practice such as respecting the elderly concerns more generic values which are relevant to the 
issue of euthanasia.   
Palliative Care 
Palliative care aims at alleviating pain and discomfort in end-of-life terminal cases to provide a 
comfortable death rather than curing disease.  Besides relieving or controlling pain, palliative 
care provides a comprehensive support system to manage terminal disease and maintain well-
being in the final phases of life.  This support may include psychological/emotional counselling, 
social aid, spiritual assistance and bereavement support for the patient and their loved ones.1 
In this way, palliative care seeks to preserve life and reasonably extend or maximize quality of 
life rather than deliberately hasten death.  This approach indicates that even at the end of life, 
individuals have needs and wishes, so should not be abandoned or neglected in their 
condition, and that terminal disease involves more than just physical pain.  As one source 
notes: ‘Palliative care recognizes a complex relationship between physical pain (and other 
symptoms) and emotional and spiritual suffering.’2 Putilo et al. believe that the palliative care 
movement today looks to not only re-affirm established principles in medicine, but to also re-
define the core of (end-of-life) medicine, with its emphasis on respecting human life and the 
patient through its commitment to cure illness and prolong life, rather than a focus on 
technology and scientific advancements.3   
Since palliative care also aims at respecting the sanctity of human life, it is supported 
by the scholars in this study who oppose euthanasia.  For example, Banner challenges those 
who call euthanasia a ‘“reasonable” and “caring” answer’ which provides a ‘good death’ by 
arguing that palliative care is a way to achieve an ‘alternative “good death”’ because it does 
not aim at killing, and provides the support described above.4  And from a theological point of 
view, Banner believes that palliative care conveys proper respect for the ‘goodness of human 
life but also the goodness of its redeemed future.’5 Drawing on Augustine’s view, he is claiming 
that the body is integral to the identity of the person and will share in the life of the 
                                                          
1 The National Council for Palliative Care, ‘Palliative Care Explained,’ in The National Council for Palliative Care, 27 October 2009, 
<http://www.ncpc.org.uk/palliative_care.html> (accessed 25 July 2009). 
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5 Banner, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, p. 75.   
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resurrection.6 In this way, palliative care aims to acknowledge the sacredness of human life 
and thereby conforms to anthropological arguments that oppose euthanasia.  John Paul uses 
the same method as Banner to express a similar attitude to support hospice care, even when it 
results in death, since the intent is not to kill.  This type of attitude was also demonstrated by 
Dame Cicely Saunders, who founded the modern UK palliative care movement in 1967.  
Saunders and others believed that end-of-life care should be provided with the love of God in 
every aspect of patient care, and this aim was grounded in the practice of Jesus healing and 
tending to the sick, the weak and the disabled.7 
However, there are other Christian scholars who also note particular pluralistic 
challenges in palliative care today. 8 One challenge involves interacting with non-Christian 
patients.  While many palliative care organizations in the UK and US are Christian-based, they 
welcome persons of all faiths or no faith.  And although many principles in Christianity relating 
to health care can appeal to non-Christians, such as justice, autonomy, beneficence and 
compassion, some Christian health professionals also feel the need to introduce or share 
Christian-specific principles with non-Christians so they will attain a ‘peaceful death,’ salvation 
and eternal life.9  Some Christian scholars may see this work as vocational, and some patients 
may be receptive to this calling, but for other patients, the message can conflict with, or be 
offensive and disrespectful to, their established beliefs.  In order to avoid this, it may be 
advisable for the health care provider to acknowledge and respect the patient’s values to 
enhance rapport and trust.     
Although the Islamic perspectives in this study do not address this practice in the same 
way, they can be linked to Christian thought.  For example, Sachedina cites the Qur’an and 
Hadith to articulate the idea that since God has created all things, He has also created a 
remedy for every illness.10  As the Quran states: ‘And when I am sick, He restores me to health’ 
(26:80). Therefore, Sachedina supports the advancement of medical research, and argues that 
medical treatment should be sought and provided as long as it is not used to unlawfully kill or 
harm, even if it results in unintentional but foreseeable death.11  Similarly, Zahedi et al. state 
that ‘patients in pain from terminal illness may receive analgesic medicine until the time of 
death.’12  In this way, this kind of medical treatment may be interpreted as a type of palliative 
care.  And although palliative care can extend or prolong life, Sachedina also seems to suggest 
that the matter is in the hands of divine providence, by arguing that the time of death is based 
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purely on God’s will.13  So death can occur even with the best of medical intervention if death 
is destined.  Lastly, Banner’s notion of achieving family closure through palliative care is 
comparable to Sachedina’s (and John Paul’s) view that one has a responsibility to one’s family 
or community even at the end-of-life.  Based on these perspectives, it seems evident that 
Christianity and Islam hold common views in support of palliative care.  In Chapter V, we will 
expand on the idea of palliative care, and explore the topic in a different way from an Islamic 
perspective.     
There are other Muslim scholars (not included in this study) who specifically comment 
on palliative care and Islam.  As we noted, palliative care involves a comprehensive approach 
toward end-of-life care.  Some Muslim commentators like Mohammad Zafir al-Shahri and 
Abdullah al-Khenaizan also adopt this approach and explore a wide range of Islamic aspects 
related to the palliative care.14 For example, like Sachedina and Zahedi et al., Al-Shahri and Al-
Khenaizan support the use of medications at the end-of-life to ease suffering even though 
suffering can be beneficial, as we will discuss next.15  Other important aspects explored 
include: Cleanliness and hygiene (to perform daily prayers), modesty especially relating to 
interactions with female patients, moral support, dietary restrictions (halal and non-pork 
products), patient honesty, and post-mortem rituals.16  With the exception of the last 
consideration, it may be contended that these issues are not specifically relevant to palliative 
care or the treatment of Muslim patients, but can be applied more generally and in cases that 
involve non-Muslim patients.  This suggests that a more specific and comprehensive Islamic-
based palliative care system is needed.  As discussed, many end-of-life decisions are made by 
the family, and the family traditionally cares for the elderly at home.  However, with the 
breakdown of the Muslim family (because of young people moving away) and an increasing 
elderly population, some Muslim scholars argue that the need for palliative care in Islam is 
growing.17 But the few palliative care institutions in Muslim countries are 20-30 years old, and 
focus mainly on pain management.18 This focus may be insufficient, because the ‘most 
common reasons’ for palliative care among adult Muslims today involve cardiovascular 
diseases and diabetes.19 These types of ailments like cancer, for example, may require a more 
specialized, holistic and culturally-sensitive approach to healing due to various related (end-of-
life) issues such as secondary illnesses and conditions, extended health care/rehabilitation, 
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19 Gatrad and Shiekh, ‘Palliative Care for Muslims and issues before Death,’ p. 527.  
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lifestyle/dietary adjustments, living will matters and financial and family concerns.20 Such 
approaches need not be restricted to Muslim patients.  With appropriate Christian pastoral or 
spiritual services in Islamic-based palliative institutions, these approaches can also appeal to 
Christian patients because they may experience similar issues.  
Suffering 
So far, we have considered arguments by scholars who support palliative care, as well as views 
that seem to oppose it, particularly in extreme pain cases.  Another scholar who supported 
palliative care was Nigel Biggar, and as we saw in Chapter II he argues that it can be effective in 
many, if not all, pain cases, so is to be preferred to eliminating pain by euthanasia or enduring 
pain.  His reference to enduring pain introduces another issue to the palliative care discussion.  
This issue involves suffering and whether it should always be managed or eliminated.  In the 
next part of this discussion, we will explore various Christian and Islamic viewpoints on 
suffering.  
From the previous section, it is clear that Sachedina and Zahedi et al. support palliative 
care or medical intervention from an Islamic perspective. However, they do not support the 
elimination of suffering in all cases, which may suggest that suffering may have some meaning, 
benefit or purpose.  Some of the possible purposes or benefits of suffering were discussed in 
Chapter III.  For example, suffering may be a spiritual ‘test’ or ‘trial’ to determine how Muslims 
react to suffering or adversity.  This thought is supported in the Qur’an: ‘And surely we will test 
you with something of fear and hunger, and loss of wealth and lives and crops, but give glad 
tidings to the steadfast’ (2:155). The Islamic response to this test should be one of patience in 
God’s help and perseverance to find an acceptable solution or remedy. This response is related 
to a second possible purpose of suffering, which involves individual reform towards being 
more modest and recognizing that as in all matters concerning life and death, God creates and 
controls suffering.  So patience and perseverance may be modes of humility to receive God’s 
healing and guidance.  As the Qur’an suggests: ‘Before thee We sent (Messengers) to many 
nations, and We afflicted the nations with suffering and adversity that they might learn 
humility.  [And] If Allah touches you with hurt, there is none can remove it but He’ (6:42, 
10:117). A third related benefit or purpose of suffering may involve the ‘cleansing’ of one’s sins 
to attain a sort of spiritual ‘purification’ (Tazkiyah).  This experience may also imply a type of 
individual reform through a change of one’s views and habits following ‘purification.’   
The idea that suffering can serve a purpose or confer a benefit suggests that it may not 
be simply bothersome or a nuisance.  Rather, it may have deep meaning, the recognition of 
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which requires reflection and active appropriation.  As Sachedina affirms, the right attitude or 
approach to these matters ‘inculcates faith in God’s goodness and an acceptance of suffering 
as part of the overall divine plan for humanity’s spiritual and moral development.’21 Therefore, 
it can be argued that ‘understanding suffering is central to Islamic bioethics.’22 In Chapter V, 
we will further explore the idea of suffering from an Islamic perspective by looking at how 
suffering can be a deeper transformative experience. This experience of suffering can be a 
motivation for enduring the suffering, because it may enrich one’s personal narrative and 
one’s relationship with God. 
Similar to the Islamic perspectives, some Christian scholars in this study, like John Paul, 
believe that there is benefit in foregoing or reducing palliative treatment, so as to admit the 
experience of suffering.  John Paul acknowledges that suffering was traditionally thought of as 
bad or linked to evil through interpretation of scripture.  As John Paul states in his Apostolic 
Letter on the Christian Meaning of Human Suffering (Salvifici Doloris), ‘It can be said that man 
suffers whenever he experiences any kind of evil (sic). In the vocabulary of the Old Testament, 
suffering and evil are identified with each other.’23 Therefore, suffering was directly denoted as 
negative over the centuries and, as a result, it was viewed as form of punishment or divine 
wrath.  However, he disputes these traditional attitudes and suggests that even if suffering is a 
mode of punishment as a result of sin, it need not be considered negatively, but rather as a 
form of rehabilitation or transformation of one’s ways.  Moreover, according to John Paul, 
there was no need to see Job’s suffering as a form of punishment, or a negative phase in Job’s 
storied life, because Job was considered innocent.24 As he states: ‘While it is true that suffering 
has a meaning as punishment, when it is connected with a fault, it is not true that all suffering 
is a consequence of a fault and has the nature of a punishment.’25 John Paul argues instead 
that one should attempt to endure at least tolerable forms of suffering because, like in the 
case of Job, it may have some divine meaning, or one may learn some lesson from it, which 
requires patience and trust in God.  To support his argument, John Paul cites the Book of Job 
(42:2): ‘I know that you can do all things, and that no purpose of yours can be thwarted.’ 
Besides the Old Testament, similar viewpoints are conveyed in Paul’s letters to the Corinthians 
(1 Corinthians 10:13) which may have been an influential source for John Paul’s perspective.   
However, based on his understanding of the Book of Job, Fletcher disputes John Paul’s 
view by claiming that Job did not discover the purpose of his suffering and so came ‘to no 
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other conclusion but that suffering is a mystery, as far as God’s will and power are concerned.  
He only wondered, as we all do sometimes, why such a thing is ever needed or desired.’26 
Therefore, Fletcher seems to deny that there is any (theological) significance in enduring 
suffering and, according to Fletcher, Job did not explicitly condemn or reject euthanasia or 
suicide in these types of cases (7:15).27   
As well as considering Job’s suffering, some Christian scholars in this study also set out 
their understanding of redemptive suffering.  For example, John Paul supports his account of 
suffering by emphasizing the sufferings of Christ.  According to John Paul, humankind can 
participate in His sufferings through their own suffering.  This allows the individual Christian to 
find meaning in their own suffering, which, in turn, can make that suffering redemptive and 
worthwhile.28 Nigel Biggar cites John Paul’s Salvifici Doloris to interpret redemptive suffering in 
a somewhat different way.29  For Biggar, suffering may acquire greater meaning when it 
involves the sufferer extending forgiveness to the individual who was the cause of the 
suffering.  On this view, when suffering is caused by another individual, its acceptance can 
make the suffering ethically significant, and a part of one’s own story.  Since Christ suffered for 
a purpose and forgave others (according to the Gospels), this may motivate one to endure 
suffering, understand its meaning or purpose, and forgive others.  However, this particular 
argument will hold only when one’s suffering has been caused by another person. 
There are many points of comparison between these Islamic and Christian 
perspectives on suffering given their use of scripture, tradition and experience.  For example, 
John Paul’s reference to Job can be of interest to Muslims especially since the Qur’an also 
recounts Job’s story (21:83, 38:41). In one part of the story, the Qur’an indicates that Job is 
chosen for a ‘trial’ or ‘test’ of suffering and will be a premier example for others relating to 
how one should approach suffering.  We will further discuss Job and suffering from an Islamic 
point-of-view in Chapter V.  This idea is also noted by John Paul.  As John Paul comments, ‘And 
if the Lord consents to test Job with suffering, he does it to demonstrate the latter's 
righteousness. The suffering has the nature of a test.’30 ‘More so than anything else, suffering 
can challenge one’s spiritual convictions and put them to the test.’31 Based on these 
viewpoints, the idea of ‘test’ seems to have similar if not identical connotations in Christianity 
and Islam, and the key for both traditions is how one will react or respond to suffering.  The 
test can act as a spiritual assessment of the level of one’s faith based on one’s reaction or 
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response.  In this way, the test can be a way of strengthening one’s faith, or the test can be a 
way of questioning or destroying one’s faith and trust in God.    
A second point of similarity involves the theme of suffering and the development of 
character.  For instance, Nigel Biggar argued that suffering can improve one’s moral character 
by leading the person to develop traits and responsibilities to cope with and endure suffering, 
like patience and resilience.  This viewpoint is similar to that of Sachedina who states that 
suffering can be ‘part of the overall divine plan for humanity’s spiritual and moral 
development.’32  Once again, although perceived as problematic, evil or unwelcomed in itself, 
suffering may make possible a significant good.  
A third related point of similarity involves the idea of suffering as a means to ‘spiritual 
purification.’  Although John Paul argued that not all forms of suffering need imply 
punishment, he also argues that even if suffering means punishment, it need not be viewed 
negatively.  Unlike a retributive or a utilitarian account of punishment, John Paul seems to 
imply that suffering can be considered a rehabilitative form of punishment, which provides a 
person with the opportunity to forgive, reform their behaviours or morals, and improve their 
fellowship with others. This idea supports the conviction that God is in control, and that 
suffering can be part of God’s mercy to bring the individual to a right way of living.33 As John 
Paul states, ‘Suffering must serve for conversion, that is, for the rebuilding of goodness in the 
subject, who can recognize the divine mercy in this call to repentance.  Its purpose is also to 
strengthen goodness both in man himself and in his relationships with others and especially 
with God.’34 Interestingly, the Qur’an expresses a similar viewpoint that urges the Muslim to 
use adversity or hardship as a way of changing certain habits and practices that may be 
contrary to Islam: ‘See they not that they are put in trial once or twice every year (with 
different kinds of calamities, disease, famine)?  Yet, they turn not in repentance, nor do they 
learn a lesson’ (9:126). So suffering may initially seem negative or harmful, but it may be good 
or vice versa as the Qur’an suggests: ‘And it may be that you dislike a thing while it is good for 
you, and it may be that you love a thing while it is evil for you, and God knows, while you do 
not know’ (2:216).  
However, one difference between the Christian and Islamic approaches to suffering 
may involve the idea of redemptive suffering.  This idea may be largely non-transferable at 
least to Sunni Muslims because redemptive suffering focuses on the central figure in 
Christianity.  In Sunni Islam, there seems to be no comparable idea of suffering which centres 
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on the sufferings or trials of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) or his closest companions.35  
There seems to be no compelling evidence of Muslims necessarily re-enacting or emulating the 
sufferings that the Prophet (pbuh) experienced.  Although one may empathize with another’s 
sufferings, the sufferings of the Muslim are separate from the sufferings of the Prophet 
Muhammad (pbuh), so the Muslim does not suffer to ‘share in,’ or be ‘in union with,’ the 
Prophet’s (pbuh) sufferings. Besides this, it can be argued that the Prophet Muhammad 
(pbuh), like the Prophets (pbuh) who came before him (pbuh), suffered or were tested 
differently, or at the highest spiritual level, because they were chosen to spread the Word of 
God and were warned that they would face many distinctive seminal challenges.36 Rather, it 
seems that suffering in Sunni Islam is focused more on individual spiritual purification and the 
cleansing of sins, or possibly a form of divine punishment, as discussed.  In this way, suffering 
in Sunni Islam may be considered more rehabilitative or retributive than redemptive.  It is 
plausible that the sufferings and trials of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) can encourage or 
motivate Muslims to endure their own suffering.  And his (pbuh) interpretations of suffering 
based on the Qur’an and his (pbuh) use of medicine can impact how Muslims view their own 
suffering. This approach can also strengthen one’s trust in God.   
The idea of redemptive suffering in Shi’ite Islam is different from that in Sunni Islam, 
but somewhat similar to the idea in Christianity.  Redemption through suffering is considered a 
major theme in Shi'ite Islam, and focuses mainly on the sufferings and martyrdom of the third 
Imam of the Shi’ite named Husayn ibn Ali who was the Prophet’s (pbuh) grandson.  The 
redemptive value of suffering of Husayn’s followers involves commemorating the events that 
led to Husayn’s martyrdom at the Battle of Karbala on the 10th day of Muharram (Ashura) by 
undergoing various acts of deprivation and suffering to imitate the sufferings of Husayn (as 
well as succeeding Imams).  This imitation includes acts like self-flagellation and mock sword 
battles as well as weeping and mourning.37 On a personal level, Husayn’s sufferings represent 
or symbolize those who have suffered or are suffering among his followers.  And it is believed 
that the suffering of the community through such rituals can redeem the sins of the 
community. 38  Moreover, those who emulate Husayn’s struggles, sufferings and martyrdom 
can anticipate his intercession (as well as that of succeeding Imams) on their behalf after 
death, because Husayn and the Imams that followed were considered infallible and pure in 
matters of faith and morals due to their sufferings.39  So through these rituals, salvation and 
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eternal reward is earned by the follower.40 As Mahmoud Ayoub argues, ‘the suffering of Imam 
Husayn has been taken by the Shia community to be a source of salvation through the 
interiorization and emulation of that suffering by the community and through the high favour 
of the Imam as an intercessor.’41 Based on Ayoub’s perspective, a number of parallels can be 
drawn between redemptive suffering in Shi’ite Islam and Christianity.  For example, Husayn is 
portrayed as a heroic or extraordinary figure in religious history similar to Jesus Christ.42  In 
addition, the sufferings and martyrdom of Husayn and Christ were pre-destined in order to 
redeem the faithful individuals and community.43 However, according to Ayoub, Shi'ite 
Muslims must imitate Husain to be redeemed and achieve salvation while the Christian is 
redeemed and achieves salvation by union with Christ in his sufferings and death.44   
Based on the majority of Christian and Muslim perspectives in this section, it may be 
concluded that palliative care is a reasonable option for both traditions because it provides 
comprehensive support in end-of-life terminal cases, while avoiding any intention to kill.  In 
this way, palliative care aims at preserving and respecting the sanctity of human life.  Although 
palliative care is generally supported by the Christian and Muslim scholars in this study, some 
also believe that suffering, at least in moderate or tolerable forms, may be allowed because it 
has purpose or meaning.  The points of comparison and difference discussed here merit 
further expansion and exploration, but for the purposes of this section, these shared points 
serve as a way of rejuvenating the interfaith discussion relating to the end-of-life, dying and 
death.  There are many complex ethical issues like those surrounding suffering that can affect 
patients and families in the health care setting.  Similarities and differences on these issues 
may be a rich source of interfaith discussion, and can create greater understanding between 
monotheistic health-care professionals and patients.    
Respect for the Elderly  
According to John Paul, proper respect for elderly or older persons involves caring for or 
fulfilling their needs at the end of their life traditionally within a family-home support system. 
This practice is different from palliative care because it need not require a clinical 
environment. Let us begin by exploring the reasons why one has a duty to respect or care for 
elderly people.      
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On some views, treating elderly people with respect is a duty because this practice has 
the backing of long-established moral tradition.  On this approach, since tradition links 
communities and cultural values together, there is at least an initial presumption that 
respecting this sort of custom is justified.  A prime example of this idea is seen in Japanese 
culture where people are relatively long lived because of continued care and support for the 
elderly that is based on traditional Confucian Chinese teachings.45 In Confucianism (and 
Eastern Asian cultures), this idea is also known as filial piety which is a virtue that involves 
unconditional respect for and good conduct to all those who are older than oneself.46  This 
type of reasoning is also evident in John Paul’s argument that elderly people should be treated 
with respect and dignity by the community since this practice has been maintained by long 
established traditions.47  This tradition is clearly exemplified in Old Testament scripture and 
part of the Mosaic Law states: ‘Rise in the presence of the aged, show respect for the elderly 
and revere your God. I am the LORD’ (Leviticus 19:32 NIV).  Placing respect for the elderly and 
revering the Lord in the same line suggests the great significance of respecting the elderly, 
because worshiping God is arguably the most important obligation for humankind (at least in 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam).  In this way, respecting the elderly is also a principal form of 
obedience to God’s directive. There are several other verses in the Bible which place similar 
emphasis on respecting the elderly.  And from the perspective of interfaith dialogue, similar 
verses can be observed in the Qur’an, as we will discuss in Chapter V.  Moreover, it is arguable 
that since the elderly population in society is a growing proportion of the total population 
(globally the figure is expected to increase from 12.2% to 21.9% of persons over age 65 
between 1980 and 2050), the obligation to maintain this tradition becomes more important, 
especially in a society where independence is increasingly the norm.48  On the other hand, 
these figures may lend support to the euthanasia and ‘right-to-die’ movement.  As Eric Cohen 
cautions: ‘In an aging society, in which the elderly come to seem and come to feel like 
paralyzing burdens, the seduction of euthanasia may be too strong to resist.’49   
A second reason that underscores treating elderly people with respect involves the 
benefits society may gain from them.  Older persons should not be ignored or neglected due to 
physical weakness or old age, and although older persons may appear to be ‘unproductive,’ 
frail and dependent, in many cases a longer life may imply greater knowledge, experience and 
wisdom, which may be valuable particularly for younger generations.  This idea is supported in 
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scripture which states that we must always honour the elderly because the “multitude of years 
should teach wisdom” (Job 32:7).  Moreover, elders in cultures such as the Japanese are held in 
high esteem due to their capacity to discern traditions.50 And learning from older persons may 
be one way of respecting them, their intelligence or their experience, upholding traditional 
values and maintaining a meaningful bond between generations.  As one scholar asserts, 
interactions between young and old are ‘key for culture, tradition and values sustainability.’51  
Further, these interactions can also help to promote ‘intergenerational solidarity’ and combat 
the problem of loneliness in elders.52 This bond can also be a form of motivational support or 
inspiration for the young which can also help to strengthen their faith and trust in God.  Some 
of these cross-cultural reasons were also identified by John Paul.  He similarly highlights 
experience to argue that elders should be respected since they provide good judgment, insight 
and guidance for humanity.  Therefore, elderly people should not be compelled into 
intentionally hastening their death or suicide as if they are a burden upon the community.53 As 
one scholar asserts, ‘Because [euthanasia] requires the participation of at least one other 
person, it becomes a communal act involving the larger society and giving its approval to an 
act of abandonment.’54  
This idea of treating elders with respect because of their wisdom or knowledge need 
not imply that those who cannot offer or provide something valuable should not be respected 
or honoured.  In general, societies teach that we should treat others the way we would want 
to be treated, namely, with respect and dignity.  This thought is especially relevant to those 
who may have difficulty taking care of themselves, such as the very young or older persons. 
Respect should be unconditional, and lack of respect from the sense that someone is 
unproductive is in practice a false perception.   
None of the Islamic scholars in this study specifically discuss respect for the elderly in a 
way which is directly comparable to John Paul’s viewpoint.  This does not mean that there is 
no ideal of respecting the elderly in Islam.  On the contrary, like in Christianity, this ideal is a 
very important obligation in Islam and second only to believing in and worshipping one God.  
Compassion and respect for the elderly is a core element in Islamic conduct and social 
behaviour, and disrespecting the elderly constitutes a major sin in Islam. In Chapter V, we will 
develop an expanded discussion on the topic of respect for the elderly from an Islamic 
perspective which may be more comparable to John Paul’s perspective. However, for the 
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purposes of this section, the closest indirect reference to respect for the elderly is made by 
Sachedina who commented, as we saw in Chapter III, that end-of-life decisions should be made 
as a family or community in consultation with the health care provider, because the individual 
is a meaningful part of a larger communal network regardless of what they can provide.55 If, 
for example, the individual is an elder and they are incompetent or their decision-making 
capacity is compromised, then making a group decision(s) in their best interest or for their well 
being can be construed as a form of respect or honour.  This importance of communal ties is 
rather reminiscent of John Paul’s emphasis upon the role of tradition.   
Withholding Ineffective Treatment 
In Chapter I, we discussed the idea of ‘active’ euthanasia which involves the intent to hasten 
death in suffering or terminal cases. Active euthanasia can be differentiated from withdrawing 
or withholding treatment in terminal cases, which aims to spare the patient the burden of 
treatment and avoid needlessly prolonging life.  Since in such cases it is the disease or illness 
which is arguably causing death, some Christian scholars in this study consider this practice as 
morally uncontroversial.  So this may be why John Paul, for example, only uses the word 
‘euthanasia’ to refer to the case of intentionally hastening death.  However, some Muslim 
scholars in this study refer to this practice as ‘passive’ euthanasia.56 But one source disputes 
this approach: ‘Some medical actions that are often labelled “passive euthanasia” are no form 
of euthanasia, since the intention to take life is lacking.’57  
Although the scholars in this study seem to classify the practice differently, they 
identify it using similar or identical terms. For example, Michael Banner uses terms such as 
‘aggressive’ or ‘more and heavier doses of’ treatment in a ‘futile battle’ when describing 
ineffective treatment that may needlessly prolong life.58 Similarly, Sachedina uses the term 
‘aggressive’ when referring to ineffective treatments in several contexts.59 Zahedi et al. 
contend that ‘futility’ in each end-of-life case must be examined to assess whether treatment 
has ‘benefits [or] burdens.’60 In the same way, John Paul uses vocabulary such as ‘aggressive, 
disproportionate, excessive, precarious and burdensome’ with regards to treatment that is 
needlessly prolonging life.61  Shared use of terms by Christian and Muslim scholars suggests a 
degree of consensus on the moral status of this practice.  So, next, we will explore some 
common clinical, theological and economic reasons that are cited by authors on both sides in 
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support of the practice of withdrawing or withholding treatment in futile cases. As we will see, 
these reasons seem to be interlinked, because they all seem to involve the need to avoid 
needlessly prolonging life.  Let us first discuss the clinical advantages to this practice. 
The first clinical benefit of withdrawing or withholding ineffective treatment involves 
patient autonomy.  As discussed, patient autonomy allows a competent individual to make 
choices or wishes or anticipate decisions through a living will, advanced directive or surrogate 
decision that is in accordance with their beliefs and values about their medical condition, such 
as an unconscious or incompetent state.  So refusing ineffective treatment in these types of 
terminal cases can enhance patient autonomy, some Christian and Muslim scholars in this 
study suggest. For example, as Zahedi et al. stated: ‘Advanced directives aim to honour 
individual autonomy and respect individual choice.’62  John Paul averred that when death is 
impending and expected, ‘one can in conscience “refuse forms of treatment.”’63 In the same 
way, Zahedi et al. asserted that ‘some Muslim jurists recognize as legal a competent patient’s 
informed refusal of treatment’ and they illustrate this claim by providing a case study, which 
we documented in Chapter III, in which patients expressed their wish to refuse ineffective 
treatments like resuscitation and nutrients.64  Sachedina conveys an almost identical view.65 
These perspectives suggest that autonomous decisions to refuse treatment can be supported 
by religious attitudes that encourage the discontinuation of ineffective treatment which would 
needlessly prolong life.  These types of religiously grounded views are similarly supported by 
some secular scholars.  For example, Islamic ethics scholar Sahin Aksoy conducted a study that 
compared Islamic positions on advanced directives at the end-of-life with those of philosopher 
John Harris.66  Aksoy found that although significant and fundamental differences exist in the 
application of euthanasia between both sides, there are similar views on the idea of advance 
directive, because it promotes patient autonomy and independent decision-making.67  Patient 
autonomy is honoured provided that it does not clash with medical, religious, cultural and 
social standards, which generally involve preserving life, maintaining health and avoiding 
unnecessary harm. And at least for traditional Muslims living in the West, individual autonomy 
is often shaped by religious (legal) (e.g. Qur’an, Hadith, Shariah Law) and cultural values, and 
decisions, as well as conflict resolutions, are made as a family or community, so decisions that 
are contrary to religion and culture may be rejected or overruled, despite recommendations 
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from non-Muslim healthcare professionals.68   These decisions may involve suicide-related acts 
such as euthanasia or refusing life-saving intervention.  So for traditional Christians and 
Muslims in general, it is arguable that end-of-life decisions are not independent of faith, but 
rather are a part of an overall spiritual purpose that focuses on submitting to the divine will, 
seeking forgiveness and attaining eternal life.  
A second clinical advantage that is discussed by at least the Muslim authors in this 
study involves physician discretion to withdraw or withhold ineffective treatment based on 
clinical judgement or experience.  For example, Brockopp made the argument that physicians 
may legally withhold further (artificial) treatment in brain death, PVS and permanent coma 
cases where the heart is artificially functioning.  This view suggests that physicians should have 
the right to exercise their clinical judgment in keeping with religious values, rather than rely on 
religious scholars to make medical decisions.  This attitude also underscores doctor-patient 
rapport from the point of view of trust, justice and best interests related to final decisions.  
Sachedina gives evidence to this point by stating that as a part of these decisions, the ‘law 
actually takes into consideration the patient’s long-term treatment relationship with a 
physician whose opinion, in the final analysis, serves as the grounds for turning off the 
respirator.’69  A ‘final analysis’ may also cause a physician to override a patient’s request to 
prolong their life when the physician judges that further treatment would be futile.  A good 
example of this is the case cited by Zahedi et al. of the cancer patient who wanted ‘everything 
done for her’ perhaps out of misunderstanding or fear.70 However, these scholars contended 
that since the burdens of the treatment outweighed benefit in this case, it may be 
discontinued by the physician, because continuing treatment in these cases would not be 
medically worthwhile.  But while physician discretion may imply the power to override a 
patient’s wishes, like patient autonomy it also has limits.  The physician ought to acknowledge 
their therapeutic boundaries and understand that life and death are ultimately divine matters, 
so allowing nature to take its own course in cases where medical intervention cannot further 
prolong life.71 Even so, there is still a responsibility to employ adequate pain control or 
sedation until death occurs to achieve the most comfortable death possible.  
Although physician judgement is not discussed by the Christian scholars in this study, it 
can be linked to Christian thought.  For example, Dennis Sullivan believes that although 
physicians should respect patient autonomy, autonomy is not an absolute privilege and 
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physicians have the right to withdraw futile treatment.72  As Sullivan states, ‘Patients must 
respect the integrity of the medical profession, and the ability of caregivers to say no to 
unreasonable requests for inappropriate or futile treatment.’ 73 This view is endorsed by the 
Christian Medical and Dental Association which states: ‘We do not oppose withdrawal or 
failure to institute artificial means of life support in patients who are clearly and irreversibly 
deteriorating, in whom death appears imminent beyond reasonable hope of recovery.’74 If, for 
example, the PVS, brain death, or coma condition is characterized as total and irreversible, 
there seems to be strong theological support for health care professionals to discontinue 
artificial feeding, because the aim here is not to kill, but rather to lift the burden of futile 
treatment. In this way, a Christian or Muslim physician seeks to respect the sanctity of life and, 
once again, acknowledges their healing limits.  As with patient autonomy, Christian and 
Muslim scholars also have similar views on physician authority at least in terminal cases.   
However, physician authority can be abused or misused particularly in euthanasia 
cases.  For example, Robert Weir argues that abuse of physician power has led to a rise in non-
voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands.75  Citing a 1990 Dutch report, Weir highlights that out 
of 3,300 euthanasia-related deaths, nearly 1/3rd of cases were without ‘explicit request, what 
the Dutch call “non-voluntary.”’76  Weir believes that patients with compromised psychological 
states have allowed physicians to misuse their authority, which is contrary to the spirit of 
euthanasia regulations and may lead to the slippery slope.77 Other opponents of euthanasia 
contend that if euthanasia were to be legalized in the UK and Canada, this would lead to the 
abuse of physician authority, by putting vulnerable, disabled or incompetent persons at 
particular risk of non-voluntary euthanasia, and degrade the standards of the medical 
establishment.78  This risk may be evident in the case of now-retired UK G.P., Howard Martin, 
who ‘admits hastening’ the death of terminally ill persons who were in ‘dreadful suffering’ as 
an act of ‘“Christian compassion” for patients’ dignity.’79 In these cases, he asserts: ‘I used my 
discretion’ and similarly, ‘I would take control by keeping people asleep until they had passed 
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over.’80 However, from Martin’s point of view, he did not abuse his authority, but rather acted 
out of necessity to fulfil his obligations of providing relief and preventing further harm.  
Supporters of euthanasia in the UK have argued that physician-assisted suicide should be legal 
only with strict medical and legal safeguards.  If euthanasia were permissible and the public 
were to be in favour of euthanasia in these types of cases, then acts like those of Howard 
Martin may not be construed as physician abuse, but rather as the appropriate exercise of 
physician responsibility.  However, even with the strictest of laws, physician abuse can still 
occur.   
So far we have discussed two clinical topics related to withdrawing or withholding 
ineffective treatment, namely, patient autonomy and physician discretion.  There is a degree 
of consensus on these matters among Christian and Muslim commentators in this study. Next 
we will explore some theological ideas related to this practice.  
According to the scholars in this study, the first theological notion that supports this 
practice involves freedom from fear of death and trust in God.  Fear of divine punishment, fear 
of death itself or deep attachment to earthly life can be natural end-of-life reactions, as 
discussed.  As Sachedina asserts, ‘understandably, death appears as an obstacle to the 
enjoyment of the expanding material pleasures of the world.’81 These types of reactions may 
suggest that earthy life has permanent worth or quality, which may result in not 
acknowledging the existence of death and in attempts to needlessly prolong life.  However, 
John Paul objects to this attitude citing scripture (Mark 8:35) to propose that although earthly 
life has unconditional value, it is not of ‘absolute’ value.  As John Paul states: ‘Certainly the life 
of the body in its earthly state is not an absolute good for the believer, especially as he may be 
asked to give up his life for a greater good.’82  The ‘greater good’ may refer to the greater value 
of the life beyond this world as the Qur’an emphasizes: ‘O my people! This life of the world is 
only a (passing) enjoyment, and surely the hereafter is the abode to settle’ (40:39). Similarly, 
Michael Banner used scripture (Revelation 1:17) to contend that one should not fear and deny 
death.  As Banner states: ‘It is this denial which leads to that aggressive maintenance of life, 
resistance to the very end and striving against the inevitable.  There can be a clear-sighted 
refusal of these heroic measures which will simply prolong, to no obvious point or purpose, the 
patient’s dying.’83 ‘Refusal of these heroic measures’ may acknowledge death and signify trust 
in God.  Zahedi et al. similarly argue from an Islamic perspective that faith in God can help to 
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prevent fear at the end-of-life, which can be the ‘biggest weakness of man.’84  As Zahedi et al. 
state, ‘Such a belief in divine destiny and divine sagacity resulting in trust in God puts an end to 
the fear of death.’85 These religious views suggest that withdrawing or withholding treatment 
in terminal cases may be appropriate.   
A second related theological idea that supports this practice involves the concept of 
divine providence.  From a Christian and Islamic viewpoint, divine providence may imply that 
since God controls the phases of human existence, death occurs at a ‘divinely intended 
moment.’  For example, Sachedina argues that ‘the earthly term has been fixed by the 
unalterable divine decree.’86 Similarly, John Paul comments that dying in the proper Christian 
spirit implies a ‘supreme act of obedience to the Father, being ready to meet death at the 
“hour” willed and chosen by him.’87 So when death is imminent, Zahedi et al. argue that one 
should be ‘completely ready for’ death.88 Though one cannot realistically be ‘completely ready 
for’ death, a willingness to withdraw or withhold treatment that does not benefit the patient 
may be part of readiness for death.  
Following this discussion of clinical and theological perspectives, the last part of this 
section will now examine economic considerations, which also seem to support withdrawing 
or withholding ineffective treatment.  Some Christian and Muslim scholars in this study argue 
that withdrawing or withholding ineffective treatment in terminal cases is also appropriate 
because it is cost-effective, and this is important given the need to use ‘limited’ resources 
more efficiently by committing them to cases with reasonable chances for recovery or 
progress. For example, Nigel Biggar argued that in cases of mere ‘biological life,’ there is 
benefit in switching resources ‘for use in bettering the conditions of the afflicted, but still 
responsible human [or those with ‘biographical life’].’89 In a similar way, Zahedi et al. state that 
‘delaying the inevitable death of a patient through life-sustaining treatment is neither in the 
patient’s nor the public’s best interests because of limited financial resources.’90 Expensive 
limited resources means there is pressure on health-care providers to use resources more 
efficiently.  For example, as one scholar notes, health-care providers are sometimes ‘being 
criticized, even threatened by [their] superiors for refusing to make financial considerations.’91 
This type of pressure arises especially in cases in which the patient is a ‘useless eater’ of 
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treatment.92 Moreover, distributing and managing resources can also involve risk of coercion 
and manipulation in some regions leading to mismanagement and inefficient utilization.93  
Therefore, some scholars highlight the principle of distributive justice to argue that although 
health care providers have a moral responsibility to reasonably save and prolong life, this duty 
should not be exaggerated in terminal or irreversible cases.94  In addition, in order to prevent 
often reckless and wasteful use of resources through bribery and fraud, there must be an 
allocation process in which resources are used fairly and impartially in legitimate cases.95 
Through this approach, which involves a case-specific assessment of how treatment is used 
and the results it produces, resources may be used with maximum effectiveness and not used 
to needlessly prolong life in terminal cases.  Based on their viewpoints, this approach can 
appeal to both Christian and Muslim sides in the discussion.   
Given the various clinical, theological and economic ideas we have explored, it may be 
concluded that withdrawing or withholding treatment can be justified or beneficial.  This 
practice arguably enhances patient autonomy, allows for physician discretion, encourages 
trust in God rather than fear of death, respects the intended moment of death and promotes 
better use of health-care resources.  And since these ideals are commonly supported by the 
Christian and Muslim scholars in this study, these considerations may invite greater interfaith 
dialogue and cooperation particularly in the clinical setting.     
In this section, we have discussed practices that are common to both Christian and 
Muslim traditions.  In addition, we have looked at practices that are discussed only by Christian 
scholars but which may also be of interest to Muslim scholars. Often these practices are 
utilized because they are grounded in dogmatic ideas that involve preserving human life, like 
the sanctity of human life.  In the next section, we will further examine this principle.   
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Dogmatic Principles 
The previous section examined various practices related to euthanasia cited by both Christian 
and Muslim scholars.  Most scholars in this study believe that human life is unconditionally 
sacred and should not be discarded, so they support practices like, for example, palliative care.  
However, other scholars who believe that human life is conditionally worthwhile think that 
palliative care need not be followed in certain cases, particularly in cases of extreme pain and 
suffering.     
In the next section, we will examine a dogmatic principle related to euthanasia that is 
cited by both Christian and Muslim commentators examined in this study, to underscore 
similarities and differences in thought.  This dogmatic principle is the sacredness of human life.  
Sacredness of Human Life 
For theists, the term ‘sacredness’ generally signifies a quality that is some ways intimately 
associated with God, and based on the Christian and Muslim perspectives in this study, it may 
be inferred that something which is sacred will typically have special value and dignity and is 
therefore to be treated with respect.  According to the Oxford Dictionary (2002), the term 
‘sacred’ is defined as a principle or object that has some form of explicit connection or 
association with God, dogma and/or faith-based tradition.  The sacredness of human life is 
discussed by John Paul and Nigel Biggar on the Christian side of this study, and by Zahedi et al. 
on the Muslim side.  This section will compare and contrast the perspectives of John Paul and 
Zahedi et al.  The perspectives of Nigel Biggar and Zahedi et al. are not compared, because 
they are fundamentally different.  Biggar presents case-specific or context relative conditions 
for sacredness whereas Zahedi et al. consider sacredness to be inalienable.  Let us begin by 
reviewing the positions of John Paul and Zahedi et al. from our discussion in Chapters II and III, 
respectively.        
As the reader may recall, Zahedi et al. argued that human life is unconditionally sacred 
‘because God is its origin and its destiny.’96  This view suggests that human life is sacred 
because God is causally present in, or influences, every part of human life.  If God is involved in 
all phases of human life, this also suggests that death occurs at a pre-determined time.  The 
idea that there is a pre-determined time of death helps to ground Zahedi et al.’s opposition to 
euthanasia.  Acts such as euthanasia or suicide aim to hasten or manipulate the time of death 
and thereby, for Zahedi et al., they degrade or fail to properly respect the sacredness of human 
life.  The notion of protecting human life is related to an idea in Islam called divine trust.  
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Divine trust implies that humans have been appointed by God as responsible stewards 
(khalifa) of the earth to care for themselves, others and their surroundings.  This idea can be 
especially relevant to Muslim health care professionals, because they have obligations to 
reasonably prolong life and avoid unnecessary harm.  It is this responsibility which makes 
human life special or distinct from all other forms of creation.97      
John Paul argued that human life is sacred because it is created by God ‘in his own 
image’ or as ‘a sign of his presence.’98 Human life has an explicit connection to God which is 
grounded in God’s creation of humankind.  Since human life is made by God, and is in his 
image, its value cannot be negated by any physical or mental illness, so human life is ‘always a 
good’ or is unconditionally sacred.99 Moreover, human life is sacred due to its distinctiveness 
from all other creation.  Put differently, human life is distinctive because it is made in the 
image of God, so it is inherently sacred or unconditionally good.100 John Paul believes that the 
human person is distinctive because he or she has ‘spiritual faculties,’ characteristics or 
attributes, namely, autonomy, the capacity for reason and the ability to discern right from 
wrong.101 Linking this idea to the previous one, these ‘spiritual faculties’ can be interpreted as 
a ‘manifestation of God in the world, [or] a sign of his presence’ because it is the possession of 
these faculties which ensures that human beings are made in the image of God.102 In this way, 
John Paul believes that the relationship between humans and God is ‘special.’  For John Paul, 
euthanasia or suicide implies a severing of this ‘special’ connection and a degrading of the 
sacredness of human life.103   
From this review of Christian and Muslim viewpoints on the sacredness of life, it is 
clear that John Paul and Zahedi et al. arrive at similar deontological conclusions since both 
believe that human life is unconditionally sacred.  However, they provide different 
anthropologically-based rationales for this finding.  In the next section, we will compare and 
contrast the ideas of ‘image of God,’ ‘signs,’ stewardship and divine pre-determination as 
found in from the perspectives of Zahedi et al. and John Paul.  Let us begin with the idea of the 
‘image of God.’  The Muslim authors in this study do not associate the idea of the sacredness 
of human life with the ‘image of God’ idea.  It is arguable that the separation of these ideas 
may be observed in most, if not all, of Islamic literature for two traditional reasons.     
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First, there is a concern that physical or iconic images of the Prophet Muhammad 
(pbuh) or of God can lead to idolatry or intercessional prayer.  Although a prophet, 
Muhammad (pbuh) did not claim to be divine, but rather a herald of God’s message, according 
to Islamic tradition.  In this way, the concept of divinity in Islam is significantly different from 
that in Christianity, since Jesus (pbuh) is considered both human and divine as the second 
person of the Holy Trinity.  In the view of Islamic tradition, the Prophet (pbuh) forbade 
depictions or illustrations of himself (pbuh) or other animate characters.  As one Hadith 
reports:  ‘Abu Talha (r.a.) narrates: I heard Allah’s apostle saying; “Angels (of mercy) do not 
enter a house wherein there is a dog or a picture of a living creature (a human being or an 
animal).”’104 Besides the Hadith, the ‘image’ idea is also critically interpreted in the Qur’an, 
which most likely influenced Muhammad’s (pbuh) judgment and position.  For example, in the 
Moses and the golden calf incident, the Qur’an narrates:  ‘The people of Moses made, in his 
absence, out of their ornaments, the image of a calf, (for worship): it seemed to low: did they 
not see that it could neither speak to them, nor show them the Way? They took it for worship 
and they did wrong’ (7:148). Due to these traditional attitudes, geometrical aesthetic 
ornaments like Arabic calligraphy are the main form of artistic expression in Islam.  
A second likely reason why the notion of an ‘image’ is not associated with the 
sacredness of human life in Islam is because God is said to be without form, limitless, eternal 
and different from all others.  So one cannot form or imagine an accurate representation of 
the divine.  This view is supported by several verses in the Qur’an: ‘There is nothing like Him 
but He is the All-Hearing, All-Seeing;’ ‘Vision cannot grasp Him, but His Grasp is over all vision;’ 
‘There is nothing comparable to Him’ (42:11, 6:103, 112:4).  These verses are also reflected in 
the poetry of Rumi (d. 1272 C.E.): ‘He is the first, He is the last. He is the outward, He is the 
inward; I am intoxicated in Love’s cup.’105 So God is not depicted in terms of an ‘image’ or 
pictorially, but rather descriptively in the form of His many, if not infinite, epithets such as 
‘everlasting,’ ‘holy,’ ‘generous,’ ‘forgiving’ and ‘merciful’ which form part of His ‘ninety-nine 
beautiful names.’ This portrayal is similar to the Christian description of God cited earlier, 
where God is represented in terms of creativity, compassion, love, generosity, justice and 
intelligence.  Still, a comprehensive understanding of God cannot be captured even in words, 
let alone in imagination.  
While the ‘image of God’ idea in Christian thought may not appeal to the Islamic 
tradition, the idea of an ‘image’ may be considered in a different way, namely, as a ‘sign.’  John 
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Paul described the manifestation of God in human life as a ‘sign of his presence.’  In a similar 
way, the Qur’an asserts: ‘God has the power to send a sign, but most understand not’ (6:37). 
The Qur’an provides many examples of physical, mental and spiritual types of sign as proof of 
God’s existence.  These examples include: various environmental phenomena, the diversity of 
species, His control of the individual’s earthly life, the human intellect and the Qur’an itself 
(13:3, 55:3-4, 38:29, 16:13). For example, the Qur’an states: ‘And you might see the sun when 
it rose, decline from their cave towards the right hand, and when it set, leave them behind on 
the left while they were in a wide space thereof. This is of the signs of Allah; whomsoever Allah 
guides, he is the rightly guided one, and whomsoever He causes to err, you shall not find for 
him any friend to lead (him) aright’ (18:17).    
At least some of these ‘signs’ in Islam are comparable to Christian thought.  For 
example, the idea that there are geo-physical ‘signs’ is similar to the claims of natural theology 
(or physico-theology) in the Christian tradition, which involves the idea that the natural world 
gives evidence of God’s existence and providence.  This idea is also reflected in New Testament 
scripture, as when it is said: ‘For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—his 
eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has 
been made, so that men are without excuse’ (Romans 1:20).106 Due to the Islamic influence on 
Christian theology through medieval scholasticism, we find similar natural theological 
arguments in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica and Ibn Sina’s The Book of Healing (1027 
C.E.).107 Moreover, according to Anthony O’Mahony, Spanish priest-professor Miguel Asin 
Palacios (d. 1944) also examined how Islam was substantially shaped by Christianity and 
oriental monasticism during medieval times on various topics like philosophy, mystical 
theology, mystical confraternities, spirituality and eschatological poetry.108 These examples of 
cross-fertilization of ideas, among others, clearly demonstrate how Christianity and Islam are 
‘ineluctably linked together in the religious history of mankind.’109   
In addition, the idea that there are mental ‘signs’ can also relate to Christian thought, 
and these signs may suggest that human life is distinctive for both traditions.  For example, 
John Paul argued earlier that human life has been endowed with ‘spiritual faculties which are 
distinctively human, such as reason, discernment between good and evil, and free will.’110 The 
idea of ‘spiritual faculties’ can be linked to the idea of ‘signs’ because John Paul argued that 
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human life ‘is a manifestation of God in the world, a sign of his presence....’111 In other words, 
‘spiritual faculties’ as distinct human traits can be interpreted as ‘signs’ of God.  Similarly, in 
the Islamic tradition, the distinctive character of human beings’ mental qualities is a part of the 
‘special’ status of human life, which is considered a ‘sign.’  As one source asserts: ‘If in the case 
of life we find that the Qur’an has given special attention to it, that is only a sign of its 
importance and high value.’112 This viewpoint is supported by Christine Huda Dodge who 
asserts: ‘Islam teaches that human beings are a unique life form that was created by Allah in a 
special way with unique gifts and abilities unlike any other: a soul and conscience, knowledge 
and free will.’113  So, for Islamic and Christian scholars, human mental qualities suggest that 
human life is distinctive, and for both traditions this provides one basis for the idea that 
human life can be considered of special value.   
In addition to the idea of ‘sign’ and this case from the distinctiveness of human mental 
qualities, the idea of human stewardship may also suggest that human life is special, at least in 
the Islamic tradition.  As discussed in Chapter III, stewardship involves caring for oneself, 
others and the environment as a part of a divine trust, and these obligations can imply that the 
human person has a significant status in Islam.  In the context of medicine and euthanasia, it 
may be argued that considered as a steward, a Muslim physician is accountable for upholding, 
or has the duty to preserve, the sacredness of human life by not intentionally hastening their 
own death or unnecessarily harming others.   
Similarly, according to Catholic teaching, humans have a God-appointed duty to 
establish harmony on Earth by caring for themselves, others and their surroundings.  As one 
Vatican source states: ‘Human beings, created in the image of God, are persons called to enjoy 
communion and to exercise stewardship in a physical universe.’114 And with this responsibility, 
God grants humans limited power over other creatures.  As the source asserts: ‘Created in the 
image of God, man exercises his sovereignty over visible creation only in virtue of the privilege 
conferred upon him by God.’115 Due to this power, stewards are held responsible for their 
activities or how they exercise their power.  As the source states: ‘The steward must render an 
account of his stewardship, and the divine Master will judge his actions.’116 So the idea of 
stewardship as it is developed in the Christian tradition can suggest that human life is 
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distinctive because of the special responsibility and authority which has been conferred upon 
human beings by God.   
Moreover, some Christian scholars also link the idea of stewardship to euthanasia and 
argue that health care providers have a responsibility to look after life, but not ownership over 
life and death.  As Kenneth Overberg S.J. states, ‘The conviction that we are stewards of life 
grounds the opposition to euthanasia.  As stewards we respond with care and compassion to 
those who are suffering. Mercy killing moves beyond stewardship into dominion.’117 This view 
is shared by the United States National Conference of Catholic Bishops who assert: ‘As a 
responsible steward of life, one must never directly intend to cause one’s own death, or the 
death of an innocent victim either by act or omission.’118 The concept of stewardship is 
common to Islam and Christianity, and scholars in both traditions have linked it to the issue of 
euthanasia by seeing it as a call to respect the sacredness of human life by preserving and 
reasonably prolonging life.  In this way, this topic may invite rich discussion not only in the 
interfaith setting, but also in the clinical setting, since this perspective can be adopted by 
Christian and Muslim health care professionals.      
As well as citing their stewardship and mental capabilities, the Qur’an suggests that 
humans are also distinct because of their broad diversity as evident in many different races, 
ethnicities and traditions.  As the Qur’an states, ‘And He has created you in different forms and 
different conditions’ (71:15).  Furthermore, it is arguable that the diversity of creation is 
apparent in the differences of language or speech which also makes human beings distinct in 
their communication with others.  As the Quran states: ‘O Mankind, We have created you from 
a male and a female and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another 
(and not despise one another)’ (49:13).  Interestingly, this thought is comparable with a 
Catholic perspective based on the image of God discussion.  As one source states: ‘Implicit in 
the Catholic Theology of the imago Dei is the profound truth that the material world creates 
conditions for the engagement of human persons with one another.’119  From this information, 
it may be suggested that human life can be distinctive in many similar ways from Christian and 
Islamic viewpoints based on their accounts of human mental qualities, stewardship and the 
diversity of human creation.  It is important to emphasize for the purposes of Christian-Muslim 
dialogue that both sides consider human life distinct where this implies a special relationship 
with God.   
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Finally, both traditions also approach the question of the sacredness of human life by 
drawing on the idea of pre-determination.  For example, Zahedi et al. argue that God is 
involved in every phase of human existence, which suggests that God controls the moment of 
death.  And they assert that ‘health-care providers must do everything possible to prevent 
premature death,’ which can be linked to the previous discussion of stewardship.120 Similarly, 
in his euthanasia discussion, Sachedina argued that the ‘Qur’an states quite clearly that “it is 
not given to any soul to die, save by the leave of God, at an appointed time” (3:145).’121 These 
views are comparable to Christian thought.  For example, John Paul maintains that the person 
who commits euthanasia or suicide rejects their special relationship with God and overrides 
God’s sovereignty over the intended moment of death because they take ‘control of death and 
bring it about before its time.’122 Instead, by highlighting a concept from Romans, John Paul 
proposes that enduring pain and suffering until the intended time of death is a fitting 
submission to God’s will.123   
In considering the ideas of human stewardship and pre-determination from these 
Christian and Islamic viewpoints, a somewhat delicate balance emerges.  On the one side, 
humans take an active (collaborative) role to preserve the life of others especially when 
progress or improvement is indicative, since both Christianity and Islam overwhelmingly 
support the practice of medicine and provision of healing when it is needed.  On the other 
side, there is a degree of passivity and a resignation to the divine will in cases of end-of-life 
care, so as to not usurp God’s sovereignty over life and death.  However, this is not to say that 
some Christians or Muslims may not choose to depend heavily on human/medical intervention 
to prolong life and avoid death while others may exclusively depend on God or divine 
intervention for healing or cure.  
From this discussion, it may be concluded: first, that the idea of ‘signs of God’ and 
similarly of the ‘image of God’ are linked to the sacredness of human life in Christian thought.  
Second, there are conceptual links between the notions of ‘image’ and ‘sign’ in Christianity, 
and the ‘signs’ idea may appeal to Islamic thought.  Third, there are comparable notions of 
various types of ‘sign’ in both traditions, including mental ‘signs,’ which may suggest that 
human life has special significance.  Other similarities between Islam and Christianity on the 
sacredness of human life flow from their ideas of stewardship, divine pre-determination and 
human diversity.  However, there seems to be no ‘image of God’ idea in Islam, and there is no 
compelling evidence in the Qur’an to suggest that human beings’ status as ‘signs of God’ 
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means that their life is sacred.  The ‘image of God’ idea seems to be relevant to the question of 
human beings’ intrinsic value and quality only in the Christian tradition, and the idea of a ‘sign’ 
in Islamic sources applies equally to all created things, and not only to human beings.    
Consequentialism 
Thus far, we have compared traditional practices and dogmatic principles that are applied to 
the question of euthanasia by Christian and Muslim commentators.  This comparison has 
found that there are similarities as well as differences of approach.  On the one side, some 
scholars in this study apply dogma and religious anthropology to make a deontological type of 
argument that since human life has unconditional value or sacredness, it should always be 
preserved and respected, so opposing euthanasia (or suicide).   
However, other scholars in this study emphasize that terminal disease or extreme pain 
can result in continued suffering, loss of autonomy, diminished quality of life and increased 
burden on others.  On this basis, these scholars make a utilitarian type of argument that 
euthanasia (or suicide) should be permissible at least in principle in order to alleviate pain, 
preserve the dignity of life and reduce dependence on others.  On this view, human life has 
conditional value or is worth living only in certain circumstances and euthanasia will in certain 
cases result in the best outcome.     
In the next section, we will compare some Christian and Islamic utilitarian arguments 
that involve suffering and mercy. We will draw on some of the focal authors of this study as 
well as other commentators.   
Mercy and Suffering 
As we have seen, mercy and suffering are discussed by Joseph Fletcher and Jonathan Brockopp 
among others.  ‘Mercy’ is generally defined as the expression of compassion, kindness or 
sympathy to others.  In the context of our discussion, this concept can be applied in various 
ways.  For example, John Paul argued that because euthanasia rejects the intimate relationship 
between God and human beings, it is, he says, a ‘false mercy, and indeed a disturbing 
“perversion” of mercy.’124  Rather, ‘true mercy’ involves palliative care to preserve life and 
encouraging the afflicted person to endure suffering.125 By contrast, Fletcher and Brockopp 
argue that euthanasia (or suicide) can be an act of mercy.  In this section, we will review the 
arguments of Fletcher and Brockopp and then compare their perspectives.   
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As we discussed in Chapter II, Joseph Fletcher forms his argument for mercy and 
euthanasia from a physical and psychological point of view, but also makes his case in 
philosophical and theological terms.  For example, like Nigel Biggar in his description of 
‘biographical life,’ Fletcher stresses that having ‘personality’ or possessing certain qualities 
such as ‘freedom, knowledge, self-possession and control, and responsibility’ implies quality of 
life and makes human life valuable or worthwhile.126  For Fletcher, quality of life is conditional 
upon having personality or possessing such qualities, and for him it is quality of life rather than 
quantity that is of fundamental importance.  Fletcher claims that terminal suffering and 
extreme pain can degrade ‘personality’ to the point of ‘just being’ and may compromise 
dignity, promote greater dependence on others and inhibit public service.127 On this basis, 
Fletcher appeals to the Matthean verse 5:7 (‘Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain 
mercy’) to argue that euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide can be considered an act of 
mercy to relieve suffering, preserve dignity, and avoid (further) dependence on others.  As 
discussed, this type of view may be reflected in the case of the English G.P., Dr. Howard 
Martin, who ‘admits hastening’ the death of terminally ill persons who were in ‘dreadful 
suffering’ as an act of ‘“Christian compassion” for patients’ dignity.’128 However, Fletcher 
claims that once the Church joined forces with the state in the early centuries of the Christian 
era, its sense of mercy was weakened. So for Fletcher, terminal disease or extreme suffering 
can negatively affect quality of life and euthanasia may be a licit and merciful response to this 
condition.  
After examining a Christian perspective on mercy that supports euthanasia, we will 
now review an Islamic account of mercy and euthanasia and compare both sides. Taking a 
similar approach to Joseph Fletcher, Jonathan Brockopp draws attention to the perspective of 
Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 1209) and the Qur’anic verse 4:29 (‘Do not kill yourselves, for surely God 
is merciful to you’) to argue that euthanasia or suicide can be considered an act of mercy in 
extreme suffering cases.129  Although Brockopp acknowledges that contemporary scholars and 
sources like ICME forbid mercy killing based on their interpretation of verse 4:29, Brockopp 
contends, appealing here to Abu Ja`far al-Tabari’s view, that this verse in fact refers to a 
proscription on killing fellow Muslims and is intended to prevent intra-Muslim conflict.  
Although al-Razi also believes that verse 4:29 is referring to intra-Muslim conflict, he suggests 
that the first part of this verse may be ‘useful’ to also prohibit suicide by serving as a warning 
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of possible worldly and eternal punishment.130  However, al-Razi stresses God’s mercy in the 
second part of verse 4:29 to argue that suicide may be permissible in extreme suffering 
cases.131  Based on this interpretation of verse 4:29 it may be deduced, first, that suicide in 
non-extreme or remedial cases is forbidden and should be avoided.  Second, since God is 
compassionate and merciful, He would not want one to suffer needlessly, so one may commit 
suicide in unbearable cases and eternal punishment may in such cases be withheld or 
annulled.  This perspective may suggest that the worldly effects of adversity or illness may 
outweigh the eternal consequences of committing suicide.  So suicide in these cases may result 
in the most favourable outcome, namely, forgiveness and paradise, as well as the elimination 
of physical and mental torment. 
Al-Razi’s arguments may be compared to the Christian and philosophical viewpoints 
discussed previously.  First, Fletcher also argued that euthanasia or suicide could be considered 
in extreme or terminal cases.  As Fletcher stated, ‘Our defence of the right to die is not made in 
any kind of illness except the fatal and demoralizing ones.’132  And in a similar way, Fletcher 
asserts that some Greek philosophers ‘were willing to justify suicide in cases [of extreme pain] 
calling for a merciful death.’133 This view suggests that like al-Razi, Fletcher also makes a 
distinction between unjustified and justified suicide depending on the person’s condition.  And 
for both authors, justified suicide can be grounded in the common Christian and Muslim idea 
that God is merciful and loving, from which it may be inferred that He would not want one to 
continue suffering, especially if there are no other viable ways of ending suffering.  If God is 
merciful to humankind, and humankind is called to follow God’s example so far as possible, 
then it may be argued that human beings should be merciful to each other.  Furthermore, if 
one would not want to suffer oneself, then should one allow others to experience suffering?  
In this way, we are reminded of the classical New Testament verse ‘Do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you.’134 Similarly in the Hadith, the Prophet Muhammad asserts: 
‘None of you truly believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for himself.’135 
Although euthanasia and suicide can be interpreted from this perspective, this approach would 
challenge the idea that, like all things, suffering and relief or cure is divinely ordained.  So does 
a Christian or Muslim have right to decide when they have suffered ‘enough’ making suicide 
justified?   
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Second, Brockopp’s interpretation of al-Razi’s view of suicide above is similar to 
Fletcher’s reading of Job’s view of suicide, namely, that although Job did not commit suicide, 
he did not denounce it either.136 Third, Al-Razi’s argument suggests that medieval scholars 
recognized practical reasons that justified suicide, so it is unlikely that one is strictly required 
to follow the first part of the Qur’anic verse ‘Do not kill yourselves.’ As Brockopp states, ‘Al-
Razi’s commentary demonstrates that the classical sources were fully aware of possible 
motivations for suicide.’137 In a similar way, although the ‘thou shall not kill’ directive was used 
by Christians to argue against killing innocent people, it was also taken to be compatible with 
killing in capital punishment or war situations.  So as Fletcher argues, the commandment 
cannot be strictly enforced.138 Finally, al-Razi’s utilitarian approach to suicide may be similar to 
Jeremy Bentham’s perspective, because both views seem to involve an emphasis upon the 
elimination of pain and the experience of pleasure, which, in both cases, is achieved by suicide, 
since ‘death seems easier to bear’ than continued pain, according to al-Razi.139   
The similarity of views discussed may suggest that there is a degree of mutual 
influence in the formation of these traditions.  For example, according to one source, many of 
al-Razi’s works including ‘The Great Commentary’ were shaped by his criticisms and 
appreciation of Greek philosophy including Aristotelianism and Platonism.  As stated by the 
source, Al-Razi asserts: ‘We have delved deep into the writings of the previous philosophers 
and have affirmed the true and rejected the false.  We have added certain principles to this 
philosophy and have put forth some new ideas.’140  And according to another source, al-Razi’s 
criticism of Greek philosophy included a rejection of Aristotle’s ‘first figure’ principle.141 These 
links suggest that ancient philosophical approaches may have influenced medieval Islamic 
scholars as well as shaping later philosophical approaches.    
On the other hand, there are also differences between the way Fletcher interprets the 
Matthean verse 5:7, ‘Blessed are the merciful for they shall obtain mercy’, and the way 
Brockopp interprets verse 4:29 from the Qur’an with regards to suicide.  In view of Fletcher’s 
argument that euthanasia is an act of mercy, the Matthew 5:7 verse may suggest that if an 
agent is merciful by intentionally hastening the death of the sufferer, then God will be merciful 
to that agent.  By contrast, the 4:29 verse in the Qur’an does not in fact, despite Brockopp, 
seem to express this message.  Although humans should be merciful to others, through 
kindness and compassion (and expect the same from their fellow Muslims), in Islam, God alone 
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is merciful to the sufferer when providing a merciful or painless death.  So an agent or sufferer 
cannot be merciful in such a way that supersedes God’s authority to oversee matters of life 
and death.   
This argument is supported by Sayyed Fadlallah who asserts: ‘There might be a man 
who is suffering from great pains and could die in 6 months or even a month.  In this case, it is 
impermissible to kill him even if he or his family asks us to. We do not have an authority over a 
man's life, and the man himself is not authorized to end his life.’142 Fadlallah goes on to state 
that while euthanasia can be merciful for the ‘particular moment’ of alleviating pain, 
euthanasia ‘could even be the opposite of mercy’ because it implies disrespecting the sanctity 
of life.143 This is similar to John Paul’s view that euthanasia is a ‘“false mercy” and indeed a 
disturbing “perversion” of mercy.’144 Furthermore, John Paul argued against mercy killing since 
it functions ‘to take control of death and bring it about before its time’ either by a human 
agent or oneself, which is reminiscent of the Islamic notion of divine authority.145  This point 
was emphasized in the sacredness of human life section which similarly noted that since, from 
Christian and Islamic perspectives, human life is sacred it should be protected.  Sayyed 
Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah conveys a similar message from a monotheistic point of view:   
The point I'd like to make concerning mercy killing from the point of view of medical ethics is that: In the Islamic 
ethical theory, and probably in Christianity as well, Religion not only protects man from others but also from 
himself.  As it is impermissible to kill someone else, it is impermissible to kill yourself. The principle is the same: To 
respect life in both cases.
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Brockopp and Fletcher’s interpretations of the respective scriptures are different but aim to 
make similar arguments for suicide as an act of mercy in extreme cases.  However, Christian 
and Muslim opponents of suicide and euthanasia use similar arguments, as seen in Fadlallah’s 
viewpoint above, which are grounded in preserving human life and respecting the intended 
moment of death because humans are not the owners of life.  So despite his emphasis on 
God’s mercy through the use of verse 4:29, it is fair to argue that al-Razi’s viewpoint may not 
be fully supported by the Qur’an and most scholars.  Rather, mercy may be expressed more 
properly through practices that intend to preserve life, like palliative care.   
From this discussion, it may be concluded that there are different viewpoints on mercy 
among Christian commentators and also among Muslim scholars, based on their use of 
philosophical viewpoints, experience and interpretation of scripture.  However, there are also 
similarities among the Christian, philosophical and Muslim viewpoints.  On one side, some 
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scholars contend that in cases of extreme pain, euthanasia or suicide may be considered an act 
of mercy, or that suicide is permissible based on New Testament and Qur’an verses.  It may be 
permissible to alleviate pain in this way because God is merciful, so an agent may act 
mercifully and may avoid punishment.  However, other Christian and Muslim scholars, the 
majority, argue that euthanasia or suicide is not an appropriate expression of mercy, even in 
extreme conditions, because it fails to uphold the sanctity of human life.  Moreover, since 
euthanasia or suicide may imply worldly and eternal punishment, suffering should be endured.  
So these scholars would oppose the way the respective verses are interpreted by those who 
use them to support suicide.  
Conclusion to Chapter IV 
The purpose of this chapter was to compare and contrast the viewpoints of traditional 
Western-minded Christian and Muslim authors in this study on a range of topics related to 
euthanasia, based on their use of sources such as scripture, traditional practices, reason and 
experience.  Topics discussed by the authors in this study include various traditional or faith-
based practices such as palliative care, suffering, respect for the elderly, and withdrawing or 
withholding treatment, and ideas such as the dogmatic concept of the sacredness of human 
life, and the consequentialist idea of showing mercy and minimizing suffering.     
Interestingly, many similar or identical ideas were uncovered in the group of scholars 
who opposed euthanasia and likewise among those who supported it.  For example, the 
Christian and Muslim scholars who oppose euthanasia in practice such as Michael Banner, 
John Paul, Nigel Biggar, Zahedi et al., and Abdulaziz Sachedina cited similar reasons for their 
stance.  The practices discussed above were supported because of their role in preserving the 
dignity of human life, disclosing the value and purpose of suffering, respecting the divinely 
appointed time of death, not intending death so as to alleviate pain, and removing 
burdensome treatment.  These reasons and others were also similarly presented by both sides 
to argue against prolonging life indefinitely and against suicide.  However, as we saw in the 
consequentialist section of this chapter, suicide was favoured by Brockopp and Fletcher since it 
could imply a certain kind of respect for human life, and the permanent alleviation of pain, 
especially in extreme cases, when palliative treatment was ineffective.   
When exploring the Christian and Muslim viewpoints on the sacredness of human life, 
some interesting similarities and differences emerge.  For example, the ‘image of God’ idea 
seems to be a fundamental Christian principle that makes human life sacred and, therefore, 
distinctive and special.  However, the image principle is broadly not transferable to Islamic 
tradition due to the way the notion of an ‘image’ is critically or unfavourably interpreted in 
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Islam.  Instead, a more applicable principle involves the idea of a ‘sign.’  Although there was no 
discernible evidence in the Qur’an to suggest that the ‘signs’ of God had any link to the 
sacredness of human life specifically, the views of Muslim commentators suggest that the 
mental capacity to read spiritual and natural signs makes human life distinctive.  In addition to 
these mental signs, the idea of stewardship and the diversity of human life also suggest the 
distinctiveness of human life from Christian and Muslim viewpoints.  Although the Muslim 
commentators in particular make a link between divine providence and sacredness, some 
Christian commentators concur that human life has a predetermined time of death and that, 
therefore, one does not have the right to intentionally hasten death.  So in this study, we have 
uncovered some examples of practical as well as conceptual distinction and overlap, and these 
may all be of benefit in furthering the Christian-Muslim dialogue on these issues.   
In the last part of this chapter, we explored a consequentialist idea related to 
euthanasia, namely, the idea of relieving suffering.  While those who oppose euthanasia like 
John Paul and Abdulaziz Sachedina label euthanasia as a ‘false mercy,’ Joseph Fletcher and 
Jonathan Brockopp employ various sources such scriptural verses, reason and scholarly 
viewpoints to mount similar arguments for suicide under certain conditions.  Fletcher 
formulates his perspective on mercy from a psychological point of view and grounds this 
perspective using philosophical and theological methods of argument, while Brockopp uses the 
viewpoint of a medieval scholar to make his case for mercy. They arrive at similar 
consequentialist conclusions and agree that only in cases of intense physical suffering and 
mental torment may suicide be regarded as a justified act of mercy.  This would suggest that 
suffering in extreme cases may not be worth enduring and/or human life is not worthwhile in 
these cases. But Fletcher’s and Brockopp’s interpretation of the respective scriptural verses is 
controversial and this may lend support to the opponents of euthanasia.  What is interesting 
about this discussion is that these scholars use both philosophical and theological sources to 
make the argument for euthanasia or justified suicide.  While theological sources are often 
associated with common or mainstream attitudes against euthanasia, this discussion indicates 
that these sources may also be used to argue in favour of euthanasia.  This alternative view 
may be appealing to more liberal or moderate Christians and Muslims and is just as important 
to consider in the monotheistic discussion of euthanasia.    
Moreover, these similarities and differences on euthanasia from Western Christian 
and Islamic traditions can serve as a platform for comparison and analysis with other Western 
thought and respective Eastern Christian and Islamic methodological perspectives on the topic 
to strengthen intra-faith, as well as interfaith, discussions.  An example of interfaith dialogue 
that was initiated by the Catholic Church includes the Pontifical Council for Interreligious 
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Dialogue (PCID), which promotes the study of religions and dialogue, and has a special 
delegation to address issues that involve Islam.147 In 1981 PCID organized an amended version 
of a manuscript titled: Guidelines for Dialogue between Christians and Muslims.  This 
manuscript advanced theological reflection and encouraged mutual harmony and openness 
among Catholics involved in discussion with Muslims on shared topics and issues, such as 
religious ethics, and was specially made by John Paul II and organized by a panel of Catholic 
scholars who were specialists in Islamic studies.148  During the past 40 years, there has been 
wide-ranging diplomatic dialogue between the Pontificate and various influential Muslim 
groups, particularly during the prominent pontificate of John Paul II.149 In fact, according to 
Andrew Unsworth, John Paul, in addition to Paul VI (d. 1978) did more to advance improved 
ties between Christians and Muslims than any other popes in history. 150      
Chapters III and IV have allowed us to gauge what themes in Western Islamic medical 
ethics call for further examination or are not as fully developed as the Western Christian 
perspectives  examined in this study.  Drawing on these reflections, Chapter V will aim to 
generate a more comprehensive Western Sunni Islamic account of euthanasia.  This discussion 
will serve as contribution to the literature in Islamic medical ethics, and is intended to 
constitute an invitation to greater interfaith exchange.
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Chapter V: An Extended Western Sunni Islamic Account of Euthanasia     
Following a general introduction of various strands of the debate on euthanasia, Chapter II 
surveyed different Western Christian perspectives on euthanasia drawing on practice-based, 
anthropological and consequentialist kinds of argument.  Chapter III followed a similar method 
and explored the use made by Western and Eastern Muslim and non-Muslim Islamic ethics 
scholars of these same kinds of argument.  In Chapter IV, these Christian and Islamic 
viewpoints were analyzed.  The purpose of this analysis was to emphasize how different 
methods can lead to the formulation of comparable and contrasting conclusions on end-of-life 
issues that are directed toward, or can appeal to, a Western audience.  This analysis can be 
helpful in finding common ground as well as identifying distinctively Christian and Islamic 
approaches for the purpose of meaningful interfaith exchange, at least in the Western world.  
This analysis also allows us to gauge whether some aspects of the Islamic ethics of euthanasia 
may remain unexplored or may invite further development particularly in dialogue with the 
Western Christian discussion.  So by drawing on this review of the arguments used by the 
Christian and Muslim scholars in this study, Chapter V will offer an expanded Western Sunni 
Islamic anthropological and practice-based account of euthanasia, death and dying.   
It may be contended that some of the arguments we have been examining are more 
evident in the Christian perspectives represented in this study are not developed as fully, by 
the Muslim scholars in this study.  This may be a reflection of the current literature on Islamic 
ethics.  This contention is partly supported by Shanawani and Khalil who examine a broad 
range of articles in Islamic ethics, and conclude that the majority of articles are ‘very much 
inadequate’ for teaching Islamic ethics because they may make ‘little or no use of the 
discourse of Islamic studies.’1 Therefore, Chapter V will attempt to develop Islamic ethical 
reasoning with reference to the particular theme of euthanasia.  This will be done by 
proposing a broader approach to the methodology of Islamic ethics that extends beyond, for 
example, a straightforward proof-texting method.  The weakness of this method is also noted 
by Sachedina who argues there is ‘an abundance of juridical opinions deduced from the 
revealed texts on issues in biomedicine such as...end-of-life decisions without any ethical 
discussion on the rightness or wrongness of the act in its medical, scientific and clinical 
practical settings.’2 Rather than rejecting this textually-based method altogether or replacing 
the system of fiqh or Islamic jurisprudence, it will instead be supplemented here by the use of 
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practice-based, anthropological and consequentialist arguments, which is an approach that is 
drawn from, or adopted by, the selected Western Christian scholars presented in this study.   
The normative sources applied in this chapter include: the Qur’an, Hadith (Sunnah), 
Sharia Law (juridical law), Ijmah (communal consensus), Qiyas (analogical reasoning), Ijtihad 
(deductive reasoning), and of lesser importance, Urf (custom) and Maslaha (public welfare).  
At least from a Sunni perspective, the Qur’an and Sunnah play major roles in how moral 
thought and reasoning in Islamic ethics ‘ought’ to be developed in the Muslim community 
based on traditional customs and the Prophet’s (pbuh) actions as a ‘moral reformer of 
mankind.’3  This approach may be linked to the application of Qiyas and Ijtihad which enable 
ancient and modern scholars to appropriately interpret Qur’an and Hadith, explore other 
sources and allow for dynamic rational thinking (Ra’y) in relation to new ethical quandaries.  
These techniques may lead to new recommendations on novel ethical issues, so creating 
common Ijma.4  According to Sachedina, many articles demonstrate ‘no indication that 
normative sources of Islamic ethical reflection provide a variety of opinions and resolutions to 
each ethical dilemma in biomedicine.’5  Perhaps due to the tendency to rely on ‘juridical 
opinions deduced from the revealed texts’, it seems the sort of process described above is 
lacking or is not applied with rigour in the modern Islamic ethics literature.  
Based on this overall approach, the Western Sunni Islamic perspective in Chapter V will 
serve as an original contribution to the literature in Islamic medical ethics.  This approach may 
produce a number of results that attempt to match the overall needs of modern Islamic ethics.  
For example, this approach will allow us to: offer new ways of solving contemporary issues in 
Islamic ethics or arriving at reasonable ethical decisions; understand the moral reasoning or 
process behind ethical decisions; and/or settle a novel dispute not directly addressed in the 
revealed text (e.g. stem-cell technology).  Perhaps most importantly, as a contribution to the 
discourse in monotheistic medical ethics, this approach may encourage a deeper and more 
critical discussion of contemporary issues by Muslim scholars and thereby stimulate greater 
intra-faith exchange.  And since many of the issues in this chapter are also addressed by 
Western Christian authors in this study, this approach may likewise produce better interfaith 
understanding between Christians and Muslims, at least in the Western world. This venture 
may also be necessary because according to Sachedina, the contemporary Islamic medical 
                                                          
3 Fazlur Rahman, ‘Concepts Sunnah, Ijtihad, and Ijma in the Early Period,’ in Islamic Methodology in History (Islamic Research 
Institute, 1965), p. 1 and 10  
4 Rahman, ‘Concepts Sunnah, Ijtihad, and Ijma in the Early Period,’ p. 18.  
5 Sachedina, ‘Defining the Pedagogical Parameters of Islamic Bioethics,’ p. 242  
153 
 
ethics literature ‘hardly provides the frame of reference for comparative study between 
Islamic and, for instance Jewish or Christian bioethics.’6    
Rather like Chapter IV, Chapter V will be divided into four sections.  The first section 
will cover topics associated with practices relevant to euthanasia and the preservation of 
human life.  These topics include: practices of the body relating to acts of worship, old age and 
respect for the elderly and withdrawing ineffective treatment; and the doctrine of double 
effect as it pertains to martyrdom vs. suicide and palliative care. The second section discusses 
topics in Islamic anthropology and the third segment will consider consequentialist ideas.  
Topics in the second section include: the purpose of earthly life, the sacredness of human life, 
and the act of killing a human being.  The third section will examine material related to the 
slippery slope phenomenon and ‘living’ vs. ‘merely existing.’  The last section will discuss the 
role of the Muslim physician which seemingly relates to more than one of these types of 
argument.  
Let us begin by discussing practice-based arguments.  
Practices of the Body: Acts of Worship 
According to the Christian perspectives in this study opposed to euthanasia, the body should 
be respected, protected or preserved until natural death because it has intrinsic value or is 
considered a divine gift.  For example, Michael Banner emphasized faith practices such as 
asceticism and relic veneration as examples of respect for the body while John Paul and Nigel 
Biggar supported hospice care alternatives on a similar basis.  These practices are in contrast 
to euthanasia and suicide, which, according to these perspectives, tend to disrespect and 
devalue the body.  In this section, we will construct an analogy to this Christian approach by 
drawing upon Islamic sources.  From an Islamic perspective, the body is significant because it 
serves to fulfil certain roles in this world and the next according to the Qur’an and Hadith.  It 
may be argued that since Sunnah implies ‘exemplary conduct’ based on the Qur’an, the Hadith 
may serve as a behavioural model for practices of maintaining and respecting the body based 
on his (pbuh) actions.7 One of the body’s roles in this world involves fulfilling certain spiritual 
obligations including acts of worship, which not only require the body, but also strengthen and 
discipline the body.  This is one reason for respecting the body.  The first section will discuss 
how the body is respected or maintained through traditional hygienic practices.  The second 
section will discuss the purposes of the body during earthly life by highlighting some faith 
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based practices.  The last section will discuss the spiritual role of the body and how it 
contributes to the life of the soul after death.    
One significant way of respecting the body from an Islamic perspective involves 
keeping the body clean.  The significance of cleanliness is also clearly evident from a personal 
perspective in the following Hadith.  As the Prophet (pbuh) simply asserts:  ‘Cleanliness is half 
the faith.’8  Based on his field work in Muslim communities in Bahrain, Christian scholar Fuad 
Khuri emphasizes that in addition to keeping the body concealed and guarded against illicit 
activities (e.g. preserving chastity against adultery), one should also dress modestly and keep 
the body clean.9  Cleanliness of the body can be observed through certain hygienic practices or 
taharah. These practices can include ablution or wudu before prayers, daily bathing especially 
before Friday prayers, wearing clean clothes, brushing the teeth with miswak and applying 
perfume.10 Besides this, keeping the body clean can also be considered a good general practice 
from a public perspective (maslaha). Therefore, it may be argued that implementing these 
practices keeps a person clean and prevents the spread of disease and sickness to others 
thereby maintaining a sense of decency and respectability among others.  Avoiding tattooing 
and/or excessive piercings that deface or mar the body can also be interpreted as a form of 
cleanliness.  As one Hadith indicates on tattooing, for example: ‘It was narrated that Abu 
Juhayfah (may Allah be pleased with him) said: “The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be 
upon him) cursed the one who does tattoos [and] the one who has a tattoo done.”’11 In 
addition, women are to clean themselves after the menstrual cycle according to 
interpretations of the Qur’an, Hadith and Ijtihad, to regain physical purity.12   
In addition to keeping the body externally clean, a Muslim should keep the body 
internally pure.  This may be done by consuming food and drink that are authorized by Islamic 
Law (Halal) such as camel, lamb, veal, chicken, fruits and vegetables and milk.  This 
permissibility is based on Hadith and later supported by the consensus of Muslim scholars.13 
Food and drink that are considered illicit (Haram) due to the diseases they may propagate may 
include dog, pig, elephant, bear, bat, alcohol, and blood among other sources.14  However, it 
may be argued that any meat may cause disease especially if contaminated, infected or not 
cooked properly (as seen in the recent experience of Swine Influenza Virus, Avian Flu and 
                                                          
8 Sahih Muslim, Book 2, Chapter 1, Number 0432. 
9 Fuad I. Khuri, ‘The Human Body: A Religious View,’ in The Body in Islamic Culture (London: Saqi Publishers, 2001), p. 36-37.   
10Sahih Muslim, Volume 1, Book 4, Number 137. 
11 M. Muhsin Khan, translator, Sahih Al-Bukhaari, Book 1, Volume 2, Number 5032,Translation of Sahih Al-Bukharri, 
2005,<http://www.iium.edu.my/deed/hadith/bukhari/index.html> (accessed 2 September 2010).  
12 Huda Younis, ‘Islamic Bioethics’ O&G Magazine Volume 10, Number 2 (2008): p. 24. 
13 Khuri, ‘The Human Body: A Religious View,’ p. 52-53.   
14 Qur’an: 2:173, 5:3, 6:145, 16:115.  
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Salmonella).  There is further discussion of the licit consumption of food and drink in the 
section on palliative care below. 
Aside from observing standards of respect and decency, the body is kept externally 
and internally clean most importantly to perform acts of worship such as the five daily prayers, 
as we will discuss next. One cannot legitimately observe and fulfil these practices if one’s body 
is dirty.  For example, as one source states: ‘Soiling with any [excreted] substances will render 
the patient ritually unclean and...unable to perform prayers.’15 Another example may include 
women not engaging in prayers until the completion of the menstrual cycle and bathing.  As 
the Qur’an affirms: ‘O ye who believe! Approach not prayers until after washing your whole 
body’ (4:43).16 Similarly, as one Hadith by Abu Huraira suggests, the Prophet (pbuh) states, 
‘The prayer of a person is not accepted until [they] perform the ablution (wudu).’17 The 
ablution also serves to symbolically absolve one’s bodily sins.18  In addition, consuming 
forbidden food and drink may not only invite harmful disease, but also negate or render one’s 
prayers or personal pleas (dua) unacceptable.19 For example, the Prophet refers to a man in 
this situation who is supplicating: ‘“Oh Lord, Oh Lord!” (while) his food was haram, his drink 
was haram, his clothing was haram, and he nourished [his body] with haram things, so how 
can he be answered?’20 Therefore, an impure body ‘generates a polluted state to be purified 
before prayer’ which may imply a need for cleaning the body and/or avoiding unlawful food 
and drink.21 
Why do Muslims need their body in this earthly life?  As stated above, although the 
body is used to perform many general tasks throughout one’s life, from a religious perspective 
the body of a Muslim is most importantly used during earthly life to serve God by fulfilling 
certain fundamental religious obligations and to serve others. These obligations will also be 
referred to here as ‘spiritual activities’ or ‘practices of the body.’  These practices will be 
discussed because they are ways of respecting the body by keeping the body strong thereby 
allowing the believer to continue serving God and society.  This view is supported in Rahman’s 
                                                          
15 Mohammad Zafir al-Shahri and Abdullah al-Khenaizan, ‘Palliative Care for Muslim Patients,’ The Journal of Supportive Oncology, 
Volume 3, Number 6 (2005): p. 432. 
16 Abdullah Yusuf Ali comments that this verse (4:43) can also imply not approaching prayers in a state of intoxication (before it 
was prohibited) or in a dazed state of mind due to drowsiness or sleepiness.  So the individual should be mentally and physically 
pure before approaching prayers (The Meaning of The Holy Qur’an, (Maryland: Amana Publication, 1997): page 198).  According to 
Maulana Muhammad Ali, there is a difference of opinion as to what is meant by the word ‘sukarah’ in this verse (4:43).  It can 
mean to be intoxicated with drink, or it can also mean to be intoxicated with sleep.  And sakr may be applied in the latter sense, 
because its literal significance is not functioning. The word is also applied to confusion of judgment (The Holy Qur’an: Arabic Text 
with English Translation Commentary and comprehensive Introduction, (Ohio: Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha`at Islam Lahore Inc, 2002): 
p. 234). 
17 Abdul Hamid Siddiqui, translator, Sahih Bukhari, Volume 1, Book 4, Number 137, Translation of Sahih Bukhari, 2005, 
<http://www.iium.edu.my/deed/hadith/bukhari/index.html> (accessed 17 October 2010). 
18 Siddiqui, translator, Sahih Bukhari, Volume 2, Book 4, Number 13, (accessed 17 October 2010). 
19 Khuri, ‘The Human Body: A Religious View,’ p. 52-53.   
20 Siddiqui, translator, Sahih Bukhari, Volume 3, Book 5, Number 1686, (accessed 18 October 2010). 
21 Khuri, ‘The Human Body: A Religious View,’ p. 41.   
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(d. 1988) Islamic perspective on human life which states that the body should be ‘healthy and 
worth living, because for the Qur’an, life is meant for the “service of God,” for good works.’22 
In contrast, euthanasia and suicide would not allow the Muslim to fulfil these obligations.  
Therefore, as proposed by the Christian viewpoints in this study, intentionally killing oneself 
may be interpreted as disrespecting the body and abandoning one’s religious obligations or as 
preventing one from doing these good deeds.  As one Hadith suggests: ‘None amongst you 
should make a request for death, and do not call for it before it comes, for when any of you 
dies, he ceases (to do good) deeds and the life of a believer is not prolonged but for 
goodness.’23 Although it may be argued that terminal illness or intense suffering may inhibit 
one from doing good deeds and that this provides a case for euthanasia or suicide, such 
situations do not justify intentional termination of life because patience, enduring pain and 
seeking God’s help (Tawasuul) and medical assistance to manage pain may be considered a 
more fitting response.   
Good deeds that serve to respect and strengthen the body can consist of specific acts 
of worship which involve physical action.  These acts include: a) The five daily prayers (Al-Salat) 
which involve repetitive movements; b) Saum or fasting during Ramadan; c) Zakat or charitable 
donations that involve the physical ability to serve others; and d) Hajj or pilgrimage which 
involves certain rituals and practices. We will now explore the spiritual and medical benefits of 
each practice beginning with the five daily prayers. 
Practices of the Body through Islamic Acts of Worship  
Is one who is obedient to Allâh, prostrating himself or standing (in prayer)? And your movements (are) among those 
who fall prostrate (to Allâh in the five compulsory congregational prayers) (39:9, 26:219). 
The five daily prayers are important because they are a major religious requirement and a 
faith- based practice that involves many physical movements, as the verses above suggest. In 
order to engage in prayer, it has been argued that first the body must be maintained by being 
kept healthy and clean.  And second, from a medical point of view, physical movements in 
prayer can strengthen and preserve the body to persevere in this practice.  For example, 
prostration can increase blood flow to the brain providing greater nourishment, strengthen 
cervical and neck muscles preventing related disorders and clear out the nasal cavity avoiding 
sinus infections.24 While in a sitting position in prayer, the buttocks are placed on the heels 
imitating a yoga position which has been noted to lower stress and anxiety levels and decrease 
high blood pressure among other benefits.25 Lastly, standing in prayer for long periods of time 
                                                          
22 Rahman, Health and Medicine in the Islamic Tradition, p. 109.   
23 Sahih Muslim Book 35, Number 6480.  
24 Dr. Muhammad Karim Beebani, ‘The Medical Benefits of Sajdah,’ The Saudi Gazette, 7th July 2000.   
25 Mohammed Faruque Reza, Yuji Urakami and Yukio Mano, ‘Medical Benefits of Salat’ Annals of Saudi Medicine 22 (2002): p. 1.   
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is known to enhance focus and balance.26  All of these actions combined can also relieve 
varicose veins by decreasing pressure on the veins in the leg.27   
Multiple prostrations can also be used to make personal pleas (dua) with some 
psycho-somatic benefit.  As the Prophet asserts: ‘The nearest a servant comes to his Lord is 
when he is prostrating himself, so make supplication (in this state).’28 As Beebani comments, 
pleading this way ‘is a great psychological advantage and it gives relief to the person 
concerned as life is full of worries and in this position he gets at least a transient refuge from 
the agonizing problems’, thereby giving one hope and optimism.29 Prostrations also suggest a 
position of humility, weakness and need of God thereby drawing one spiritually closer to Him.  
And this type of closeness is a way of preventing the body from performing evil acts as well as 
receiving forgiveness for sins committed by the body.  This practice overall indicates, first, that 
the body participates integrally in the life of faith and, second, that this life is ordered to the 
good of the body.   
In sum, prayer requires cleanliness, strength and preservation of the body.  
Consequently, prayer can provide many spiritual and physical benefits which can help to 
prevent illness and weakness, bring about a sense of peace and serenity, and improve the 
body, so enabling the believer to continue prayer.  Therefore, prayer from an Islamic 
perspective is an important way of respecting the body and acknowledging its spiritual 
importance.   
O believers, prescribed for you is the fast, even as it was prescribed for those that were before you (2:183).
30
 
B.)  Like the daily prayers, the practice of fasting (Saum) is also a way of respecting the body 
because it can improve the body or make it healthier.  Fasting during the month of Ramadan 
involves abstaining from food, drink, smoking and marital relations or other pleasurable acts 
from sunrise to sunset.  From a spiritual point of view, this form of renunciation is a way of 
controlling one’s inner base desires (nafs). Fasting also serves to shield the body (e.g. the 
                                                          
26 Mohammed Faruque Reza, Yuji Urakami and Yukio Mano, ‘Medical Benefits of Salat,’ p. 1.   
27 Dr. Sharif Kaf Al Ghazal, ‘Reflections on the Medical Miracles of the Quran,’ in Islamic Medicine on Line, 4 September 2004,  
<http://www.islamicmedicine.org/medmiraclesofquran/medmiracleseng.htm> (accessed 12 September 2010) 
28 Sahih Muslim, Book 4, Number 979, Search Truth, 2011,  
<http://www.searchtruth.com/book_display.php?book=004&translator=2&start=0&number=0946> (accessed 17 March 2011).  
29 Dr. Muhammad Karim Beebani, ‘The Medical Benefits of Sajdah’ The Saudi Gazette, 7th July 2000, 
<http://seedsofrealisation.hadithuna.com/the-medical-benefits-of-sajdah-prostration/> (accessed 20 September 2010).   
30 According to Abdullah Yusuf Ali, this verse (2:183) can be interpreted as a reaffirmation of fasting. In other words, before Islam 
existed, fasting was observed, or was a traditional practice of previous communities (The Meaning of The Holy Qur’an (Maryland: 
Amana Publication, 1997): p. 73). 
Commentator Muhammad Asad agrees with Ali’s interpretation.  Asad believes that fasting has been widely practiced ‘at all times 
of man’s religious history.’  Moreover, he asserts that the purpose of fasting as a traditional practice is threefold: 1) to 
commemorate the month in which the Quran was revealed to the Prophet (pbuh); 2) to provide one an exercise of self-discipline 
against one’s carnal desires; and 3) to gain a true appreciation of the hungry and poor (The Message of the Qur’an: translated and 
explained by Muhammad Asad (Arthur Classic Novels, 2007): p. 168). 
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tongue, ears and eyes) from committing sins such as backbiting or lying.31 Fasting keeps one 
away from these types of actions, so one may become closer to God (taqwa) through 
recitation of the Quran (taraweeh), remembrance of God and charitable deeds resulting in the 
pardon of transgressions. As the Prophet states, ‘He who fasts in Ramadan motivated by his 
faith and with dedication will have all his past sins forgiven.’32 
From a medical standpoint, fasting improves the body by serving as a regulatory or 
cleansing mechanism.  For example, smoking habits may decrease after sustained fasting, or 
the consumption of unhealthy foods which contain excess sugars and high-fat carbohydrates 
may diminish after fasting.33  Moreover, fasting can decrease blood sugar levels and lower 
cholesterol levels preventing build-up of arterial plaque and resulting in reduced blood 
pressure.34  As a result, fasting may help to improve health by, for example, reducing the risk of 
lung cancer or obesity-related illnesses.  Therefore, fasting or control of food intake is 
recommended to maintain or lose weight.  Abstaining from food and drink for this extended 
period of time also assists in the digestive breakdown of metabolic nutrients in the liver and 
stomach.35 Lastly, refraining from water for 12 hours allows the renal system rest from the 
process of disposing waste and helps with prevention of waste build-up which may result in 
renal lithiasis (kidney stone).36   
So fasting can yield several spiritual and medical benefits.  The medical benefits can 
help to preserve and strengthen the body by potentially making it healthier, so enabling the 
person to continue serving God.  Therefore, from an Islamic perspective, fasting is a second 
example of the requirement to respect the body.      
And We sent them inspiration to do good deeds …to practice regular charity (21:73). 
C.)  Similar to individual prayer and fasting, charity and/or serving others is another important 
practice that serves to respect the body.  Zakat or alms-giving involves donating a portion of 
one’s income to those less fortunate.  Although this form of charity may not require much 
physical activity, there are other forms of required charity called sadaqah that can involve 
using the body in the service of others.  As one Islamic source confirms, ‘Social charitable 
acts...are considered obligatory daily activities.’37  For example, a Muslim may volunteer in a 
                                                          
31Islaam.org, ‘Blessings & Benefits of Fasting,’ in Sunnah Organization, 2007, <http://www.islaam.org/Ramadhan/Rama-13.htm> 
(accessed 20 October 2010). 
32 Sahih Bukhari Book 2, Number 36 and 37, in Search Truth, 2011, 
<http://www.searchtruth.com/book_display.php?book=2&translator=1&start=0&number=36#36> (accessed 17 October 2010). 
33 Al Ghazal, ‘Reflections on the Medical Miracles of the Quran,’ in Islamic Medicine on Line, 4 September 2004.  
34 Al Ghazal, ‘Reflections on the Medical Miracles of the Quran,’ in Islamic Medicine on Line, 4 September 2004.   
35 Dr. Krishan Bakhru, ‘Benefits of Fasting,’ in Health Guidance, <http://www.healthguidance.org/entry/4803/1/Benefits-of-
Fasting.html> (accessed 3 November 2010). 
36 Al Ghazal, ‘Reflections on the Medical Miracles of the Quran,’ in Islamic Medicine on Line, 4 September 2004.  
37 Al-Bukhari & Muslim, Hadith number 26, <http://fortyhadith.iiu.edu.my/hadith26.htm> (accessed 18 November 2010). 
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humanitarian or charitable organization such as homeless shelters or soup kitchens to help 
those less fortunate or in need.  These actions are also encouraged by the Qur’an: ‘And they 
give food out of love for Him to the poor and the orphan and the captive. If you give alms 
openly, it is well, and if you hide it and give it to the poor, it is better for you’ (2:271, 76:8).  The 
following Hadith describes other forms of charity involving bodily activity as a way of serving 
others and for one’s own good, which need not require a special occasion:  
On every person's joints or small bones (i.e. fingers and toes), there is sadaqah (charity) every day the sun rises. 
Doing justice between two people is sadaqah; assisting a man to mount his animal, or lifting up his belongings onto 
it is sadaqah; a good word is sadaqah; every step you take towards prayer is sadaqah; and removing harmful things 
from pathways is sadaqah.
38 
Serving others in these ways is a form of respecting the body in Islam because it utilizes the 
body in order to fulfil an obligatory religious act as well as create a more caring and supportive 
society.  Following Michael Banner’s approach, we might argue that this is different from 
euthanasia and suicide, because they may imply selfishly abandoning one’s obligations to 
humanity, especially if one is still able to help others.  Even when one is not able to help others 
due to a terminal condition, active euthanasia and suicide are still not permitted in Islam, 
because there are other alternatives to providing a comfortable death which do not involve 
the deliberate termination of life.  
And proclaim to mankind the Hajj. They will come to you on foot and on every lean camel. Then let them complete 
their prescribed duties (of Hajj), and perform their vows, and circumambulate the Ancient House (the Ka'bah) 
(22:27,29). 
D.) The last obligatory spiritual practice that serves to respect the body involves the rites and 
rituals of the Hajj or the pilgrimage.  The spiritual benefits of Hajj are special and inclusive 
because according to one Hadith, those who complete the Hajj correctly and avoid intentional 
transgressions will have all of their sins forgiven. ‘As Abu Hurairah narrates: ‘I heard the 
Prophet say, “Whoever performs Hajj and does not commit any Rafath (obscenity) or Fusooq 
(transgression), he returns (free from sin) as the day his mother bore him.”’’39 So the Hajj 
symbolizes a spiritual purification of the body as if the believer is reborn.   
From a physical standpoint, this practice is distinctive because not only may it improve 
or strengthen the body, but it also requires exceptional physical strength (more so than the 
other practices) if it is to be completed over a period of five days.40 Not only may pilgrims 
arrive on foot as the above verses indicate, but Hajj also involves long distance walking or light 
jogging when visiting the holy places such as the Kabah, the landmarks of Safah and Marwah 
                                                          
38 Al-Bukhari & Muslim Hadith, Volume 3, Book 27, Number 26, <http://fortyhadith.iiu.edu.my/hadith26.htm> (accessed 16 
November 2010) 
39 Sahih Bukhari, Volume 2, Book 26, Number 596, in The Hadith of Muhammad,  
<http://www.blessedquietness.com/alhaj/bukhar26.htm> (accessed 16 November 2010). 
40 We can speak here from personal experience having completed the Hajj in 2003.   
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and travelling to Mount Arafat a short distance away. These rituals are in addition to the five 
daily prayers. So there is an exceptional amount of physical activity involved which requires 
bodily strength and energy as is evident in the next verse: ‘And sanctify My House for those 
who circumambulate it, and those who stand up (for prayer), and those who bow (submit 
themselves with humility and obedience to Allâh), and make prostration (in prayer)’ (22:26). So, 
in order to fulfil this physically demanding spiritual duty, the body should be protected and 
strengthened, and this requires respecting the body.     
What is the role of the body beyond life in this world?  Michael Banner argued from a 
Christian perspective that the body will be restored to life at the resurrection and that this is a 
reason for respecting it.  There is a comparable Islamic eschatological perspective.  According 
to Sachedina, the soul is detached at the moment of death.41  But the soul will reside near the 
grave to be questioned after burial by the angels of death, Munkar and Nakir, about the 
individual’s faith-related beliefs.42 Although the body decomposes, Islamic tradition states that 
on the Day of Judgement, the body ‘reattaches’ with the soul at the time of resurrection so the 
person can be questioned about their earthly deeds.  According to Imam Reza’s interpretation 
of the doctrine of Islam, the person is questioned about their earthly deeds because every 
person is responsible and will receive appropriate judgement for their good and bad deeds.43  
As the Qur’an affirms, ‘the souls are joined with their bodies (the good with the good and bad 
with the bad).44 They will come forth, with humbled eyes from (their) graves as if they were 
locusts spread abroad’ (81:7, 54:7).   
According to the Quran, one major role of the body in the hereafter is to ‘bear witness’ 
to the wicked and good deeds committed by the body.  As the Qur’an states: ‘Nay! Man will be 
a witness against himself [as his body parts (skin, hands, legs, etc.) will speak about his deeds]’ 
(75:14). Similarly, the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) remarked: ‘A servant of God will remain 
standing on the Day of Judgment until he is questioned about his (time on earth) and how he 
used it; and about his body and how he used it.’45 Examples of evil deeds carried out by the 
body can include using the tongue, eyes, ears to express jealously and envy, lie to others, 
exhibit arrogance and greed, listen to gossip and slander or ‘backbite’ others. In addition, the 
                                                          
41 Sachedina, Islamic Biomedical Principles, p. 143.  
42 Sachedina, Islamic Biomedical Principles, p. 144.  
43 Imam Reza (A.S.), ‘The Doctrine of Islam,’ in Imam Reza (A.S.) Network, 
<http://www.imamreza.net/eng/imamreza.php?id=5773> (accessed 16 January 2010) 
44 Yusuf Ali believes that there is a broader meaning to this verse (81:7).  He asserts that this verse makes a distinction between 
good traits or things and wicked traits or things.  Whereas in the earthly life, good traits are mixed with bad traits, the life beyond 
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interpretation of verse 81:7.  He reads this verse as the ‘uniting of men’ to create a single nation that is presumably good and 
obedient to God here on earth (The Holy Qur’an with English Translation and Commentary, (Ohio: Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha`at 
Islam Lahore Inc, 2002): p. 762).   
45 Hadith Al-Tirmidhi, Hadith 148, in Asma Ul Husna,  http://www.asma-ul-husna.netne.net/ (accessed 19 December 2010).  
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hands and feet can be used to commit physical evil deeds such as murder or adultery.  
Similarly, we can include suicide and euthanasia as evil deeds towards one’s own body since 
they are prohibited in Islam. On the other hand, good deeds done by the body may favour the 
believer such as helping orphans, widows and homeless people in addition to the practices of 
the body discussed above.   
Lastly, the following Quranic verse suggests that both the body and soul experience 
the ‘final destination’ of Heaven or Hell.  In the following example from the Quran, the 
believer’s body and the soul encounter divine punishment for harm caused to others: ‘Those 
who unjustly eat up the property of orphans, eat up a Fire into their own bodies: they will soon 
be enduring a blazing Fire’ (4:10). As one Hadith suggests, the body also incurs enduring 
punishment for its involvement in harm caused to oneself: ‘Whoever purposely throws himself 
from a mountain and kills himself, will be in the (Hell) Fire falling down into it and abiding 
therein perpetually forever; and whoever drinks poison and kills himself with it, he will be 
carrying his poison in his hand and drinking it in the (Hell) Fire wherein he will abide eternally 
forever...’46 Based on this information, it may be deduced that the individual is responsible for 
deeds committed by the body including euthanasia and suicide, and that the body plays a 
significant role in the events of the life that is to come following death.   
In conclusion, based on the Qur’an, Hadith and contributions by Muslim physicians 
from scientific perspectives, it may be said that the body is significant in earthly life and the life 
beyond this world.  During earthly life, the body should be protected from harmful activities 
such as suicide and euthanasia so it may fulfil its spiritual obligations.  In addition, these 
spiritual practices can produce a number of spiritual and physical benefits—the latter of which 
can help to improve or strengthen the body thereby allowing the person to continue serving 
God.  The body is also significant in the hereafter since it is involved in bearing witness to 
deeds committed through the body and experiencing eternal life with the soul.  Therefore, it 
may be argued from an Islamic (and scientific) perspective that the body should be respected 
not only for the purpose of fulfilling spiritual practices during earthly life, but also because of 
its role in the life to come. This argument may specially apply to elder persons who may 
consider euthanasia or may be coerced into it by loved ones.  Let us turn to this issue next.      
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Practices: Old Age and the Respect for the Elderly 
In this study, John Paul has made the argument that caring for and showing respect to elderly 
people is a practice that should be preserved since it is a well established tradition and 
because elderly people possess wisdom and experience.  Because of its rootedness in 
tradition, this practice can be considered prima facie justified.  This duty implies that elderly 
people should not be compelled into euthanasia or suicide; nor should they be neglected.  
Abdulaziz Sachedina made a comparable argument that since the individual is linked to their 
family and/or community, end of life decisions should be made as a group rather than 
individually.  This approach often serves to protect the welfare or well-being of the patient as 
well as uphold religious and cultural values.  Other Muslim scholars support this and add that 
as a customary practice (urf) ‘close family members often contribute significantly to the 
decision making process’ since public interest takes precedence over personal decisions.47  
Moreover, these decisions should not involve aiming at death or abandonment.   
In this section, we will construct an analogy to John Paul’s perspective on respecting 
the elderly by further examining this topic from an Islamic perspective drawing on Islamic 
sources.  According to the Qur’an and Hadith, adult children have a duty (fard or wajib) to care 
for their aged parents or relatives, speak softly to them, and be patient with them when they 
are frail, weak or cannot take care of themselves until natural death.  As the Quran states: ‘And 
We have enjoined man [to] respect his [elder] parents’ (31:14).  This verse has also be 
interpreted or translated as being ‘dutiful’ or good to, or showing concern for, one’s parents.48   
Similarly, the Prophet (pbuh) teaches: ‘Those who do not respect the elderly and do not act 
kindly toward the young, are not one of us.’49 This Hadith is supported by Imam Reza who 
states that respecting the elderly or one’s elder parents is one of the cornerstone principles in 
Islam following the respect of deen (i.e. religion).50  The duty of respecting one’s aged parents 
or relatives also implies that they should not be forsaken, abandoned or coerced into 
euthanasia or suicide.   
The duty of respecting the elderly or not abandoning them may seem to arise partly 
because this obligation is plainly laid down in the Qur’an and expressed in the Hadith, so this 
practice becomes a part of tradition and a duty.  Therefore, another reason could be that the 
culturally sanctioned practice of caring for others within a family or community has been 
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50 Imam Reza (A.S.), ‘Respect One of the Foundations of Faith in Islam,’ in Imam Reza (A.S.) Network, 
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preserved from generation to generation thus making it a part of tradition.  But should a 
practice be implemented and maintained based on traditional status alone?  In other words, 
should a practice have a rationale over and above preserving tradition?  
Based on the Qur’an and Hadith, one reason for adult children caring for an elderly 
parent stems from the responsibility their parent exercised in caring for them when they were 
young children.  In this context, caring can be regarded as a fitting recognition of the burdens 
parents, especially the mother, endured in order to give birth to, rear and raise the child to 
adulthood.  As the Qur’an states, ‘[And] his mother bears him with faintings upon faintings and 
his weaning takes two years’ (31:14).  For this reason, when asked about good behaviour 
toward elderly parents the Prophet (pbuh) responded that the mother should be honoured 
three times over the father. ‘Allah's Messenger, who amongst the people is most deserving of 
my good treatment? He said: “Your mother, again your mother, again your mother, then your 
father, then your nearest relatives according to the order.”’51 This view is similarly emphasized 
by I. A. Arshed, who argues that the mother has more rights than the father and deserves 
more respect.52  In addition to child bearing, parents also fulfil their responsibility by cleaning, 
teaching, and financially and emotionally supporting their offspring with mercy and 
compassion when they could not sustain themselves.  The parents did not abandon or give up 
the child, but rather had an obligation to care for their young children.  So when adult children 
care for their parents, the roles are reversed and the obligation is reciprocated.  In other 
words, the ‘original favour’ is paid back by ‘returning the favour.’ 
According to the Qur’an and Hadith, the believer has an obligation to ‘return the 
favour’ by extending ‘good’ treatment to and caring for their parents to the best of their ability 
until natural death.  As the next Hadith suggests, this obligation is second only to daily 
obligatory prayers and/or worshipping God.  Al-Walid bin 'Aizar commented: ‘“I asked the 
Prophet, 'Which deed is loved most by Allah?" He replied, 'To offer prayers at their early (very 
first) stated times.' "Abdullah asked, "What is the next (in goodness)?" The Prophet said, "To 
be good and dutiful to one's parents."’53  And as the Qur’an states in a commandment-like 
form in two instances: ‘You shall not serve any but Allah and (you shall do) good to (your) 
parents. And serve Allah and do not associate anything with Him and be good to the parents 
and to the near of kin’ (2:83, 4:36).  The latter verse (4:36) has a broader interpretation, 
namely, treating all of God’s creatures with respect, courtesy and dignity with an emphasis on 
practical action or public service for the common good rather than merely expressing 
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sentiment or intention.54 55  These sources clearly link care for elderly parents with prayer and 
worshipping God or divine teachings, which suggests that caring for one’s parents is second 
only in importance to worshipping God.  As Shah asserts, ‘to render service to one’s parents is 
made next to serving Allah.’56 So after serving God’s commandments through the Prophet 
Muhammad’s (pbuh) teachings, care and respect of parents is next in importance.  
However, like the care of a young child, respect and reverence towards one’s aged 
parents or relatives involves more than just physical care taking.  It also implies a moral system 
by which the adult child interacts with the elder.  For example, one aspect of respecting the 
elderly may involve feeding them, cleaning/bathing them, spending quality time with them 
and taking care of their other needs, which are similar tasks to those the parents undertook 
when the child was young.  But another aspect involves the social, psychological and emotional 
side which may imply speaking gently to them, being patient and fair with them, keeping their 
best interests in mind and supporting their social and emotional interests.  As discussed, these 
aspects are reminiscent of a palliative care approach.  As the Qur’an clearly states, ‘Your Lord 
has commanded that you shall not serve (any) but Him, and show goodness to your parents. If 
either or both of them reach old age with you, say not to them (so much as) ‘Ugh’ nor chide 
them, and speak to them a generous word’ (17:23).  Yusuf Ali comments that in this verse 
one’s spiritual and moral duties are combined, or are affirmed at a similar level, to emphasize 
the importance of both worshipping God and serving one’s parent.57  In addition to this care, 
the adult child has a responsibility toward his parents even after their death.  This 
responsibility entails praying for their parents’ forgiveness and admittance into paradise as 
illustrated in the Quran: ‘My Lord! forgive me and my parents. The gardens of perpetual abode 
which they will enter along with those who do good from among their parents; and the angels 
will enter in upon them from every gate’ (71:28, 13:23).  According to Riaz Siddiqui, praying for 
one’s parents after their death is considered ‘a duty’ similar to caring for them when they were 
alive.58  According to one interpretation of verse 13:23, although the physical self of the parent 
has departed, praying for the parent can maintain the expression of love and affection a child 
has with the parent (or any relationship) until the two parties are reunited in paradise.59  
On the other hand, disrespecting or abandoning aged parents is considered a 
significant sin.  This view is also expressed by Siddiqui who also cites the following Hadith to 
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emphasize the egregiousness of mistreating one’s elderly parents.60  As the Hadith suggests, 
disrespect to aged parents is a sin second only to polytheism: ‘Allah's Apostle said thrice, “Shall 
I not inform you of the biggest of the great sins?" We said, "Yes, O Allah's Apostle." He said, 
"To join partners in worship with Allah: to be undutiful to one's parents.”’61 And these actions 
can lead to divine punishment perhaps in this world and in the next as is evident in the 
following Hadith:  ‘“Despised and humiliated he is! Despised and humiliated he is! Despised 
and humiliated he is!” When his companions asked him to whom he was referring, the Prophet 
(pbuh) answered: “A person whose parents, or one of them, attain old age, living with him, 
and [the parent’s supplications to God] do not cause [the person] to be admitted into heaven”’ 
due to their disrespect or disregard.62 These descriptions suggest the magnitude of the 
obligation to respect aged parents.  These punishments are parallel to the consequences of 
committing suicide. 
In sum, respect of the elderly including aged parents and relatives should be practised 
because it is good and important according to scripture and is for this reason a part of tradition 
(urf).  From an Islamic perspective using the Qur’an and Hadith, this practice is good because it 
allows the child to appreciate the burdens and sacrifices associated with caring for someone 
who cannot sustain themselves.  This practice is also fitting because the adult child is looking 
out for the elderly parent’s best interests and their overall well-being.  Adult children have the 
same burden of obligation toward their aged parents that most parents once had to them, and 
are required to return the care they received themselves, which also implies that adult 
children do not have the right to abandon or euthanize their parents.   
Practices: Withdrawing Ineffective Treatment and Prolonging Life Indefinitely  
As we discussed in the previous chapter, ‘passive’ euthanasia involves withdrawing or 
withholding futile life sustaining care in terminal, incurable or brain death cases.  Some who 
favour the practice do not consider it a form of euthanasia because the intention to kill is not 
present.  Instead, withdrawing treatment lets natural death occur as a result of the terminal 
disease or ailment.  This practice is favoured by Muslim scholars in this study because the 
patient has the right to refuse or the physician may block ineffective treatment, it avoids fear 
associated with delaying death, it respects the intended moment of death, and treatment may 
be used for the care of other patients.  This view is supported by Rahman who argues, based 
on his interpretation of the Quran, that prolongation at the end of life is not encouraged when 
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quality of life does not improve.63 This notion indicates that quality of living is more important 
than, or just as important as, the mere duration of life.64   
As we have seen, this perspective can be defended from an Islamic perspective given 
the viewpoints of Sachedina and Zahedi et al.  These viewpoints are that ‘passive’ euthanasia is 
permissible in Islamic Law when treatment cannot bring further progress or is considered more 
of a burden or when quality of life is deemed low or non-existent.  Therefore, it may not be 
necessary to add anything new to this topic from an Islamic perspective since these viewpoints 
sufficiently acknowledge medical, theological and economic considerations.  However, these 
considerations seem to be linked to preventing the needless prolongation of life, which 
requires further exploration.  
From an Islamic perspective, prolonging life may challenge the intended moment of 
death by intentionally delaying death.  However, according to the Qur’an, the moment of 
death is one part of divine providence since all phases of human existence occur at a 
predetermined moment; so it is impossible to obstruct regardless of a person’s age, status or 
location.  Numerous verses in the Qur’an support this notion relating to the timing of death.  
For example: ‘Wherever you are, death will overtake you. When their time (of death)… arrives 
they cannot tarry for a single hour nor can they go ahead. It is He who gives life and brings 
death. The death from which you flee, that will surely overtake you...’ (4:78, 17:33, 40:68, 
62:8).  These verses reaffirm God’s ultimate power over life and death, and that He is not 
limited by time or space or dependent upon beings or things.65  Moreover, as discussed, death 
from an Islamic perspective is defined as the detachment of the soul from the body at 
predestined time.66 Therefore, attempts to somehow resist the inevitability of death by 
prolonging life needlessly seem vain and defy reason.  Still, opposition to this practice leaves 
open the question of the rationale behind needlessly prolonging life. 
In Chapters II and IV, we highlighted Michael Banner’s case for supposing that delaying 
death can originate from a fear of death.  Alternatively, it was suggested that delaying death 
may stem from fear of divine punishment, concern over unfinished tasks or the well being of 
one’s family, or an extraordinary affection for worldly life or for loved ones.  Although fear, 
anxiety and love can be rational emotions at the time of death due to the uncertainties 
surrounding death for even the most devout believer, trust or reliance in God at the time of 
death may be lacking in such cases.  However, the Islamic tradition teaches Muslims to 
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tenaciously trust (tawwakul) God in every aspect of their life, as the following verses suggest: 
‘Whoever trusts in God will find Him sufficient. Verily God will accomplish His purpose. I put my 
trust in Him alone, and all who trust should only trust Him’ (65:3, 12:67).  These verses also 
indicate that trust is grounded in faith or belief that God knows what is best for the believer 
and is kind and forgiving, and that his Universal Purpose is always good no matter how 
negative the condition may be.67       
Why should a Muslim trust in God at the time of death? In the previous section, it was 
suggested that fear may reasonably arise from the possibility of divine chastisement for earthly 
sins.  According to the Qur’an, while God is described as Just and Fair, He is also known as 
Forgiving, Merciful and Compassionate towards the person in spite of human transgression 
and sin (15:49). In fact, when Muslims begin any action, they are advised to say ‘In the Name of 
God, the Beneficent, the Merciful.’ Based on this maxim, rather than feeling fear of death and 
the possibility of punishment, one may have trust in God that He will forgive one’s 
transgressions if asked to do so with sincerity.  These notions are clear in the following verse: 
‘Ask forgiveness of your Lord and turn unto Him: for my Lord is indeed Full of mercy and loving-
kindness’ (11:90).  In this way, asking and hoping for forgiveness of sins through genuine 
repentance can arguably be one form of trust in God and can reduce fear at the end-of-life and 
on the Day of Judgment.  As the Qur’an suggests: ‘And trust in Allah…O My servants! there is 
no fear for you this Day, nor shall you grieve’ (43:68).  This verse suggest that one’s faith or 
devotion to God should prevail over one’s fears and insecurities with the conviction or 
acceptance that whatever He wills (at the end-of life) has positive nuance.68  This is in contrast 
to repentance driven by fear alone at the last moments of death where the intention is to 
avoid punishment.  According to Rahman’s interpretation of the Qur’an, this approach is 
discouraged since the individual had a lifetime to seek forgiveness.  As he states: ‘[The Qur’an] 
categorically disallows intercession as well as repentance on deathbed when there is no more 
opportunity for a person to work and earn.’69 However, it may be argued that forgiveness on 
the deathbed may still occur by the ultimate discretion or will of God.  According to a classical 
Hadith, when God created mankind, He declared that ‘My mercy shall surpass my wrath.’70 
Further support is evident in the next Hadith which states: ‘Allah the Exalted said: “O son of 
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Adam! If your evil deeds reach the borders of the sky, and then you ask Me for forgiveness, I 
will forgive you.”’71  Both of these sources may be applied to the end-of-life. 
Withdrawing ineffective medical treatment respects the intended moment of death in 
addition to satisfying medical and economic concerns.  The attempt to delay death may stem 
from fears involving divine judgment.  Instead, the Qur’an states one should accept the 
inevitability of death by trusting in God to accept sincere repentance since God is Merciful and 
Compassionate.  From an Islamic perspective then, ‘passive’ euthanasia is an accepted practice 
while prolonging life indefinitely is rejected.  Just as Banner argues from a Christian 
perspective for trust in God and against delaying death due to fear, so here we can make a 
comparable case from an Islamic perspective using Islamic sources.  Next, we will discuss two 
more practice-based topics in relation to the doctrine of double effect.  These practices are 
linked to the topics just discussed because they do not aim at death, but rather principally 
intend to preserve life until the divinely intended moment of death.    
 Doctrine of Double Effect 
The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) when applied to end-of-life situations implies that it can 
be licit to give medication with the intention of relieving pain, even if it is foreseen that death 
will occur sooner as a result.  In this study, we highlighted two actions which conform to DDE, 
namely, martyrdom vs. suicide and palliative care.  These practices respect bodily life and do 
not intend death.  However, DDE can also be interpreted from an Islamic perspective since 
intention (Niyyat) is important in every action.   
We can make the assumption that every reasonable action has a motive, even if that 
action is just intended and not performed.  Therefore, in the Islamic tradition, any action is 
assessed by God based on motive as suggested in the Quran and Hadith.  As one verse states: 
‘Allah will not call you to account for thoughtlessness in your oaths, but for the intention in 
your hearts; and He is Oft-Forgiving, Most Forbearing’ (2:225). And in the case of one who 
intends to perform a good deed but is not able to do so, God will assign that intended deed a 
positive credit.72 Another version of this Hadith explains: ‘The rewards of deeds depend upon 
the intentions, and every person will get the reward according to what he has intended.’73  It 
may also be deduced that through an authoritative source like Hadith, intentions should be 
considered to understand whether the agent is culpable or not.  Similarly, one who intends to 
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commit an unlawful deed but does not because of a change of heart also receives a positive 
credit.74  This approach implies that God knows an individual’s intentions regardless of 
whether the action occurs and is evaluated on that basis.  The intention to murder where 
there is no change of heart and the intention to donate would be measured differently, even if 
neither intention is implemented.  Intention is also important because it is considered a core 
principle that shapes the process of formulating Islamic Law.75 Applying the principle of 
intention in the process of Shariah Law, Kasule asserts that ‘the law considers only the 
intentions behind human actions.’76 With regards to euthanasia, ethical positions are 
formulated based on the presumption that the physician’s intention ought to be to always do 
good.  Since euthanasia is considered a desecration of human life, Islamic law has forbidden 
Muslim physicians from this practice and this is reflected in the Islamic Code of Medical Ethics 
(ICME).  
Applying DDE in medical ethics from an Islamic perspective, the intention should never 
be to kill a patient regardless of ‘motive’ by active or assisted means in severe cases. As Aziz 
Sheikh affirms, ‘What is important is that the primary intent is not to hasten death.’77 Scholars 
deem such actions as impermissible based on Islamic Law and the ICME due to their 
contravention of principles given in the Qur’an and Hadith.  As an alternative, palliative care 
should be applied to manage pain and retain the highest quality of life possible even if it 
results in death, since this was not the intention, as we will discuss in further detail next.  Thus, 
the agent would not be held responsible.  As Al-Jawziyya (d. 1350) asserts, ‘A skilful physician 
who practices his craft properly, whose hand causes no harm, yet from his action there occurs 
injury to a life or loss of life, or the loss of some faculty.  Such a man is not held responsible.’78  
Similarly, one should not aim at death with reference to martyrdom. Even if there is no 
intention to aim at death the action may be misinterpreted as murder and suicide, 
respectively, which are clearly prohibited acts in Islam.  As the Quran affirms in two instances, 
‘And they were persisting in great sin (joining partners in worship along with Allâh, committing 
murder and other crimes).  Do not kill yourselves, for surely God is merciful’ (56:46, 4:29).  
Although verse 56:46 mainly implies shirk or associating other deities with God, the verse can 
also suggest (prohibiting) other forms of major sins, including unlawfully killing others.79  
However, since the circumstances of death can be misconstrued in some cases, we concur with 
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Brockopp that the individual’s true intentions are only known to them and God.  These 
intentions are especially important when differentiating martyrdom from suicide.  
Practices: Martyrdom versus Suicide 
In this study, Michael Banner and Jonathan Brockopp made the argument that there is a 
distinction between martyrdom and suicide (or euthanasia) based on intention. The intention 
in martyrdom should not be to bring about death even though death may be foreseen.  By 
contrast, suicide or euthanasia involves a deliberate intent to terminate life.  In this section, we 
will extend the discussion by first examining different interpretations of martyrdom and we 
will then discuss suicide from an Islamic perspective.  
According to the Qur’an, a martyr (shahid) is considered a ‘witness’ to their faith by 
sacrificing their life to defend their religious convictions, for example, during combat, as we 
will discuss next (3:140). In addition, a person may be martyred when defending a social idea 
or conviction. Lastly, martyrdom may also be construed as defending oneself, defending one’s 
property, or surrendering to disease such as plague or intestinal illness.80 
Martyrdom in Islamic literature is often described in the context of war and 
persecution. For example, if an enemy or aggressor threatens, suppresses, or infringes upon, 
the religious rights and freedoms of Muslims, they may lawfully retaliate through armed 
means or tactics.  As the Qur’an sanctions, ‘Permission (to defend) has been granted to those 
who have been fought against; they have been oppressed. Verily God has the power to help 
them. Those who were unjustly expelled from their homes for no other reason than saying: 
“God is our Lord”’ (22:39-40).81 Even in these conditions, the primary intention should be to 
reach a diplomatic solution with the opposition with the aim of avoiding loss of life, so war or 
killing are reserved as final options that must meet several strict criteria based on Shariah 
Law.82  As the Qur’an states, ‘If they seek peace, then you seek peace. And trust in God for He is 
the one Who hears and sees all things’ (8:61).  Based on this verse, some scholars believe that 
although peace should always be sought in cases of potential conflict, a conflict may be a way 
establishing peace or a new order or system, as opposed to fighting for the sake of fighting.83  
And if war must be initiated, there are also rules in Islam about engaging with the aggressor, 
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which does not primarily involve killing, but rather deterring the enemy or causing their retreat 
to prevent the loss of life (2:190). On the other hand, killing the enemy or aggressor to defend 
oneself or one’s religious convictions may be considered the lesser of two evils to continuous 
violence, persistent persecution, renouncing one’s faith, losing one’s land or one’s loved ones, 
as we will discuss.  So in these cases, killing the enemy may be permitted, but only as a last 
resort.  As the Qur’an states: ‘War is a greater transgression, but to turn men from Allah, and 
to disbelieve in him, and to expel his people thence, is greater with Allah; for persecution is 
worse than killing’ (2:217). This type of self-defence is known as the lesser Jihad or physical 
Jihad, which was implemented especially in early Islam to protect its rising development and 
expansion from enemies and foreign invaders.84   
The struggle to preserve or defend the existence of Islam and/or avoid renouncing 
religious convictions can result in martyrdom. Since the belief or faith (Iman) of the believer, as 
the first pillar of Islam, centres on surrender or submission, dying to uphold faith in conflict 
implies the ultimate sacrifice and is an act which deserves reverence.  This view is 
characteristic of the most pious believers.  As the Qur’an states, ‘Whoso obeyeth Allah and the 
messenger, they are with those unto whom Allah hath shown favour, of the prophets and the 
saints and the martyrs and the righteous. The best of company are they! And there is the type 
of man who gives his life to earn the pleasure of Allah...’ (4:69, 2:207). In addition to the martyr 
being recognized along with these other groups, the last verse indicates a supreme spiritual 
compensation for this sacrifice. This idea is confirmed in the following verse: ‘[If] you strive 
hard and fight in the Cause of Allâh with your wealth and your lives, that will be better for you, 
if you but knew. (If you do so) He will forgive you your sins, and admit you into Gardens under 
which rivers flow, and pleasant dwellings in Paradise; that is indeed the great success’ (61:11-
12).  After the Prophets (peace be unto them) and their closest followers, the fate of the 
martyr clearly holds a significant station in Islam because giving up one’s life and one’s 
material possessions is outweighed by the everlasting value and reward of eternal life.  In 
addition to these spiritual rewards, the martyr may also be venerated or admired by people.   
A second related example of a martyr can be one who is killed protecting or defending 
their life, their property and/or their family from hostile or oppressive forces such as in cases 
of theft, rape or murder.  According to Muslim scholars, one may intentionally kill another as 
an act of self-defence especially if one’s life is in imminent danger.85  However, if one’s life is 
not at immediate risk, the intention should be to deter the attacker, which may result in 
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unintentional but foreseen killing.86 This viewpoint is supported by Al-Munajjid: ‘The person 
who is attacked should not hasten to kill the assailant until after he has exhausted other 
means of warding him off, such as reminding him of Allah, scaring him and threatening him, 
seeking help from other people, or seeking the help of the police.  But he may hasten to kill 
him if he fears that the aggressor is about to kill him.’87 Like war-time killing, self-defence 
killing in domestic crime situations can involve a direct intention to kill, but only as a last 
alternative.  And if the attacker is killed in the struggle, the victim need not face justice or 
punishment nor pay the attacker’s family blood money remuneration (diyah) since the killing 
was not based on mutual hostility, according to Shariah Law.88 However, if the victim is killed in 
the course of defending themselves, then the victim is considered a ‘martyr’ and the aggressor 
experiences divine punishment if killed.89  
A third interpretation of martyrdom related to self defence need not involve physical 
combat, but rather defending and dying for one’s ideas or convictions through social discourse 
or ‘standing up’ to hostile forces. For example, Martin Luther King (d. 1968) has been called a 
‘martyr for justice’ and a ‘martyr for peace’ because he died defending his non-violent 
approach to social justice and racial equality.90 Another example involves the martyrdom of a 
Polish Roman Catholic priest named Father Jerzy Popieluszko who was murdered in 1984 
trying to defend his country from communism. In 2009, Pope Benedict XVI declared him a 
martyr to clear the way for his beatification and possible sainthood.91  The Pope remarked: 
‘[Father Popieluszko’s] zealous service and his martyrdom are a special sign of the victory of 
good over evil.’92 Moreover, based on this translation and commentary of the Qur’an 
(specifically verse 4:69 cited above), Abdullah Yusuf Ali believes that a martyr need not only be 
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one who was engaged in physical battle, but a martyr may also be a one who was devoted to 
the service of others through, for example, teaching and charity.93  And a more current 
example involves the 2011 tension and uprisings in many Middle Eastern countries.  For 
example, from the perspective of Egyptian Muslim and Christian protesters struggling for 
democracy, greater freedom and more economic opportunity, those who died for these causes 
were considered ‘martyrs of the revolution.’94 This type of view also seems to be what Joseph 
Fletcher is referring to when he interprets a martyr as the ‘hero’ or, one who symbolically 
takes a stand against (continued) pain and suffering by terminating it through euthanasia.95  
This view suggests that an aggressor need not take the form of a human or animal but could 
also be internal.  
It is clear from these views that the idea of martyrdom can be derived from different 
forms of self-defence.  And martyrdom, according to proper Islamic principles, may result in 
preservation of faith, eternal reward, worldly recognition or the continuation of global ideals.  
Alternatively, martyrdom may be shaped by a combination of motivations or consequences 
discussed above because they may bring about the most benefit for the martyr.  At the same 
time, martyrdom can pose a challenge for the modern believer because of the way it involves 
sacrifice, motive, and consequence.  For example, martyrdom may compel someone to reflect 
on the values or priorities of their life and their present overall state in relation to their faith, 
and what they are willing to give up in accepting martyrdom.  Important and critical questions 
may arise during this evaluation: ‘How important is my faith and the world to me?’ and ‘How 
important is it to uphold my faith?’  These questions may help the believer to appraise the 
importance of the next life in relation to their current situation in this life.  So if one believes, 
for example, that the next life is more important than earthly life, then one may be willing to 
give up one’s worldly assets and become a martyr for a worthy cause.  On the other hand, 
unwillingness to be a martyr does not mean that eternal life is not important, as there are 
other ways to gain paradise such as through acts of worship or respecting the elderly or 
serving one’s parents, as discussed.  However, martyrdom seems like the most direct way of 
attaining heaven since, according to Hadith, the martyr forgoes the ‘questioning’ phase after 
death perhaps because the martyr’s sins are erased.96 However, this willingness raises the 
question of motive and consequence.  Is martyrdom intended to release oneself from one’s 
present condition or to hurt others?  Or is martyrdom a way of preserving one’s spiritual 
convictions, respecting the ‘goodness of bodily life’ but, at the same time, gaining heavenly 
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reward?  In other words, is one aiming at death to attain heaven or does death occur as an 
unintended by-product of defending one’s faith?  
The benefits of martyrdom may motivate some to seek ‘martyrdom’ inappropriately 
by aiming at death.  This concern is evident in Brockopp’s perspective that martyrdom may be 
confused with suicide since these two practices are distinguished only by intent.97  In cases 
when death occurs quickly or is unplanned, the intention may be unclear, unknown or 
misunderstood.  Therefore, in these situations, unknown to others, death may be intended for 
the sake of the rewards only, as discussed above, or it may be misperceived as suicide when 
actually it was a case of martyrdom.   
However, it may be argued that one who aims at death to achieve these benefits 
maligns the concept of martyrdom and is not really achieving martyrdom at all, but rather 
suicide, as we will discuss next.  If martyrdom implies ‘desiring death’ or intent to die, this 
would conflict with, or negate, DDE because the intention in DDE should not be to die.  If one 
wants to be a martyr as a means to attain the reward of paradise, then it may be contended 
that the real aim in martyrdom should be to act for the pleasure of God.  This is supported in 
the Qur’an: ‘Say (O Muhammad SAW): Verily I am commanded to worship Allah alone by 
obeying him and doing religious deeds sincerely for His sake only’ (39:11). This motive can be a 
means of receiving admiration from others, preserving their faith and receiving a heavenly 
reward.    
Martyrdom may be differentiated from suicide.  Several Christian and Muslim scholars 
in this study define suicide as deliberately killing oneself and condemn it as the purest kind of 
wrong act regardless of the person’s condition, worth or quality of life.  And they discuss some 
psychological, theological and sociological effects associated with suicide.  In addition to the 
psychological aspects discussed, it may also be noted that suicide may often be perceived as a 
symptom of mental disturbance such as severe depression, schizophrenia or bipolar disorder.  
For example, up to 15 per cent of those who have untreated depression commit suicide.98 In 
fact, elderly people (65 or older) have a higher risk of completed suicide than any other age 
group often due to feelings of hopelessness and depression that may arise from long-term 
illness as well as social and financial hardships.99  Some scholars refer to this form of suicide as 
‘egotistical suicide,’ or ‘anomic suicide’ when suicide is associated with an economic downturn 
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or loss of meaning in life.100  Suicide may also be a result of an overdose of antidepressants, as 
well as the person’s feeling that they are a burden on others.101  And those with bipolar 
disorder are 15 times more likely to commit suicide when this illness is combined with alcohol 
abuse.102 Further, depression is generally accepted as a characteristic of suicide in 
schizophrenia in which the biggest danger of suicide comes during non-psychotic, depressed 
phases of the illness.103 On the one hand, suicide is universally condemned in Islam for reasons 
already discussed, and can result in divine punishment as suggested in the following Hadith: ‘A 
man was inflicted with wounds and he committed suicide, and so Allah said: My slave has 
caused death on himself hurriedly, so I forbid Paradise for him.’104 However, one who acts 
illegally but without sound mind may be exempt from earthly and divine punishment as they 
are also exempted from their spiritual duties.105  
Another aspect of suicide relates to its sociological impact.  In Chapter III we discussed 
how in Islam an individual is closely linked with their family or community, so patient 
autonomy is limited because major decisions are usually made in the best interest of the 
family as a group in consultation with the physician.  On this approach an individual is still an 
important part of the community and may also play a major role therein.  Furthermore, the 
values, beliefs and obligations of an individual may be a reflection of those of the society and 
vice versa.106 In this way, there may be a reciprocal relationship, namely, the individual may 
have a responsibility to maintain and protect the community as the community similarly has a 
duty to care for its members.  So what effect would one’s decision of suicide have on others?  
On the one hand, individuals who belong to larger families or broader social networks are less 
likely to commit suicide perhaps due to greater overall support.107  However, suicide (or 
euthanasia) can imply that one is not only forgoing pain and discomfort (or their current 
seemingly untenable situation) through suicide, but one is also abandoning one’s social 
responsibilities like charity and serving others and deserting the community.  Here suicide may 
reflect the fact that an individual is not able to properly carry on their duties due to their 
condition, and feel they are becoming a burden or ‘dead weight’ upon others.  One’s inabilities 
or weakness can also lead to depression and isolation, which may result in suicide, as 
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discussed.  By contrast with the perspective noted above, Durkheim found that suicide rates 
among the elderly increased during times when social interaction was the greatest and when 
social tasks were most rigorous, such as the spring and summer seasons.108 In this way, suicide 
of the weak could be interpreted as a social service or favour.  This is referred to as ‘altruistic 
suicide’ in which one may ‘feel it is their duty’ to eliminate oneself in the interest of the 
community.109 Moreover, a suicide may be especially distressing for those closest to the 
individual if another community member aided in the suicide like in physician-assisted suicide.  
In this way, suicide can destroy oneself, one’s spiritual connection with God by rejecting God’s 
control over life and death, and it can also sever one’s close link with the community.    
We will now further discuss suicide from an Islamic perspective. Suicide also raises 
moral questions as to whether society should intervene to prevent it.  Does the Muslim 
ummah or community have a moral obligation to prevent suicide?  If so, how far does that 
obligation extend (e.g. persuasion, force, changes in policy, risk to one’s own life, etc.)? Or 
does the Muslim have a moral right to kill himself/herself on the grounds of autonomy?  If the 
Muslim community has an obligation to prevent harm based on the Islamic principle of helping 
others, then it may be argued that actions which prevent suicide should form part of the social 
policy of the ummah. This, in turn, may shape social views toward suicide, which may also 
suggest that the limits of autonomy from an Islamic perspective would prohibit acts that 
deliberately infringe upon the sanctity of life and God’s control over life and death. This 
perception is evident in many Middle Eastern countries where social guidelines that are 
established on suicide (or any other matter) are based on its vehement prohibition by the 
Qur’an and Hadith.110  Suicide can have at least an indirect effect on family and the community 
at large.  So it may be inferred that killing oneself or others is like killing a community as the 
Qur’an suggests: ‘If anyone killed a person not in retaliation of murder, it would be as if he 
killed all mankind’ (5:32).111  
It is important to also highlight a second more modern and troubling sociological 
consequence from an Islamic perspective. Not only can suicide impact friends and family 
overall, but it can also impact the wider community particularly when one resorts to violence 
(e.g. ‘suicide bombings’) to kill others and oneself.  These activities are often distortedly hailed 
as ‘martyrdom’ operations.  This view is supported by Muhammad Tantawi who uses analogy 
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(qiyas) to affirm that suicide bombings and other extremist activities are not only forbidden in 
Islam but are clearly distinguishable from just-war and martyrdom ‘like the earth and the 
sky.’112 Similarly, Muhammad Tahir ul-Qadri issued a legal ruling through the use of Ijtihad 
vehemently condemning all forms of violence associated with extreme forms of Islam and 
commented that they should absolutely not be confused with martyrdom.113 As Ul-Qadri 
affirms in his statement: ‘I didn't leave a single, minor aspect that, in the mind of radicals or 
extremists, can take them to the direction of martyrdom.’114 Declarations like these can have a 
positive impact on future extremist activity as well as public welfare (maslaha).115 It may also 
alter one’s view of Islam and influence a third, more universal sociological effect of suicide.  
This effect involves a continued perception of Islam by the media and the general population 
as a possibly violent faith due to the acts of a minority in Islam.    
Martyrdom is clearly a righteous, honourable and respectable act in the appropriate 
situation such as when it involves defending oneself and/or Islam.  But it is equally important 
to not aim at death to become a martyr, because that could be construed as suicide.  Suicide in 
the form of killing oneself and others to achieve so-called ‘martyrdom’ may have very 
damaging consequences.  Therefore, it should be re-affirmed that martyrdom and suicide are 
morally distinct actions in virtue of their differing intention(s), and should not be confused.  
Since humans may find it difficult to establish whether death was a result of martyrdom or 
suicide, Brockopp’s idea that precise intentions and exact type of death are only known to God 
and the deceased may be re-iterated here.116 This thought is also reinforced in the Qur’an as 
one verse in the Qur’an, for example, states: ‘Know they not that [only] Allâh knows their 
secret ideas, and their Najwa (secret counsels), and that Allâh is the All-Knower of the unseen’ 
(2:78).  It is arguable that this supposition is true in any case of intent.  Like martyrdom, the 
practice discussed in the next section seeks to avoid aiming at death.    
Practices: Palliative Care  
The Christian and Muslim scholars in this study who oppose euthanasia support hospice and 
palliative care as a form of comprehensive support for an individual in the final phases of life.  
This is because hospice care serves to avoid needlessly prolonging life or intentional killing. 
This approach was upheld as an appropriate way of respecting the body.  In contrast, 
euthanasia and suicide involve a direct intention to hasten death thereby preventing death at 
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the divinely intended moment and compromising the dignity of human life.   In this section, we 
discuss from an Islamic perspective how palliative care can be viewed from a medicinal and 
non-medicinal viewpoint.   
One major resource of hospice care involves using medicine to alleviate discomfort 
associated with terminal illness.  From an Islamic perspective, this approach is favourable 
based on the assumption that God created all forms of illness and all forms of relief as the 
ultimate healer.  As one verse in the Qur’an suggests: ‘And when I am sick, He restores me to 
health’ (26:80). This implies that if God afflicts an individual with sickness or creates disease, 
then only He has the power to relieve the individual through some remedy or bring about 
death.  The use of medicine and the process of healing as integral to religious practice are also 
emphasized in the following Hadith: ‘Is there then some value in medicine, O Messenger of 
God?  He (pbuh) replied: “The One Who sent down illness also sent down medicine. Indeed 
God sent down both illness and medicine, and for every illness He gave a remedy—except for 
death. So carry out medical treatment, but do not use therein anything unlawful.”’117 Since 
euthanasia is a form of suicide, and both are prohibited in Islam, the last statement may be 
interpreted as using medicine with the intention of shortening the patient’s life or causing 
unnecessary harm.  Otherwise, in end-of-life cases, medicine has historically been utilized to 
alleviate pain, combat illness and reasonably extend life until death occurs. This means that 
medicine or treatment is applied provided it benefits the patient.  This objective is reflected in, 
for example, the works of Ibn Sina (d. 1037 C.E.) who discussed methods of scientific 
experimentation, signs and symptoms to identify diagnoses, and ways to classify and 
quarantine various diseases and pathogens as well as curative and therapeutic remedies.118 
And due to the advances in medical science, modern clinical medicine also encourages the use 
of medicine in end-of-life cases.  For example, the ICME categorically states that palliative care 
or other end-of-life forms of treatment can help to mitigate all forms of pain thereby 
invalidating all forms of intentional self-killing like euthanasia or suicide.  The Code contends 
that ‘there is no human pain that cannot be conquered by medication,’ which indicates that 
palliative care is supported in Islam particularly in end-of-life cases.  And based on the Qur’anic 
and Hadith excerpts above, the ICME view also signifies trust and hope in God that He will 
provide relief from pain or cure illness, if He wills.   
However, palliative care need not be limited to conventional hospital medicine. The 
Oxford dictionary (2002) defines palliative care as ‘anything used to alleviate pain, anxiety, 
etc.’ Therefore, it may be argued that dietary practices and natural remedies can also be 
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another form of palliative care. These alternatives were also supported by the Prophet (pbuh) 
through his consumption of specific foods that possess healing powers to keep the body 
healthy and prevent disease.  Like standard methods of palliative care, this method may be 
another way of respecting the body from an Islamic perspective.  Examples of these foods 
included meats, black cumin and honey, according to al-Shahri and al-Khenaizan’s view of 
Islam and health issues.119  As Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya (d. 1350) asserts, ‘The Messenger of God 
(pbuh) liked sweetmeats and honey.  These three—meat, honey, sweetmeats—are among the 
most excellent of foods and the most beneficial to the body, the liver and organs.  
Nourishment from these brings great benefits in preserving health and strength, and no one 
can be harmed by it.’120 Other examples included fruits and vegetables.  As one sources states: 
‘The Prophet (pbuh) used to eat the fruit of the land when it was in season, and did not refrain 
from it.  This too is among the greatest means of preserving health.’121 Similarly, to alleviate 
illness the Prophet (pbuh) consumed boiled barley soup since barley helped to cleanse the 
stomach, reduce body temperature, quench thirst, and reduce coughs.122  Natural remedies 
included olive oil, dates or unripe grapes, pomegranate, fig, barley, and vinegar to fight skin 
infections, sores, septic ulcers and hives.123 And many modern dieticians endorse these types 
of natural remedies as well as fruits and vegetables because they can prevent diseases such as 
heart disease, diabetes and stroke thereby increasing one’s life’s span.124  These practices also 
support what was discussed earlier in the practices of the body section concerning the need to 
keep the body internally pure with lawful food and drink, not only to keep the body healthy 
but also to engage in acts of worship.   
Palliative care in its modern sense is a way of respecting the body from an Islamic 
perspective.  But palliative care can be viewed in other ways, namely, daily nutritional 
practices outside the hospice care setting that also serve to respect the body by improving 
health and preventing disease.  According to the following Hadith, these elements are the best 
divine gifts one can receive in earthly life: ‘Whoever awakes with good health of body, safe in 
his mind, possessing the food for that day, it is as if the world is granted to him [because] no 
one is given any better than health.’125 
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The next section of this perspective will discuss some topics in Islamic anthropology as 
they relate to euthanasia including: suffering and the mercy of God, the purpose of earthly life, 
the sacredness of human life, and the act of killing a human being.  
Suffering and the Mercy of God 
In the previous chapters, we examined different aspects of the teachings on suffering 
advanced by Abdulaziz Sachedina and John Paul.  From this analysis, we concluded that 
although hospice care is encouraged as a way of respecting the body in terminal cases, the 
opportunity to experience suffering may also be favourably viewed.  Sachedina argued from an 
Islamic perspective that suffering can be a test of one’s faith and can result in the absolving of 
sins.  Therefore, we contended that suffering need not be viewed as ‘evil,’ negative or 
burdensome in every case.  In this section, we will extend the discussion on suffering from an 
Islamic perspective by discussing how suffering can be a means of enhancing one’s relationship 
with God through spiritual purification and by providing an opportunity to assess one’s faith in 
adversity.  Suffering within moderate or tolerable limits is worth enduring because it has value 
and serves a purpose, so one should not eliminate such suffering by euthanasia or suicide.  Let 
us now further explore this view.  
Given human nature and the nature of suffering, we may (initially and understandably) 
perceive suffering as destructive, restrictive or even as a karma-like retributive punishment 
since nobody should want or welcome suffering (at least in normal circumstances). This 
negative reaction is anticipated in the Quran: ‘But whenever He tries him by straightening his 
means of life, restricting his subsistence, [say not]: My Lord despises me’ (89:16).126 Suffering 
may cause one to protest, ask ‘why’ one is suffering, and to become anxious and discontent, 
which can affect one’s quality of, and outlook on, life as well as one’s faith and one’s 
relationships with others.  As the Qur’an states, ‘Truly man was created, very impatient, fretful 
when evil touches him’ (70:19-20).127 And in certain cases it may be especially reasonable to 
ask ‘why,’ for example, where a child suffers from leukaemia, or those who are seemingly good 
or moral suffer from genetically-acquired illnesses or unforeseen diseases.  Does God play a 
role in these forms of suffering, and if so, to what extent? Does suffering happen for a reason 
or purpose in every case? Do we need to suffer? These are hard questions which do not have 
simple answers.  As a way out of foreseen prolonged suffering, or one’s current unpleasant 
and deteriorating state, one may consider suicide or euthanasia.  However, end-of-lifesuffering 
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is not considered a ‘legally-defined hardship’ that warrants euthanasia or suicide, if these 
options were permissible in Islam.128  
Instead, it may be argued that (end-of-life) suffering in Islam may be considered a 
deeper transformative good for the Muslim, which can ultimately foster a more intimate 
relationship with God. The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) suggested that suffering may have 
beneficial divine origins, and can be a means of correction in one’s spiritual status or one’s 
relationship with God: ‘When Allah intends good, He makes [the individual] to suffer from 
some affliction.’129 Something that may be considered negative or random may actually turn 
out to be constructive if one seeks to understand why suffering is present.  As the Qur’an 
states, ‘But you may dislike something which is good for you, and you may like something 
which is bad for you. God knows while you do not know’ (2:216). Thus, the proper response to 
suffering, as we will discuss later, is patience, trust and dependence on God’s mercy for relief, 
in addition to the use of medical treatment.  As the Qur’an dictates: ‘Seek help in patience and 
prayer; and truly it is hard save for the humble-minded’ (2:45).130  As the verse indicates, this 
experience may understandably still cause one to complain and ask ‘why’ suffering is present.  
However, embracing the mentality that suffering may occur for some positive reason may 
allow one to understand its possible meaning or lesson, rather than resorting to euthanasia or 
suicide.   
One purpose of suffering at the end-of-life may be to serve as a process of spiritual 
purification.  As the Qur’an confirms: ‘See they not that they are put in trial once or twice every 
year (with different kinds of calamities, disease, famine)? Yet, they turn not in repentance, nor 
do they learn a lesson (from it)’ (9:126).  More specifically, this verse suggests that purification 
is linked to atonement for transgressions, and also the reform of one’s policies, habits or 
behaviours.  This verse urges the believer to repent (Tawba) or seek forgiveness by 
supplication (Istighfar) particularly during times of suffering.  In this context, when God desires 
something positive or good for the believer, such as the cleansing of sins, He causes them to 
suffer, as discussed above.  As one Hadith implies, the Prophet (pbuh) asserted that during the 
course of any suffering, however minimal, at least some sins are forgiven: ‘Nothing strikes a 
Muslim – no fatigue, illness, worry, grief, hurt nor sorrow; not even a prick of a thorn – except 
                                                          
128 Omar Hassan Kasule Sr., ‘Euthanasia: Ethic-Legal Issues,’ in Mission Islam, <www.missionislam.com/health/euthanasia.htm> 
(accessed 17 March 2011).  
129 Sahih Al-Bukhari, Kitab al-Marda, 7:209, Hadith 5.  Source: Abdulaziz Sachedina, Islamic Biomedical Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 93. 
130 Patience can have several connotations in this verse (2:45) as a form of instruction or recommendation in certain situations.  
For example, patience can imply being thorough and not hasty, being steadfast and consistent toward one’s purpose or goal, and 
accepting defeat, resignation and suffering.  However, patience need not imply being passive with the expectation that God will 
provide without one making significant preparation, effort and sacrifice (Marmaduke William Pickthall, The Meaning of The 
Glorious Qur’an (Kazi Publication, 1996): p. 78).   
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that Allah wipes off due to it some of his sins.’131 Such a process naturally seems to suggest less 
or no punishment in the hereafter.  As a result, one may die sinless by virtue of repeated 
periods of suffering: ‘A Muslim, male or female, continues to remain under trial in respect of 
his life, property, and offspring until he faces Allah, the Exalted, with no sin record.’132 
However, does this mean that if one does not suffer, one will not repent, and will not be 
forgiven, or that one has not sinned?  Or is there a greater probability of reform, repentance 
and forgiveness when one suffers? Does suffering in these cases automatically pre-suppose 
that the individual is sinful or has greatly sinned, or indicate the need for a change in lifestyle, 
as possibly implied by verse 9:126? These types of questions invite further investigation as to 
the nature and purpose of suffering.     
In addition to forgiveness, remembering God (dhikr) is also beneficial during 
challenging times as when suffering as the Qur’an indicates: ‘And whosoever is conscious of 
Allah, He will make a way for him to get out (from every difficulty)’ in the most unexpected 
way (65:2).  This information suggests that suffering should not be viewed as burdensome or 
oppressive or a reason to consider euthanasia or suicide.  As the Qur’an affirms: ‘Allah does 
not wish to place you in a difficulty, but to make you clean…’ (5:6). Rather, since humans are 
imperfect and prone to commit errors, a major objective of affliction from an Islamic 
perspective seems to be to serve as a means of absolving sin to achieve a form of religious 
purity.  Furthermore, suffering may allow one to fortify one’s personal relationship with God, 
as we will discuss later.      
A second purpose of (end-of-life) suffering may be to provide the opportunity for a 
type of spiritual examination.  To begin with, a spiritual examination or spiritual ‘trial’ can be 
linked to the idea of spiritual purification above, as evident in verse 9:126. This means that 
suffering may be considered a test where this may lead to the forgiveness of sins.  Further, a 
spiritual examination can be interpreted in another way. The Qur’an and Hadith do not limit 
suffering to physical pain, but also include misfortune that may produce concern or anguish, as 
suggested in the excerpts above.  Suffering of these kinds can also serve to test the strength of 
one’s conviction or iman in God during difficult times by how one reacts or responds to 
suffering.  On the one hand, as we discussed, trials of suffering may cause one to complain, or 
question, doubt, or even leave, one’s faith, especially if they are perceived as some form of 
punishment or castigation.  However, suffering can also serve to fortify or enrich the person’s 
faith.   
                                                          
131 Sahih Bukhari Book 70, Volume 3, Number 545, in Search Truth, 2011, #545, 
<http://www.searchtruth.com/book_display.php?book=70&translator=1&start=0&number=544#544> (accessed 18 March 2011). 
132 Al-Tirmidhi, [At-Tirmidhi] Riyad-us-Saliheen Volume 1, Number 4 
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Although suffering such as in natural disasters or personal illness may result in 
scepticism, distrust or renunciation of one’s faith, these events may be trials which serve to 
assess the believer’s conviction in God, rather than being a means of destruction, loss or self-
annihilation.  This view is supported by Abdul al-Qadar Jilani who rejects the negativity of the 
suffering experience: ‘O my son, disaster has not come in order to destroy you, but it has only 
come to examine your patience and your faith.’133 And as the Quran confirms: ‘And surely we 
will test you with something of fear and hunger, and loss of wealth and lives and crops, but 
give glad tidings to the steadfast. Nay it is only a trial, but most of them understand not’ 
(2:155, 39:49). If God causes suffering in these ways, then it may be deduced that He can 
remove suffering (10:117). Therefore, it may be argued that one ought to react to suffering 
with patience and perseverance with the help of God.    
A prime example of this trial and response is evident in the story of Job, a prominent 
figure in Judaism, Christianity and Islam who is symbolic for his virtue of patience under 
exceptional adversity. In addition to being the central character in the Book of Job in the 
Hebrew Bible, he is also mentioned in the Epistle of James (5:11) of the New Testament.  Like 
these sources, the Qur’an describes Job as afflicted with grave losses to his health, wealth and 
family as a way of testing his faith in God. However, instead of abandoning this test by 
resorting to suicide, Job seemed to ‘understand’ or approach this encounter as a trial and 
made a concerted effort to remain ‘steadfast,’ patient and dependent on God for mercy and 
relief as implied in the verses above.  Thus he is distinctly venerated in the Qur’an: 
‘Commemorate Our servant Job, Behold he cried to his Lord: “The Evil One (Satan) has afflicted 
me with distress and suffering!”’ (38:41).   
This trial was not meant to destroy Job or cause him to criticize or question his 
conviction in God’s purpose, but rather to trust in, and wait for, God’s help.  Since he turned to 
God for help during this experience, Job’s trust in God seems to have been sustained and 
fortified.  Furthermore, the Qur’an indicates that one is not exempt from being tested even if 
one has belief in Islam and declares oneself ‘Muslim.’  The Qur’an questions the believer: ‘Do 
men imagine that they will be left (at ease) because they say, We believe, and will not be tested 
with affliction?’ (29:2). This suggests that suffering can affect anybody regardless of their level 
of faith or conviction and/or stage in earthly life.  Faith is practically tested in the ‘up and 
down’ circumstances of life, as the individual strives to continuously persevere through these 
episodes and accepts the will of God as good and just.134  How one perceives suffering is 
important in shaping how one responds to it.  So, in addition to serving as a means of spiritual 
                                                          
133 Al-Jawziyya, Medicine of the Prophet, p. 146.  
134 Ali, The Meaning of The Holy Qur’an, p. 987. 
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purification, a second purpose of end of life suffering from an Islamic perspective may be to 
examine one’s level of trust or faith in God or conviction.   
This purpose and the account of Job may yield some worthwhile lessons for the 
modern Muslim sufferer that may allow them to draw closer to God. This is evident from the 
Qur’anic verse above (9:126) which suggests that in addition to prompting the believer to seek 
forgiveness, trials are meant to underscore some form of ‘lesson’ or spiritual moral.  One 
possible lesson cited earlier entailed changing or improving one’s habits, behaviour or overall 
lifestyle to possibly avoid further suffering or sin.  A second lesson can involve acknowledging 
that since suffering comes from God in different way for the purposes of spiritual purification 
and/or testing faith, only God can remove it if He wills.  As the Qur’an clearly asserts, ‘If Allah 
touches you with hurt, there is none can remove [hurt] but He’ (10:107). Therefore, one should 
respond to suffering by (re-)developing a state of reliance upon God to obtain His mercy like in 
the case of Job.  As the Qur’an affirms, ‘These [people] depend on guidance from their Lord. 
These are the successful [ones]’(5:5). This need not imply that one remain in passive 
resignation waiting for God’s help, or abdicating one’s responsibility to understand suffering.  
Rather, reliance may be exemplified by being actively patient for God’s help, making personal 
supplication (dua’) to understand the meaning of suffering and seeking physical and mental 
comfort.  As the Qur’an clearly states in any situation which involves need: ‘Call upon Me and I 
will answer you’ (40:60). For example, when Job was tested, he sought God’s help and received 
mercy by having his suffering relieved.    
And Job, when he cried unto his Lord, (saying): Lo! adversity afflicted me, and Thou art Most Merciful of all who 
show mercy. Then We heard his prayer and removed that adversity from which he suffered, and We gave him his 
household (that he had lost) and the like thereof along with them, a mercy from Our store, and a lesson for the 
worshippers (21:83-84).   
In addition, one may also persevere in suffering by seeking lawful medical remedies, as 
discussed, which implies not seeking solutions that intentionally hasten death.  However, it 
may be questioned that if God is Good, Merciful and Beneficent, and suffering can be viewed 
as bad, evil, punishing, or at least undesirable, then how can God cause, or be associated with, 
suffering? This question is central to the issue of theodicy in at least Islam and Christianity, 
which seems to focus on the question of the authorship of suffering, a question that humanity 
has attempted to understand for centuries.135 It seems that if we view suffering from a good or 
beneficial point of view only, and suppose that God does not desire it for itself, then we can 
rightly attribute suffering to God’s Goodness.  On the other hand, familiar questions resurface: 
If God is Good, why does a child sufferer from leukaemia?  What is God’s role in this form of 
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suffering? Why does a seemingly good, moral, or honest person suffer?  How do we explain 
suffering that is caused by an illness that is genetically acquired?   
Through these various spiritual methods, the mindset of the believer is grounded in 
trust in God’s mercy for recovery or overcoming illness.  And based on the Qur’an, this is the 
correct approach in any situation.  This idea also supports the fact that human beings are 
imperfect and are in unconditional need of God, whereas God is Self-Sufficient and without 
need and want, yet He still provides for creation out of His limitless beneficence and mercy: ‘O 
Mankind, it is you who stands in need of Allah [for guidance, provision and success], But Allah is 
Rich (Free of all needs)…’ (35:15). Related to dependence, (end-of-life) suffering can also stress 
the lesson of humbleness or modesty of lowering oneself before God particularly in times of 
tribulation, which is also a reminder of God’s omnipotence.  As the Qur’an states: ‘Before thee 
We sent (Messengers) to many nations, and We afflicted the nations with suffering and 
adversity that they might learn humility’ (6:42).136 Humility implies recognition of the frailty or 
weakness of human nature, the temporary nature of one’s existence, the limits of one’s 
supposed independent endurance and the minuscule influence one commands over one’s own 
body.  This further supports the notion that God controls all things like suffering as the Qur’an 
confirms, for example, in the story of Joseph’s tribulations: ‘And God has full power and 
control over His Affairs, but most of men know not’ (12:21).   
However, this lesson is something that one may not acknowledge or appreciate if one 
were always healthy or if suffering did not exist.  If one did not experience suffering, one might 
not feel compelled or inclined to beseech God for mercy.  Hence, trusting in, or depending on, 
God’s mercy to relieve or manage suffering during a trial can be an effective spiritual method 
of acquiring the ‘goodness’ which suffering makes possible.  This approach carries with it a 
greater lesson than suffering as ‘just experiencing physical pain.’  This approach also implies 
that the principle of mercy is not a tool that should be utilized to kill.  If God’s mercy can be 
interpreted in the Qur’an as a way of bringing respite to the sufferer and improvement of their 
condition, then it should not be misinterpreted as a licence for humans to cause harm.  This 
notion is clearly evident in, for example, Job’s appeal to God for comfort because He is 
merciful (21:83) rather than making a request to kill himself.  Therefore, Joseph Fletcher’s 
application of mercy through the use of scripture (Matthew 5:7) and Jonathan Brockopp’s use 
of Fakhr al-Din al Razi (d. 1209) to argue that suicide (or euthanasia) can be considered an act 
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(6:42) to the Psalms (94:12) which states: ‘Blessed is the man whom Thou chastenest, O Lord!’ (The Meaning of The Holy Qur’an 
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of mercy are disputable.  On the other hand, as we will see in the next section, suffering, 
perhaps more importantly, can lead to, or help re-develop, a more intimate spiritual 
relationship between God and the believer.   
So far, we have discussed the idea that end-of-life suffering from an Islamic 
perspective does not occur by chance.  Rather, suffering seemingly comes from God and has a 
purpose, namely, as a way of helping the believer attain spiritual purification by removing past 
sins or transgressions and as a means of testing their faith in the form of trial.  Hence, one 
should respond to suffering by entrusting oneself to God’s mercy for relief rather than react by 
intentionally hastening one’s death.  In this way, suffering may be considered a gift, because it 
allows one to draw closer to God.   
In examining the possible spiritual purposes of suffering at the end of life, it is worth 
reflecting on a possible overall reason for an individual to undergo trial and/or spiritual 
purification.  Perhaps the most important objective of suffering from an Islamic perspective is 
to (re-)develop a more intimate relationship with the divine.  This does not imply that suffering 
occurs so God can come closer to the individual since God is always close to His creation. 
Instead, suffering exists so the individual may draw nearer to the divine presence through 
remembrance of Him and personal supplication.  As the Qur’an states: ‘We verily created man 
and We know what his soul whispereth to him, And We are nearer to him than his jugular vein 
(by Our Knowledge).137 [So] when my servants ask thee (O, Muhammad) concerning Me, tell 
them I am indeed close (to them). I listen to the prayer of every supplicant when he calleth on 
Me’ (50:16, 56:85). Moreover, unlike mortal creatures, God is inextricably connected to an 
individual‘s identity or consciousness like, for example, one’s shadow during every stage in life.  
Yet, the individual may envision God as a detached or unfamiliar figure especially during times 
of adversity or difficulty.  However, one should remember God not only in times of hardship, 
but in all situations to maintain one’s relationship with God.  As the Prophet (pbuh) 
underscores: ‘Remember Allah in times of ease, and He will recognize you in times of 
distress.’138 Similarly, the Quran asserts: ‘Therefore remember Me, I will remember you,’ which 
is another reminder that this practice can be applied in any condition particularly ‘in times of 
                                                          
137 The two jugular veins (and the two carotid arteries) are the main sources that transport blood and nutrients from the heart to 
(and from) the head.  Therefore, this verse (50:16) can be interpreted as God being close enough to the individual to know (better 
than the individual) their innermost thoughts, desires and motivations that involve the mind and heart (Majid Fakhry, An 
Interpretation of the Quran: English Translation of the Meanings (NYU Press, 2004): p. 327).   
138 The Story of Yunus, Hadith narrated by Abu ‘Abbas ‘Abdullah, in The Story of Yunus, 2011, 
<http://abdurrahman.org/qurantafseer/ibnkathir/ibnkathir_web/37.44333.html> (accessed 19 March 2011).  
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distress’ (2:152). Remembrance in this scriptural context can imply praising frequently, 
mentioning, celebrating or commemorating, or cherishing.139   
By way of spiritual purification, ‘times of distress’, like suffering at the end-of-life, may 
ultimately serve to restore one’s understanding that God is always present within the 
individual as a source of direction and compassion.  In addition to the ‘prayer of every 
supplicant,’ the Qur’an, as a representative Word of God, is a clear example of this direction.  
As the Quran affirms: ‘These are revelations of the wise Scripture, a guidance and a mercy for 
the good’ (31:2-3). Consequently, the experience of suffering may give one a valuable and 
essential opportunity to revitalize one’s intimate relationship with and draw closer to God.  
The value of this opportunity suggests that euthanasia and suicide should not be justified from 
an Islamic perspective.  
After examining the intended purposes of end-of-life suffering from an Islamic 
perspective it may be deduced that moderate forms of suffering may be worth enduring.  We 
know that suffering exists and that it need not be limited to end-of-life anguish, and can be 
considered more than just superficial physical pain.  There is a deeper meaning that requires 
greater personal reflection.  Why is suffering afflicting the sufferer?  How does this affliction 
affect one’s relationship with the Creator?  Affliction of this type allows an individual to 
establish a meaningful link with the divine source that creates suffering.  It compels the 
individual to strengthen their rapport with God.  In this way, suffering helps produce 
recognition that managing and overcoming it necessitates help from and dependence upon 
the divine, confirming one’s finite and limited abilities.  In this way, suffering becomes a 
poignant journey that is meant to empower a spiritual form of awakening.  Therefore, a 
Muslim’s suffering is a mysterious gift that should be embraced to unlock its hidden secrets of 
mercy. And it may be suggested that events like suffering may also prompt an individual to 
explore the reasons for their earthly existence. 
Purpose of Earthly Life 
When examining the purpose of earthly life from an Islamic perspective, the question of why 
humanity exists or was created is crucial.  What is the purpose of human life?  Why was human 
life created?  The central purpose of some people’s lives may be to survive and thrive in a 
fertile earthly environment via abundant God-given material resources.  But the main reason 
for the creation of humankind, according to the Qur’an, is to believe in, understand and 
worship the God who created mankind and to adhere to divine guidelines as a means to 
earthly success and eternal happiness.  One who intentionally hastens their own death 
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through euthanasia or suicide would be acting against this conception of the good or 
successful human life.     
Human beings exhibit various inclinations, tendencies, and ambitions shaped by their 
genetic and environmental endowments that can help to create a vision of what they desire in 
earthly life. This notion is supported by the Quran: ‘And let those aspire, for those who have 
aspirations’ (83:26). Such aspirations may include acquiring a sustainable livelihood and 
material goods as well as producing fulfilled prosperous offspring.  For some, achieving these 
aspirations would mean the fulfilment of their life purpose or goal.  According to Muhammad 
S. Al-Munajjid, there is nothing wrong with these activities provided they are undertaken in 
moderation and through legal (halal) channels.140  And some of these goods (e.g. housing, 
food, clothes, etc) can be considered basic necessities which are required in order to maintain 
human life from a bodily point of view.  Yet, from an Islamic perspective, the aspirations of 
earthly life should, more importantly, be subsumed under a supreme goal that lies beyond 
death.  This is evident in the following verse: ‘And know ye that your possessions and your 
progeny are but a trial; and that it is Allah with whom lies your highest reward’ (8:28). This 
suggests that material wealth can be a transient form of satisfaction and comfort, but also a 
distraction from the real purpose of earthly life.  Earthly benefits or provisional goods are 
therefore temporary and short lived, whereas the good of right relationship to God is 
permanent and everlasting.141       
As stated, according to the Qur’an, the raison d’être of the human person is to 
remember and serve God as an expression of gratitude for being created, and as a way of 
attaining earthly success, righteousness and the spiritual status necessary to reach paradise.  
Therefore, one’s main aspiration during earthly life should be to worship and submit to God.  
As the Qur’an clearly affirms: ‘And I did not create the Jinn and mankind except to worship Me.  
And strive to please thy Lord’ (51:56-58, 94:8). This view is supported by Khalid Yaseen who 
states that one’s purpose in life is to acknowledge God, to be thankful to God, to submit 
oneself to God, and to comply with His divine laws.142 For Yaseen, these acts imply that 
worshipping God in the inherent purpose of one’s life. 143  This requirement laid upon human 
beings is inherently grounded in the belief in the Oneness of God and His sole worthiness to be 
worshipped.  This is, of course, a part of the central monotheistic message of Islam which 
                                                          
140 Al-Munajjid, ‘What are haraam types of jobs? How did the Sahaabah earn a living? What is the best way to earn a living?’ in 
Islam Questions & Answers, Fatwa 107144, <http://www.islam-qa.com/en/ref/107144/ways%20to%20earn%20a%20living> 
(accessed 2 April 2011). 
141 This is how Abdullah Yusuf Ali interprets verse 83:26 above: (‘And let those aspire, for those who have aspirations’).  In other 
words, ‘aspirations’ should not be directed at procuring material possessions, but rather at gaining eternal reward and blessing 
(The Meaning of The Holy Qur’an, p. 1619).   
142 Khalid Yaseen, ‘The Purpose of Life,’ (excerpt of lecture given in Saudi Arabia in 1994), 
<http://www.sultan.org/articles/purposeoflife.htm> (accessed 16 June 2010). 
143 Yaseen, ‘The Purpose of Life,’ (excerpt of lecture given in Saudi Arabia in 1994).  
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pronounces that there is no Deity but God that is worthy of worship and Muhammad (pbuh) is 
His messenger. This was the same message that was bequeathed to the prophets of nations 
before Islam beginning with Adam.  For example, Noah declared to his people: ‘O my people! 
Lo! I am a plain warner unto you (Bidding you): Serve Allah and keep your duty unto Him and 
obey me’ (71:2-3).     
These observations raise the question of how God should be worshipped.  Serving God 
and observing one’s duty to Him can be achieved in the form of acts of worship.  As we 
discussed, these acts include the five daily prayers, fasting during Ramadan, charity, pilgrimage 
to Mecca and other forms of remembering God exclusively for God or His pleasure.  As the 
Qur’an commands His messenger (pbuh) to proclaim to mankind: ‘Say (O Muhammad SAW): 
"Verily, I am commanded to worship Allâh (Alone) by obeying Him and doing religious deeds 
sincerely for His sake only’ (39:11).  Shaykh ‘Ubaid Ibn Abdullah bin Sulaiman al-Jaabiri believes 
that worshiping God for His sake only emphasizes sincerity which, in addition to knowledge, 
certainty, acceptance, submission, truthfulness and love of God and the Prophet Muhammad 
(pbuh), is one of the 7 conditions of being a Muslim or accepting the Shadaha (i.e. testimony of 
faith).144  These acts or good deeds not only serve to achieve the main purpose of one’s earthly 
existence but carry the immense reward of eternal paradise.  As the Quran maintains, for 
example, in three separate references: ‘Whatsoever good you send before [death] for your 
souls, you will find it with Allah, better and greater in the recompense. ‘O my people! Worship 
Allâh, and hope for (the reward of good deeds by worshipping Allâh Alone, on) the last Day (i.e. 
the Day of Resurrection). He is the Best to reward and the Best to give success’ (73:20, 29:36, 
18:44).  Any good that an individual does elevates their status and dignity.145  Therefore, the 
purpose of earthly life should first be to serve God by fulfilling the obligations He has laid upon 
human beings, and second to pursue material or earthly goals, where this second goal is 
always to be subordinated to the first.  
However, if one were to intentionally hasten death or commit suicide, naturally one 
would not be able to fulfil these duties.  Such acts can be interpreted, therefore, as contrary to 
God’s will.  This idea is reinforced by the following Hadith: ‘Hammam b. Munabbih said: “Abu 
Huraira narrated to us a Hadith from Allah's Messenger (pbuh) and out of these [Hadith] one is 
that Allah’s Messenger said:  None amongst you should make a request for death, and do not 
call for it before it comes, for when any of you dies, he ceases (to do good) deeds and the life 
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of a believer is not prolonged but for goodness.”’146  ‘Good deeds’ here can be interpreted as 
serving God as well as engaging in lawful materialistic pursuits in order to achieve ‘goodness’ 
or success. This implies that one should endure pain and suffering with the aid of medicine and 
continue to worship God until the intended moment of death.  Only by serving God to the best 
of their ability until natural death can the Muslim be successful in this world and in the 
hereafter.  In addition, as discussed, the consequence of suicide or any form of it like 
euthanasia can include divine punishment.147 Based on multiple texts in the Qur’an and Hadith, 
it may be concluded that euthanasia and suicide are forbidden in Islam and should be avoided 
in order to serve and worship God, so one may be successful in one’s earthly life and eternal 
life.   
It has also been argued by Muslim scholars in this study that euthanasia is forbidden 
because human life is sacred.  The next section will look at some further aspects of earthly life 
that may also be considered particularly sacred.   
Sacredness of Ideas, Material Objects and Spaces 
We have seen that similar conclusions concerning the sacred significance of human life can be 
derived from scriptural verses, in both the Qur’an and the Bible, and the writings of John Paul 
and Zahedi et al.  What is interesting about this discussion from an interfaith point of view is 
that the Christian and Islamic perspectives in this study use different reasons to make their 
argument.  John Paul made the argument that human life is sacred because it made in the 
image of God.  We argued that this reasoning is not transferable to Islamic thought due to the 
traditional Islamic association of image and idolatry.  Although the notion of ‘image’ was not-
transferable, it was found that human beings’ mental qualities can function as a sign, and that 
these qualities give human beings the distinctive capacity to read other signs like natural 
phenomena.  However, there was no convincing link between signs and sacredness from an 
Islamic perspective. Rather, Zahedi et al. made the argument that human life is sacred because 
God is directly involved in every phase of human life including the predetermined time of 
death.  Human beings are entrusted by God to act as stewards to protect life until this time.  
Like the idea of signs, pre-determination and stewardship implied that human life is distinct 
from that of other creatures and these ideas also appeal to the Christian approach.   
It is clear from the Islamic and Christian perspectives in this study that the relationship 
between sacredness and human life suggests that human life has special value or dignity.  
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Truth,<http://www.searchtruth.com/book_display.php?book=35&translator=2&start=10&number=6480> (accessed 17 October 
2010). 
147 Hadith – Sahih Bukhari, Book 23, Number 445, in Search Truth, (accessed 18 October 2010). 
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Human life is worthwhile because it is grounded in God’s historical presence or creative 
activity on earth.  In other words, human life is good because God is good. This is evident in the 
New Testament and the Qur’an.  As the Qur’an states: ‘And you have no good thing except but 
it is from Allah’ (16:53).  Similarly, the Bible states: ‘For everything created by God is good’ (1 
Timothy 4:4) and ‘He can know and do the will of God which is good’ (Romans 12:2).  And since 
human life is a fundamental good, it should therefore be preserved and protected from ill-
treatment like euthanasia and suicide. While the idea of the sacredness of human life is firmly 
established in Christian and Islamic traditions, this general approach can also be related to 
other features of earthly life.  This section will briefly examine how sacredness can be 
associated with other things such as places of worship, certain Islamic periods, divinely 
inspired texts and inanimate objects.  As with human life, it may be argued that these or any 
aspect of earthly life may be considered sacred because they are associated with God, the 
Creator of all good.  Thus, all efforts should be made to protect or preserve these things.  
Although this section does not have direct relevance to euthanasia, the tendency to assign 
sacredness to the human person can be linked to a broader or larger body of ideas, material 
objects or spaces that are also considered sacred in Islamic thought.    
According to the Qur’an, the Ka’bah within the Grand Mosque in Mecca is considered 
unconditionally sacred in Islam.  As the Qur’an states, ‘Allah made the Ka’bah the Sacred 
House, an asylum of security for men’ (5:97).  According to Islamic tradition, the Ka’bah is 
considered sacred because it is the structure which was re-built by Abraham (pbuh) and his 
son Ismail (pbuh) to signify and establish a centre for prayer and worship of the One God.  As 
the Qur’an clarifies: ‘Behold! We gave the site, to Abraham, of the (Sacred) House148 (saying): 
"Associate not anything (in worship) with Me; and sanctify My House for those who compass it 
round, or stand up or bow or prostrate themselves (therein in prayer)”’ (22:26). As such, the 
Ka’bah stands as the epicentre for worship towards which all Muslims face for their five daily 
prayers.  As the Qur’an states, ‘Turn then thy face in the direction of the Sacred Mosque’ 
(2:144).149 And due to its sacredness, the Qur’an dictates that no physical conflict shall take 
place within the Ka’bah’s vicinity or the hunting of animals, presumably to preserve its sanctity 
and uphold its significance.  This is what the Qur’an seemingly implies when it refers to the 
Ka’bah as an ‘asylum of security for men’ (5:97).    
                                                          
148 Unlike the Temple of Solomon, which was only for the Jewish people (or the people of Israel), the Ka’bah is considered 
universal or for (Muslim) people of all races (Muhammad Khan, Interpretations of the Meaning of The Noble Qur’an (Darussalam, 
2000): p. 268).      
149 Prior to the early Muslim community facing Makkah for the daily prayers, they turned toward Jerusalem.  Facing Makkah also 
re-established Islamic ties to Abraham in antiquity, the founding father of monotheism, according to Islamic tradition.   
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Peace and the prohibition of killing are especially enforced during the last month of 
the Islamic calendar (Dhu al-Hijjah), which is one of the four months in the Islamic calendar 
that is considered sacred.  As the Qur’an explains:  
The number of months in the sight of Allah is twelve (in a year) ― so ordained by Him the day He created the 
heavens and the earth; of them four (1
st
, 7
th
, 11
th
, 12
th
) are sacred; that is the straight usage. They ask you 
concerning fighting in the Sacred Months. Say, "Fighting therein is a great (transgression) but a greater 
(transgression) with Allâh is to prevent mankind from following the Way of Allâh, to disbelieve in Him, to prevent 
access to Al-Masjid-Al-Harâm (at Makkah)” (9:36, 2:217). 
Dhu al-Hijjah is considered sacred because this is the time when Muslims perform the Hajj.  As 
the Qur’an states: ‘Such (is the Pilgrimage): whoever honours the sacred rites of Allah, for him 
it is good in the sight of his Lord’ (22:30). During the Hajj, Muslims circulate the Ka’bah and 
visit adjacent areas originally established by Abraham and re-established by the Prophet 
Muhammad (pbuh) as an act of ‘cleansing’ the sanctuary of idol worship.  As chapter 2, verse 
125 of the Qur’an continues from above: ‘And We commanded Abraham and Ishmael that they 
should purify My House (the Ka'bah at Makkah) for those who are circumambulating it, or 
staying (I'tikâf), or bowing or prostrating themselves (there, in prayer).’ In addition to the 
Ka’bah, an adjacent area also considered sacred is Muzdalifah (Sacred Monument) because it 
is where the Prophet (pbuh) prayed to God and was instructed to remember God during the 
Hajj.  As the Qur’an states: ‘Then when ye pour down from (Mount) Arafat, celebrate the 
praises of Allah at the Sacred Monument, and celebrate His praises as He has directed you...’ 
(2:198).   
From this information, a number of conclusions can be drawn. The way the Ka’bah is 
described in the Qur’an and its connection to two major pillars of Islam, prayer and pilgrimage, 
and to Abraham indicate the sheer importance of this area. It may be argued that the last 
month when the Hajj is performed and the areas involved in the Hajj are considered sacred 
because of their association with the Ka’bah, a place linked to the worship and remembrance 
of God.  So these times and places are considered good because they are a part of the religious 
history of the Ka’bah that glorifies God’s presence.  From this argument, it may be reasoned 
that anything related to the Ka’bah may also be considered sacred or good.  And since the 
origins of Islam are fundamentally grounded in this location, the Ka’bah therefore represents 
the very identity of Islam.  As Kutty affirms: ‘By facing toward the Ka`bah in our prayers, we are 
stressing the unity of humankind under the Lordship of the One and only God.  Moreover, by 
facing toward the Ka`bah, we are stressing the idea of centrality of God in our life.’150   
                                                          
150 Sheikh Ahmad Kutty, ‘Significance of the Ka’bah,’ in Islam Online, 2 January 2005, 
<http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-English-
Ask_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503546246> (accessed 19 November 2010) 
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Lastly, other areas regarded as sacred in the Qur’an include: Tuwa in the Sinai 
Peninsula where God communicated with Moses (pbuh) to warn Pharaoh of God’s wrath for 
enslaving the Israelites and considering himself a deity; The Prophet’s Mosque in Medina, 
which was the first mosque built in this area following the emigration from Makkah; and The 
Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem where the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) ascended to the 
heavens during the Night Journey. Like the places above, these locations are sacred because 
they are associated with the calling to worship God especially at certain specified times.  Since 
the message can be considered good, and by association the place where it was received, both 
aspects should be preserved and protected from desecration similar to human life. 
It was noted above that the 12th month in the Islamic calendar is sacred because of the 
Hajj.  According to the Qur’an (9:36), three other months, namely, 1st, 7th and 11th are also 
considered sacred.  Past events that make the 1st month (Muharram) sacred include: Moses 
delivering his people from Pharaoh based on the Tuwa message, Noah settling in Mount Judi 
after the flood, the birth of Adam, the cure of Job and the martyrdom of Prophet Muhammad 
(pbuh)’s grandson.151 It is also believed that the Day of Judgment will occur in this month.152 
The 7th month (Rajab) is significant because it is when the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) 
experienced the Night Ascension journey and received instruction for the five daily prayers.153 
Lastly, the 11th month (Dhul Qa’dah) is important because it marks the beginning preparation 
of the Hajj.154  So these months are sacred due to the occurrence of notable theological events 
both prior to and during the Islamic era.  Moreover, these events are seemingly significant 
because they similarly involve an advancement of God’s willpower towards spreading His 
universal message through humans and continuation of His worship.  As with human life, since 
these months are created by, or associated with, God, they are considered good.  Therefore, 
these months are to be preserved or remembered through practices like fasting, similar to the 
preservation of the Ka’bah and Muzdalifah. 
Thus far, we attempted to link sacredness to various locations and times and 
ultimately concluded that both are sacred because they are linked to the worship of God.  
Next, we will attempt to link the idea of sacredness to the Qur’an (54:43) and draw some 
parallels with other divinely inspired books.  The Qur’an is sacred to Muslims for several 
reasons.  First, it is regarded as the culmination of the divine message that was first revealed to 
Adam, then Moses, David, Jesus and finally to the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).  So the Torah, 
the Psalms and the Gospels may be regarded as continuations of this sacred message and 
                                                          
151 Islamic Society of Greater Richmond, ‘Islamic Months,’ in Islamic Society of Greater Richmond, 21 June 2001, 
<http://www.isgr.org/islammonth.htm> (accessed 25 November 2010) 
152Islamic Society of Greater Richmond, ‘Islamic Months,’ 21 June 2001. 
153 Islamic Society of Greater Richmond, ‘Islamic Months,’ 21 June 2001. 
154 Islamic Society of Greater Richmond, ‘Islamic Months,’ 21 June 2001. 
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hence, are appropriately recognized in the Qur’an, which is an affirmation of the previous 
scriptures.  As the Qur’an states: ‘And this Qur'ân is not such as could ever be produced by 
other than Allâh, but it is a confirmation of the revelation which was before it [i.e. the Torah, 
and the Gospel], and a full explanation of the Book - wherein there is no doubt from the the 
Lord of the Alamin’ (10:37).  This would imply that the revelations of the Qur’an are not 
authored by humans but rather transmitted by a messenger (Wahi).  Second, and perhaps 
most importantly, the Qur’an verifies the purpose of human existence, which is to 
acknowledge and worship the one God, as discussed.  As the Qur’an states, ‘Verily in the 
(Qur'an) is a Message for people who would (truly) worship Allah’ (21:106). This Qur’an 
reiterates a universal ‘message’ to all people, as part of its affirmation of the previous 
scriptures, which also conveyed this message.  Third, it is a source that provides 
comprehensive guidance on distinguishing good actions from bad actions, encourages justice, 
compassion and equality, and informs humans that they will be tested with hardships and 
suffering.  As the Qur’an states, ‘These are revelations of the wise Scripture, a [practical] 
guidance and a mercy for the good’ (31:2-3). The outcome of these tests and the divine 
judgment of every individual’s actions ultimately determine the person’s eternal fate, as the 
Qur’an clearly warns. Lastly, the Qur’an includes accounts of events from past nations and 
narratives from past prophets to emphasize certain moral lessons (e.g. Job) and to reinforce 
the overall message.  
The sacredness of the Qur’an, and similarly the Gospels and the Torah, are arguably 
grounded in the fact that they are embodiments of God’s will and expressions of God’s mind.  
Although introduced to mankind at different times, these books provide similar content 
related to the divinely ordained significance of human life.  Since the scriptures are directly 
associated with God in these ways, they are good.  Therefore, the Torah, the Gospels and the 
Qur’an should be protected from any form of desecration through the practice of recitation 
and reflection.   
Lastly, we will discuss the relationship between sacredness and relics.  As we saw in 
Chapter II, relic veneration is discussed from a Christian perspective by Michael Banner as an 
example of respecting or protecting the body.  From an Islamic perspective, relics may belong 
on one’s person or may be one’s personal possessions.  For example, relics may include 
personal possessions and/or various parts of the body such as hair, a tooth, a written letter, 
slippers and the sword belonging to the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).  Some sources label 
these relics as ‘sacred’ including the Topkapi Palace in Istanbul, Turkey which houses many of 
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the relics listed.155  Even if relics are considered sacred, they would not be owed worship as 
this would involve idolatry (shirk). However, relics may be viewed as valuable or sacred 
historical religious artefacts because they shed light on or signify the historical development of 
Islam.     
Some of these relics were used in some capacity to spread the message of worshipping 
God.  For example, the Prophet’s (pbuh) slippers allowed him to travel to spread the word.  A 
similar example of a communicative relic would be the letter he (pbuh) wrote to the ruler of 
Bahrain inviting him to Islam.  A third example may include the sword he (pbuh) used to 
defend Islam.  In this way, it may be argued that these relics were involved in propagating and 
enacting the will of God.  At the same time, it may be argued that items not used to spread the 
message (e.g. tooth, hair, mantle, footprint) may still be considered sacred because they 
belonged to, or were on the person of, the Prophet (pbuh) because he (pbuh) was considered 
the perfect exemplar of divine worship.  So instead of being worshipped, these sacred relics 
may be venerated as a channel that resulted in the worship of God or as the belongings of a 
person who was charged with spreading the message to worship God.  And worshipping God, 
as discussed, is the primary obligation of human beings.                
In this section, we have examined how the idea of sacredness can be connected to 
locations, certain time periods, divine texts and relics in Islamic history.  So sacredness need 
not be limited to human life nor need it imply worship.  Rather, sacredness, or the property of 
bearing some close relation to the creative activity of God, can clearly obtain in various 
contexts.  Sacredness is a core component in each of these examples because they bear a 
specially close relationship, or serve in a special way as a medium of, God’s purpose or 
manifestation through human life.  As with human life, this would arguably make the things 
which display these different kinds of sacredness good.  Therefore, as we have made the 
argument that human life is sacred and should be protected from euthanasia and suicide, so 
too can we make the argument that these sacred places, months, texts, and relics should be 
safeguarded or preserved because they are in some specially intimate way related to God 
and/or to the worship of God as is everything, if interpreted from a religious viewpoint.  So the 
discussion of this section has allowed us to understand the idea of sacredness, as it functions 
in Islam, more fully, by seeing how the idea applies in a range of contexts.  
                                                          
155 A. Enis Cetin, ‘The chambers of the Sacred Relics,’ in Topkapi Web Page, 2005,  
<http://www.ee.bilkent.edu.tr/~history/topkapi.html> (accessed 2 December 2010).  
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Extending our consideration of the sacredness of human life, the next section will 
discuss some further examples of innocent persons who should not be killed as well as cases 
when human life may be lawfully terminated.     
 
The Act of Killing a Human Being 
As a general principle, the act of taking a human life without legal justification would 
presumably be considered in any civilized society a form of murder or self-murder and may 
imply legal and/or divine punishment.  Thus far, we have made the overall argument that 
certain forms of killing human beings such as euthanasia and suicide are forbidden in Islam 
from a legal and moral standpoint.  In this section, we will construct an analogy to John Paul’s 
Christian perspective on the ‘Thou shall not kill’ commandment, by discussing from an Islamic 
perspective other examples of killing innocent people, in addition to euthanasia.     
From an Islamic perspective, euthanasia and suicide are considered unjust according 
to the Qur’an because they imply taking innocent life that is made by God, degrading the 
sacredness of human life and intentionally hastening death before its divinely intended 
time.156 As the Qur’an instructs, ‘Take not life which Allah has made sacred save in the course 
of justice and law’ (6:151).157 More specifically, the ICME states that euthanasia is unjust 
because human life has unconditional value during earthly life and the afterlife.  As the Code 
states, ‘Mercy killing like suicide finds no support except in the atheistic way of thinking that 
believes that our life on this earth is followed by void.’158 This attitude can be linked to that of 
the Christian scholar Michael Banner who similarly views secular medical ethics as attaching 
insufficient value to human life.  Thus, euthanasia is prohibited under any circumstance 
including what may be described as ‘painful hopeless illness.’159  Moreover, although 
traditional Shariah Law does not specifically address practices of euthanasia, Shah states 
through the use of Shariah Law, Ijtihad and Qiyas that hastening death is equivalent to the 
Islamic legal definition of homicide: ‘To kill someone deliberately by act or omission because 
he is suffering from an unbearable painful illness or injury, or because he is too old and has lost 
all usefulness and prays for death, or his illness is declared incurable, amounts to culpable 
                                                          
156 Aminah Molloy, ‘Attitudes to medical ethics among British Muslim medical practioners,’ J. of Medical Ethics 6 (1980): p. 139.   
157 Abdullah Yusuf Ali translates the latter part of verse (6:151) as ‘justice and law’, but states that this part of the passage may also 
be interpreted as ‘right, truth, what is becoming, etc.’ Moreover, it is not only that human life is sacred, but that all life is sacred, 
and to kill animals for ritual purposes, for example, is lawful by invoking the name of God, without diminishing its sacredness (The 
Meaning of The Holy Qur’an, p. 339).     
158 Islamic Ethics, ‘Islamic Code of Medical Ethics, The Sanctity of Human Life,’ in Islamset, 2004, 
<http://www.islamset.com/ethics/code/sancti.html> (accessed 3 December 2010). 
159 Islamic Ethics, ‘Islamic Code of Medical Ethics, The Sanctity of Human Life,’ in Islamset, 2004. 
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murder unless pardoned by the next of kin of the victim.’160 And if one is convicted of ‘murder,’ 
then according to Sharia Law, the sentence could be execution or an indemnity settlement 
(diya) to the victim’s family.161  As we will see, the idea of not killing innocent life can also be 
linked to the treatment of elderly, women or children.  
Although it is plausible to agree with Shah that self-killing may be interpreted as a 
form of self-murder from the Islamic perspective, one part of his view can be challenged.  Shah 
states that ‘pray[ing] for death’ is wrong because it is equivalent to ‘murder.’162 However, 
according to the next Hadith, the Prophet advised the suffering believer to ‘pray for death’ if 
there are no other options: ‘On the authority of Anas b. Malik, God be pleased with him, the 
Prophet, God’s blessings and peace be upon him, said: “Do not any of you desire death out of 
any need which oppress you.  If there is no way out, then say: Oh God, revive me if life is 
better for me, or take me away if passing away is better for me.”’163 Praying for death and 
killing oneself (or killing another person voluntarily) are not the same not least because the 
former still acknowledges God’s sovereignty over life, because the believer asks God to take 
his life and does not take the matter into his own hands.  By contrast, helping to kill someone 
because they prepare for, and aim at, death can be considered murder in Islam, like in 
physician-assisted suicide, because the agent takes an active hand in bringing about the 
patient’s death.    
As discussed, in recognition of the significance of the body and the purpose of 
suffering, the Qur’an and Hadith encourage the use of medical intervention to reasonably save 
and prolong life and subsequently bring about a comfortable death.  This is reflected in the 
ICME which directly contends, ‘There is no human pain that cannot be conquered by 
medication.’164  Therefore, according to the Code, intentional hastening of death is never 
justified from an Islamic perspective.165  
There are other forms of killing that may pose similar ethical issues to those which 
arise in relation to euthanasia.  From his Christian perspective, John Paul made an argument 
through the ‘Thou shall not kill’ commandment that one has a duty never to intentionally kill 
an innocent human being.  Although the commandment implies that one should never kill, 
John Paul places particular emphasis on not killing those who are vulnerable, weak and/or 
incompetent, such as the young and elderly, when making his argument against euthanasia.  
                                                          
160 Shah, ‘Mercy Killing in Islam: Moral and Legal Issues,’ Arab Law Quarterly, Volume 11, Number 2 (1996): p. 107; Al-Misri, 
‘Retaliation for Bodily Injury or Death,’ p. 240. 
161 Al-Misri, ‘Retaliation for Bodily Injury or Death,’ p. 240. 
162 Shah, ‘Mercy Killing in Islam: Moral and Legal Issues,’ p. 107. 
163 Muttaqunn OnLine, Hadith – Sahih Muslim Number 6480,in Muttaqun OnLine, 2003, <http://muttaqun.com/suicide.html> 
(accessed 5 December 2010). 
164Islamic Ethics, ‘Islamic Code of Medical Ethics, The Sanctity of Human Life,’ in Islamset, 2004. 
165 Islamic Ethics, ‘Islamic Code of Medical Ethics, The Sanctity of Human Life,’ in Islamset, 2004. 
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However, he seems to support killing in capital punishment and just warfare cases, as a last 
option.  Similar arguments can be made from an Islamic perspective.  
Unlike the Old Testament, the Qur’an does not seem to have an explicit 
commandment which instructs a Muslim that ‘one should not kill.’  However, Islam considers 
the killing of children, women, elderly and the handicapped as murder or as taking the life of 
an innocent person especially during times of conflict. According to Islamic tradition, these 
types of practice were common during the Jahiliyah or pre-Islamic pagan period.  So after 
witnessing the killing of women during one battle, for example, the Prophet (pbuh) 
categorically prohibited the killing of these groups of people, as expressed in many Hadith.166  
As one Hadith affirms, ‘Yahya related to me from Malik from Nafi from Ibn Umar that the 
Messenger of Allah (pbuh) saw the corpse of a woman who had been slain in one of the raids, 
and he disapproved of it and forbade the killing of women and children.’167  And as another 
Hadith similarly expresses: ‘Set out for [war] in the name of Allah and for the sake of Allah.  Do 
not lay hands on the old verging on death, on women, children and babies.’168 Al-Qaradawi (b. 
1926) supports this view by stating that ‘Islam deals strictly with such a matter of bloodshed. It 
forbids the killing of innocent people who have nothing to do with wars. The religion is set 
against taking the lives of innocent people just for mere suspicions.’169  These views suggest 
that these groups of people are considered innocent bystanders and should not be 
intentionally killed even though killing may be a foreseen result of conflict such as in battle 
crossfire.  
The killing of innocent people need not occur only during times of conflict and may 
also involve some social or psychological factors.  For example, Shah notes that many 
traditions would allow the killing of elders ‘who were no longer socially or economically useful’ 
by testing their strength as to how long it would take one to climb a tree and hang on to its 
branches when it was shaken.  Those that fell from the tree were killed.170 This exercise may 
indicate that some elders may be a burden on the community or may be unable to care for 
themselves.  However, following the advent of Islam, the Prophet (pbuh) also banned these 
practices and established the definition of unjust killing to protect these groups of people.   
                                                          
166 Bassam Zawadi, ‘The Prophet Prohibited The Killing of Women and Children: But What About Those Night Raids?,’ in 
Answering-Christianity, 2005,  
<http://www.answering-christianity.com/bassam_zawadi/did_prophet_muhammad_kill_innocents.htm> (accessed 23 January 
2011) 
167 Muttaqunn OnLine, Hadith –Al-Muwatta 21.9 (Similar proofs in 21.8, 21.10, and 21.11), in Muttaqun OnLine, 2003.    
168 Abdul Hamid Siddiqui, ‘What Islam really says about Killing the Innocent,’ from Introduction to The Book of Jihad and 
Expedition, <http://www.muhajabah.com/reallysays.htm> (accessed 3 March 2011). 
169 Essam Talima, ‘Islam Forbids Kidnapping, Killing Civilians: Qaradawi,’ in Islam Online, 10th September 2004, 
<http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2004-09/10/article03.shtml> (accessed 15 March 2011). 
170 Shah, ‘Mercy Killing in Islam: Moral and Legal Issues,’ page 105. 
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As discussed, euthanasia may involve fear of (continued) pain or suffering.  Similarly, 
the Quran also urges the believer not to kill children out of fear of destitution, harm or 
orphanage.  For example, infanticide, especially of females, was also common practice during 
the Jahiliyah period due to the preference for boys, the inability to financially support children 
or the concern about children becoming orphans.  In fact, the pre-Islamic Arabs were 
‘addicted’ to the killing of female infants, because the daughter was a source of weakness, and 
often had greater financial demands or burdens, whereas the son was a source of strength 
often in battle.171  And according to some scholars, this practice is not uncommon today in 
some countries.172   The Qur’an also addresses these archaic practices as senseless and killing 
of the most innocent: ‘And when the female (infant) buried alive (as the pagan Arabs used to 
do) is questioned. For what sin was she killed?’ (81:8-9). As with the killing of elderly people, 
the Prophet overturned this practice following divine revelation based on the idea that God is 
the ultimate provider, which also relates to trusting God.  As the Qur’an states: ‘Do not kill your 
children for fear of poverty; We give them sustenance and yourselves (too); surely to kill them is 
a great wrong’ (17:31). In a similar way, the killing of unborn babies is not permitted unless the 
mother’s life is in danger.173  The Prophet’s (pbuh) change of policy regarding the killing of 
these various groups of people seems to reflect a broader change he (pbuh) introduced from 
the standard Jahiliyian way of life in the Arabian Peninsula towards a more moral and just 
Islamic culture.    
In addition to these groups of people, Islam also opposes the killing of non-Muslims 
provided that they are living in harmony with Muslims.  Killing non-Muslims in times of peace 
is considered a significant offence or a violation of a peace treaty that non-Muslims may have 
with Muslims.174  Also covered by this regulation are non-Muslims involved in the service of 
God including Christians.  According to Anthony O’Mahony, the early developing Muslim 
community made treaties with their Christian neighbours in Arabia which involved Christians 
paying a special tax (jizyah) in return for protection from Muslims, in accordance with the 
Qur’an.175 Moreover, Abu Bakr, the first caliph of Islam after the Prophet’s (pbuh) death 
according to the Sunni tradition, established 10 rules of war following the Prophet’s (pbuh) 
guidance.176 One of these rules, as discussed, included the requirement not to kill women, 
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children or the elderly.  The second was not killing those involved in monastic service like 
Christian monks and preserving places where God is worshipped and remembered, such as 
monasteries, churches and synagogues (22:39-40). This rule may have been part of an 
extension of a Muslim treaty with Christians following the Prophet’s (pbuh) death.177  Lastly, 
Islam forbids the destruction of nature, wildlife (e.g. cutting down trees) and killing animals 
without good reason.178   
So although the Qur’an does not have a literal ‘thou shall not kill’ command, in Islam 
all innocent creatures should be protected from harm or killing, especially the weak, the 
vulnerable or those unable to care for themselves.  Since Islam does not condone 
indiscriminate killing, this discussion may help to clear up the misconception that Islam allows 
the killing of innocent people and/or non-Muslims.  This part of the discussion also suggests 
that the requirement not to kill innocent people need not only cover the case of euthanasia, 
but may also apply to those who are not terminally ill or who do not want to die.  So if there 
were a commandment like ‘thou shall not kill’ in Islam, it may be most comparable to the 
Vatican’s directive of: ‘"Do not slay the innocent and the righteous" since it degrades the 
dignity of life,’ as such a directive is similarly expressed in the Qur’an (6:151).179 Such 
similarities suggest that Christianity and Islam are in fundamental agreement on these 
questions.   
Although euthanasia, suicide and the killing of other innocent persons may be 
considered unjust from an Islamic viewpoint, there are some forms of killing which may be 
permitted in specific conditions or circumstances. As the Qur’an indicates: ‘And do not kill any 
one (human being) whom Allah has forbidden, except for a just cause’ (17:33). The instances of 
‘just cause’ killing that were discussed in the ‘Martyrdom versus Suicide’ section were the 
struggle to preserve Islam, to defend an idea or principle, or to protect one’s family or 
property.   
Another example of ‘just cause’ killing would be capital punishment.  But in capital 
punishment killings, the main issue does not seem to involve whether the guilty party’s life is 
sacred or not.  Some proponents of euthanasia have questioned why some religions like 
Christianity and Islam support capital punishment if religious commentators argue that human 
life is sacred.180 Rather, it seems that one of the main concerns in capital punishment is to 
secure justice for the innocent (Al-Qisas). Islam has a comprehensive judicial system based on 
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the guidelines of the Qur’an, Hadith and Shariah Law. The system functions to hold individuals 
accountable for an alleged unlawful act and to punish those who are found guilty.  In this way, 
punishment is a means of defending and protecting the innocent as well as restoring or 
maintaining civil order.   
For the purposes of this discussion, we will focus on capital punishment in Islam as it 
relates to murder of an innocent person.  According to Islamic scholars, a competent person 
who is found guilty of murder on the basis of evidence which establishes their guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt for any reason except self-defence may be executed.  As Siddiqui argues, 
‘The court of law may pass a death sentence against a person as a punishment for some crimes 
such as premeditated murder or other serious crimes.’181 This punishment is a licit form 
retribution according to Shariah Law if the perpetrator is not forgiven by the victim’s family or 
they do not pay blood money (diya) as a form of reparation.182 However, an execution verdict 
can only be implemented when the victim has been killed, on the grounds that the punishment 
should be proportionate to the crime. 183  In other cases, prison time may be an appropriate 
form of sentencing.184   
This sort of ‘eye for an eye’ approach suggests the wrongness in taking an innocent life 
and recognizes the value of, or upholds the memory of, the life which has been eliminated.  
This approach may also deter a would-be killer from killing or harming another person.  And 
besides acquiring justice for the victim, this approach may prevent illegal forms of retribution 
and secure justice for the victim’s family, leading to emotional closure in time.  In this way, 
capital punishment may result in favourable legal and social outcomes.  Since these ideas are 
also supported in some Christian sources, these matters may be of mutual interest in the 
interfaith dialogue.  In addition to a possible interfaith interest, this approach can also appeal 
to secular ethics.  For example, Islamic ethics scholar Seyed Mohammad Ghari S. Fatemi 
conducted a comparative study between Kantian ethics and Shi’ite teachings as it relates to 
euthanasia and death.  One similarity Fatemi found was that executing a murderer is an action 
that is warranted in both the orthodox interpretation of the Kantian system as well as the 
jurisprudential interpretations of Islamic teachings.185  However, it may be disputed that 
although capital punishment ensures justice, killing the murderer will not bring back the victim 
                                                          
181 Muzammil Siddiqui, ‘Is Euthanasia allowed in Islam?,’ in Islam Online, 14th November 2006, 
<http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-English-
Ask_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503543386> (accessed 23 April 2011). 
182 Al-Misri, ‘Retaliation for Bodily Injury or Death,’ page 240. 
183 Al-Munajjid, ‘Accepting diyah instead of qisaas in the case of deliberate killing,’ Fatwa number 104855, in Islam Question & 
Answer, 1999, <http://www.islam-qa.com/en/ref/104855/punishment%20for%20killing> (accessed 3 April 2011). 
184 Al-Munajjid, ‘Accepting diyah instead of qisaas in the case of deliberate killing,’ Fatwa number 104855.  
185 Seyed Mohammad Ghari S. Fatemi, ‘Autonomy, Euthanasia and the Right to Die with Dignity: A Comparison of Kantian Ethics 
and Shi’ite Teachings,’ Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 18 (2007): p. 347. 
202 
 
and execution would presumably not give the victim’s family any pleasure and may not give 
them closure.  
Through the use of Qur’an, Sunnah, Ijtihad, Ijma and Qiyas, we can deduce that Islam 
permits certain forms of killing that involve upholding justice and honouring the innocent.  
However, these forms of killing do not include any form of ‘merciful’ self killing in situations of 
pain and suffering or killing others who are young, frail or defenceless.  So the attitude 
commended here is similar to John Paul’s attitude to killing.  Euthanasia would be considered a 
form of suicide and a direct attack on the sacredness of human life since pain and suffering 
may be alleviated by hospice care.  So voluntary euthanasia and suicide can be deemed 
universally unlawful in Islam.  It may be argued that such a ruling may also prevent other forms 
of euthanasia.   
The third section discusses two consequentialist issues from an Islamic perspective, namely, 
the slippery slope phenomenon and ‘living’ vs. ‘merely existing. 
The Slippery Slope Phenomenon 
As we discussed, from an Islamic perspective, VAE and PAS can imply: a) taking innocent life, b) 
degrading the value of human life, c) a means of interfering or trying to interfere with the 
divinely appointed time of death.  From this perspective, a Muslim is prohibited from seeking 
to intentionally hasten death even if it is with consent or voluntary, regardless of the person’s 
condition or circumstance.   
Due to their governance by Sharia Law or laws that promote the preservation of 
human life, justice, fairness and equality most, if not all, Islamic countries at least forbid 
voluntary active euthanasia (VAE) and suicide for the reasons already discussed.186 Besides the 
reasons discussed above that underpin the prohibition of VAE, it may also be suggested that if 
VAE were introduced in principle, this would make it possible for VAE to slip into non-voluntary 
(NVE) and involuntary euthanasia (IE).  However, if VAE (or anything else) is considered a bad 
practice overall, then the principle of VAE would likely not be permitted legally.  As Warnock 
acknowledges: ‘There is no danger of sliding down to the bottom slope if you never allow 
yourself even to contemplate approaching its top.’187  And since VAE cannot be justified in 
principle from an Islamic standpoint due to the reasons discussed above, this would imply that 
NVE and IE would also be prohibited and prevented in a medical context or otherwise.  This is 
primarily because NVE and IE are considered forms of murder or homicide similar to VAE 
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according to Sharia.188 So the legal punishment (Qisas) for these forms of killing may involve 
execution among other penalties, unless pardoned by next of kin.189 This, it seems, is the idea 
that is reflected in the Qur’an when it states that killing another, unless justified, is 
symbolically like killing all of mankind, which suggests that all humans are a part of a common 
humanity created by God (5:32).  If killing oneself or voluntarily killing one’s patient or others is 
wrong in Islam based on this verse and the reasons discussed above, then it would be fair to 
argue that a slippery slope relating to euthanasia would be unlikely in an Islamic context.  Put 
differently, since VAE would not be introduced in principle in Islam, it is doubtful that a slide 
toward (other) illegal forms of killing would occur.   
But what if VAE were legal and not considered a form of murder? Could NVE and IE still 
occur, or could VAE be controlled so IE and NVE remain prohibited, in such a way that the 
prohibition is effective?  On one side, it can be argued that only those competent to give 
consent should be allowed to intentionally hasten their death.  This regulation could plausibly 
curb a slippery slope and may deter one from engaging in risky forms of (self) killing.  As Miller 
et al. state: ‘In order to ensure that physician-assisted death is voluntary, which is the 
inviolable cornerstone of this policy, only adults with decision making capacity should be 
eligible for physician assisted death.’190 As we discussed in Chapter II, Warnock also expressed 
similar views.  In addition, Warnock argued that the prohibition of VAE could lead to the rise of 
other, more dangerous, unlawful methods of killing or desperate attempts at suicide.191 It may 
be contended that if laws permit VAE only, these laws may make NVE and IE less likely, but this 
does not guarantee that NVE or IE will never occur or have never occurred, as is evident in the 
Netherlands Remmelink Report.192 Furthermore, although he does not provide evidence, 
Kasule claims that legalizing ‘euthanasia can indirectly lead to the violation of the purpose of 
preserving progeny by cheapening human life thus encouraging suicide, homicide, and 
genocide.’193 The legalization of VAE need not increase NVE and IE, but it may not completely 
remove the risk of forms of killing which can be considered more serious and egregious at least 
from an Islamic legal point-of-view. 194   
From an Islamic perspective, there is no doubt that killing oneself, voluntary or non-
voluntary killing of one’s patient, or involuntary killing of a group of innocent people are wrong 
because they degrade the inherent value of human life.  These practices should arguably be 
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rejected by the Muslim physician on the basis of Islamic principles that strive to preserve 
innocent human life and prevent unnecessary harm, to uphold the image of the medical 
establishment as well as the physician’s personal reputation and values, and to avoid the risk 
of a slippery slope.195 The importance of not killing was reflected in the previous Qur’anic verse 
(5:32). This is why Islamic law and the ICME also prohibit any forms of VAE.  And if VAE is 
strictly prohibited in Islam, then it may be reasoned that NVE and IE are even less likely to be 
approved.  Along the same lines, we concur with Biggar’s viewpoint that laws like those in the 
UK (or elsewhere) which prohibit VAE should remain to prevent a slide towards unsanctioned 
killing.  On the other hand, Fatemi argues that the ‘professional fallibility’ of physicians is a 
‘major reason’ to keep the slippery slope phenomenon in consideration, because the slightest 
doubt(s) (like that which is similar to Biggar’s discussed in Chapter II) related to issues of life 
and death justify serious concern.196  While there may be aberrant cases of a Muslim physician 
involved in NVE and IE, based on the literature and the law, the majority of Muslim physicians 
are likely to seek alternative means that prolong life and eliminate suffering in accordance with 
Islamic guidelines.197 Through this approach, it would seem that saving one life from 
intentional killing is like saving all of mankind (5:32). 
‘Living in Life’ versus ‘Existing in Life’ 
In Chapter II, we discussed two different viewpoints on the idea of quality of life as it relates to 
euthanasia.  On one side, scholars like Joseph Fletcher and Nigel Biggar among others make a 
distinction between those who possess mental capacity and those who do not.  Mental 
capacity, they similarly argue, or the qualities that make up mental competence, allow one to 
enjoy various goods (e.g. pleasure, family, good health).  Besides mental capacity, physical 
ability or freedom is also important.  The ability to enjoy or experience these goods thereby 
gives life value or makes life worth living.  So, from these perspectives, the worth or value of 
one’s life is almost entirely determined or shaped by one’s mental and physical state.  For 
these scholars then, the absence of capacity or ‘low’ quality of life bolsters the argument for 
active euthanasia on the grounds that a life lacking in value understood in these terms is not 
worth living.   
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On the other hand, Patterson disputes the notion that ‘quality of life’ should 
determine one’s overall worth in life. 198  Instead, like Beauchamp and Childress, he argues that 
the appropriateness of treatment should be measured by the benefits of treatment.199  A 
treatment would be considered helpful if it allows one to pursue one’s goods or what one 
values and, by contrast, a hindrance if it does not.  Still, if treatment is a hindrance, Patterson 
believes that the patient should not be intentionally killed because even with ‘low’ quality of 
life, one may be able to still experience these goods.200  Besides this, he asserts that life is 
sacred even in these conditions, a view which sets him apart from Nigel Biggar.  He concludes 
that withdrawing burdensome treatment is appropriate because it is a proper way of 
respecting life.   
Drawing on these perspectives, we may now consider a more in-depth Islamic 
approach to the quality of life issue.  We have observed from both sides of the discussion that 
quality of life involves the ability to pursue a range of goods.  And in a ‘low’ quality of life state, 
it is fair to argue that it would be more difficult to achieve these goods, but not impossible.  In 
addition to enjoying goods such as pleasure, family life and good health, let us also consider 
the ability to engage in, or interact with, goods of a theological nature.  These religious goods 
may include seeking spiritual knowledge, interpreting or reflecting on the signs of God and 
practices related to the worship of God like prayer, fasting, charity and pilgrimage.  Let us first 
consider these latter practices.    
As we noted in the practices of the body section earlier, these practices serve to 
strengthen the body to continue worship.  In addition to this physical component, these 
practices, arguably like almost all other tasks, require mental capability for correct execution. 
So, for example, in relations with family or social engagements, physical ability and mental 
faculties would allow one to effectively interact with others.  In this way, quality of life is at 
least indirectly linked to mental capacity to effectively pursue this good of relationships. 
In the same way, it may be argued that one needs to be mentally conscious and have 
relevant cognitive capacities to engage in worship and build a relationship with God.  Sharia 
Law outlines certain qualities one must possess to be mentally competent, which include 
intellect, knowledge, puberty and freedom.201  These attributes are interestingly similar to 
Fletcher’s and Biggar’s definitions of ‘personality’ and ‘biographical life,’ respectively.  
Furthermore, mental competence also involves the capacity for abstract thinking and rational 
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reflection.202 To support this argument, Al-Ghazali and Al-Razi assert that what is ‘first of all 
and most essentially required’ prior to Islamic scholarship is the ‘intellectual capacity to make 
deductions.’203  So, in the context of worship, mental competency might involve, for example, 
possessing a proper awareness and understanding of how, when, where, and perhaps most 
importantly, why to pray five times a day or perform the pilgrimage.  Similarly, the same types 
of question may be applied to an individual who must be aware of the requirement not to eat 
or drink during the fast.  So if, for example, one has ‘low’ quality of life and some level of 
competency exists, then it may be argued that such goods would be difficult, but not 
impossible, to achieve.  In these cases, one may attempt or struggle to attain these goods since 
intention (niyyah) is important in Islam.  However, in cases where one is considered mentally 
incompetent (e.g. in cases of dementia) or does not have the mental capabilities to understand 
the guidelines of worship, it is arguable that one may not or should not be required to perform 
these tasks.  This is supported by Sharia regulations.  For example, as Kasule states:  
In complete loss of consciousness, there is no obligation to pray. In semi-coma, syncope, or stroke the patient tries 
to pray as much as they can. Stroke patients must be careful not to fall down during salat due to the limb paralysis 
or paresis. A dozing person stops salat, sleeps, and resumes when conscious of what he is reading. In fright or 
inability to concentrate, salat is shortened. A person who forgets and eats in Ramadan just resumes fasting and 
completes the day. The obligation of fasting is dropped if the patient is in coma or is fully unconscious. Hajj is 
delayed if consciousness is impaired. 
204 
This statement clearly suggests that an individual is not required to worship God in Islam when 
physical or mental capacity is acutely compromised, as in cases of brain death, coma or a 
persistent vegetative state.  So such guidelines clearly indicate that the presence of mental 
capacity is a crucial element in engaging in worship.  Thus, it seems that one should not engage 
in worship related practices just for the sake of it.  In other words, when engaging in worship, 
one must come out of it with some understanding of what one has performed and what it 
implies for one’s spiritual life.  This understanding may be drawn from reflective questions 
such as: ‘Why am I praying everyday and what is the purpose behind it?,’ ‘What is my intention 
in fasting for these days in Ramadan?,’  ‘What is my approach toward fulfilling the obligations 
to God?’ and ‘Do I even understand my obligations to God?’  From this statement then, it is 
clear that deficiencies or lapses in mental capacity can indeed affect the applicability of 
requirements to worship.  As such, it would make sense that mentally incapacitated individuals 
are exempt from fulfilling these duties in accordance with Sharia Law.  
Moreover, this argument need not be limited to having the mental capacity to 
understand worship.  It may also be applied in a natural sciences context from an Islamic point 
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of view, which can be connected to worship.  Take for example the physical creation of God 
such as in the form of mountains, the growth of crops and the alternation of day and night.  
The Qur’an makes many references to these phenomenon as ‘signs’ or ‘proofs,’ which validate 
divine existence and allow humans to subsist and prosper, as we discussed in Chapter IV. 
Hence, worship is appropriate as an expression of appreciation for these signs, among other 
reasons.  As the Quran states, for example,  
It is He Who sends down rain from the sky: from it ye drink, and out of it (grows) the vegetation on which ye feed 
your cattle. With it He produces for you corn, olives, date-palms, grapes, and every kind of fruit: verily in this is a 
Sign for those who give thought. He has made the Night and the Day; the Sun and the Moon; and the Stars are in 
subjection by His Command: verily in this are Signs for men who are wise. And the things on this earth which He has 
multiplied in varying colours (and qualities): verily in this is a Sign for men who celebrate the praises of Allah (in 
gratitude) (16:10-13). 
The lack of mental capacity may affect a person’s capacity to understand these ‘Signs for men.’  
So, it may be argued, one who is mentally incompetent may not be able to fully understand or 
appreciate the significance of these signs.  And such an inability to reflect can affect how one 
approaches worship.  For example, if one can understand the signs of rain and sun from God to 
feed the crops, then it is plausible that one is more likely to ‘celebrate the praises of Allah (in 
gratitude)’ or express appreciation for one’s quality of life.  Lastly, besides its role in 
understanding natural signs and performing worship, mental capacity is also required to 
acquire knowledge (`ilm) and reason (aqhl), which are major components of understanding 
Islam and the world, and implementing the Islamic way of life.  As the Prophet states in one 
Hadith, ‘Seeking knowledge is incumbent on every Muslim.’205 Another version states: ‘You 
should be a scholar, or a student, or a listener, lover of `Ilm.’206 In some cases, the Prophet 
(pbuh) maintains that gaining knowledge often outweighs serving God.  As the Prophet (pbuh) 
states, ‘The excess of Ilm is better than the excess of Ibadah (worship).’207 Clearly, it would be 
more difficult to gain knowledge when one ‘merely exists.’  
In this way, it may further be argued that if physical hardship (e.g. handicap, disability) 
and mental incompetency make it difficult or impossible to perform these duties, then there is 
an important distinction between one who is competent, or one who possesses the qualities 
needed to participate in these religious goods or worship, and one who is ‘merely existing’ 
(e.g. in a condition of brain death, PVS or permanent coma).  In other words, ‘Living in life’ and 
‘merely existing’ are not equivalent states because the ability to effectively pursue these, or 
other, goods is grounded in mental capacity and may shape one’s quality of life.  In this way, 
quality of life may be determined by one’s abilities.  Indeed, competency is required to 
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perform almost any task appropriately on a daily basis.  So one who ‘merely exists’ may 
arguably be neither able nor obligated to worship and interpret the natural signs, because 
religious goods also seem to depend on competency, which suggests the importance of mental 
capacity to lead a functional life.  Therefore, with regards to their distinction argument, 
Fletcher and Biggar make a defensible and sound argument.   
On the other hand, should quality of life determine the absolute worth of life?  Does 
‘low’ quality of life mean that a person’s life is less sacred or not sacred at all?  And does ‘low’ 
quality of life imply that such individuals may be intentionally killed?  While it is a fair 
argument that physical inability and mental incapacity would make it difficult to enjoy what 
one values, complete worship-related tasks, read natural signs and procure knowledge, this 
need not imply that the overall value of life has been lost altogether.  This view also does not 
mean that a person who is, for example, brain dead or ‘merely existing’ should be needlessly 
kept on a ventilator so putting quantity of life before its quality.  Worth should not be squarely 
determined by one’s abilities or quality of life because there is more to life than engaging in 
worthwhile activity.  For example, a dementia or Alzheimer’s patient can still have meaningful 
experiences through his relationships with, and his impact on, others.  An individual may still 
have some access to these goods when capacity is not significantly or fully compromised like in 
a brain death situation.  Since worth need not be lost or reduced when capacity is damaged or 
restricted, one’s death should not be intentionally hastened in these cases.    
The issue of worth may be linked to the idea of sacredness.  It is arguable that losing 
quality of life need not imply loss of worth of life because human life is sacred, and since 
human life is sacred, it is worthwhile regardless of context.  So, even cases involving total lack 
of mental capacity or the complete inability to experience goods should not alter the sacred 
value of human life.  The fact that one’s life is human implies an ineradicable sacredness 
because it is made by God and is made differently from all other creation.  Therefore, while it 
may be a reasonable argument that a person who ‘merely exists’ or has ‘low’ quality of life 
cannot or would not be fully able to achieve various goods, Biggar’s assertion that sacredness 
is lost in these cases may be disputed.  The intention to kill would be harmful, contrary to what 
Biggar argues.  Moreover, it may be concurred with Paterson that an individual should not be 
intentionally killed in these cases, even if the intention is not harmful.  Like the ICME, the 
Qur’an clearly commands, ‘Do not take life which God has made sacred, except for just cause’ 
and terminal illness do not qualify as ‘just cause’ (6:151).  As discussed, killing individuals with 
‘low’ quality of life or in terminal disease is outside the domain of ‘just cause’ (e.g. war, self-
defence, capital punishment).  Furthermore, by killing these individuals, one would be 
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disregarding the inherent goodness that each human life possesses regardless of their 
condition.   
At the same time, however, it is clearly not feasible to continue supporting a life which 
displays little or no clinical signs of progress or has no quality of life (e.g. cases of brain death, 
coma or persistent vegetative state).  Through this approach, life may be needlessly prolonged 
and treatment may not be most effectively used.  Therefore, in such cases, it is appropriate to 
follow Paterson’s recommendation and that of the scholars in this study who oppose 
euthanasia.  That is, when treatment becomes more of a hindrance than help, it should be 
withdrawn because it is unlikely that it would contribute to improving the patient’s quality of 
life or reverse their incapacitated state.  Through this approach, we are evaluating the 
appropriateness of continuing treatment according to the role treatment plays in upholding 
the patient’s capacity to enjoy goods or engage in worship, rather than supposing that low 
quality of life implies the loss of worth or sacredness.  Such an approach may also be 
reasonably reflected in the practice of the Muslim physician, as we will discuss in the next 
section. 
The Role of the Muslim Physician 
Islamic medical practice is arguably grounded in a theological tradition as opposed to secular 
medical practice.  This implies that a Muslim physician serves the patient within Islamic ethical 
guidelines that emphasize, for example, distinguished professional standards, moral character 
and preservation of human life.  Since VAE and PAS would contradict these important 
principles, it follows, once again, that euthanasia is categorically forbidden in Islam regardless 
of medical or social condition.  Instead, Islamic ethics instructs the patient to endure suffering 
with patience while seeking medical treatment like palliative care under the supervision of a 
health care professional whose intention it should be to reduce pain and reasonably prolong 
life.  And if the individual is advised not to end their own life, then an external agent should 
equally not play a role in ending the patient’s life like in physician-assisted suicide.  As the 
following Qur’anic verse explicitly states: ‘And do not kill yourselves (nor kill one another), 
surely God is Most Merciful towards you’ (4:29).   
Muslim physicians embrace several professional duties to their patients, their 
colleagues and the medical community at large. This viewpoint is supported by Arafa who 
applies the Qur’an and Hadith to state: ‘The medical profession has been characterized by the 
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tremendous responsibilities its practitioners shoulder.’208 In addition to commanding adequate 
and broad medical knowledge, the Muslim physician is, for example, obligated to supplement 
this knowledge with a rigorous professional ethic.  Muslim physicians may be guided more by 
an ethical approach that is shaped by Qur’an, Hadith, and Islamic Law.209 According to Rahman, 
early post-Islamic sources, for example, discuss this ethical approach as linking knowledge to 
respectable practice, superior morals, virtuous character and appropriate behaviour based on 
the character of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).210 This approach is supported by a Hadith in 
which the Prophet (pbuh) states: ‘I have been sent so that I may perfect good manners and 
ethical conduct.’211 And while it may be argued that this approach is potentially universal in its 
application, its meaning is specially grounded in an Islamic context by reference to the Qur’an 
and Hadith to shape the essential element of Islamic character.212 As such, this approach is a 
form of a special branch of Islamic literature known as Adab which means to act in a morally 
upright manner, and may also be interpreted as ilm-ul-Akhlaq implying ‘the science of 
ethics.’213   
A prime example of Adab or ilm-ul-Akhlaq in Islamic medicine is the Islamic Code of 
Medical Ethics (ICME), which is a major contemporary source of guidance for Muslim 
physicians to help them develop and maintain a standard of personal and professional Islamic 
conduct toward others that promotes good health and good relations.214 This conduct includes 
an overall responsibility to do good, for example, treat disease, alleviate pain, avoid harm, 
prevent further sickness or unnecessary pain, and act righteously and judiciously with all 
patients.  In fact, although Islam promotes the protection and respect of human life, Fatemi 
believes that this idea is a ‘primary rationally self-evident norm’ based on human reason, and 
can stand independent of scriptural support or scholarly opinion, implying that Muslim and 
non-Muslim patients should be treated equally irrespective of condition.215  As a healer, the 
Muslim physician may also be considered a pillar or symbol of (reasonable) hope and 
encouragement for their patient whilst being sympathetic and caring to their condition and 
values or views.  Moreover, a physician’s responsibility will also include being aware of current 
medical issues, dilemmas, or challenges that affect society.  Physicians have traditionally been 
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respected and influential figures within the community.216 A Muslim physician can play a major 
role in the Muslim community by informing them about, for example, the benefits of diet and 
exercise, the advantages of quitting smoking (or refraining from other noxious substances), 
preventing domestic abuse, managing stress, and detecting the symptoms of diseases such as 
stroke and diabetes.217  This type of education may arguably carry greater weight when it is 
conveyed from an Islamic perspective by emphasizing what the Qur’an and Hadith state about 
health and wellness.  
This attitude represents a commitment by the Muslim physician to society which is 
encapsulated in the ‘Oath of the Doctor’ within the ICME which states: ‘Protect human life in 
all stages and under all circumstances, doing [one’s] utmost to rescue it from death, malady, 
pain and anxiety.  To be, all the way, an instrument of God’s mercy, extending… medical care 
to near and far, virtuous and sinner and friend and enemy.’218 In this way, the Muslim 
physician is also upholding the classical four principle approach in medical ethics consisting of 
autonomy, beneficence, justice and non-malfeasance.219 However, this emphasis also comes 
with awareness that God is the supreme healer or may decree death, if it should be His will.220 
These practices may be interpreted as proper applications of Adab or Aklaq in end-of-life 
cases.  
Physician responsibility also includes knowing what is morally and religiously 
forbidden.  In the context of euthanasia, this would imply not supporting a patient to 
intentionally hasten death, whether out of patient request, a sense of mercy for the patient, a 
duty to end the patient’s suffering or external pressure from others.  Aramesh and Shadi apply 
the ICME and ijma to argue that ‘a physician should not take an active part in terminating the 
life of a patient....even if the reason is severe deformity.’221 This view is also supported by 
Sachedina who states: ‘Decisions about ending the life of a terminally ill patient...are beyond 
the moral and legal purview of a Muslim physician.’222  However, in a study conducted by 
Molloy, a minority of Muslim physicians surveyed were ‘sympathetic and disturbed...in 
extreme cases, one admitting that this may one day drive him to practise euthanasia.’223  
Moreover, Ahmed et al. found that 15% of Sudanese physicians left open the possibility for 
voluntary euthanasia, while 23.4% of final year medical students at Khartoum University 
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supported active euthanasia in terminal cases that involved severe and unmanageable pain 
and suffering.224 In a similar study, among a sample of Turkish University Health Science and 
Liberal Arts students surveyed (n=878), 48% of them were open to the idea of euthanasia in 
similar medical conditions, while the rest opposed euthanasia mainly on religious grounds.225 
On the other hand, Shah argues that Sharia Law does not take such feelings into 
account because the act is still fundamentally wrong.226 Mercy should not motivate killing 
because killing is wrong regardless of mercy.  And due to possible legal and divine punishment, 
the law and ICME therefore counsel the Muslim physician to seek legal alternatives as 
appropriate expressions of mercy.227 Still, even if euthanasia was valid in theory based on 
mercy, there seems to be no supporting evidence for euthanasia from an Islamic point of view 
since VAE is principally banned in Islam due to its foreseen consequences.  Euthanasia would 
involve disregarding the idea of pre-destined death, inappropriately applying the idea of 
mercy, and a failure to protect innocent human life under all circumstances, thereby violating 
a fundamental duty of the Muslim physician according to the ICME.  Killing an innocent person 
can also result in legal repercussions like execution or eternal punishment according to Shariah 
Law, disbarment from the medical profession as well as a tarnished personal image from a 
social perspective.228 Since this practice clearly contradicts the ICME, the Qur’an and 
appropriate professional conduct, it should unequivocally be avoided.   
A second anthropologically-related case against euthanasia involves the unconditional 
sacredness of human life. This stance is echoed by the majority of Muslim ethicists and is 
similar to John Paul’s proposal that ‘human life is always good.’229  As the Qur’an states, ‘Do 
not take life which God has made sacred except in the course of Justice’ (6:151). Euthanasia 
would imply a devaluation of human life through active and illegal means. This viewpoint is 
supported by the ICME and its use of the Quranic verse (5:32) to affirm: ‘Human life is sacred 
and should not be wilfully taken except upon the indications specified in Islamic jurisprudence, 
all of which are outside the domain of the Medical Profession.’230 In addition, PAS can imply 
divine punishment since, as the above statement suggests, taking the life of another without 
justified cause is illegal in Islam.  As Al-Qaradawi asserts, ‘[Euthanasia] is an act of killing, and 
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killing is a major sin and thus forbidden in Islam, the religion of pure mercy.’231 This indicates 
that no medical forms of killing can be justified under Islamic law making euthanasia 
forbidden.  With these reasons in mind, Muslim physicians have an obligation to morally 
support patients during their end of life ordeals away from euthanasia.  As the Qur’an 
advocates: ‘Save those who believe and do good words, and exhort one another to truth and 
exhort one another to endurance’ (103:3). If the physician learned the practice of medicine to, 
for example, only heal himself/herself, then they would not be fulfilling their professional and 
spiritual duty as healers.  Whatever good the physician (or anybody else) has learned, they 
have a duty to bestow on others as a way of encouraging health and wellness and increasing 
firmness in faith.     
These Islamic arguments are similar to those that may be derived from Christian 
anthropology.  The question of the legitimacy of euthanasia is common to both religions.  As 
Fatemi contends, the sanctity of human life argument, for example, in both Islam and 
Christianity, makes the permissibility of active euthanasia ‘extremely difficult’, especially 
where religious values influence end-of-life decisions.232  So it is reasonable to argue that 
principles against euthanasia in the ICME may appeal to Christian physicians who work with 
Muslim patients.  For example, the UK Islamic Medical Association (IMA) and the Roman 
Catholic Church jointly fought to block a 2007 law that gave patients the right to request 
euthanasia in terminal cases.233 Abdelmajid Katme, a spokesperson for the IMA stated in 
regards to working with Christians who also criticized the law: ‘It was a blessing to work with 
Catholic doctors who believe in pro-life, even some non-Muslims are willing to be treated by 
Muslim doctors to save their lives.’234  A shared ideal such as this can be beneficial not only in 
the interfaith dialogue setting but also in the clinical setting to bring about greater 
collaboration among Christian and Muslim health care professionals, as well as other religious 
medical professionals with similar views.   
As well as having common views on euthanasia, it is arguable that Christian and 
Muslim physicians share a responsibility to put their greatest effort into attempting to 
reasonably prolong life until further treatment is futile. This suggests that palliative care is a 
feasible alternative to diminish pain and preserve the sacredness of human life in accordance 
with an appropriate Islamic approach.  And according to the ICME and Kasule, there is no pain 
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that cannot be alleviated by ‘medication or suitable neurosurgery’ or ‘further scientific 
research.’235 This stance is similar to Biggar’s position on palliative alternatives.  Therefore, in 
incurable cases where pain becomes intense or discomforting, treatment in appropriate 
measures should be implemented, even if it results in unintentional but foreseen death.  This 
opinion is supported by Sachedina who states, ‘Pain-relief treatment that could shorten life, 
but which is administered to relieve physical pain…, is permitted in Islamic law simply because 
the motive is regarded as a sufficient justification.’236  In this way, the Muslim physician is also 
adhering to the Oath and Islamic ethical principle by decreasing suffering and protecting the 
patient from avoidable harm.     
In addition to issues posed by euthanasia, the Muslim or religious physician face many 
other challenges and changes.  One such challenge is adjusting to a rapidly changing 
technological world.  A possible response to this challenge involves integrating traditional 
religious doctrine with the practical circumstances of a case to promote Islamic ethical values.  
Due to the novelty of the case, this process may require the method of Ijtihad and Ijma as well 
as analogy (Qiyas) followed by scholars of the relevant disciplines within the framework of 
Shariah Law, instead of austerely following classical Islamic principles.  A second related 
challenge involves the idea of necessity or making exceptions to traditional rules in unusual or 
atypical circumstances, such as a male physician interacting with a female patient in an 
emergency situation.   
A third related challenge is being more open and tolerant of patients of various 
backgrounds and views.  In an increasingly multicultural society, this challenge calls for more 
awareness of sensitive religious and ethnic issues to promote impartial and thoughtful service.  
Examples of issues that may require greater awareness on the part of non-Muslim doctors 
include appropriate interactions with Muslim female patients, or customs or procedures 
involving post-mortem Muslim patients.  Similarly, a Muslim physician needs to be aware of 
issues and customs of non-Muslim patients.  As Padela explains in his historical interpretation 
of ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ from an Islamic perspective, health care professionals who are 
‘culturally competent’ can be open to patients who have different viewpoints to offer effective 
health care without threatening their own beliefs.237 Health care professionals have an 
obligation to understand the patient’s Islamic values, so as to appreciate a patient’s request in 
a religious context, where appropriate.  Moreover, health care professionals treating Muslim 
patients should also recognize their own responsibilities and obligations and how the spiritual 
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requests of their patients may conflict with the physician’s morals.  These challenges are 
therefore an opportunity for scholars and health care professionals to openly discuss relevant 
issues and arrive at a religiously, culturally and ethically acceptable solution.   
We can conclude that a Muslim physician has a moral and professional obligation to 
reasonably save and prolong life in end of life situations.  Euthanasia, on the other hand, 
hastens death before the intended time and diminishes the value of human life. Principles of 
this type can be of interest to Christian and Muslim health care professionals who may 
subscribe to similar ethics in end-of-life situations, thereby generating greater understanding 
and collaboration. 
Conclusion to Western Sunni Islamic Perspective 
This chapter has attempted to construct an expanded Western Sunni Islamic perspective on 
euthanasia as an original contribution to the literature in Islamic ethics.  The chapter was 
constructed by examining a range of topics related to euthanasia that are seemingly 
underdeveloped or not researched by the  Islamic ethics scholars discussed in this study.  The 
approach to these topics involved the application of various religiously informed methods, 
including traditional proof-texting, as well as anthropological and consequentialist types of 
arguments, which have been drawn from Western Christian scholars in this study.   
The sources used to generate these arguments included the Qur’an, Hadith, Shariah 
Law, Ijma, Qiyas and Ijtihad.  The first three sources are seemingly the root for the others and 
are the basis for almost all Islamic ethical statutes (e.g. ICME).  We also considered other 
authors within the contemporary Islamic ethics literature.  In many cases, it seems that proof-
texting, which directly refers to Qur’an and Hadith, was the only method applied to form 
Islamic opinions, supporting Sachedina’s claim in the introduction.  However, in other cases, it 
seems that commentators have attempted to construct a more broadly grounded position by 
applying scholarly interpretation and legal opinions based on reason and Shariah Law in 
addition to proof-texting by reference to the Qur’an and Hadith.  In other words, an attitude 
toward euthanasia is often based on the use of Ijma, Qiyas and Ijtihad, which is grounded in an 
understanding of the Qur’an and Hadith.  This suggests that any legitimate discourse regarding 
Islamic medical ethics must include some reference to Shariah Law because many legal rulings 
seem to be ethical in intent, making frequent references to public good and customary 
practices.  Furthermore, in some cases, scholars used sources similar to those others used and 
to those in this Islamic perspective.  In other cases, different methods were applied to arrive at 
similar conclusions.  This indicates that while many scholars may still resort only to proof-
texting methods, the ‘flexible’ use of various classical religious methods by others, often in 
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collaboration with other methodologies, may be becoming more common with the rise of 
modern issues in the Western world.  This approach is supported by Sachedina who was cited 
in the introduction as stating that ‘normative sources of Islamic ethical reflection provide a 
variety of opinions and resolutions to each ethical dilemma in biomedicine.’ 238 Similarly 
Rahman believes that the Qur’an, for example, ‘displays a situational character’, implying that 
it is important to consider history as well as contemporary issues so long as the view reached 
does not contravene the Qur’an (and Hadith). 239   
Based on the use of these methods in this chapter, it may be concluded that active 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide prevent one from discerning the value of suffering 
and carrying out the purpose of earthly life; harm the body; devalue the sanctity of human life; 
and may contribute to unregulated forms of killing.  Euthanasia infringes religious values 
because it involves violating the divine authority over life and death.  As the master of all life, 
God gives and takes life, implying that humans must recognize their limits.  Since VAE and PAS 
seems to cause more harm than good from an Islamic point of view, they should be/remain 
prohibited.  However, when there is little indication of recovery, ineffective treatment may be 
withdrawn because the intention is not to kill, but only to remove excessive or burdensome 
treatment.  Although I oppose all forms of active euthanasia, I agree with Seyed Fatemi that 
euthanasia ‘is not a linear issue.’240  In other words, euthanasia is not a simple ‘open and shut’ 
issue, but rather involves a range of complex life and death related questions, concerns and 
matters that may keep the permissibility of active euthanasia open, at least in principle, in rare 
cases.   
This approach has drawn on arguments and perspectives that were developed in some 
of the Western Christian perspectives in this study.  Therefore, the approach of this chapter 
may reasonably appeal to Western Christian and even Western Jewish scholars in theological 
ethics on the basis of their shared ethical principles, interpretation of vocabulary and 
methodological stance.  In addition, this chapter may also help to highlight differences in 
approach between the monotheistic traditions from a Western perspective.  Similarly, 
reflection on the methods used in this chapter and in other perspectives presented in this 
study may facilitate fresh intra-faith exchange among Sunni and Shiite Muslim scholars, as well 
as among non-Muslim scholars, which is arguably needed to address and accommodate new 
changes and concerns in Islamic medical ethics.  However, for new concerns to be addressed 
within an appropriate framework, it is arguable that an identifiable and systematic sub-field 
must also be established that brings together Islam and medical ethics.   
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In 1987, Fazlur Rahman accurately stated: ‘Problems of bioethics...belong to the 
contemporary age and in the Muslim world have not...yet become the subject of overt and 
systematic discussion.’241  So where are we in the discussion at this point in time?  The 
discussion has advanced a long way in 20 and more years since that time to generate new 
perspectives on issues like euthanasia and abortion.  However, many other emerging ethical 
issues remain unexplored by Islamic scholars, or in dispute or unresolved and still pose serious 
moral, spiritual and legal questions.  Moreover, Islamic customs linked to professional practice 
and the requisite sensitivity toward Muslim patients are not familiar to some secular and non-
Muslim health care professionals, risking a clash with the wishes of the Muslim patient (and 
family).  Moreover, the nature of medical technology, which affects the way health care 
functions, is ever-changing.  Yet, according to the literature, Islamic Medical Ethics (IME) does 
not exist as a distinct discipline or has not been acknowledged as a legitimate field.   
For these reasons, it may be argued that IME has a necessary role to play in 
understanding human character and ethical reasoning within clinical medicine and institutional 
teaching programs.  In addition, IME needs to be studied for its similarities and differences in 
approach to secular ethical approaches.  IME is distinct from secular ethics because it depends 
on religious texts and divinely-inspired law, and attempts to draw on historical teachings and 
incorporate rational human reasoning (Ra’y) to form a universal moral code.  However, even 
allowing for this, IME remains an emerging field and a standard methodological approach, such 
as the one used in this chapter, has yet to be universally identified and adopted.  Besides being 
required for intra-faith dialogue, a system like this is needed to generate sensible ethical 
resolutions or suggestions for new ethical issues.  This development can help IME to: 
investigate new ethical cases, generate more awareness of socio-ethical issues, create greater 
collaboration among scholars of various disciplines, guide dynamic technological advances by 
fundamental religious principles and cater for the diverse needs and views of the Muslim 
patient.  In this way, IME is firmly grounded in an anthropological cultural framework that is 
largely shaped by location, history, language, personal identity and modern questions.  
Therefore, Islamic medical ethics has the opportunity to become, and needs to become, an 
active and fully recognized branch of ethics which is capable of responding vigorously and with 
appropriate nuance to future challenges.     
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Conclusion 
This thesis has sought to develop an expanded Western Sunni Islamic account of 
euthanasia by bringing the established Western and Eastern Islamic literature on euthanasia 
into dialogue with the literature on euthanasia in Western Christian ethics and moral 
philosophy.  Following a general introduction to the topic of euthanasia, the following chapters 
surveyed and compared Christian and Islamic approaches to euthanasia based on their use of 
sources such as scripture, tradition, reasoning and experience. The information gathered from 
these chapters was then used to create a more comprehensive Western Sunni Islamic 
perspective on euthanasia.  For instance, the thesis considered whether certain 
methodological strategies of argument similar to those employed in the Western Christian and 
Western philosophical literature can also be developed in Islamic terms from a Western 
perspective.  Respecting the body provides one example of a practice discussed by Western 
Christian ethicists which can also be examined fruitfully in a specifically Islamic context. Such 
an approach can help to strengthen Western interfaith and intra-faith dialogue on ethical 
questions, and also the encounter between religious and secular ethical perspectives. In this 
conclusion, we will briefly review our findings as well as discuss how these results contribute 
to the overall dialogue within religious ethics.         
Chapter I of this thesis addressed some of the main contested issues in the debate on 
euthanasia, such as its definition and that of associated concepts, the ‘killing’ vs. ‘letting die’ 
question, and the central arguments in the debate between supporters and opponents of 
euthanasia that are addressed in later chapters.  Chapters II and III examined contemporary 
English-language theological perspectives on euthanasia that specifically applied traditional 
religious and Western principles and values.  Chapter II specifically considered the views of a 
variety of Western Christian scholars, including Michael Banner, the late Pope John Paul II, 
Joseph Fletcher and Nigel Biggar. Chapter III looked at a range of Western and Eastern Muslim 
and non-Muslim Islamic scholars in medical ethics including Jonathan Brockopp, Farzaneh 
Zahedi, Bagher Larijani and Javad Tavokoly Bazzaz (Zahedi et al.), and Abdulaziz Sachedina.   
The purpose of these chapters was to examine these scholars’ use of sources such as 
scripture, tradition, reason and experience.  These sources inform religious anthropology and 
thereby lead to a view on questions such as the significance of human life in an end-of-life 
situation, and what makes human life worthwhile. This method of enquiry may generate a 
Western-oriented deontological or consequentialist perspective on euthanasia.  On the one 
hand, Western perspectives on euthanasia are not compared with Eastern perspectives on 
euthanasia in this study using this strategy.  Furthermore, historical perspectives and 
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viewpoints conveyed in foreign languages on euthanasia, such as Latin, Arabic or Persian, were 
excluded from this study.  However, since we are discussing a range of Christian and Muslim 
viewpoints from a Western perspective, Chapters II and III also serve to promote greater intra-
faith discussion in the West by examining how the resources of a given tradition may be used 
in a variety of ways to reach comparable or distinct conclusions or viewpoints.   
For example, Michael Banner presents a strong Western anti-consequentialist stance 
against euthanasia that is rooted in a distinctive Christian anthropology, by the use of 
scriptural verses which emphasize not fearing death and trusting God at the time of death, and 
tradition-based practices such as asceticism and martyrdom that stress respect for and 
preservation of the body.  In Evangelium Vitae, John Paul II develops an absolutist Western 
deontological approach against euthanasia which underscores the idea that the human person 
maintains a special relationship with God in all circumstances, because human life is 
unconditionally sacred.  Although John Paul believes that this relationship cannot be removed 
by any variations in physical or mental condition, he opposes euthanasia because it can 
morally degrade the relationship.  In addition, he emphasises the value of suffering as a part of 
sharing in the redemptive suffering of Christ.  Besides these dogmatic principles, John Paul also 
supports certain traditional moral practices such as respecting persons of old age, and he 
upholds the ‘thou shall not kill’ commandment as a way of protecting vulnerable people such 
as the disabled and incompetent from euthanasia.   
In his contrasting Western consequentialist perspective, Joseph Fletcher applies a 
combination of theological and philosophical ideas to conclude that euthanasia should be 
permissible when quality of life diminishes due to terminal suffering or extreme pain, or when 
one cannot serve others.  In these cases, euthanasia would serve to eliminate suffering, 
preserve dignity and decrease dependence on others.  Fletcher also criticizes the Church’s 
position on euthanasia and contends that if, for example, capital punishment is sanctioned, 
then euthanasia should certainly be allowed, because euthanasia can be considered an act of 
mercy.  Moreover, he rejects the idea that human life should be preserved at all costs and 
questions the DDE principle by arguing that in practice the aim when administering pain relief 
known to shorten life is actually to kill.  However, he believes intentional killing should involve 
strict legal regulations, so as to prevent an overly quick or uninformed decision.  Finally, Nigel 
Biggar applies both Western Christian anthropological and secular consequentialist methods of 
argument to argue that because human life loses its sacred value in cases of terminal suffering 
or extreme pain, euthanasia may be permissible in principle.  In addition, extreme suffering is 
not redemptive, because it inhibits one from expressing Christ-like traits of forgiveness and 
compassion.  However, Biggar believes that moderate or tolerable suffering may be 
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redemptive, and that it also presents an opportunity for spiritual growth by enabling the 
development of character-strengthening qualities.  While Biggar considers euthanasia in 
principle in extreme cases, he believes that euthanasia should ultimately not be allowed in 
practice.  He concludes that there should be no changes in current UK laws due to the 
potential degradation of moral values that may result from a growing number of (voluntary) 
euthanasia requests, the risk of the slippery slope phenomenon, and a repetition of Nazi-like 
practices.              
In his Islamic perspective, Jonathan Brockopp employs a Western utilitarian approach 
that involves scripture, tradition, reason and experience to argue that since the purpose of 
death, namely, to attain paradise, is more significant than the means by which death occurs, 
‘active’ and ‘passive’ euthanasia may be permissible in certain cases.  And since what he terms 
‘passive’ euthanasia is also accepted by most Islamic scholars and Muslim physicians in brain 
death cases, for example, Brockopp believes that not all forms of euthanasia are prohibited in 
Islam.  Moreover, based on his interpretation of scripture and scholarly viewpoints, he asserts 
that the practice of suicide in extreme suffering cases can be considered a legitimate act of 
mercy.  However, he believes that suicide should be differentiated from martyrdom based on 
intention, even if this is in practice difficult when circumstances surrounding death are unclear.  
In their case-based, Eastern Shiite consequentialist perspective, Zahedi et al. also use Western 
based sources such as scripture, tradition, reason and experience to argue that if the burdens 
of treatment outweigh its benefits, or if the treatment is ineffective, it should be withdrawn or 
withheld, rather than needlessly prolong life.  The decision to refuse ineffective treatment as 
reflected in an advanced directive or living will as a part of one’s end-of-life planning, the 
scholars believe, can also serve to enhance patient autonomy.  However, Zahedi et al. assert 
that patients do not have the autonomy to hasten their death regardless of condition, mainly 
because human life is considered unconditionally sacred.   
Lastly, Abdulaziz Sachedina uses scripture and tradition-specific reasoning to formulate 
a Western anti-consequentialist perspective on euthanasia.  Sachedina opposes euthanasia in 
suffering cases, because suffering can be a form of spiritual ‘trial’ or ‘test,’ a source of spiritual 
‘purification,’ or divine punishment.  While Sachedina supports an approach to suffering that 
involves patience and perseverance, he also does not rule out the use of treatment or remedy.  
Although he opposes ‘active’ euthanasia, he believes that ‘passive’ euthanasia may be 
permissible in the form of withdrawing or withholding treatment in terminal cases, or 
administering pain relief which unintentionally but foreseeably results in death, because the 
aim does not involve killing or harm.                    
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The issues discussed in Chapters II and III can be grouped within various categories or 
themes that may be common to both faiths.  These themes may include religious anthropology 
or anti-consequentialism, which can be grounded in faith-based practices and dogmatic 
principles, and consequentialist ideas that may focus on the physical and physiological aspects 
of euthanasia and death such as quality of life and pain.  Although these themes are 
specifically discussed from a Western vantage point in this study, they need not be limited to 
this scope, as these themes may also be applied from an Eastern or historical religious or 
secular perspective.  However, there are some Christian perspectives that are tradition-specific 
and not readily transferable, but may still be of interest to Muslims, and vice versa.  This 
account was helpful in comparing and contrasting Christian and Islamic approaches to 
euthanasia in Chapter IV in the interest of advancing the interfaith dialogue in the Western 
world.  For example, a comparison of practice-based perspectives or themes such as palliative 
care, suffering, respect for the elderly and withdrawing and withholding treatment found 
several key similarities in viewpoint.  Moreover, our comparison of the sacredness of human 
life idea in the two traditions found links as well as interesting differences relating to how the 
idea is grounded or conceived in Christianity and Islam.  The last section in Chapter IV explored 
the idea of mercy from a Western consequentialist Christian and Islamic point of view and also 
found many parallels in thought which supported euthanasia and suicide based on shared 
interpretations of scripture and the human suffering condition.   
Chapters III and IV were also useful in evaluating which topics, issues or concerns in 
Islamic Medical Ethics may need further discussion or development.  It was a contention of this 
thesis that compared to the literature in Western Christian ethics on euthanasia, some 
euthanasia-related issues or concerns may invite fuller discussion in Islamic terms from a 
Western viewpoint.  Therefore, Chapter V sought to compose a more comprehensive and 
extended Western Sunni Islamic perspective on euthanasia using a range of sources and partly 
informed by the discussion in Western Christian ethics of topics that can relate to Western 
Islamic thought.  Based on the information discussed in this chapter, it was concluded that 
‘active’ euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide should remain forbidden in Islam due to the 
abundance of negative considerations associated with euthanasia.  In this way, Chapter V 
sought to make an original contribution from a Western point-of-view to the developing 
discipline of Islamic Medical Ethics, as well as provide a new perspective on the existing intra-
faith and interfaith dialogues on euthanasia and religious ethics.  This study has demonstrated 
how it is possible to apply methodology that is used in one religious tradition to develop a 
perspective from another religious tradition, giving greater merit or weight to the interfaith 
dialogue.   Moreover, due to the way this study was designed, it may specifically appeal, but 
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not be restricted, to a Western or English speaking readership that seeks to gain a greater 
understanding of how one’s religious tradition plays a role in the formulation of an ethical 
perspective. We will conclude with some reflections on how this thesis can contribute to the 
dialogue in religious ethics.   
Religious ethics set the benchmark for what is and what is not acceptable behaviour in 
theological terms.  Christian ethics in general has tended to emphasize the need for love, 
grace, mercy and forgiveness as traits exhibited by Jesus Christ.  Islamic ethics is generally 
grounded in the idea of moral responsibility and proper expression of one’s faith and humanity 
as it relates to submitting to the will of God, as demonstrated in the Qur’an and personified by 
the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).  Many of these ideals can be applied or transferred to issues 
in bioethics or medical ethics like euthanasia.  Although important foundational doctrinal 
beliefs distinguish the two religions, the survey conducted in this thesis of Christian and  
Islamic approaches to euthanasia has shown significant common ground between the two 
traditions.  Scholars in the two faiths seem to share many basic ethical values such as 
respecting the dignity of all persons and avoiding harm and preserving human life, and they 
raise similar concerns regarding euthanasia and prolonging life.  Similarly, other Islamic and 
Christian scholars raise common concerns related to prolonged suffering and quality of life.  
Yet it is possible to generalise about the methods adopted in the two traditions despite the 
differences in intra-faith approaches.  For example, Islamic ethics has mainly focused on the 
Qur’an, Hadith, scholarly consensus and reasoning while Christian ethics has concentrated on 
the New Testament, traditional practices, reasoning and experience. For Muslims, the life story 
and actions of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) (as well as his companions) are a ‘live’ dynamic 
source of guidance when addressing ethical issues, and for Christians, Jesus Christ, and his 
teachings and actions (as well as those of his disciples) play a similar role.   
Christianity and Islam are both Abrahamic monotheistic faiths, and each rests upon 
fundamental theological beliefs that are grounded in a conception of God which derives from 
the message of their respective leaders.  Christian monotheism involves dogmatic ideas such 
as the Incarnation and the Trinitarian God of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, while for Muslims, 
these ideas are disputed due to their endorsement of the absolute Oneness of God.  However, 
these differences need not imply that interfaith dialogue is futile or illogical and should be 
abandoned.  On the contrary, there is a certain degree of overlap in the approaches taken by 
the two traditions, implying that their methods and core principles are not simply exclusive or 
tradition-specific, but can contribute to a common theistic ethical perspective.  Based on this 
overlap, Christian and Muslim scholars generally seem to uphold comparable understandings 
of the divine, humanity and the world drawing on their respective scriptures, as well as 
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favouring similar types of practices and experiences.  Moreover, given the range of 
perspectives on euthanasia endorsed by religious scholars in this study, it is plausible that 
liberal, moderate or conservative thinkers in one tradition may have more in common with 
like-minded members of the other tradition than with other members of their own tradition 
on some ethical questions.  Two key examples of this phenomenon include the rather 
conservative deontological viewpoints of John Paul II and Abdulaziz Sachedina and the more 
liberal teleological perspectives of Joseph Fletcher and Jonathan Brockopp.  By contrast, Nigel 
Biggar occupies a more ‘moderate’ position that is not matched to any Islamic scholar in this 
study, though this position may still have some appeal for Islamic scholars, as it has appealed 
to this author.   
These varying views are of some importance because they serve to enhance and 
expand not only the intra-faith discussion, but also the interfaith one as well.  Varying 
viewpoints relating to euthanasia (or any other issue) can be a way for members of different 
traditions to learn from each other and can help a person to clear up misconceptions, increase 
their awareness of different views and gain a deeper understanding of their own tradition and 
perspective, as well as a broader picture of the ethics discussion.  Interfaith dialogue is, by no 
means, a simple task, nor has it ever been.1 Religio-ethnocentric identities grounded in 
centuries of dogmatic belief can serve as seemingly insuperable barriers to fruitful exchange.  
But interfaith dialogue need not imply abandonment or invalidation of one’s religious identity, 
but rather a verification of its evolution as well as its significance to advance the exchange of 
ideas in the contemporary era.2  
Although both sides have been embroiled in periods of conflict over the centuries, 
both sides also have a responsibility that has been evolving for centuries to understand and 
learn from ‘the other side,’ not least because Christians and Muslims face several common 
challenges in the 21st century.  By taking up this responsibility, perhaps ‘the other side’ may 
come to seem less foreign, distant, different or hostile.  For example, since the broader ethics 
discussion concerns novel and always changing bioethical issues such as cloning, human 
genetic engineering, repro-genetics and stem cell research, among others, future research 
using a similar comparative religion paradigm to address such issues would be interesting and 
worthwhile.  Christian-Muslim dialogue today subsumes more than just theological and 
                                                          
1Anthony O’Mahony, ‘Christians and Muslim-Christian Relations: Theological Reflections,’ in Christians and Muslims in the 
Commonwealth: A Dynamic Role in the Future, edited by Anthony O’Mahony and Ataullah Siddiqui (London: Altajir World of Islam 
Trust, 2001), p. 126.   
2 Anthony O’Mahony, ‘Christians and Muslim-Christian Relations: Theological Reflections,’ p. 91 and 95.   
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historical issues and extends also to questions which are bio-technological, anthropological, 
ethical, political and economic, internationally and domestically.       
It is my sincerest hope that in a tumultuous time in history, this thesis can help 
Christian and Islamic ethics learn from one another, and that this learning will foster greater 
collaboration and mutual support for the common good and the improvement of the world 
not only on pressing issues in bioethics, but on ethical issues more generally.  As O’Mahony 
succinctly advocates, ‘There must be on all sides a desire, a wish for sympathy and intellectual 
fairness, an anxiety to understand precisely the other’s thought.  And perhaps, in doing this, 
we shall see more than once the dialogue breaking off in favour of a common task of  
philosophical exploration.3   For as the Qur’an states: ‘O you Men! Surely We have created you 
male and female, and made you (different) tribes and families that you may know each other 
(and not despise one another)...’(49:12).
                                                          
3 Anthony O’Mahony, ‘Christians and Muslim-Christian Relations: Theological Reflections,’ p. 125-126.  
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